cause of action survived, or that there was a severance between the
surviving and the representatives of the deceased plaintiff. The death
of the deceased party was not suggested on the record, his representa-
tives did not appear voluntarily, nor were they cited to appear. Held,
that the proper course of proceeding to enable this court to obtain
jurisdiction had been wholly disregarded, and that it was too late to
cure the defect, more than four years having elapsed since the final
decree was entered. Dolan v, Jennings, 385.
9. To give this court jurisdiction to review the judgment of a state court
under section 709 of the Revised Statutes, because of the denial by
the state court of any right, title, privilege or immunity claimed under
the Constitution, or any treaty or statute of the United States, it must
appear on the record that such title, right, privilege or immunity was
specially set up or claimed at the proper time and in the proper way.
Leeper v. Texas, 462.
10. A decree dismissing the bill was entered April 21, 1883. Judgment
for costs was rendered June 16, 1883. The appeal was allowed
June 16, 1885, on an application made June 15, 1885. Held, that the
decree of April 21 was the final decree; but that, even if the judgment
of June 16 was the final decree, the allowance was too late to enable
this court to take jurisdiction. Fowler v. Hamill, 549.
11. On a writ of error, this court cannot review any error committed by a
jury in finding an amount of damages; nor take cognizance of a com-
plaint that a motion for a new trial was overruled, or that the verdict
of the jury was contrary to law and not warranted by the testimony.
Wilson v. Everett, 616.
12. A writ of error to review the judgment of the highest tribunal of a
State cannot be maintained in the absence of a Federal question giv-
ing this court jurisdiction. Davis v. Texas, 651.
13. The questions sought to be presented in this case as Federal questions
fall entirely within the scope of the exercise of the powers of the State,
and this court has no jurisdiction over them. Ib.
See CORPORATION, 2;
NATIONAL BANK, 1.
JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. The doctrine reaffirmed that the federal courts, sitting in any State,
have equal and coördinate jurisdiction with the state court in deter-
mining questions of general law, although they will, in cases of
doubt, lean to an agreement of views with the state court.
Clark v.
Bever, 96.
2. The judgment in this case was reversed in this court for want of juris-
diction in the Circuit Court, 130 U. S. 341. The reversal was accom-
panied by an order that the defendants recover their costs in this
court, and have execution therefor, and the cause was remanded to
the Circuit Court for further proceedings. Upon filing the mandate
in the Circuit Court, the defendants moved that they have judgment
against the plaintiff for their costs in this court, and for the costs of
the transcript from the Circuit Court, and that execution issue there-
for. The defendants, alleging in their motion that certain sums had
been collected on the judgment, also moved for a summary inquiry
as to the amount, and that they have judgment for the same, with
interest; and they having proved that there was collected by the plain-
tiff upon the judgment, by supplementary proceedings in aid of the
execution thereon, the sum of $629.23, the court rendered judgment
that the defendants recover that sum with interest and costs, and that
the action be dismissed for want of jurisdiction as to the subject
matter of the suit. Held, that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction to
correct by its own order that which, according to the judgment of
this court, it had no authority to do in the first instance, and that
the judgment should be affirmed. Northwestern Fuel Co. v. Brock,
3. In this case the complaint described the defendant as a corporation
chartered under the laws of Alabama and doing business in that State,
one of the plaintiffs as a "resident" in North Carolina, and two other
plaintiffs as "residents" in South Carolina. An amendment added
twelve plaintiffs with no averments as to citizenship. As the juris-
diction depended upon citizenship; Held, that the Circuit Court was
without jurisdiction. Timmons v. Elyton Land Co., 378.
4. While an unconstitutional tax may confer no right, impose no duty and
support no obligation, the trespass resulting from proceedings to col-
lect such void tax cannot be restrained by injunction, where irrepara-
ble injury or other ground for equitable interposition is not shown to
exist. Shelton v. Platt, 591.
5. Purely injunction bills cannot be maintained to restrain the collection
of taxes upon the sole ground of their unconstitutionality. Shelton
v. Platt, 139 U. S. 591, affirmed and applied. Allen v. Pullman's
Palace Car Co., 658.
C. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS.
1. In an action against the United States to recover for amounts due cer-
tain mail contractors under the appropriation in the sundry civil
appropriation act of March 3, 1877, 19 Stat. 362, c. 105, which pro-
vided that "any such claims which have been paid by the Confederate
States government shall not again be paid; " the burden of proof is on
the plaintiff to show that his claim was not of the excepted class.
Selma, Rome &c. Railroad Co. v. United States, 560.
2. Whether, that appropriation having been covered into the Treasury, a
claimant can maintain suit under that act in the Court of Claims
without further legislation, is a question which the court has not
deemed it necessary to consider. Ib.
1. Forty-three years after the ancestor of the plaintiffs acquired title,
more than twenty years after that ancestor had positive information
of the wrong upon which the claims set up in this bill of equity are
grounded, twenty-five years after the purchase by the defendant in
good faith and with no knowledge of the wrong, this suit was com-
menced, without any assertion of the right now set up having been
made during all that time. Held, that these facts disclosed laches
which forbade the interference of a court of equity. Underwood v.
Dugan, 380.
2. The statute of limitations of Nebraska, of four years, as to an action
for relief on the ground of fraud, and the doctrine of laches, apply to
a suit by a county in Nebraska, brought in the Circuit Court of the
United States for the District of Nebraska, to set aside a decree of
the same court for fraud.
