1

1752.
JOURNAL of the PROCEEDINGS and DEBATES
in the POLITICAL CLUB, continued from the
APPENDIX of laft Year's MAGAZINE, Page 590.

İfball now give you a Debate which
we had in our Club upon this Quef-
tion, Whether the Sum of 16000/.
fhould be granted for the Pay of
the General and Staff-officers for
his Majefty's Land Forces ? A
Which Debate was opened by T.
Sempronius Gracchus, in Substance
as falious.

Mr. Prefident,
SIR,

A

ally been burdened with this expence. Now, as the provifion for the ftaff is generally brought in, as an article in grofs, in our estimate for the army; and as I last year obferved, that this article exceeded what has formerly been granted in time of peace for this purpose, I thought it was incumbent upon this house to inquire into the cause of this exceeding, which was the reafon for my moving to have this article of the staff particularly flated, and brought in, as an eftimate by itself alone.

As to the civil part of the staff I have nothing to fay against it, Sir, I fhall at prefent make no objection to it; but as to the military, I think it not only unneceffary but dangerous. To have in time of peace a captain geCneral, with all the parade attending that high office, looks more like a military than a civil government; and

S the estimate now under B confideration was at my defire brought in feparately, and as it was too late, when this refolution was agreed to in the committee, to trouble you with what I had to fay upon the subject, I now think myfelf obliged to give my reafons for having it brought in diftinct from any other article, and my reasons for thinking that this refolution ought not to be agreed to. This branch of publick expence, which is called the taff, confifts, as gentlemen will fee by the estimate now before us, of two parts, which are in their nature very different, the one being a civil, the other a military establishment. The civil establishment confifts of a provifion for certain officers, who, though they have a concern with our army, yet are by their employ. ment mere civil officers; and this continues in time of peace as well as war, and amounts to a little above 10,000l. a year. The other is a provifion for a captain general, feveral inferior generals, aid-de-camps and the like, which can be of no use F in time of peace, and therefore in fuch a time this nation has not ufuE of EJanuary, 1752.

E

may now, as it has done heretofore, put an end to our conftitution, by drawing in all the other parts of our government within the whirlD pool of its own power. I have not feen this captain general's commiffion; nor would I move for it, because of the ill luck I had laft feffion in my mo. tion for the commiffion of the mafter general of the ordnance +. But whatever his commiffion may be, his power will be much the fame with that which the lord high conftable of England had of old, only it will be much more dangerous: The high constable had by his office the power over the military; but what was then our military, Sir? It confitted of our great barons, or lords of great manors, and their tenants : These were then our officers, thefe were then our foldiers: Of thete our B armies † See London Magazině

* See London Magazine for last year, p: 367; 410. for 1759, P. 459.

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PROCEEDINGS of the POLITICAL CLUB, &c. Jan.

cuting all the fentences of the court; but our captain general has not only the nomination of all the judges in our modern courts-martial, but the execution of all their fentences, without controul. Then as to the men fubject to our modern courts martial, who are they? They are either officers whofe commiffions depend entirely upon the pleasure of the captain general, and who have no natural influence upon the men under their command; or they are foldiers who dare never difpute, much less difobey the orders of the captain general, let them be never fo illegal, let them be of never fuch dangerous confequence to their fovereign. If he fhould order a party to go and bring the fovereign from St. James's C to the head quarters, no man commanded upon that party durft difobey If any did, they might be tried and condemned by a courtmartial, and fhot by the captain general's orders, in a few hours. In fhort, by a dexterous management, and a fudden modelling of the army, the captain general might bring his fovereign into the fame condition that Henry III. was in the army of the earl of Leicester, or Henry VI. in the hands of the Yorkists; and the fame pretence can never be wanting, which was that of taking or keeping the king out of the hands of evil counsellors.

