In what Oeconomy Virtue confifts. From this Detail it appears, that MAN, by his Original Frame, is made for a temperate, compaffionate, benevolent," active, and progreffive State. He is strongly attractive of the Good, and repulfive of the Ills, which befall others as well as himself. He feels the highest Approbation and Moral Complacence in those Affections, and in those Actions which immediately and directly refpect the Good of others, and the highest Disapprobation and Abhorrence of the contrary. Befides these, he has many particular Perceptions or InStincts of Approbation, which though perhaps not of the fame kind with the others, yet are accompanied with correfpondent Degrees of Affection, proportioned to their respective Tendencies to the Public Good. THEREFORE, by acting agreeably to these Principles, Man acts agreeably to his Structure, and fulfils the benevolent Intentions of its Author. But we call a Thing GOOD, when it anfwers its End; and a Creature GOOD, when he acts in a Conformity to his Conftitution. Confequently, Man must be denominated GOOD or VIRTUOUS when he acts fuitably to the Principles Principles and Destination of his Nature. And where his VIRTUE lies, there alfo is his RECTITUDE, his DIGNITY, and PERFECTION to be found. And this coincides with the Account of Virtue formerly given, but prefents it in another Attitude, or fets it in a Light something different. THE THE ELEMENTS OF Moral PHILOSOPHY. BOOKII. SECT. I. The principal Distinctions of Duty or Virtue. WE E have now confidered the Conftitution and Connections of Man, and on these erected a general Syftem of DuTY, or MORAL OBLIGATION, confonant to Reaĵon, approved by his moft facred and intimate Senfe, fuitable to his mixed Condition, and confirmed by the Experi ence ence of Mankind. We have also traced the FINAL CAUSES of his Moral Faculties and Affections to thofe noble Purposes they answer both with regard to the private and the public System. General Di vifion of Duty. Another to Socie From this Induction it is evident, that there is one Order or Clafs of Duties which Man owes to HIMSELF. ty. And a third to God. Dutics to Good or The Duties he owes to HIMSELF are founded chiefly on the DEFENSIVE and PRIVATE Paffions, which prompt him to pursue whatever tends to private Good Happiness, and to avoid, or ward off whatever tends to private Ill or Mifery. Among the various Goods which allure and folicit him, and the various Ills which attack or threaten him," To be intelligent and accurate in felecting one, and rejecting the other, or in preferring the moft excellent Goods, and avoiding the most "terrible Ills, when there is a Competition "among either, and to be difcreet in ufing "the best Means to attain the Goods and "avoid the Ills, is what we call PRU"DENCE." This, in our inward Frame, correfponds to Sagacity, or a Quickness of E Senfe Senfe in our outward." To propor "tion our DEFENSIVE Paffions, to our Dangers, we call FORTITUDE;" which always implies" a juft Mixture of calm "Refentment and Animofity, and wellgoverned Caution." And this Firmnefs of Mind anfwers to the Strength and Mufcling of the Body. And duly to "adjuft our PRIVATE Paffions to "Wants, or to the refpective Moment "of the Good we affect or pursue, we "call TEMPERANCE;" which does therefore always imply, in this large Sense of the Word, 66 a juft Balance or Command "of the Paffions," and answers to the Health and found Temperament of the Body. Society. r¢ * The Second Class of Duties Duties to arifes from the PUBLIC or soCIAL Affections," the juft Harmony or Proportion of which to the "Dangers and Wants of others, and to "the feveral Relations we bear, com"monly goes by the Name of JuSTICE." This includes the Whole of our Duty to Society, to its Parent, and the general Polity of Nature; particularly Gratitude, Friend * Vid. Tim. Locr. de Anima Mundi. |