This class of sales cannot be likened to the sale of a sheriff, and the effect of his neglect to file or record the certificate of his sale. There the owner of the land is regarded as in court until the satisfaction of the judgment, and usually has actual notice of the levy. The authority to sell and convey, depends alone upon the judgment and execution. The purchaser is bound to look no further. No irregularity of the officer, either in advertising or selling the land, or in the performance of any duty, imposed upon him subsequent to the sale, can affect the title of the purchaser. But the power of the officer in tax sales depends upon a series of acts, which are required by law to precede and follow the sale; each and every step, from the listing of the land for taxation to the consummation of the title, by the delivery of a deed to the purchaser, is a separate and independent fact. All of these facts, from the beginning to the end of the proceeding, must exist; and if any material link in the chain of title be wanting, the whole falls to the ground for want of sufficient authority to support it. Testing the Ohio and Pennsylvania cases, by these principles decisions in relation to the return, deposit, and record of the proceedings of the officer who made the sale- they cannot be sustained. The return of sale in the Ohio case, as has already been shown, was beneficial as well to the purchaser as the owner, besides being the only guide of the officer in the redemption or conveyance of the land. The surplus bond, required by the laws of Pennsylvania, constituted a lien upon the land purchased, in favor of the former owner of the estate. The filing of it in the office of the prothonotary, where the evidence of judgment and mechanics' liens were preserved, was intended to give notice to subsequent purchasers and creditors, and was, therefore, beneficial to them as well as to the owner. In conclusion, to use the language of one of the courts, "it is easier for the purchaser to see that the duty is performed, than it is for a judge to assign reasons why it may be safely omitted."

and the New England

CHAPTER XVIII.

OF THE AUTHENTICATION OF THE DIFFERENT DOCUMENTS.

THE rule is well settled, that every public document, which is required by law, to be executed by a public officer, and preserved as a memorial of the facts recited in it, must be verified by the official signature of the person who made it. The object of the rule is the identification of the document as an official act, executed by authority of law; and its spirit is answered only, when the official character of the person making it is established, and the document appears upon its face to be an official act, attested by the signature of the officer. The reason of the rule is obvious. No man has the right to bind another by a written statement, unless he has authority to make such a statement, either from the person to be affected, or the laws of the land, by which all are bound. All written instruments, executed in pursuance of private authorities, show upon their face the representative character of the person executing them. The agent executes in the name of his principal, signs the name of the principal, and attests the paper by his own signature; else, he alone is bound by it. Chief Justice Parker, in Stackpole v. Arnold,' says: "It might be sufficient for the decision of this cause to state, that no person, in making the contract, is to be considered as the agent of another, unless he stipulates for his principal by name, stating his agency in the instrument which he signs. This principle has long been settled, and has been frequently recognized; nor do I know of an instance in the books of an attempt to charge a person, as the maker of any

1 11 Massachusetts, 27.

written contract, appearing to be signed by another, unless the signer professed to act by procuration or authority, and stated the name of the principal, on whose behalf he gave his signature. It is also held, that whatever authority the signer may have to bind another, if he does not sign as agent or attorney, he binds himself and no other person." An additional reason why every act of an officer should bear upon its face evidence of its official character, is, that in this country every officer is responsible to the government and parties interested in his acts, for all injuries occasioned by his acts or omissions under color of his office; and in actions against him it is not just that the injured party should be compelled to resort to a weaker species of evidence depending upon memory, and subjected to the risks attending death, absence, and insanity—to prove the legal identity of an official document. The reason of the rule applies more strongly to the execution of all public authorities, whether conferred by general or special laws, where the exercise of the power affects the property of the citizen. The authority is conferred without his consent, he is not consulted in the selection of the agent, he cannot control the acts of the officer, nor is the officer answerable to him for his conduct. The authority is delegated by law, it is reposed in the officer, not the man. He acts in an official capacity. But for the protection of the law he would be a trespasser in exercising the power, and responsible to the citizen for his acts. When therefore he attempts to execute the power, he must recognize the source from whence he derives it, follow the requirements of the law, and perform all acts in that character alone which the law recognizes, otherwise the act is a nullity. The principle is uniformly conformed to by all of the great departments of government. The proclamations of the king bear upon their face the official character of the act. The process of the courts run in his official name, are attested by his chief judicial officer, and authenticated with the seal of the court. The presiding officers of the two houses of parliament authenticate the passage of all bills, and the legality of warrants, by their official signatures. And in this country, every officer, from the president down to an overseer of