Boone County v. Burlington & Missouri River
3. Facts stated which supported the defences of the statute of limitations
and of laches.
4. On the 16th of November, 1863, plaintiffs brought suit to recover cus-
toms duties illegally exacted, laying the ad damnum at $1500. On the
8th of January, 1881, they amended their claim, increasing the ad
damnum to $20,000. There was no interest count in the declaration,
and it was doubtful whether interest was at first specially declared for
in any way. No account was rendered or demand made prior to the
commencement of the suit, nor was any bill of particulars furnished
at that time. On the 11th of May, 1882, a bill of particulars was for
the first time served. The court below gave judgment for $14,394.95,
with interest from the date of the several payments. Held, on the
facts set forth at length in the opinion, showing laches on the part
of plaintiffs, that they were only entitled to judgment for $1500 with
interest from November 16, 1863, and $12,894.95, with interest from
January 8, 1881. Redfield v. Bartels, 694.
LIMITATION, STATUTES OF.
See LACHES, 2, 3.
1. An averment in a bill, filed by the curator of an interdict in Louisiana
to have a contract declared null and void, that at the time of making
it the interdict was losing, and to a great extent had lost, his capacity
to attend to business and to manage his affairs, and that his mind was
seriously impaired so as to affect his understanding and judgment, and
so continued until he was judicially interdicted, does not meet the
requirements of the Civil Code of that State, and does not entitle the
plaintiff to relief upon the ground that the interdict was then incapa-
ble in law of making a binding agreement. Stockmeyer v. Tobin, 176.
2. In Louisiana a judgment debtor can waive or renounce the right to
have property, which is taken on execution to satisfy the judgment,
appraised. Ib.
3. The right of appraisement of property taken on execution is given in
Louisiana to the owner, and, if waived by him, his creditors cannot
complain unless the waiver was made fraudulently and to defeat their
debts.
4. When a mortgage in Louisiana stipulates for a sale, on forfeiture, with-
out appraisement, and the petition for executory process prays for
such a sale, and the order is "let executory process issue herein as
prayed for and according to law," it imports a sale without appraise-
ment. Ib.
5. When a plantation in Louisiana and its fixtures are to be sold under a
mortgage, the sale must be made at the seat of justice, unless the
debtor, within the time after the seizure prescribed by law, requires it
to be made on the plantation. Ib.
6. In Louisiana, when a plantation and the personal property upon it are
mortgaged together by one mortgage, they may be sold together as an
entirety. lb.
7. In Louisiana mere informalities or irregularities in a judicial sale do
not constitute a sufficient ground for setting it aside. Ib.
8. Following the Supreme Court of Iowa in its construction of the local
law of that State, this court holds that a mortgage of a stock of goods
in a store in that State, otherwise valid, is not invalidated by reason
of a parol understanding at the time of its execution, that the mort-
gagor may retain possession, and sell the goods, and apply the pro-
ceeds to his own support, and to keep up the stock, applying only the
surplus to the payment of the mortgage debt. Etheridge v. Sperry,
266.
9. Sections 1067, 1068 and 1070 of the Code of Tennessee of 1884, by Mil-
liken & Vertrees, do not require that, after an election, the ballot-box
shall be opened at the place where the election was held, and the
names of the persons appearing in each ballot be read aloud at that
place, and the ballot-box not be removed from that place before the
votes are counted, so as to make an indictment good, under § 5515 of
the Revised Statutes of the United States, relating to an election at
which a Representative or Delegate in Congress is voted for, which
alleges, as a neglect or refusal to perform a duty, required of the offi-
cer of an election, by a law of a State, and as a violation of a duty
imposed by such law, a failure to open the ballot-box at that place, and
a failure to read aloud such names at that place, and the removing of
the ballot-box from that place before the votes were counted, no fraud
being averred in the indictment, and no intent to affect the election
or its result, and there being no allegation that the election or its
result was affected. United States v. Brewer, 278.
1. The writ of mandamus cannot issue in a case where its effect is to
direct or control the head of an executive department in the discharge
of an executive duty, involving the exercise of judgment or discretion.
Boynton v. Blaine, 306.
2. When a mere ministerial duty is imposed upon the executive officers of
the government, that is, a service which they are bound to peform
without further question, then, if they refuse, the mandamus may be
issued to compel them. Ib.
3. A writ of mandamus confers no new authority, and the party to be
coerced must have the power to perform the act. Ib.
4. The act of June 18, 1878, 20 Stat. 124, c. 262, subjects specifically the
payment of the Weil and La Abra awards under the Mexican Claims
Commission of July 4, 1868, 15 Stat. 679, to the control of the Presi-
dent; and the subject being thus confided to his judgment and dis-
cretion, mandamus will not lie to compel their payment. Ib.
MEXICAN CLAIMS COMMISSION.
See PUBLIC LAND, 12, 13, 14, 15.
1. Limitations upon the power of a trustee in a railroad mortgage to take
proceedings to enforce payment of the amount secured should be con-
strued strictly.. Guaranty Trust &c. Co. v. Green Cove Spring &c. Rail-
road Co., 137.
2. A provision in a mortgage that the mode of sale provided by it "shall
be exclusive of all others" is an attempt to provide against a remedy
in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings and oust the jurisdic-
tion of the courts, and is therefore invalid. Ib.
See LOCAL Law, 4, 5, 6, 7.
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