Federal question raised in the case at the trial was not necessarily
involved in the trial of the issue under the second count, and that, as
the judgment could be sustained under that count, this court was with-
out jurisdiction. Delaware & Philadelphia Navigation Co. v. Reybold,
636.

13. Even if a Federal question was raised in the state court, yet, if the
case was decided on grounds broad enough, in themselves, to sustain
the judgment without reference to the Federal question, this court will
not entertain jurisdiction. Ib.

14. In considering the amount necessary for the jurisdiction of this court
on a writ of error, not only is the amount of the judgment against the
plaintiff in error to be regarded, but, in addition, the amount of a
counter claim which he would have recovered, if his contention setting
up had been sustained. Clark v. Sidway, 682.

it

See PRACTICE, 1, 4 to 7;

WRIT OF ERROR.

B. OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

See EQUITY, 3;

NATIONAL BANK, 2.

LACHES.

1. When a person, whose equity of redemption in mortgaged real estate is
foreclosed, rests inactive for eleven years, with full knowledge of the
foreclosure, and of the purchaser's rights claimed under it, and of his
own rights, and with nothing to hinder the assertion of the latter, and
then files a bill in equity to have the foreclosure proceedings declared
void for want of proper service of process upon him, this court will, at
least, construe the language of the returns so as to sustain the legality
of the service, if that can reasonably be done, even if it should not
regard it as too late to set up such a claim. Martin v. Gray, 236.
2. It appearing that the United States is only a nominal party, whose aid
is sought to destroy the title of the Navigation Company and its
grantees, in order to enable settlers to protect their titles, initiated by
settlement and occupancy, the court holds the case of United States v.
Beebe, 127 U. S. 338, to be applicable, where it was held that when a
suit is brought in the name of the United States to enforce the
rights of individuals, and no interest of the government is involved,
the defence of laches and limitations will be sustained, as though the
government were out of the case. United States v. Des Moines Navi-
gation & Railway Co., 510.

See BANKRUPT, 1;

RIPARIAN OWNER, 3.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

As between landlord and tenant, or one in temporary possession of lands
under any agreement whatever for the use of the same, the law is
extremely indulgent to the latter with respect to the fixtures annexed
for a purpose connected with such temporary possession. Wiggins
Ferry Co. v. Ohio & Mississippi Railway Co., 396.

See RAILROAD, 2 (1), (5).

LEGISLATIVE ACTION.

The knowledge and good faith of a legislature are not open to question,
but the presumption is conclusive that it acted with full knowledge
and in good faith; and in this case the circumstances surrounding the
transaction not only preclude the idea of misconduct or ignorance on
the part of the legislature, but it is clear that the Navigation Com-
pany was a bona fide purchaser, within the meaning of the resolution
of 1861, and intended to be a beneficiary thereunder. United States v.
Des Moines Navigation & Railway Co., 510.

LEX LOCI.

See CONTRACT, 2.

LIMITATION, STATUTES OF.

See LACHES, 2;
TRUST, 3.

LOCAL LAW.

1. When land in Florida assessed for taxation is neither assessed to the
owner or occupant, nor to an unknown owner, and also by an official or
accurate description sufficient to impart notice to the owner, the title
of the purchaser at a sale made for non-payment of the tax so assessed
is not protected by the provision in the statutes of Florida limiting the
right of action of the former owner, to recover the possession of the
lands sold, to one year after the recording of the tax deed; but the sale
and the deed are nullities within the decisions of the Supreme Court
of Florida. Bird v. Benlisa, 664.

2. When a railroad company initiates proceedings in Illinois to acquire land
for its road, and a defendant appears and claims ownership of the tract,
and no denial is made to this claim, and only evidence as to the amount
of compensation is presented for the consideration of the jury, and the
jury awards a sum as such amount, the judgment should either direct
the payment of this sum to such owner, or the deposit of the same with
the county treasurer for his benefit. Convers v. Atchison, Topeka &
Sante Fe Railroad Co., 671.

Colorado.

Dakota.
Iowa.

Illinois.

Maine.
Missouri.

New York.

South Carolina.

Texas.
Wisconsin.

See JURISDICTION, A, 5;

MUNICIPAL BOND, 1.

See TAX AND TAXATION, 1.

See ASSIGNMENT FOR THE BENEFIT OF CRED-
ITORS, 3, 4;

MUNICIPAL BOND, 3.

See EQUITY, 1.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 7.

See BILL OF EXCHANGE;

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, B, 1;
MECHANICS' LIEN, 2.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 6.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 10.

See ASSIGNMEnt for BENEFIT OF CREDITORS, 1.
See RIPARIAN OWNER, 3.

MAILS, TRANSPORTATION OF.

The postal appropriation act of July 12, 1876, c. 179, fixed a rate of pay
to railroads for carrying the mails, and provided that roads constructed
in whole or in part by a land grant, conditioned that mails should be
transported at a rate to be fixed by Congress, should receive only 80
per cent of that rate. As applied to a line of road a part of which only
was constructed with such aid, the department held, and acted in accord-
ance therewith for many years, that it was entitled to the percentage
pay for the portion of the line so constructed, and to full pay for the
remainder. Subsequently, the Department reversed this construction,
and claimed that the mails should be carried over the whole line at the
reduced rate, and it accordingly withheld from sums due for current
transportation not only the 20 per cent thereon, but a sufficient amount

settle claims for past transportation on that basis. The railroad
company sued to recover the pay withheld. The Court of Claims gave
judgment in its favor, and this court affirms that judgment. United
States v. Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co., 615.

