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visited the colony, and many deaths occurred: the last accounts received, state that the American agent himself was reduced to a very bad state of health, and that sickness generally prevailed.

Dr. Lushington has again brought into parliament his bill for the consolidation of all the existing laws relative to the abolition of the slave-trade, which was postponed from the last session; and its provisions are now under the consideration of a committee of the directors, with whom Dr. Lushing ton has been so obliging as to communicate, in order to render the details of the measure as complete as possible. They trust the bill may be so framed as to be productive of important benefits. But the directors cannot conceal their opinion, that, unless it shall prohibit the removal of slaves from one British colony to another, except in the case of domestic slaves, under certain regulations, as well as repeal the 58th Geo. 3rd, cap. 49, which allows the importation of slaves in certain cases, it will stop far short of the object which they have in view.

It has not escaped the observation of the directors, that the Brazilian government having declared itself independent, there may be danger of its flag being used for

the protection of slave ships. Upon this subject, as well as respecting a considerable portion of the African coast, as far as five and a half degrees, or about 400 miles of coast south of the Equator, wherein the Portuguese government have agreed by treaty to abstain from carrying on any trade in slaves, but in which no right of search has yet been consented to, the board has had a communication with his majesty's minister for foreign affairs; and they hope that some measures may be taken to prevent or remedy the evils, which have arisen from these circumstances.

With a view to the further diffusion of information respecting the African slave-trade, particularly in France, the directors have, during the course of the last year, circulated at Paris, in the Netherlands, and the kingdoms of Spain and Portugal, a large edition of the celebrated speech of the duke de Broglie, made in the French chamber of peers during the last year, and also of Mr. Wilberforce's letter to the emperor of Russia, describing the atrocities of the existing slave-trade; and a considerable number of copies of the last report of this institution have also been distributed in a similar manner.

II.-FOREIGN.

DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE relative to the RELATIONS between FRANCE and SPAIN.

The following are the most important of the Papers presented to both Houses of Parliament, by command of his Majesty, April 1823:

SPAIN.

Confidential Minute of Viscount Castlereagh on the Affairs of Spain. Communicated to the Courts of Austria,

France, Prussia, and Russia, in
May, 1820.

(Extract.) The events, which have occurred in Spain, have, as might be expected, excited, in

in proportion as they have deve loped themselves, the utmost anxiety throughout Europe.

The British cabinet upon this, as upon all other occasions, is ever ready to deliberate with those of the allies, and will unreservedly explain itself upon this great ques tion of common interest; but as to the form in which it may be prudent to conduct these deliberations, they conceive, they cannot too early recommend that course of deliberation which will excite the least attention or alarm, or which can least provoke jealousy in the minds of the Spanish nation or government. In this view, it appears to them advisable, studiously to avoid any re-union of the sovereigns to abstain, at least in the present stage of the question, from charging any ostensible conference with commission to deliberate on the affairs of Spain. They conceive it preferable that their intercourse should be limited to those confidential communica tions between the cabinets which are, in themselves, best adapted to approximate ideas, and to lead, as far as may be, to the adoption of common principles, rather than to hazard a discussion in a ministerial conference, which, from the necessarily limited powers of the in dividuals composing it, must ever be better fitted to execute a purpose already decided upon, than to frame a course of policy under des licate and difficult circumstances.

There seems the less motive for precipitating any step of this nature in the case immediately under consideration, as, from all the information which reaches us, there exists in Spain no order of things upon which to deliberate; nor, as yet, any governing authority with which foreign powers can communicate.

The king's authority, for the moment at least, seems to be dissolved. His majesty is represented in the last despatches from Madrid, as having wholly abandoned himself to the tide of events, and as conceding whatever is called for by the provisional junta and the clubs.

The authority of the provisional government does not appear to extend beyond the two Castilles and a part of Andalusia :-Distinct local authorities prevail in the various provinces, and the king's personal safety is regarded as extremely liable to be hazarded, by any step which might lay him open to the suspicion of entertaining a design to bring about a counter-revolution, whether by internal or external means.

