equitable interest in the land itself, and do not simply constitute a chose in action, or a chattel interest. On the death of the holder, they descend to his heirs. And the construction which the Supreme Court of Ohio place upon the words "legal. representative," is in conformity with the decisions in analogous cases.1

The right of a purchaser to a deed, in pursuance of the sale and certificate, when the time of redemption expires, is a vested one; and the legislature cannot, without a violation of the contract between the State and the purchaser, repeal the authority of the officer to execute and deliver a deed to him.2 Nor can the legislature extend the time of redemption, after the rights of the purchaser have attached. Those rights attach when his bid is accepted, and he pays the purchase-money, and the stat ute then in force constitutes the law of his contract; by it alone are his rights and duties to be determined. The certificate vests such an interest in the purchaser, that when the time fixed for redemption has expired, and the officer improperly refuses to clothe the purchaser with the legal title, a mandamus will be awarded at the instance of the purchaser, to compel the execution of a deed. Where the law requires the purchaser to record his certificate or lodge his deed in a particular office, with the evident design of giving notice of the sale to the former owner, the requisition must be strictly complied with.5 In most of the States, the certificate of purchase is made assignable in law, and the officer authorized to convey, is directed to execute and deliver the deed to the assignee.

The nature and extent of the interest of one who purchases land at a tax sale, prior to the time limited for a redemption, present some highly important questions, and may be appropri

1 Delaunay v. Burnett, 4 Gilman, 454; Grand Gulf Railroad & Banking Co. v. Bryan, 8 Smedes & Marshall, 234; 4 Missouri, 333; 5 Missouri, 147; 9 Missouri, 714; 3 Vesey, Jr., 486; 1 Yeates, 213; 2 Yeates, 585; 2 Dallas, 205; 6 Sergeant & Rawle, 83.

2 Bruce v. Schuyler, 4 Gilman, 274, 278.

Dikeman v. Dikeman, 11 Paige, Ch. 484.

• Maxcy v. Clabaugh, 1 Gilman, 26.

Reeds v. Morton, 9 Missouri, 878; Ives v. Lynn, 7 Connecticut, 505.

ately considered in this connection. The general principles which control estates, granted with conditions subsequent annexed to them, are of occasional application in this class of cases. A conditional estate is one which depends for its existence upon the happening or not happening of some uncertain event, whereby the estate may commence, be enlarged or defeated. Such an estate may arise by implication of law, but is more commonly created by express words in the instrument by which the estate is conveyed. These conditions are either precedent or subsequent. Precedent are such as must happen or be performed before the estate can commence or be enlarged; subsequent are such by the non-performance or failure of which an estate already vested may be defeated. The usual practice on the making of the sale, is to deliver to the successful bidder a certificate of purchase, with a proviso attached thereto, that unless the sale is redeemed from, within the time limited by law in that behalf, the purchaser will be entitled to a deed for the land. But in several of the States, instead of this certificate, a deed is immediately executed and delivered to the purchaser, conveying to him a present estate, with a redemption clause annexed. And in all cases, the right of redemption is preserved to married women, infants, lunatics, and others laboring under special disabilities. In each of these instances the estate may be said to be granted in præsenti, but liable to be defeated upon a compliance with the redemption laws, by those who formerly owned the estate. If no redemption is made within the time and in the manner prescribed by the statute, the estates becomes ipso facto discharged of the condition; if the sale is redeemed from, the estate of the tax purchaser is defeated. Until a redemption takes place, the grantee under the tax sale (after the delivery of the deed to him) may be regarded as the owner of the estate, at least so far as strangers are concerned. He may maintain an action at law for all injuries done to the inheritance by a wrong-doer; recover in ejectment against one who intrudes himself into the possession of the estate; and generally, do any act consistent with the nature of his title. It is presumed, however, that he cannot himself commit.

waste, or do any act to the injury of the estate, until the time fixed for redemption has expired; and that if he attempts to do so, the former owner may restrain him by injunction. It might be prudent however, for the complainant, in such a case, to bring into court with his bill, the amount necessary to redeem the estate. On the other hand, the tax purchaser may sustain a bill to enjoin the former owner, or those acting under his license, from the commission of similar acts of waste or destruction; this remedy he is entitled to, because a redemption is uncertain; and if it never takes place, he has a right to the estate as it was at the time of his purchase. Whether the party claiming under the tax deed, could maintain an action of trespass quare clausum fregit against the former owner for cutting timber upon the estate, is, to say the least, a debatable point. Until the redemption takes place, he is the owner of the estate undoubtedly. But has he all of the rights incident to an ownership in fee? Has he a right to take possession, and make improvements upon the land? If timber land, may he clear, fence, and cultivate it? These and similar questions are somewhat embarrassing. One thing, however, is certain; his possession would not be adverse to the true owner until the time of redemption expired; and consequently the statute of limitations would not run in his favor. He is in without the consent of the true owner, and against his will; but he holds the possession in subordination to the title of the original proprietor, in case a redemption is seasonably made. If the owner does not redeem, the possession may be regarded as adverse, and having relation back to the date of his entry, even as against the former owner. But suppose a redemption takes place within the time limited, is the possessor under the tax title entitled to compensation in equity for his improvements, or is he to be regarded as having made them at his peril? Is the former owner entitled to an account of the rents and profits of the estate while in the occupancy of the tax purchaser ? Has he any remedy for waste, spoil, or destruction? When the redemption takes place, can it have any retrospect, so as to make the tax purchaser a trespasser under any circumstances, or does it operate like the

performance of any other condition subsequent annexed to an estate? These questions must necessarily arise in the investigation of the rights acquired under the taxing power of every State; and without attempting the solution of them, or anticipating the decision of the courts when they do arise, it may be remarked, that the analogy is complete between an estate at common law, with a condition subsequent attached to it, and the title of a tax purchaser after the delivery of the deed to him, and prior to the time when the right of redemption, by those laboring under disabilities, has expired; and it would seem that the same principles are applicable to each.

CHAPTER XVII.

OF CONDITIONS SUBSEQUENT TO THE SALE.

WE are not now treating of conditions subsequent, annexed to estates at common law, on the breach or non-performance of which an estate which has already vested may be defeated; but of those acts which the law requires to be performed after the sale has been made, in order to vest the estate in the purchaser. In the language of Judge Cowen, these conditions, "if looked to in their chronological order, are indeed conditions subsequent; but for the purpose of giving effect to the deed, they are conditions precedent, to all intents and purposes, and without showing affirmatively the literal performance of them, the deed is mere waste paper."

The statutes of several of the States require either that the ministerial officers of the law, or the purchaser, shall, within a limited time after the sale has taken place, perform certain duties or acts intended for the protection of the former owner, the nonperformance of which invalidates the sale.2 The duties of this character most commonly enjoined upon the officers, are the return of the proceedings anterior to, and at the time of the sale, and the deposit or record of the same; and those imposed upon the purchaser are the filing of a surplus bond, the record of his certificate of purchase, and the giving of a notice to redeem, actual or constructive, to the former owner. Of each of

these in their order.

1 Bush v. Davison, 16 Wendell, 554.

[2 In Michigan it has been held, that the sale was not void merely because the town treasurer failed to make a statement under oath of all money collected by him, and file the same with the county treasurer. Tweed v. Metcalf, 4 Michigan, 579.]