that the fate of Parga might be united for ever to that of the lonian Islands,' (a condition which would not have been conclusive, even if he had accepted it,) that he told them in plain terms, (as Sir James Gordon had done before him,) that he could accede to no such condition; but that they might rely on the protection of the British flag, until their fate should be decided at a general peace. It is indeed perfectly obvious that no stipulation of this kind could be made, for Corfu was at the time in full possession of France; and no man would or could, under those circumstances, have been absurd enough to determine by implication that the revival of the Septinsular Republic would form a part of the ultimate arrangements of the allied powers.

General Sir James Campbell reported to his government the step which he had taken, and in which he had been guided by the double motive of humanity and policy;-of saving these unfortunate people from an unconditional surrender to Ali, and of obtaining a temporary possession of a spot which might assist in the effectual blockade of Corfu. The British government approved of his conduct, and directed him to continue to hold Parga provisionally in possession, as he already did several of the Ionian Islands, until their final destination should be arranged at the conclusion of a general peace. In these instructions from home no assurances whatever were held out to the Parganotes as to their future destination, nor, we repeat it, did General Campbell or any other officer, either at the first voluntary overture of this people, or at the time of surrender, or at any subsequent period, give them any other assurances than those we have mentioned.

It has been falsely asserted that Sir James Campbell verbally confirmed the wishes of the Parganote deputation. Sir James Campbell is dead-but we have before us a letter dictated by him, a few days before his death, in answer to a question put to him by a brother officer, in which he says, 'I can assure you most distinctly, that no officers were at any time authorized by me, either verbally or otherwise, to enter into any engagement on the part of the British government, or to give any assurances to the Parganotes, with respect to Parga remaining permanently under the protection of Great Britain.' We wish to direct the reader's attention particularly to this point, because it forms, in fact, the whole gist of the case, and because M. de Bosset has asserted what he had not the means of knowing, and what we know to be directly contrary to truth, that Captain Hoste (now Sir William) promised the deputies they should be considered under the protection of Great Britain, and follow the fate of the Ionian Islands.'*

The Parganotes, in reality, were so well aware that no agreement, either written or verbal, had been acceded to, which could unite 'their fate with that of the Ionian Islands;' and that, as a matter of right, they were subjects of the Ottoman Porte, that, having failed with General Campbell, they beset Sir Thomas Maitland, immediately after his arrival, with applications for a more intimate connection, pressing for answers, which of course he constantly resisted.

At the Congress of Vienna, and at Paris in 1815, the governments of Russia, Austria and Prussia, after much deliberation, offered to Great Britain the sovereign protection of the lonian Republic; and in November of the same year, a treaty was signed, by which the Ionian Islands and their dependencies, as described in the Treaty of 1800 between Russia and the Ottoman Porte, were placed under the protection of England. The Parganotes, or their officious agents, affect to be surprized that Parga was not mentioned in the Treaty of Paris, though they cannot but know that every arrangement which related to Parga was comprehended in the Treaty between Russia and the Ottoman Porte, which was still in full force; and that it was only referred to in that of Paris for the sake of description.

By this treaty of 1800, the continental possessions of Parga, Previsa, Vonitza and Butrinto, were restored in full sovereignty to the Porte, and were no longer to form a part of the Ionian Republic, then placed under the sovereignty of Russia. In reference to it, the islands of Corfu, Cephalonia, Zante, Santa Maura, Ithaca, Cerigo and Paxo, with their dependencies, (but to the exclusion by name of the four places above-mentioned,) were erected into a free and independent state under the immediate protection of Great Britain. In the discussion that took place, the Treaty of 1800, which had been renewed and confirmed in 1812 by that of Bucharest, between Russia and the Porte, made it incumbent on the allied powers to respect the territorial rights of the Porte to the continental possessions of the late Venetian Republic; and they were excluded from the Septinsular Republic, of which, in fact, they had never constituted a part. Thus, when Great Britain was called, in 1815, to the protection of the Ionian Republic, Parga formed no part of that Republic. Parga, of course, followed the fate of the other three ex-Venetian states, and became, like them, united to the Turkish empire.

It does not follow that because, in the Treaty of Great Britain with the other powers of Europe in 1815, a reference is made to the Treaty between Russia and the Porte of 1800, for the purpose (and for no other) of determining the limits of the Ionian Republic, and because Parga had fallen by other means, and

by

by the seeking of the inhabitants, with a view to their own safety, into her provisional occupation;-it does not therefore follow, we say, that Great Britain was bound in the most distant manner to interfere, or to see that the conditions which had been stipulated by the Porte with Russia, and which are detailed in the Treaty of 1800, should be fulfilled towards the Parganotes. There is no article in the British Treaty of 1815 which confirms, or by which she takes upon herself, the conditions of 1800; they were perfectly foreign to her; they could not have been listened to for a moment; and that treaty was referred to, as we said before, merely as the means of defining the limits of the new territory to be placed under her protection. As far, therefore, as treaties, or engagements, or promises are concerned, Great Britain might have withdrawn her troops from Parga, and left it open at any time she pleased to the re-occupation of the Ottoman Porte.

