[8] The practical construction of the requirement | of the Act of 1838, that the cadet should engage to serve for eight years, shown by the fact that the form of the engagement in this case was to serve in the Army of the United States for eight years, is a circumstance of weight to show that the Government, from the beginning, treated the plaintiff as serving in the Army. The service for which he engaged began on the first of July, 1865, and the eight years ran from that time. That being his status, the Acts of 1881 and 1882, in speaking of "actual time of service in the Army," cover the time of his service as a cadet. In U. S. v. Tyler, 105 U. S., 244 [XXVI., 985], it was held that an officer retired from active service, who was declared by statute to be a part of the Army, who could wear its uniform, whose name was required to be borne on its register, who might be detailed by his superior officers to perform specified duties, and who was subject to the rules and articles of war, was in the military service; and that the increase of pay given for each term of five years of service by section 1262 of the Revised Statutes, and by section 24 of the Act of July 15, 1870, 16 Stat. at L., 320, from which that section was taken, applied to the year so passed in the service after, as well as before, retirement. Under the statutes involved in the present case, a cadet at West Point is serving in the Army as fully as an officer retired from active service is serving in the Army, under the statutes which apply to him, so far as the question of longevity pay is concerned. The judgment of the Court of Claims is affirmed. True copy. Test: James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. ALLINE P. WOODWORTH, Appt., V. JOHN I. BLAIR ET AL. (See 8. C., Reporter's ed., 8-12.) The law looks with disfavor on a multiplicity of suits, and refrains, wherever possible, from selling any property, clogged with unknown conditions or liens. In all cases where the court holds possession, by a receiver, of property subject to various and conflicting liens, the holders of which are all parties, not only sound doctrine but universal practice requires that the court should, in the single action, settle all questions of priority and amount, sell the property free of incumbrance, and appropriate the proceeds of sale according to the several priorities of those entitled. U. S. v. R. R. Co., 12 Wall., 362 (79 U. S., XX., 434); Codwise v. Gelston, 10 Johns., 521; Wiswall v. Sampson, 14 How., 52. The Federal Circuit Courts have, without exception, admitted interveners claiming under prior legal or equitable liens, and heard and adjudged their demands upon the merits and then enforced them according to their priority. Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U. S., 251 (XXV., 342); Trust Co. v. Soutter, 107 U. S.,591 (XXVII.,488); Railway v. Rolling Mill,109 Ú. S.,714 (XXVII., 1086); Bank v. Calhoun, 102 U. S.,256, and Myer v. Car Co., 102 U. S., 1 (XXVI., 101, 59); Brooks v. R. Co., 101 U. S., 443 (XXV., 1057); Burnham v. Bowen (ante, 596); Trust Co. v. Waterman, and Savannah v. Jesup, 106 U. S., 265, 563 (XXVII., 115, 276). No case can be cited where a court of equity ever authorized a junior mortgagee to restrict a foreclosure proceeding to the enforcement of his own lien, when a receiver had taken possession of the whole property and a senior mortgagee with a debt matured, was a party to the suit. Although purchased of the appellant as sepa rate property, when this land was made an integral portion of the right of way and depot grounds of a constructed and actively operated line of railway, it lost its character as mere lots and became a necessary portion of the entire line incapable of being dislocated and sold; consequently, the purchase money lien must be treated as enforcible only against the whole railway which, being a public highway, can only be dealt with by the courts as a unit. Muller v. Dows, 94 U. S., 449 (XXIV., 209); Payment of prior mortgage out of fund on fore- Neilson v. Iowa East R., 44 Iowa, 71; Brooks v. closure. *In a suit in equity to foreclose a mortgage from a railroad corporation of its whole railroad, franchise, lands and property, which have since been put in the possession of a receiver, an intervening prior mortgagee of part of the lands is not entitled to have the amount of his mortgage paid out of the funds in the hands of the receiver, or out of the proceeds of a sale made pursuant to the decree of foreclosure, subject to his mortgage. [No. 9.] Submitted Oct. 17, 1884. Decided Oct. 27, 1884. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois. The history and facts of the case appear in the opinion of the court. Mr. Henry Crawford, for appellant: The right of a junior incumbrancer to proceed and sell less than the whole title, is re stricted within narrow limits. It must be apparent from the bill that the junior mortgagee is not attempting to sell anything but the mere equity, and that other creditors are content. *Head note by Mr. Justice GRAY. R. Co. (supra); Meyer v. Hornby, 101 U. S., 728 (XXV., 1078); R. R. Co. v. Lewton, 20 Ohio St., 411; Walker v. Ware, etc., R. Co., 12 Jur. (N. S.), 18. The general mortgage "Can only attach itself to such property in the condition in which it comes into the mortgagor's hands. If that property is already subject to mortgages or other liens, the general mortgage does not displace them. It only attaches to such interest as the mortgagor acquires." U.S.V. R. R. Co.(supra); Ketchum v.St. Louis, 101 U. S., 306 (XXV., 999). the original transaction, by taking the full bene- 511; Pfeifer v. R. R. Co., 18 Wis., 155; F. L. & [9] The court holds by its receiver for the benefit of whomsoever in the end it shall be found to concern. Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U. S., 251 (XXV., 342). Messrs. E. Walker, E. C. Larned, W. C. Larned and J. W. Cary, for appellees. Mr. Justice Gray delivered the opinion of the court: This is an appeal, by a prior mortgagee of a tract of land occupied by the Chicago and Pacific Railroad Company, from decrees in a suit in equity to foreclose two mortgages of its whole railroad. The material facts appearing by the record are as follows: sale. The corporation afterwards paid into court the amount of the bid, interest and commissions, as required by the decree and by the Statute of Illinois; and the court found that the corporation had done what was needful to effect a redemption, and reserved for further consideration the time and terms on which a delivery of the property to the corporation should be directed. Assuming, as the appellant contends, that her conveyance to Dobbins, and the mortgage back by him, should be considered in equity as if made to and by the railroad corporation, no ground is shown for reversing the decree below. The appellant's mortgage covered only the On October 1, 1872, and on November 6, 1874, tract of land specifically described therein, and the corporation made to a trustee, to secure the did not affect the title of the corporation in payment of its bonds, two mortgages of all its other lands and in so much of its road as was railroad, right of way, franchise, road-bed, not laid over the land mortgaged to her. The stations and station-houses, depot grounds and case differs in this respect from the cases cited other property, already or thereafter owned, by her counsel, in which a mechanics' lien given possessed or acquired through or by reason of by statute for work done on part of a railroad the construction of its railroad. After breach was held to extend to the whole road. Brooks of the conditions of those mortgages, the bond-v. R. Co., 101 U. S., 443 [XXV., 1057]; Meyer holders filed bills in equity for the appointment v. Hornby, 101 U. S., 728 [XXV., 1078]. of a receiver and for the foreclosure of the mort- As a general rule, a prior mortgagee is not a gages, which were by order of court consolidated as one suit. necessary party to a bill to foreclose a junior mortgage, where the decree sought is only for a foreclosure of the equity of redemption from the prior mortgage, and not of the entire property or estate. Jerome v. McCarter, 94 U. S., 734 [XXIV., 136]. In a suit to foreclose a mortgage of the whole railroad, franchise and property of a railroad corporation, it would often produce great delay and embarrassment to undertake to determine the validity and extent of all prior liens and incumbrances on specific parts of the corporate property before entering a final decree. Pending that suit, and after a receiver had been appointed and had taken possession, the appellant filed an intervening petition, alleging that on February 1, 1872, at the request of the corporation and for its benefit, she sold and conveyed to Thomas S. Dobbins, its president, a tract of land in Chicago, in consideration of a certain sum in money and of ten promissory notes made by Dobbins, payable in ten successive years and secured by a mortgage from him of the land, which was duly recorded on September 5, 1872; that the corporation entered up- The course pursued by the circuit court in on the land and laid tracks upon it and con- the present case, dismissing the intervening petinued to use and occupy it until the appoint- tition of the appellant, without prejudice, and ment of the receiver, and the receiver since con- ordering a foreclosure by sale, subject to her tinued to use it for the benefit of the railroad mortgage, of the entire railroad and other propand neglected to pay the notes and interest; erty included in the railroad mortgages, to foreand praying that the amount thereof might be close which the principal suit had been brought, paid out of any funds in the hands of the re-judiciously and effectively secured the rights of [12] ceiver, or out of the proceeds of sale under any decree to be rendered in the cause. This petition was referred to a master, who reported that the amount due to the appellant was $59,910.10. The court declined to order the payment of the