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or not. But it must be observed that this opinion of the judge arises from his having previously decided on some material facts stated in the libel, and decreed that the French privateer was not armed nor equipped in any port of the United States, and was navigated and manned principally by French citizens. But, sir, had it been a simple question of jurisdiction, and had the judge decided that he had no jurisdiction whatsoever of the cause; yet, by the laws of the United States, an appeal from such sentence would have been authorized, because he is not the exclusive judge of his own jurisdiction; and, if the Supreme Court should be of opinion that he has jurisdiction, he must conform to their judgment, whatever his private sentiments may be. Besides, where an appeal is lawful, the refusal of the inferior judge to allow it will not prevent the superior court from proceeding on the appeal; and if it be not lawful, and allowed, the superior court, on application to them, will dismiss it.

Being, therefore, of opinion that the proceedings in these causes have been regular, I presume they must wait the usual course of judicial decision; and that any previous interference on the part of the Executive would be improper and unavailing. The papers transmitted to me are herewith returned. I have the honor, &c., &c.,

To the SECRETARY of State.

WM. BRADFORD.

eciding

re not be of

BREACH OF NEUTRALITY.

Acts of hostility committed by American citizens against such as are in amity with us, being in violation of a treaty, and against the public peace, are offences against the United States, so far as they were committed within the territory or jurisdiction thereof; and, as such, are punishable by indictment in the District or Circuit courts. Acts of the kind occurring in a foreign country, however, are not within the cognizance of our courts.

The high seas are within the jurisdiction of the district and circuit courts of the United States: wherefore, if such an offence be committed thereon by American citizens, such courts will take notice of it, and the offenders may be legally prosecuted in either of those courts, in any district where the offenders may be found.

The offence in question being committed out of the territories of the United

Breach of Neutrality.

States, cannot be noticed by our courts; the offenders must be dealt with abroad, and, after proclamation by the President, will have forfeited all protection from the American government.

JULY 6, 1795.

THE Attorney General having perused and considered the memorial of Zachary Macauly, the acting Governor of the Sierra Leone Company's colony of Sierra Leone, on the coast of Africa, and of John Tilly, the agent of Messrs. John and Alexander Anderson, proprietors of Bance island, addressed to Lord Grenville, and enclosed in the communication from his Britannic Majesty's minister plenipotentiary to the Secretary of State, has now the honor of reporting his opinion thereon.

It is stated by the memorialists that certain American citizens trading to the coast of Africa, on the 28th of September last, voluntarily joined, conducted, aided, and abetted a French fleet in attacking the settlement, and plundering or destroying the property of British subjects on that coast.

The Attorney General concurs in the opinions which have heretofore been given on this subject. He conceives that acts of hostility committed by American citizens against such as are in amity with us, being in violation of a treaty, and against the public peace, are offences against the United States, so far as they were committed within the territory or jurisdiction thereof; and, as such, are punishable by indictment in the district or circuit courts. It has been heretofore declared by the judges of the circuit court to be their joint and unanimous opinion, that, the United States being in a state of neutrality relative to the present war, such acts of hostility committed by a citizen. are an offence against this country, and punishable by the laws of this country.

So far, therefore, as the transactions complained of originated or took place in a foreign country, they are not within. the cognizance of our courts; nor can the actors be legally prosecuted or punished for them by the United States. But crimes committed on the high seas are within the jurisdiction of the district and circuit courts of the United States; and, so far as the offence was committed thereon, 1 am inclined to think that it may be legally prosecuted in either of those courts, in any district wherein the offenders may be found. But some

Breach of Neutrality.

doubt rests on this point, in consequence of the terms in which
the "Act in addition to the act for the punishment of certain
crimes against the United States" is expressed. But there can
be no doubt that the company or individuals who have been
injured by these acts of hostility have a remedy by a civil suit
in the courts of the United States; jurisdiction being expressly
given to these courts in all cases where an alien sues for a tort
only, in violation of the laws of nations, or a treaty of the Uni-
ted States; and as such a suit may be maintained by evidence
taken at a distance, on a commission issued for that purpose,
the difficulty of obtaining redress would not be so great as in a
criminal prosecution, where viva voce testimony alone can be
received as legal proof.

The Attorney General begs leave further to remark, that this
offence being committed out of the territories and waters of the
United States, the government does not seem bound to do more
than has already been done by the President, who, by his
proclamation of the 22d of April, 1793, warned all citizens of
the United States against all such proceedings; declaring that
all those who should render themselves liable to punishment
under the laws of nations, by committing, aiding, or abetting
hostilities against any of the said parties, would not receive the
protection of the United States against such punishment; and
that he had given instructions to those officers to whom it be-
longs to cause proceedings to be instituted against all persons
who should, within the cognizance of the courts of the United
States, violate the laws of nations with respect to the powers
at war, or any of them.

All which is submitted.

To the SECRETARY OF STATE.

WM. BRADFORD.

OPINIONS

OF

HON. CHARLES LEE, OF VIRGINIA:

APPOINTED DECEMBER 10, 1795.

NEUTRALITY.

It is the right of an enemy to purchase goods and instruments of war of a neutral nation, but it may be denied by a law passed; yet, if the reason of its passage were to impede the military operations of either belligerent power, and to favor the other, such conduct would be a breach of neutrality.

A citizen of a neutral State who, for hire, serves on a neutral ship, employed in contraband commerce with either of the belligerent powers, is not liable to any prosecution for so doing, by the municipal laws of his own State; nor is he punishable personally, though taken in the act, by that belligerent nation to whose detriment the prohibited trade would operate.

PHILADELPHIA, January 20, 1796. THAT an enemy may come into the territory of a neutral nation, and there purchase and thence remove any article whatsoever, even instruments of war, is a law of nations, long and universally established. Horses are, and for a long time have been, an article of commerce from the United States; and, though they are by certain treaties an article of contraband, as by the treaty with France, yet, according to the above principle, they may be purchased and exported by the enemies of France. To deny a right to either of the belligerent powers to carry on this trade, without denying it to both, would be a departure from that line of perfect neutrality which the United States have invariably observed. It is true, this right may be denied to all nations, by a law to be passed for that purpose at this time; but, if the reason for passing such a law be to impede the military operations of either belligerent power, and to favor the other, it is manifest that such conduct would be a breach of neutrality; consequently, while the French and the British are equally permitted to purchase horses, and export them from any of the States, as they heretofore have been and now are permitted, neither have any just cause of complaint. Indeed,