the poor, verifies in this manner his official acts. The rule exItends to all official documents connected with the sales of land for the non-payment of taxes.

The statute of Vermont required the collector to advertise the delinquent list before selling the lands of non-residents, to deposit with the town-clerk the newspaper containing the advertisements, and the clerk was directed to record them at length in a book to be kept for that purpose. In Spear v. Ditty,1 the defendant relied upon a tax title, and offered in evidence the record of the town-clerk, headed "collectors' advertisements." The record showed that the advertisements were simply signed "E. Spaulding," without the addition of the word "Collector." In the form of the advertisement prescribed by law, the official title was added. The court held the sale void for the omission in the record of the town-clerk. The court remarked: "It is not true that every man is presumed to be clothed with and to be exercising an official capacity, because it seems to be needed for what he was attempting. Such a principle would sweep away all official signatures and designations. The statute form must be strictly followed. Even a known public officer must so sign every official document. It is difficult to see how any one can act officially on paper, and not so state on the paper. It must appear on the publication, by what power, and in what capacity, the person acts. And this cannot be supplied by the record, headed collectors' advertisements.' The advertisement in this case was not signed by Spaulding as collector, nor did it in any way so import, and the landholders were therefore no way informed that the signer of that advertisement had any more right, than any other man, to give such notice, nor that he had such power as he undertook to exercise."

In Isaacs v. Shattuck,2 it appeared that the person who made the sale, was both collector and town-clerk; in the former capacity he was required by law to sell and return the proceed

19 Vermont, 282.

2 12 Vermont, 668.

ings; in the latter he was to record the return and certify to the due publication of the advertisement. His certificate was signed" Jonas Stone, collector." The sale was held void. The court, referring to the case of Spear v. Ditty, said: "It has been decided that when one signs his name only, omitting the official designation, it is the same as if the signature had been omitted, so far as any official validity is concerned. It is difficult to perceive, then, how the use of a wrong designation of office should be of any greater force or validity. We must then, in the most favorable view, consider the record in the handwriting of a stranger, and not certified by the town-clerk. This, we think, is not sufficient in a case like the present, where, with great propriety, the utmost strictness of construction has always been required."

It has already been shown that the assessment list must be verified by the official signatures of the officers charged by law with the duty of making it.1 In Taylor v. French,2 where the collector was required to file copies of the advertisements with the town-clerk, whose duty it was to record them at length, and certify to the fact and particulars of the publication, the facts were, that following each advertisement there was a simple statement of the clerk that the same was inserted in a certain newspaper; giving the name, volume, number, date, and place of publication of the paper, but none of these statements were verified by any signature, private or official; but at the end of the record, the town-clerk certified that "he then (October 16) received the above and foregoing eighteen advertisements for record, and recorded the same from pages 42 to 50," and attested the same. The record was held insufficient. By the court: "It is evident that this certificate must be confined to the recording of the advertisements, and cannot extend to the statements in regard to their publication. It does not profess

1 Ante, p. 113; Johnson v. Goodridge, 15 Maine, 29; Colby v. Russell, 3 Greenleaf, 227; Foxcroft v. Nevens, 4 Greenleaf, 72; Kellar v. Savage, 20 Maine, 199; Sibley v. Smith, 2 Michigan, Gibbs, 498.

2 19 Vermont, 49.