appellant's claim and dismissed her petition, without prejudice; and in the principal suit entered a decree for the foreclosure by sale of the whole railroad, including the road-bed, stations and station-houses, depot grounds and other property, without prejudice to her mort-cured by the railroad mortgages. gage. From that decree the appellant prayed an appeal to this court, and offered a bond in order to make the appeal a supersedeas. The court allowed the appeal and approved the bond and ordered that the appeal should not operate as a supersedeas or delay of the sale, but only delay the distribution of so much of the proceeds of the sale as was necessary to fully secure the amount due on her mortgage. The master afterwards reported that a sale had been made, in accordance with the decree of foreclosure, for the sum of $916,100; and the court overruled exceptions taken by the appellant to the master's report and confirmed the all parties. The price obtained by the sale of the railroad and other property, subject to her mortgage, must have been less than if they had been sold free of that mortgage; and to order the amount of that mortgage to be paid out of the proceeds of the sale would pro tanto benefit the purchaser if the sale was carried out, or the railroad corporation in case of redemption, to the corresponding detriment of the holders of bonds se The railroad corporation, after having redeemed its property from the railroad mortgages, will hold it subject to any valid lien of the appellant, just as it did before the proceedings for foreclosure were instituted. Decree affirmed. True copy. Test: James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. 6. NATHANIEL WILSON, Admr., etc., of | fraud, recover it in an action for money had and received. HORATIO AMES, Deceased, Piff. in Err., v. JOSEPHINE C. ARRICK, Admrx. of CLIF FORD ARRICK, Deceased. (See S. C., Reporter's ed., 83-88.) 4 Wait, Actions and Def., 495, 496; Catts v. Phalen, 2 How., 376. The deposition of Oliver Ames as to transactions between him and Arrick, should have been admitted, as he was not a party. He was interested in the result no doubt; but section 858 R. S. does not cover such a case. To make Administrator de bonis non, title of-right to re- the words "either party" include all who may cover proceeds of assets. The history and facts of the case appear in the opinion of the court. See, also, U. S. v. Walker, 109 U. S., 258, XXVII., 927. Messrs. A. S. Worthington and Nath'l Wilson, for plaintiff in error: In the case of U. S. v. Walker, 109 U. S., 260 (XXVII., 928), it was contended on behalf of the plaintiff in error, that an administrator de bonis non was entitled to recover from his predecessor a fund collected from the debtor of the intestate. But this court held that the common law doctrine, limiting the rights of the administrator de bonis non, to property remaining in specie, applies to proceedings under section 975, R. S. This action should be maintained on common law principles, without controverting the opinion in that case, which proceeds upon the ground that "When a debt due the deceased is collected, or a chattel of his estate is sold, the money received becomes the property of the administrator." It is contended now that this is not the law, when it is sought to recover the money so collected, from a third person to whom, as agent, it was paid. If the action be brought by the first administrator, while his authority as administrator continues, he may treat the fund in the hands of such third person as a debt due him individually or as one due the estate, and may sue in his own name or as administrator. See, cases collected in 2 Wms. Exrs., 7th ed., 952 note g; Clark v. Hougham, 2 B. & C., 149; Ord v. Fenwick, 3 East, 104; Webster v. Spencer, 3 B. & Ald., 360; Sasscer v. Walker, 5 G. & J., 102; Chapman v. Davis, 4 Gill, 166. If the first administrator die or be removed before the agent has paid the fund over, the administrator de bonis non may also treat the fund as property belonging to the estate and sue for and recover it accordingly. Md. Acts of 1785, ch. 80, sec. 1; and 1798, ch. 101,sub-ch. 14, sec. 4; 2 Kilty, Laws; Gist v. Cockey, 7 H. & J., 134; Crane v. Alling, 14 N. J. L. (2 Green), 593; Catherwood v. Chabaud,1 B. & C.,150; Blydenburgh v. Lowry, 4 Cranch (C. C.), 368; Cole v. Hebb, 7 G. & J., 20. If Mrs. Ames paid this fund to Arrick, believing his representations as to his agreement with her husband, she could, upon discovering the 112 U. S. U. S., Book 28. have an interest in the litigation, would be carrying construction to the point of legislation. and Mills Dean, for defendant in error: Messrs. Henry E. Davis, W. D. Davidge The title of an administrator de bonis non extends only to the goods and personal estate which remain in specie and were not administered by the first executor or administrator. U. S. v. Walker, 109 U.S.,260 (XXVII.,928); citing, Bac. Abr.,etc.; Alsop v. Mather,8 Conn., 584; Am. Board's Appeal, 27 Conn., 344. This principle