Opinion of the Court. before the jury by Clark, and not sustained by their verdict, was that he had no connection with the purchase of the land; that the moneys which he advanced to Sidway were merely loans to the latter; and that the deed from Sidway and wife was only security for such loans. The transaction between Sidway and Clark, of their joint purchase of the land, did not constitute a copartnership in respect thereto. It was a single, special adventure on joint account, involving the payment in equal proportions of designated sums of money. It was a mere community of interest in the property, and the agreement to share the profits and losses on the sale of the land did not create a partnership. The parties were only tenants in common, and the action at law would lie. Jordan v. Soule, 79 Maine, 590; Gwinneth v. Thompson, 9 Pick. 31; Haven v. Mehlgarten, 19 Illinois, 91; Fowler v. Fowler, 50 Connecticut, 256; Dickinson v. Williams, 11 Cush. 258; Fisher v. Kinaston, 18 Vermont, 489; Fanning v. Chadwick, 3 Pick. 420; Coles v. Coles, 15 Johns. 159; Galbreath v. Moore, 2 Watts, 89; Harding v. Foxcroft, 6 Maine, 76. The defendant has no right to complain of the action of the court in allowing the plaintiff to remit all of the verdict in excess of $4000. Probably the court thought that the verdict embraced items which were not properly allowable under the declaration. There does not appear to be any ground for holding that the remittitur was made with a view to avoid the jurisdiction of this court. We see no error in the action of the court in regard to the filling up of the amount in the verdict of the jury, even if the exception thereto can be considered as having been taken in time. We have considered all the questions properly raised by the defendant, and all the alleged errors of which he has any right to complain, and see nothing in the record which would warrant the awarding by us of a new trial. Judgment Affirmed. Opinion of the Court. HOME BENEFIT ASSOCIATION v. SARGENT. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK. No. 155. Argued January 12, 1892. - Decided January 26, 1892. A policy of life insurance provided as a condition, that death of the assured "by his own hand or act, whether voluntary or involuntary, sane or insane, at the time" was a risk not assumed by the insurer. A suit to recover the amount of the policy was tried on the theory on both sides, that death from a shot from a pistol fired by accident by the assured, was covered by the policy: Held, (1) Evidence drawn out on the cross-examination of a witness, which has a bearing on the testimony given by him on his direct examination, is competent, especially where it relates to a part of the same conversation; (2) An inquiry as to what conversation was had with the plaintiff's agent is not competent, if it does not appear what the subject of the conversation was, or what was intended to be proved by it; (3) In view of the contents of the proofs of death and of the evidence, the plaintiff was not estopped from claiming that the death of the assured was caused otherwise than by suicide, and it would not have been proper for the court to charge the jury that by the introduction of the proofs of death, the burden was put on the plaintiff to satisfy the jury, by a preponderance of evidence, that the assured died otherwise than by his own hand; (4) The defendant having alleged in its answer, that the death of the assured was due to a cause excepted from the operation of the policy, it was not error for the court to charge the jury that the defendant was bound to establish such defence by evidence outweighing that of the plaintiff. THE case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Francis Lawton (with whom was Mr. Austen G. Fox on the brief) for plaintiff in error. Mr. Miron Winslow for defendant in error. MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD delivered the opinion of the court. This is an action at law, brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, by Hen Opinion of the Court. rietta P. Sargent, a citizen of Massachusetts, against the Home Benefit Association, a life insurance association incorporated by the State of New York, to recover the sum of $5000, with interest from March 15, 1887, upon a policy of life insurance issued by the defendant, September 5, 1885, on the life of Edward F. Hall, Jr., for the benefit of the plaintiff, who was his sister. Hall was made by the policy an accepted member of the life department of the defendant. By one of the conditions in the policy it was provided, that "death of the member by his own hand or act, whether voluntary or involuntary, sane or insane at the time," was a risk not assumed by the defendant under the policy. The complaint alleged that the policy was in force on the 19th of October, 1886, when Hall died at the city of New York, and that his death was not caused by any of the causes excepted from the operation of the policy. It was set up in the answer, as a defence, that the death of Hall was brought about by his own hand and act, in that he died from the immediate effect of a shot from a pistol fired by his own hand, such shot having been fired by him with the intention of taking his own life. The case was tried before Judge Coxe and a jury, which rendered a verdict for the plaintiff for $5350. A motion