noticing an omission' of the officer, contrary to the literal import of the law, the Supreme Court of Maine say: "This may not have been productive of any inconvenience to those interested in their doings, but it was a departure from the line of duty marked out for them to pursue, which may be regarded as, in strictness, affecting the authority of the collector to make sale of the premises." The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in speaking of one of the requirements of law, say: "If we could discover neither the necessity nor use of this provision of the law, it would not be for us to dispense with it."2 In Isaacs v. Wiley, the collector failed to give a bond as required by law, and for this defect in the proceedings, the sale was held void; the court remarking: "We hold the giving of a bond, and such a bond as the statute requires, to be indispensable to pass the title, not because we consider that the public or the land-holders have any indirect interest even in the security which it affords, but because a strict compliance with all the prerequisites of the statute is considered necessary, in this class of cases, in order to pass the title." Perhaps the very strongest illustration of the strictness required in these cases, is to be found in the case of Brown v. Dinsmoor. There the question was whether, in listing the land for taxation, the name of the owner, or the description of the land, or both, should be inserted in the list. Such was the language of the statute, that it was susceptible of either construction; and the court held, that the insertion of both the name and description was necessary. Thus much with regard to the degree of strictness required in tax sales. i Brown v. Veazie, 25 Maine, 359. 2 Thurston v. Little, 3 Massachusetts, 432. 8 12 Vermont, 677. 3 New Hampshire, 103. CHAPTER III. OF THE ONUS PROBANDI. IN powers of this nature, a series of acts, preliminary in their character, are required by law to precede the execution of the power. Each and every step, from the listing of the land for taxation, to the consummation of the title by the delivery of a deed to the purchaser, is a separate and independent fact. All of these facts, from the beginning to the end of the proceeding, must exist; and if any material link in the chain of title be wanting, the whole falls to the ground for want of sufficient authority to support it.1 The party claiming under the power, is chargeable with notice of every irregularity in the proceedings of the officers. He purchases at his peril, the maxim, " caveat emptor," being rigidly applied to him.2 The reasons are obvious. The law imputes to every purchaser, knowledge of all facts appearing at the time of his purchase, upon the muniments of title, which it was necessary for him to inspect in order to ascertain the sufficiency of it. More especially is this doctrine applicable to the purchaser at a tax sale. For knowing the land to have been sold under color of an authority given by law to a public officer, who is not the proprietor thereof, he is bound to in 1 Blakeney v. Ferguson, 3 English, 277; Brown v. Veazie, 25 Maine, 362; Doughty v. Hope, 3 Denio, 595; Varick v. Tallman, 2 Barbour, 114, 115; Fitch v. Casey, 2 G. Greene (Iowa), 300. 2 Lessee of Holt's Heirs v. Hemphill's Heirs, 3 Hammond, 232; s. c. 1-4 Cond. Ohio, 551; Denning v. Smith, 3 Johnson, Ch. 344; Stead's Executors v. Course, 4 Cranch, 403; s. c. 2 Peters, Cond. 151; Yancy v. Hopkins, 1 Munford, 431; Games v. Stiles, 14 Peters, 322; Wright, 53. 8 Battemore v. White, 2 Gill & Johnson, 444. quire and take notice whether that officer, and all others whose agency is required by the law in the conduct of the proceedings, have proceeded with regularity in the discharge of their duty. If the proceedings are not in conformity with the law, the fact is as well known to the purchaser as it was to the officer. The law, at least, presumes it to be so. The statute was not passed simply to inform the officer of his duty in the premises, and limit him as to the mode of executing the power, but it was also intended to give to the purchaser full information of the terms upon which a title could be acquired to land, sold at public vendue, for the non-payment of taxes in arrear upon it. It was meant to put bidders at a tax sale upon inquiry, whether or not the land was offered for sale according to law. If they do not examine, but buy against the plain and imperative provisions of the statute, they do so at their own risk; and it will be presumed against them that they knew that the deeds given under such circumstances, were made in violation of official duty and of the law.2 The purchaser claims his title under the authority of a public law, and is, therefore, bound to take notice of all its requirements; the authority of the officer is special and limited, the law is his warrant of attorney, and the buyer must see to it, that the terms prescribed by the legislature-the creator of the power-have been pursued by the agent. We have seen, that the requisitions of this class of laws must be strictly pursued, and no purchaser is blameless who buys without seeing that they have been so.3 "A special authority must be strictly pursued, and every purchaser is presumed to know that special authority in all cases where it is conferred and limited by statute."4 There is no great hardship in this. Experience and observation render it notorious, that the amount paid by purchasers at tax 1 Yancy v. Hopkins, 1 Munford, 431. [He is bound to prove that the person described in the deed as high-sheriff, was such. Hobbs v. Shumates, 11 Grattan, 516.] 