belongs to the English law, Beall v. New Mexico, 16 Wall., 535 (83 U. S., XXI., 292), and to the law of Maryland, before the organization of the District of Columbia, Ennis v. Smith, 14 How., 416. An administrator d. b. n. can sue for assets not converted into money only. Sibley v. Williams, 3 Gill & J., 52; Neale v. Hagthorp, 3 Bland. (Ch.), 551; 7 Gill & J., 13; Hagthorp v. Hock, i Gill & J., 270; Ennis v. Smith (supra). This case is of an administrator d. b. n. seeking to recover of one who received the money sued for from a preceding administratrix, who set out the whole proceeding in the account of her administration. A more complete case of the "administration of assets cannot well be stated. Beall v. New Mexico (supra). An executor is not responsible for assets of which he is without authority to take possession. Hinckley, Test Law, sec. 858; Dorsey v. Smithson, 6 Harr. & J.,63; Smithers v. Hooper, 23 Md., 285; Kearney v. Sascer, 37 Md., 264. An administrator d. b. n. is not chargeable for or on account of moneys collected by, or waste or default on the part of, his predecessor. Re Place, 1 Redf. Sur., 276; Brownlee v. Lockwood,20 N. J. Eq.,256; Smithers v. Hooper, 23 Md., 273; Alsop v. Mather,8 Conn.,584; Am. Board's Appeal, 27 Conn., 344; Beall v. New Mexico (supra). In any event, an order of the court is necessary before suit brought. R. S. D. C., sec. 976; West v. Chappell, 5 Gill, 228; Neale v. Hagthorp, 3 Bl. Ch., 551; Johnson v. Farmers' Bk., 11 Md., 412. Mr. Justice Woods delivered the opinion of the court: Horatio Ames, whose administrator de bonis non brings this suit, died in January, 1871. On some day, not shown by the record but prior to April, 1873, his widow, Charlotte L. Ames, was appointed administratrix, with the will annexed, of his estate. There was claimed to be due the estate, from the United States, a large sum of money for cannon furnished, which was satisfied by payments made in April, 1871, and in January, 1873. In May, 1873, Mrs. Ames filed her account, in which she charged herself with the sum of $39,955 as received by her from the [84] its of the deceased which have not been administered; and that, both at common law and under the Act of Congress in force in the District of Columbia, an administrator de bonis non has title only to the goods and personal property which remain in specie and have not been administered. Upon this ground the judgment of the court was based. United States on account of the claim of the estate, and took credit for three payments, amounting to $33,574.36, made to Clifford Arrick, the intestate of the defendant, for which vouchers were filed, signed by him. Exceptions were filed to the account by Oliver Ames, a brother of Horatio Ames. Before the exceptions were heard, the court, on January 9, 1875, removed Mrs. Ames for having failed to comply with an The plaintiff in error conceding that since the order of the court requiring her to give an ad- decision in U. S. v. Walker, ubi supra, he could ditional bond, and appointed the present plaint- not maintain his action against the adminisiff, Nathaniel Wilson, administrator de bonis non tratrix or the sureties upon her bond to recover in her place. On January 22, 1876, the excep- money, the proceeds of administered assets, still tions were heard, and the credit of $33,574.36, insists that the action will lie against an agent which the administratrix claimed on account of the administratrix, to whom the money has of payments made to Arrick, was reduced by been paid. This contention cannot be sustained. the court to the sum of $2,955.56, and the com- If the money sued for in this case is the proceeds mission she claimed was also reduced. The of a debt due the estate of Horatio Ames, which account, as filed, showed a balance in her hands has been administered by Mrs. Ames, the ad- [87] of $2,260.64; as corrected by the court this bal-ministratrix, the case of U. S. v. Walker must ance was increased to $34,876.75. be decisive of this. For if the present plaintiff has no title to the money, his action will no more lie against the agent of the administratrix than against the administratrix herself. Disregarding this settlement of the account, this suit was brought by Wilson, the administrator de bonis non, against Arrick, to recover the sum of $39,955, the whole amount with which the administratrix had charged herself in her account; the allegation of the declaration being that he had collected that sum for the estate of Horatio Ames, and refused to pay it over. Arrick having died pending this suit, it was re-estate against the United States had been settled vived against the administrator of his estate. We are of opinion that the facts stated in the bill of exceptions, as already recited, show that the claims of the estate of Ames against the United States had been administered by Mrs. Ames, the administratrix. The demand of the for. U. S. v. Walker, ubi supra; Beall v. New Mexico, 16 Wall., 535 [83 U. S., XXI., 292]; Ennis v. Smith, 14 How.. 