for a new trial was made before Judge Coxe, and was denied, the opinion of the court thereon being reported in 35 Fed. Rep. 711; and a judgment was thereafter rendered in favor of the plaintiff for $5350, with interest and costs, the whole amounting to $5517.99. To review that judgment, the defendant has brought a writ of error. By the bill of exceptions it appears that, after the plaintiff rested her case, the defendant moved the court to direct a verdict for it, on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to show that she ever had presented to it, in accordance with the provisions of the policy, satisfactory evidence of Hall's death; but the court denied the motion.. The defendant excepted, and then proceeded to put in evidence on its part. After it had rested, the plaintiff put in rebutting evidence on her part, and Opinion of the Court. then the defendant put in further evidence. It is not stated in the bill of exceptions that it contains all the evidence; but it is set forth at the close of what does appear, that the defendant moved the court to direct a verdict for the defendant, on the ground that the evidence showed that Hall died by his own hand. The court refused to do so, and the defendant excepted. Parts of the charge of the court to the jury are set forth; and it is stated that the court charged the jury as to all other features of the case fully and in such manner that no exception was taken thereto, and that the portions of the court's charge to the jury which are not set forth did not in anywise bear on, or relate to, any matters contained in the defendant's requests to charge, hereinafter referred to. Among the instructions of the court to the jury were the following: "The only question upon this proof is, did Edward F. Hall commit suicide? If he did, the policy is void. If he died in some other way-by accident or assassinationit would be otherwise. Upon that issue, the burden is upon the defendant to satisfy you by a fair preponderance of proof of the truth of this defence. When the policy of insurance was introduced with evidence or admissions that the premiums had been paid, and proof was given of the death of the assured, the plaintiff, if no further evidence had been produced, would have been entitled to a verdict; but the defendant comes into the court and asserts that the contract under which the action is brought has not been fulfilled, but has been violated by the assured. Being an affirmative defence, the onus is upon the defendant to satisfy you by evidence which, in your judgment, outweighs the evidence of the plaintiff, that that defence has been established." The court, after stating that the defendant had introduced in evidence proofs of death furnished to it by the plaintiff, that the defendant insisted that the plaintiff, having produced those proofs, was estopped from saying that the cause of death there assigned was not truly assigned, and that such proofs asserted generally that Hall met his death by suicide while laboring under temporary aberration of mind, also instructed Opinion of the Court. the jury, that such proofs were proper evidence for them to consider, but were by no means conclusive evidence, and were to be taken by them in connection with the other testimony in the case, and given such weight in determining the main question as the jury might see fit to give them. The court further instructed the jury, that the plaintiff's position was, first, that the burden being upon the defendant to satisfy them that Hall met death by his own hand, intending to kill himself, the plaintiff had a right to rely upon the alleged failure of the defendant to prove that fact; second, that it was asserted by the plaintiff that Hall's death might have been occasioned simply and solely by accident; and, third, that it might have been the result of assassination; and that, if the jury found that there was a failure on the part of the defendant to prove that Hall committed suicide, (whether he was in his right mind, or laboring under temporary insanity, being wholly immaterial,) or if they found upon the proofs that his death was caused by accident and nothing else, there must be a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant excepted (1) to the instruction that, on the question whether Hall committed suicide or not, the burden of proof was on the defendant to satisfy the jury by evidence which in their judgment outweighed that of the plaintiff, that his death was by suicide; (2) to the charge that the proofs of death were proper evidence in the case, but by no means conclusive; (3) to the submission to the jury of the question whether Hall died as the result of assassination, and to the charge that the evidence must be such as satisfied the jury of the truth of the fact in dispute. Before the case was summed up to the jury by counsel, which was done before the giving of the charge, the defendant presented to the court fifteen several written requests to charge the jury. These requests are inserted in the bill of exceptions after the statement of the charge and the exceptions thereto, and it is stated, in regard to each of the requests, that the court refused so to charge "except as already charged," and that the defendant excepted to each refusal to charge. Although there are twenty-five alleged errors set forth in |