MANDAMUS.

1. Mandamus will not lie to compel a railroad corporation to build a station
at a particular place, unless there is a specific duty, imposed by statute,
to do so, and clear proof of a breach of that duty. Northern Pacific
Railroad Co. v. Dustin, 492.

2. A petition for a mandamus to compel a railroad corporation to perform
a definite duty to the public, which it has distinctly manifested an in-
tention not to perform, is rightly presented in the name of the State,
at the relation of its prosecuting attorney, and without previous de-
mand. Ib.

3. The Northern Pacific Railroad Company (whose charter authorized it
to locate, construct and maintain a continuous railroad from Lake

Superior to Puget Sound, "by the most eligible route, as shall be deter-
mined by said company," within limits broadly described, and directed
that its road should "be constructed in a substantial and workmanlike
manner, with all the necessary draws, culverts, bridges, viaducts, cross-
ings, turnouts, stations and watering places, and all other appurte
nances,") constructed its railroad through the county of Yakima, and
stopped its trains for a while at Yakima City, then the county seat
and the principal town in the county; but, on completing its road four
miles further to North Yakima, a town which it had laid out on its
own land, established a freight and passenger station there, and ceased
to stop its trains at Yakima City. Thereupon a writ of mandamus
was applied for to compel it to build and maintain a station at Yakima
City, and to stop its trains there. Afterwards, and before the hearing,
Yakima City rapidly dwindled, and most of its inhabitants removed to
North Yakima, which became the principal town in the county, and
was made by the legislature the county seat; there were other stations
which furnished sufficient facilities for the country south of North
Yakima; the earnings of this division of the road were insufficient to
pay its running expenses; and the passenger and freight traffic of the
people living in the surrounding country, considering them as a com-
munity, would be better accommodated at North Yakima than at
Yakima City. Held, that a writ of mandamus should not issue. Ib.

MECHANICS' LIEN.

1. A mechanics' lien is a creature of statute, not created by contract, but
by statute, for the use of the materials, work and labor furnished
under the contract, and the contract is presumably entered into in
view of the statute. Van Stone v. Stillwell & Bierce Manufacturing Co.,
128.

2. It is settled law in Missouri that a contractor does not waive his right
to file a mechanics' lien by receiving from the owner of the building a
promissory note for the amount due, payable at a time beyond the
expiration of the period within which he is required to file his lien;
but, within the period within which suit must be commenced to en-
force the lien, the taking of the note merely suspends the right of
action. Ib.

MISTAKE.

See EQUITY, 4.

MORTGAGE.

See BANKRUPt, 3.

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.

See PRACTICE, 5.

MUNICIPAL BOND.

1. A statement, in the bond of a municipal corporation, that it is issued
under the provisions of the act of the general assembly of Colorado of
February 21, 1881, and in conformity with its provisions; that all the
requirements of law have been fully complied with; that the total
amount of the issue does not exceed the limits prescribed by the con-
stitution of that State; and that the issue of the bonds had been
authorized by a vote of a majority of the duly qualified electors of the
county, voting on the question at a general election duty held, estops
the county, in an action by an innocent holder for value to recover on
coupons of such bonds, from denying the truth of these recitals.
Chaffee County v. Potter, 355.

2. When there is an express recital upon the face of a municipal bond that
the limit of issue prescribed by the state constitution has not been
passed, and the bonds themselves do not show that it had, the holder
is not bound to look further. Ib.

3. By virtue of Art. II, sec. 3 of the constitution of Iowa of 1857, which
ordains that "no county, or other political or municipal corporation,
shall be allowed to become indebted in any manner, or for any pur-
pose, to an amount in the aggregate exceeding five per centum on the
value of the taxable property within such county or corporation - to
be ascertained by the last state and county tax lists, previous to the
incurring of such indebtedness," negotiable bonds, in excess of the
constitutional limit, issued by a school district, and sold by its treas-
urer for the purpose of applying the proceeds of the sale to the pay-
ment of the outstanding bonded indebtedness of the district, pursuant
to the statute of Iowa of 1880, c. 132, are void as against one who
purchased them from the district with knowledge that the constitu-
tional limit is thereby exceeded. Doon Township v. Cummins, 366.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 3.

NATIONAL BANK.

1. Fifty shares of the stock of a national bank were transferred to F. on
the books of the bank October 29. A certificate therefor was made
out but not delivered to him. He knew nothing of the transfer and
did not authorize it to be made. On October 30 he was appointed a
director and vice-president. On November 21 he was authorized to
act as cashier. He acted as vice-president and cashier from that day.
On December 12 he bought and paid for 20 other shares. On January
2 following, while the bank was insolvent, a dividend on its stock was
fraudulently made, and $1750 therefor placed to the credit of F. on its
books. He, learning on that day of the transfer of the 50 shares, or-
dered D., the president of the bank, who had directed the transfer of
the 50 shares, to retransfer it, and gave to D. his check to the order of