416. If the cases cited by counsel for appellant (Catherwood v. Chabaud, 1 Barn. & C., 150, and Blydenburg v. Lowry, 4 Cranch (C. C.), 368) sustain his contention, they are inconsistent with the law as heretofore laid down by this court and cannot avail him. and paid and the liability of the United States It appears from the bill of exceptions that discharged. This was an administration of these warrants were issued by the Secretary of the assets of the estate. The mere acceptance even Navy to the administratrix for the amounts due of the warrants was such an alteration of the from the United States to the estate she repre- property as vested the title in the administratrix, sented; that on their delivery to her she was and was tantamount to their administration. required to indorse upon them her receipt for Bacon, Abr., Title Executors and Administhe money, which she did; and, having the war-trators, B. 2,2. The warrants and the money rants in her possession, she indorsed and deliv- received on them became the property of the ered them to Arrick, who drew the money. administratrix, and she was responsible therefor The court, at the request of the defendant, to the creditors, legatees and distributees of the charged the jury that "The legal effect of the re-estate, and they only were entitled to sue thereceipts, given in evidence and signed by Charlotte L. Ames, as administratrix, was to invest her with the control of the moneys mentioned in said receipts; and, if the administratrix parted with said control by the indorsement of said receipts, then the plaintiff is not entitled to recover. And the court, of its own motion, added: "If you find, from the testimony in this case, that Mrs. Ames, administratrix of the estate of Horatio Ames, deceased, received this The fact that the administratrix has impropfund from the government for the purpose of erly paid out money of the estate, the proadministration, and that after receiving it she ceeds of assets administered by her, or that they wasted it, upon Arrick or anybody else, the have been paid to her agent, does not invest the plaintiff in this case would not be entitled to re-administrator de bonis non with title and aucover; it would be the case of administration of assets, and it does not survive to the adminis[85] trator de bonis non to prosecute.' This charge of the court is assigned for error. We think the charge was right. In the case of U. S. v. Walker, 109 U. S., 258 [XXVII., 927], which, as appears by an inspection of the record, was a suit brought by the United States It further appears by the bill of exceptions for the use of Nathaniel Wilson, as adminis- that "The plaintiff offered to prove, by the trator de bonis non of the estate of Horatio Ames, deposition of Oliver Ames, taken in this case, upon the bond of Charlotte L. Ames, as admin- transactions on the part of the intestate of the istratrix of the same estate, to recover the iden- defendant with and statements by him to the tical money sued for in this case, it was held said Oliver Ames, tending to show that the said [88] that an administrator de bonis non derives his charges," on which the money sued for was title from the deceased and not from the former paid to him by the administratrix, were unconadministrator, and to him is committed only scionable. This evidence was excluded by the the administration of goods, chattels and cred-court, and its exclusion is now assigned for er thorize him to sue therefor. If, as held in the case of U. S. v. Walker, ubi supra, the administratrix was not herself liable for the proceeds of those assets to the administrator de bonis non, it follows that the person who has received them as her agent cannot be liable. We think there was no error in the charge. гог. But it is clear that, if the plaintiff had no title to the money received by Arrick, the evidence offered was immaterial and was properly excluded. True copy. Test: quired to construct a draw-bridge across any bayou leading into Pearl River, or across any small pass or mouth of said river. It is also provided that such part of this section as relates We find no error in the record. The judg- to Pearl River, if the line of the road shall be ment of the Supreme Court of the District of Co-located across the said river at a point where it lumbia is, therefore, affirmed. constitutes the boundary line between the State of Mississippi and the State of Louisiana, shall James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. not take effect until the State of Louisiana has consented to and authorized the same, or said [14] Company has built such a bridge across said accordance with this section, and also with any Pearl River, for its said railroad, as shall be in authority or power granted to said Company by the said State of Louisiana in the premises, and such draw-bridge may be built in the center of NEW ORLEANS, MOBILE AND TEXAS RAILROAD COMPANY, Piff. in Err., v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, ex rel. THE DIS- the channel of said Pearl River or in that portion TRICT ATTORNEY. (See S. C., Reporter's ed., 12-24.) of the same within the territory of the State of Louisiana or of this State, as most convenient for public use." Laws of Miss., 1867, p. 332, Draw-bridge over Pearl River-obligation of rail- 335, 336. road company to build. 