This important subject having been referred to, and considered by the duke of Wellington, his memorandum accompanies this minute. His grace does not hesitate, upon his intimate experience of Spanish affairs, to pronounce, that the Spanish nation is, of all the European people, that, which will least. brook any interference from abroad; he states the many instances in which, during the last war, this distinguishing trait of national character rendered them obstinately blind to the most pressing considerations of public safety: he states the imminent danger in which the suspicion of foreign interference, and more especially of interference on the part of France, is likely to involve the king-and he further describes the difficulties which would oppose themselves to any military operations in Spain, undertaken for the purpose of reducing, by force, the nation to submit themselves to an order of things, to be either suggested or prescribed to them from without.

Sir Henry Wellesley has, in coincidence with this opinion, reported the alarm which the intended mission of M. de La Tour du Pin had excited at Madrid, the prejudice which, in the opinion of all the foreign ministers at Madrid, it was calculated to occasion to the king's interests and possible safety. He also reports the steps which it was in contemplation to have adopted on the part of the king to endeavour to prevent the French minister from prosecuting his journey to Madrid, when the intelligence of the abandonment of the mission was received from Paris.

At all events, therefore, until some central authority shall establish itself in Spain, all notion of operating upon her councils seems utterly impracticable; and caleulated to lead to no other possible result, than that of compromising either the king or the allies, or probably both.

The present state of Spain, no doubt, seriously extends the range of political agitation in Europe, but it must nevertheless be admitted, that there is no portion of Europe of equal magnitude, in which such a revolution could have happened, less likely to menace other states with that direct and imminent danger, which has always been regarded, at least in this country, as alone constituting the case which would justify external interference. If the case is not such as to warrant such an interference if we do not feel that we have at this moment either the right or the means to inter fere with effect by force-if the semblance of such an interference is more likely to irritate than to overawe, and if we have proved, by experience, how little a Spanish

government, whether of king or Cortes, is disposed to listen to advice from foreign states, is it not prudent at least to pause, before we assume an attitude which would seem to pledge us in the eyes of Europe to some decisive proceeding? Before we embark in such a measure, is it not expedient, at least, to ascertain with some degree of precision, what we really mean to do? This course of temperate and cautious policy, so befitting the occasion and the critical position in which the king is personally placed, will in no de gree fetter our actions, when, if ever, the case for acting shall arise,

In the mean time, as independent states, the allied powers may awaken, through their re spective missions at Madrid, with not less effect than would attend any joint representation, a salutary apprehension of the consequences that might be produced by any violence offered to the king's person or family, or by any hostile measures directed against the Portuguese dominions in Europe, for the protection of which Great Britain is bound by specific treaty.

In conveying any such intimation, however, the utmost delicacy should be observed; and though it is to be presumed that the views and wishes of all the allied powers must be essentially the same, and that the sentiments they are likely to express cannot materially differ, it does not follow that they should speak either in their corporate character, or through any common organ--both which expedients would be calculated rather to offend, than to conciliate or persuade.

There can be no doubt of the general danger which menaces more or less the stability of all ex

isting governments, from the principles which are afloat, and from the circumstances that so many states of Europe are now employed in the difficult task of casting anew their governments upon the representative principle-but the notion of revising, limiting, or regulating the course of such experiments, either by foreign counsel or by foreign force, would be as dangerous to avow, as it would be impossible to execute; and the illusion too prevalent on this subject, should not be encouraged in our intercourse with the allies. That circumstances might arise out of such experiments in any country directly menacing to the safety of other states, cannot be denied; and against such a danger, well ascertained, the allies may justifiably, and must in all prudence, be on their guard; but such is not the present case. Fearful, as is the example which is furnished by Spain, of an army in revolt, and a monarch swearing to a constitution which contains in its frame hardly the semblance of a monarchy, there is no ground for apprehension that Europe is likely to be speedily endangered by Spanish arms.