armies confifted; and as the officers
were not removeable at pleasure, and
the men under their command had a
natural dependence upon them, they
could difpute the commands of the
conftable, they could difobey, if they
thought his commands contrary to A
law, or inconfiftent with the safety
of the fovereign.
And what made
this office ftill lefs dangerous, was,
that it was often hereditary; and
confequently might often happen to
be in a man who had no military
knowledge or character, nor any B
influence in our armies. Yet, not-
withstanding all thefe difadvantages,
fuch was the power of this high
office, that it often became oppreffive
upon the people, fo oppreffive, that
at laft an act of parliament became
necesary, in the reign, I think, of
Richard II. for circumfcribing its
power; which act, in the preamble,
recites, that the commons had made
grievous complaint of the incroach-
ments made upon the common law,
by the court of the conftable and
marshal. And tho the jurifdiction D
of this court was by this act confined
to military affairs only, yet the
power of this high officer continued
to be fo extenfive, that it was thought
to be of dangerous confequence to the
crown itself; for which reafon it was
at laft, in the reign of Henry VIII. E
entirely laid afide, and never fince
granted but for a particular purpose,
and for that purpofe alone.

Now, Sir, with regard to our captain general, he has the fame power, I fuppofe, over the military, that the high conftable had of old; F but his power will be much more abfolute and arbitrary both over our courts-martial, and over every man fubject to those courts. As to courtsmartial, the conftable's power was limited by the lord marshal of England, who was likewife a great offi- G cer entirely independent of the conftable, and who fat with the conftable as a judge in that court, and was the proper fupreme officer for exe

Let us confider, Sir, what an extenfive power the captain general has by the nature of his office: He must have the fole difpofal of, or at leaft the chief recommendation as to all commiffions in the army: He may treat with enemies, pardon rebels, appoint courts martial, and fign the dead warrant for the execution of the higheft officer under his command; and then, by the nature of our modern difcipline, every man in the army muft fhew the highest refpect to his perfon, and the molt implicit obedience to his commands. No man dare fo much as

mutter

1752. PROCEEDINGS of the POLITICAL CLUB, &c.

A

II

termined by his danger. The example of Hugh Capet, founder of the prefent royal family of France, would fire him with hopes of fuccefs: The fate of the duke of York, father of our Edward IV. would convince him, that no fubject could depend upon a treaty with his fovereign, whilft left in poffeffion even of the name of king.

mutter against him, or against any
order he iffues; for the article of
war fays, that Whoever shall behave
himself with contempt or disrespect
towards the general, or speak words
tending to his hurt or dishoncur, shall
be punished by the judgment of a
court-martial, that is, fhall be shot,
if the court, under the influence of
the general, fhall fo order it. Thus
every man in the army must be under
a legal dependence upon the cap:
tain general, and what will ren-
der this dependence more abfolute, B
and I may fay, voluntary, is, that
the captain general must be one who
has been bred up in war, and, as is
now the cafe, of a very high mili-
tary character. This of courfe pro-
cures him the affection and esteem
both of the officers and foldiers of C
our army, confequently, that im-
plicit obedience which is directed by
the law, will be enforced by their in-
clination; and the latter may con-
tinue to operate, nay, may operate
more firongly, after the former has
ceased. Whilst the king remained D
in the leading strings of his captain
general Whilft the latter con-
tinued to be a fort of mayor du Palais,
he might not perhaps think of any
attempt upon the crown. But after
he has once filled all or moft of the
commiffions in the army with his
creatures, and has by his conduct
engaged the hearts and affections of
the foldiers to center in him alone,
could the king with any fafety ven-
ture to difmifs him from his com-
mand, or emcancipate himself from
the flavery of his captain general?
Surely, no gentleman can fancy fo,
who thinks, that the whole military
power of this nation confifts in our
ftanding army alone. And if the
captain general fhould find the army
refolved to ftand by him, notwith-
ftanding the king's having difmiffed
him from his command, his next step
would certainly be, to feize upon
the crown: To this he would be
provoked by his ambition, and de-