1. The N. O., etc., R. R. Co. is obliged to construct and maintain a draw-bridge in the channel of Pearl River, where that stream is crossed by the Company's road, on the line between Mississippi and Louisiana, which, when open will give a clear space of not less than sixty feet in width for the passage of vessels, under the Mississippi Act of 1887, and the 2. There is nothing in the legislation by Congress which, expressly or by implication, diminishes in any degree the legal obligation of the Railroad Company to maintain such a draw-bridge in the channel of Pearl River. Louisiana Act of 1868. [No. 599.] Submitted Oct. 15, 1884. Decided Oct. 27, 1884. IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Mississippi. The history and facts appear in the Statement of the case by Mr. Justice Harlan: The following clauses in an Act of the Legislature of Mississippi, approved February 7, 1867, relating to plaintiff in error, are referred to in the opinion: "And it is also provided that said Company is authorized and empowered to construct and maintain its said railroad over and across any of the waters of this State on the line of the same by bridges; Provided, however, That in the central portion of the channel of the Pearl River, of the Bay of St. Louis, of the Bay of Biloxi and of the East Pascagoula River and in each of them, said Company shall construct and maintain a draw-bridge, which, when open, shall give a clear space for the passage of vessels, of not less than sixty feet in width, and said Company, after the construction of the said drawbridges, shall, at all times thereafter, provide that said draw-bridges shall be opened for the passage of any and all vessels seeking to pass through the same without unnecessary delay: Provided, however, That in case the Company shall locate the line of their road across the channel of the Rigolet, at a point south of or below the principal entrance of Pearl River into the Rigolet, then the said Company shall not be re NOTE.-Navigable waters; what are in the United States; streams and inland waters as highways. See, note to U. S. v. The Montello, 87 U. S., XXII., 391. Bridges, different kinds; legislative power may grant right to erect; duty to repair. See note to Weightman v. Washington, 66 U. S., XVII., 52. Also, the following clauses in an Act of the Legislature of Louisiana, approved August 19, 1868, in reference to the same Company: "And it is also provided that said Company is authorized and empowered to construct and maintain its said railroad over and across the waters of the State of Louisiana, known as the Pass Chef Menteur, Little Rigolet, Great Rigolet, or that part of Lake Pontchartrain east of the west line of Point aux Herbs, and the West Pearl River, and other streams and bayous between Lake Pontchartrain and Pearl River, and Pearl River by bridges; Provided, however, That, in the channel of that part of Lake Pontchartrain herein before named there shall be con structed and maintained by said Company a draw-bridge, which, when open, shall give a clear space for the passage of vessels of not less than one hundred feet in width; and in the channel of the Pearl River the said Company shall construct and maintain a draw-bridge, which, when open, shall give clear space for the passage of vessels of not less than sixty feet in width, except in case the Company shall locate their road across the Great Rigolet at a point south of, or below, the principal entrance of Pearl River into the Great Rigolet, when the Company shall only be required to construct one draw-bridge, which shall be in the channel of the Great Rigolet, as hereinbefore named; and said Company, after the construction of the said draw-bridges or draw-bridge, shall at all times thereafter, provide that said draw-bridges or draw-bridge shall be opened for the passage of any and all vessels through the same without unnecessary delay. It is also provided, That such part of this section as relates to Pearl River, if the line of the road shall be located across the said river at a point where it constitutes the [15] boundary line between the State of Louisiana and the State of Mississippi, shall not take effect until the State of Mississippi has consented to and authorized the same, or said Company has built such a bridge across said Pearl River for its said railroad as shall be in accordance with this section and also with any authority or power granted to said Company by the State of Mississippi in the premises; and such drawbridge may be built in the center of the channel of said Pearl River, or in that portion of the same within the territory of the State of Mississippi or of this State, as most convenient for |