In this alliance, as in all other human arrangements, nothing is more likely to impair, or even to destroy its real utility, than any attempt to push its duties and its obligations beyond the sphere which its original conception and understood principles will warrant. It was an union for the re-conquest and liberation of a great proportion of the continent of Europe from the military dominion of France; and having subdued the conqueror, it took the state of possession, as established by the peace,

under the protection of the alliance. It never was, however, intended as an union for the government of the world, or for the superintendence of the internal affairs of other states.

We shall be found in our place when actual danger menaces the system of Europe; but this country cannot, and will not, act upon abstract and speculative principles of precaution. The alliance which exists had no such purpose in view in its original formation. It was never so explained to parliament; if it had, most assuredly the sanction of parliament would never have been given to it; and it would now be a breach of faith, were the ministers of the crown to acquiesce in a construction being put upon it, or were they to suffer themselves to be betrayed into a course of measures, inconsistent with those principles which they avowed at the time, and which they have since uniformly maintained both at home and abroad.

Instructions drawn up by the Marquis of Londonderry, and transferred to the Duke of Wellington, September 14, 1822.

(Extract.) With respect respect to Spain, there seems nothing to add to, or vary, in the course of policy hitherto pursued-solicitude for the safety of the royal familyobservance of our engagements with Portugal-and a rigid abstinence from any interference in the internal affairs of that country— must be considered as forming the basis of his majesty's policy.

VERONA AND PARIS. No. 1.-The Duke of Wellington to Mr. Secretary Canning.Received September 24th.

(Extract.) Paris, September 21, 1822. I had a long discussion with Monsieur de Villèle yesterday, on the relations of this Government with Spain. It appears, that for a considerable time past, I believe since the alarm of infectious fever in Spain, the French Government have been collecting the troops in the southern departments of France. They have not, however, on the immediate frontier, a larger body of men than are sufficient for the performance of the duties of the "Cordon Sanitaire," so long as that precaution is necessary in consequence of the prevalence of the fever in the neighbouring provinces of Spain; or than can fairly be deemed necessary for the purposes of observation of a country which is the seat of a civil war, and for the protection of the French frontier from insult, by the different parties in operation immediately on the borders.

M. de Villèle said, that the assembly of the Congress at the present moment, was not a matter of indifference, in relation to the situation of affairs in Spain, or to that in which the two countries

stood towards each other. There was no doubt that expectations were formed respecting the re

sult of the deliberations of the

Congress on the affairs of Spain, as well in Spain as elsewhere; and that if the Congress were to separate, and come to no decision on those affairs, it was probable that the existing evils would be greatly aggravated, and that the two countries might be forced into

a war.

Monsieur de Villèle wished that the Congress should take into consideration the actual position of the French Government in relation VOL. LXV.

to Spain, and the hypothesis under which they might be forced into a war; and that the four other Powers of the Alliance should declare what line they would each take, in case of the occurrence of any of the events which they conceived would force them to war. I told Monsieur de Villèle that it would be quite impossible for us to declare beforehand what would be our conduct upon any hypothetical case.

I should wish to receive his majesty's instructions what line I shall take, and what arguments I shall use, in case the French Government should make the proposition at the Congress, which M. de Villèle has made to me, respecting a decla-. ration by the Allies.

No. 2.-Mr. Secretary Canning to the Duke of Wellington.

(Extract.)

Foreign-office, September 27, 1822. If there be a determined project to interfere by force or by menace in the present struggle in Spain, so convinced are his majesty's government of the uselessness and danger of any such interferencethem in principle, as well as so objectionable does it appear to that when the necessity arises, or utterly impracticable in execution, (I would rather say) when the opportunity offers, I am to instruct your Grace at once frankly and any such interference, come what peremptorily to declare, that to may, his Majesty will not be

a party.

(Inclosure in No. 3.)-Translation. Questions addressed by the French

Plenipotentiary to the Plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Great Britain.

Verona, October 20, 1822. 1. In case France should find G*

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