E

F

This, Sir, is a true reprefentation of the danger to which the crown is expofed, by continuing the poft of captain general in time of peace; and of this danger they are fo fenfible even in the defpotick kingdom of France, that they never have fuch a poft continued in time of peace; but in a free country, in a country where the people have liberties and privileges to lofe, there is another danger, and this other danger is double the former; for the liberties of the people are equally endangered by a clofe union between the king and his captain general, and by an open breach between them. In case of an open breach, and the general's getting the better of his fovereign, the certain confequence would be, the establishment of a military government and absolute defpotick power, as we may moft indubitably conclude, from what happened in the reign of Charles I. for at that time, an army raised for preferving, annihilated the liberties of the people, and vefted their general with abfolute and arbitrary power; what could we then expect from an army long accuftomed to confider chiefly their pay and preferment, and perhaps induftriously taught to hold in contempt the civil government of their country?

Then, Sir, fuppofing that a clofe union fubfifts between the king and Ghis captain general: In this cafe we muft fuppofe, that the fovereign is pretty much influenced by his general, efpecially fo far as may be agreeable to his own inclinations; and I may

B 2

now

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PROCEEDINGS of the POLITICAL CLUB, &c. Jan.

B

now decently as well as fafely remark, that moft kings incline to extend their power as much as they can, because all the world knows, that our prefent most gracious fovereign had never any fuch inclination. But we may hereafter have fuch a A king, and let us confider, what might be the confequence of fuch a king's being not only influenced but aflifted by a man of great character in the army, bred up in camps, and accustomed to have an implicit obedience yielded to all his commands. Muft we not fuppofe, that fuch a man would but ill brook being controuled by the civil power? Can we fuppofe, that he would willingly fubmit to the parliament's making a reduction in the army under his command Confequently, the par- C liament must either yield in every thing to his will and pleasure, or he would advife his fovereign to govern without a parliament; and would have great influence in prevailing with the army to be fubfervient to this defign: And let me tell you, D Sir, that the army's refufing to be fubfervient to any fuch defign, is, in my opinion, the only fecurity we now have for the prefervation of our liberties; for if they fhould refolve, by the king's fole authority, to execute martial law, notwithstanding E the expiration of the mutiny bill, they would foon extend that law to every man in the kingdom; and the continuing themselves in pay, as well as to prevent the confufion which would enfue from fuch a number of troops difbanding all at once, would, without the influence of a favourite captain general, be great incitements for their coming immediately to fuch a refolution.

This is an event, Sir, which we have great reafon to fear, and there is a much greater probability of its being brought about by a captain general, than by any prince upon our throne. The king has by our conflitution as much power as any

F

G

good or wife man can defire; and whilft our conftitution is preserved, he can never be in any personal danger. It is not therefore his intereft to attempt overturning our conftitution; because he thereby can get nothing defirable, and may lofe all. But after a captain general has ingroffed the dependence of the army upon himself alone, it is his intereft to overturn our conftitution; because from being the fervant, he would thereby become the master both of his country and his fovercign Nay, his own fafety might perhaps induce him to make the attempt; for fhould he have been guilty of any misdemeanors in his command, the danger of an inquiry, and the fear of punishment, would be ftrong arguments for the attempt, and I believe irrefiftible, if attended with a probable view of fuccefs.

Thus, Sir, I think, it is apparent, that the continuance of the poft of captain general in time of peace, may be of the most dangerous confequence to the people, as well as to the fovereign; and this danger is rather increased than diminished by the high quality of that great officer. By his ambition the nation might be involved in unneceffary wars; and though from his conduct it should appear, that he was abfolutely unfit for the command of an army in time of war, yet it would be im. poffible, or at leaft dangerous for the parliament to attempt getting him removed. Befides, he would always be for having our wars carried on by national troops, and for that end increafing their number, because it would add to his influence in the country, both which I think inconfiftent with the true intereft of this nation; and we ought to guard the more carefully against it, as, I believe, we can never now engage in any war, without being involved in a war upon the continent of Europe, which, in my opinion, ought always

td