2 Moore v. Brown, 11 Howard (U. S.), 414. 3 Allen v. Smith, 1 Leigh, 231. Chancellor Kent in Denning v. Smith, 3 Johnson, Ch. 344. sales, is uniformly trifling in comparison with the value of the property sold. "Acres for cents," is the maxim, and cupidity the ruling passion, of the speculators who attend tax sales. Taxes ought to be paid, and that promptly. In the language of Judge Scates: "The government must have revenue, and it must be collected from all; it must be enforced from the unwilling and negligent by disposing of their property to those who are willing to advance the money." But it must be remembered that all owners, whose names are perpetuated upon the "list," are not wilfully or perversely" delinquent." Oversight, accident, and misfortune, the dishonesty of agents, the neglect of the guardians of infants, and the husbands of women owning separate estates, often interfere to prevent the seasonable payment of taxes. In such cases a sale takes place while the owner is unconscious of the wrong. Shall the innocent owner be protected under these circumstances? Reasonable judges will answer the question affirmatively. How protected? Not by an immunity from his duty to the government, but by requiring a rigid compliance with the prerequisites of the law. The object of the law is, to raise a revenue with the least possible sacrifice to the citizen.2 Every member of society is presumed to have assented to the public law by which his right of property is subjected to the dominion of strangers. The manner in which this power is to be exercised is specified in the law. The same law which creates or confers the power, bridles its execution. You may take my property to pay my debts, but you must ascertain that debt by judgment, and a sheriff must execute the power. You may take my land to build a railroad, but you must pay me the value of it. You may sell my land for taxes assessed upon it, but you must do it in the manner prescribed by the law. The citizen never assents to the power, unless the safeguards attached to its exercise are strictly observed. The delinquent, when his title is sought to be divested by a tax sale, has a right to say to the 1 Hinman v. Pope, 1 Gilman, 141. purchaser, "True, I have been negligent in the performance of my duty a cause of forfeiture has thereby arisen - but the officer has been equally negligent; you also, in not inquiring into the regularity of the proceedings before purchasing; my title has not been legally divested, and I shall therefore insist upon my right according to the law of the land." To use the language of Chancellor Kent: "Sales of real property by public officers, of one description or another, have become so frequent, and have excited such active cupidity, and such a spirit of speculation, that there is very great danger of injustice, unless we support strictly the checks and guards provided by law against abuse." It is far better, when an irregularity occurs in the proceedings, that the purchaser should lose the inconsiderable amount of his bid, than that the owner should forfeit a valuable estate. The purchaser has his remedy. If the land was not subject to taxation, or the taxes had been paid before the sale, he must look to the State for that relief which such a case may require.2 If the officers have failed in the performance of any duty enjoined upon them by law, they must respond in damages to the purchaser, who has sustained an injury by their neglect. The purchaser's title is one of strict right. Positive law is the foundation of it. He deserves no indulgence from the courts. There should be no leaning in his favor. On the contrary, it is the duty of courts of justice to examine such sales narrowly, and if they do not appear to be strictly conformable to the law, to pass the merited censure upon them. In one case where the counsel, contesting the validity of a tax sale, raised many objections, the court in reviewing them and after stating the degree of strictness which the law required in such cases, say: "The counsel for the defendant in this case may, therefore, be excusable, if not 1 Denning v. Smith, 3 Johnson, Ch. 344. 2 Jackson v. Morse, 18 Johnson, 442. 8 Sumner v. Sherman, 13 Vermont, 613. 4 Wilson v. Bell, 7 Leigh, 22; Cox v. Grant, 1 Yeates, 164; Counsel for the Plaintiff arguendo in Thames Manufacturing Company v. Lathrop, 7 Connecticut, |