But, to be more explicit. There were three ways in which Great Britain might have acted with regard to Parga. 1st. She might (as we have just said) at once have withdrawn the garrison, and left the Parganotes to themselves. 2dly, She might have taken upon herself the Russian guarantee of 1800. 3dly, She might have kept possession of Parga as an appendage to the Seven Islands. The first would have been inhuman. The second equally so, if we may judge from what took place at Previsa, Vonitza, and Butrinto, under the immediate guarantee of Russia:-that guarantee had proved utterly unavailing to secure the inhabitants from every species of oppression and inhumanity, or against the infraction of every stipulation on the part of the Turks; how then could it be hoped, that Parga, which had given an equal or greater degree of offence than any of them, would escape the vengeance of an unfeeling and exasperated tyrant, for so they themselves represented Ali Pasha, under whose immediate government they were to be placed?-How could it be hoped that those conditions would be better respected in the case of Parga, than in those of the three places abovementioned, which were equally included in the same treaty? On the contrary, the very act of their having called in a British garrison at the moment when Ali Pasha had made himself certain of obtaining possession of the town, would naturally add to that thirst of vengeance with which the Parganotes supposed him to be actuated against them for former disappointments which their intrigues had occasioned. To stipulate, therefore, with the Ottoman Porte for the fulfilment of these conditions, would have been, in fact, to deliver over the Parganotes to the unlimited fury of Ali Pasha; in whose territories they are situated, and who is supposed to manage the internal concerns of his government, without much consulting the pleasure of his master.

As to the third point;-on what possible pretence we could have kept possession of Parga, as an appendage to the Ionian Islands, (which was the first and only object of the Parganotes,) we confess our lack of ingenuity to discover. We have yet to learn on what principle of justice and good faith we could presume to hold forcible possession of an integral part of the continental dominions of a sovereign which had been restored to him by a solemn treaty concluded by the allied powers of Europe, and while we were holding out the most unequivocal professions of conciliation and amity.

The only real security then, which appeared possible to be found for the Parganotes, was precisely that which was insisted on by Great Britain, namely:-that an option should be given to such of the inhabitants as might wish to withdraw from the continent, with ample time to remove, and compensation from the Porte for the full value of the property which all, thus withdrawing themselves, might leave behind. These conditions, it will readily be supposed, were not obtained without much labour and difficulty; we had, in fact, no right to insist upon them. But it appears that we not only did insist, but uniformly refused to evacuate Parga until they were procured, and until the amount of the compensation should actually be paid into the hands of the British authorities. Nor did we stop here-the officer in command at Corfu was instructed generously to offer to the emigrating Parganotes a settlement in the Ionian Islands, by which they would be united with the people and government, with and under whom they had constantly expressed so eager a desire to live.

Unfortunately for the Parganotes, it happened that, during the delay unavoidably incurred by these gratuitous negociations in their favour with the Ottoman Porte, certain officious agents in London and Paris, instigated by a few turbulent characters in Parga, found means to infect the minds of the rest of the community with a distrust of the intentions of the British government; as if that government could possibly have any other view than the interests of the Parganotes themselves; or any object to answer besides their advantage, in endeavouring to make for them the best terms that could be obtained. Great pains were taken to persuade them that as, by the treaty of 1815, Great Britain could have no pretensions to the territory of Parga, and as she did not choose to consider herself bound to see the stipulations of the treaty of 1800 fulfilled, she had nothing to do but to evacuate the place:-that she ought therefore to be desired to do so, and leave the Parganotes to defend their fortress-their miserable fortress, against the whole power of Ali Pasha backed by that of the Porte! We will do the Parganotes the justice to believe that they are neither so grossly ignorant, nor so credulous as not to perceive the absurdity of the impudent assertion

'that

"that a handful of men is sufficient to keep the place, and that, on the land side, thousands of troops would attempt in vain to take it by force.'* These pernicious advisers knew well enough, that the mere attempt at resistance would have been nothing short of devoting the whole people of Parga to inevitable destruction, to be accomplished under every feeling of revenge which their obstinacy would have provoked in the breasts of their enemies ;-for the contest could not have been long, nor the issue of it doubtful. But their atrocious counsel was calculated to answer one of two base ends; to bring indelible disgrace on the British nation, if it had been followed; or, to afford the Parganotes an argument (though a bad one) in urging their unfounded claims on Great Britain.

To obviate so dreadful a catastrophe the British ambassador was authorized to announce to the Porte, that the British garrison would be withdrawn from Parga so soon as the Sultan_should give his accession to the new settlement of the Ionian Islands, which circumstances, arising out of the war with France, had compelled the allied sovereigns to determine upon; but not until he had further consented to provide a suitable indemnity for such of the Parganotes as might resolve, from motives of personal security, to remove. We pretend not to be acquainted with all the considerations which may have rendered this latter condition a preliminary of indispensable justice and generosity, as it appears to have been regarded, on the part of the British government; but we are quite certain we shall be borne out in stating that we had not the shadow of a claim to demand such a concession. We presume however that the conduct of the Parganotes in assisting to expel the enemy from the place, and the painful events that had previously occurred, in direct violation of every condition of the treaty of 1800, at Previsa, Vonitza, and Butrinto, were deemed to render this humane interference in favour of the inhabitants an imperative act of duty on the part of Great Britain.

But those inhabitants of Parga who might be disposed to remain were equally the objects of British solicitude. As the treaty was still in force between Russia and the Porte, (which the special conditions thus obtained in favour of such of the Parganotes as chose to withdraw, could not be considered as abrogating in any respect,) it was considered that the rights to be claimed under that treaty, by those who should stay behind, ought to be secured to them by the Ottoman Porte. To those rights they were clearly and unequivocally entitled, and to all the privileges thereby granted to them; and it was competent for Russia at any time to claim the same for them. The British government, however, not being a di

* Exposé des Faits, &c.

rect