Pleafure, not the Idea of Obligation.

fteddy in its Operations or Decifion? Why fhould fuch a Divine Instinct be thought lefs rational, lefs fuitable to the Dignity of the Mind, than thofe intuitive Perceptions which are converfant about abftract Truths, and arife neceffarily and inftantaneously from the obvious Relations of Things? And if Reafon with all its Sagacity may fometimes err, nay often does, why should any other Power of Perception be thought infallible, or be condemned as brutal and irrational if it is not? From what has been faid it is evident, that it is not the Pleasures, or agreeable Senfations which accompany the Exercife of the feveral Affections, nor those confequent to the Actions that conftitute MoRAL OBLIGATION, or excite in us the Idea of it. That Pleasure is posterior to the Idea of Obligation, and frequently we are obliged, and acknowledge ourselves under an Obligation, to fuch Affections and Actions as are attended with Pain; as in the Trials of Virtue, where we are obliged to facrifice private to public Good, or a prefent Pleasure to a future Interest. We have Pleasure in ferving an aged Parent, but it is neither the Perception nor C

Profpect

Profpect of that Pleasure, which gives us the Idea of Obligation to that Conduct. Therefore, when we use these Terms, Obligation, Duty, Ought, and the like, they ftand for a fimple Idea, an original uncompounded Feeling or Perception of the human Mind, as much as any Idea whatsoever, and can no more be defined than any other fimple Idea; and this Perception is not a Creature of the Mind, but a Ray emaning directly from the Father of Lights, a fair genuine Stamp of his Hand, who impreffed every vital and original Energy on the Mind, or if we chufe rather to fay, who ordained thofe Laws of Perception, by which moral Forms attract and charm us with an irrefiftible Power.

But because the learned Dexterity of human Wit has fo marvelloufly puzzled a plain and obvious Subject, we shall confider fome of thofe ingenious Theories by which Moralifts have deduced and explained Moral Obligation.

SECT.

SECT. III.

Various Hypothefes concerning Moral Obli

F'

gation.

ROM the Induction which has been made, we shall be able to judge with more Advantage of the different Hypotheses which have been contrived to deduce the Origin of Moral Obligation. Hobbes, who faw Mankind

in an unfavourable Attitude, The Scheme of Hobbes. involved in all the Distraction and Mifery of a civil War, feems to have taken too narrow and partial a View of our Nature, and has therefore drawn it in a very odious and uncomfortable Light. Next to the Defire of Self-prefervation, he makes the governing Paffions in Man, the Love of Glory, and of Power; and from thefe, by an arbitrary, unnatural, and unfupported Hypothefis, contrary to common Experience, and common Language, he attempts to deduce all the other Paffions which inflame the Minds, and influence the Manners of Men. All Men, fays he, are by Nature equal, that is to fay, according to his own Explanation,

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the

the weakest can do as much Mischief as the ftrongeft; all defire, and have an equal Right to the fame Things, and want to excel each other in Power and Honour; but as it is impoffible for all to poffefs the fame Things, or to obtain a Pre-eminence in Power and Honour, hence must arise mutual Contests, a natural Paffion to invade the Property, and level the Power and Character of each other, and to raise and fecure themfelves against the Attempts of others. * This State of Things, in which every Man having a Right to every Thing, has likewife a Right to prevent his Neighbour by Force or Fraud; he tells us, muft naturally produce a State of War and mutual Carnage. In fuch a State, he adds, nothing can be called unjuft or unlawful; for he who has a Right to the End, has also a Right to the only Means of obtaining or fecuring it, which, according to him, are Force or Fraud. And this State he calls the State of Nature. But our fhrewd Philofopher. fubjoins, that Men being aware that fuch a State must terminate in their own Deftruction,

* Vid. Hob. de Cive, cap. i, ii, &c. and Leviath. c. xvii, &c.

struction, agreed to furrender their private unlimited Right into the Hands of the Majority, or fuch as the Majority should. appoint, and to fubject themfelves for the future to common Laws, or to common Judges or Magiftrates. In confequence of this Surrender, and of this mutual Compact or Agreement, they are fecured against mutual Hoftilities, and bound or obliged to a peaceable and good Behaviour; fo that it is no longer lawful or juft (the good Man means fafe or prudent) to invade and encroach on another. For this would be contrary to Compact, and a Violation of his Promise and Faith.

Therefore as there could be no Injustice previous to this Compact, so the Compact, and it alone, must be the Origin of Justice, the Foundation of Duty and Moral Obligation. This is our fubtle Philofopher's Scheme!

But one may ask him, What Obligation is a Man under to keep his Promise, or ftand to his Compact, if there be no Obligation, no motal Tie diftinct from that Promise, and that Compact, independent of and previous to both? If there is none, they must prove a mere Rope of Sand, and Men are left as loose and unfociable

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