Opinion of the Court.

since 1883; that it resembled in appearance bichromate of potash, which was composed of chromic acid and potassium; and that both were used to produce chrome yellow and other colors, although bichromate of soda was less soluble, and less valuable for producing some colors, than bichromate of potash. The plaintiffs, in their protest, and at the trial, insisted that bichromate of soda was a chemical compound and salt, "not specially enumerated or provided for in this act," within the meaning of Schedule A, and was therefore dutiable under that schedule at twenty-five per cent ad valorem; and requested the judge to direct a verdict in their favor.

But the judge ruled, in accordance with the decision of the collector, that bichromate of soda was subject to a duty of three cents a pound under § 2499, as a "non-enumerated article," which bore a similitude, in the use to which it was applied, to bichromate of potash; declined to submit the question of similitude to the jury; and directed a verdict for the defendant. 29 Fed. Rep. 684. The plaintiff alleged exceptions, and sued out this writ of error.

Mr. Edward Hartley (with whom was Mr. Walter H. Coleman on the brief) for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General Parker for defendant in

error.

MR. JUSTICE GRAY, after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

The ruling below was in accordance with decisions in other circuits. Biddle v. Hartranft, 29 Fed. Rep. 90; Lloyd v. MeWilliams, 31 Fed. Rep. 261. But it appears to us to have procceded upon an erroneous view of the statute, as applied to the case before the court.

The general scope of the similitude clause in the customs acts is defined in a recent judgment of this court, delivered by Mr. Justice Field, as follows: "To place articles among those designated as enumerated, it is not necessary that they should be specifically mentioned. It is sufficient that they are

Opinion of the Court.

designated in any way to distinguish them from other articles. Thus, the words 'manufactures of which steel is a component part,' and 'manufactures of which glass is a component part,' have been held a sufficient designation to render the goods enumerated articles under the statute, and take them out of the similitude clause. Arthur v. Sussfield, 96 U. S. 128. Upon the same principle, 'manufactures of hair' must be held a sufficient designation to place such manufactures among the enumerated articles." Arthur v. Butterfield, 125 U. S. 70, 76, 77. So the description, "manufactures composed wholly of cotton," or even "manufactures of cotton," has been held to be a sufficient enumeration. Stuart v. Maxwell, 16 How. 150; Fisk v. Arthur, 103 U. S. 431. See also Hartranft v. Meyer, 135 U. S. 237.

In the customs act of 1883, Schedule A, entitled "Chemical Products," besides defining the duties on more than a hundred kinds of such products, makes the duty on "all chemical compounds and salts, by whatever name known, and not specially enumerated or provided for in this act, twenty-five per centum ad valorem." The designation, "all chemical compounds and salts, by whatever name known," includes all chemical compounds and chemical salts, used then or thereafter in any science or art, as clearly as if the proper names of each and all of them had been given. Bichromate of soda, being undoubtedly a chemical compound and a chemical salt, is within. the very words of the schedule, and cannot therefore be treated as a non-enumerated article, within the similitude clause. The manifest intent of Congress was that every kind of chemical compound and of chemical salt, by whatever name known, should have a fixed rate of duty, to be ascertained quickly and easily by the schedule of chemical products, without entering upon a comparison, under the similitude clause, of “material, quality, texture or the use to which it may be applied," which, though affording a convenient and valuable test as applied to many articles of manufacture, would often be found difficult of application to chemical products, without such scientific knowledge and investigation as could not be expected of custom-house officers.

Syllabus.

It was argued for the United States that this conclusion would be inconsistent with the decisions in Stuart v. Maxwell, 16 How. 150, and in Arthur v. Fox, 108 U. S. 125. But we cannot perceive any such inconsistency. In neither of those cases was there any question between the similitude clause and a clause specially enumerating, describing or designating a particular class of goods. In Stuart v. Maxwell, the question was between the similitude clause and a general clause covering "all goods, wares and merchandise, imported from foreign countries, and not specially provided for in this act." Act of July 30, 1846, c. 74, § 3; 9 Stat. 43. In Arthur v. Fox, the question was between successive sentences of the similitude clause itself, as applied to an article admitted not to be enumerated.

Judgment reversed, and case remanded with directions to set aside the verdict, and to take further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

BOCK v. PERKINS.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA.

No. 285. Argued April 2, 3, 1891. — Decided April 13, 1891.

A marshal of the United States, or his deputies, being sued in trespass for seizing particular property under an attachment, to him directed, and defending upon the ground that the property, so seized, belonged to the defendant named in the writ of attachment, may have the case-the amount in dispute being sufficient removed to the proper Circuit Court of the United States, as one arising under the laws of the United States. A deed of assignment for the benefit of creditors, recited the indebtedness of the assignor, his inability to pay his debts with punctuality or in full, and his desire to make "a fair and equitable distribution of his property among all his creditors," and provided that the assignor "has bargained, sold and assigned, and does hereby grant, convey and assign," unto the assignee "all the lands and all the personal property of every name and nature whatsoever of the said party of the first part, more particularly enumerated and described in the schedule hereto annexed, marked Sched

Opinion of the Court.

ule A, or intended so to be. . . . Schedule B, hereto annexed, contains, as near as I can state, a list of all my creditors and the amount of their respective demands, and both of said Schedules A and B are hereby made part of this assignment." Schedule A, annexed to the assignment, contained an inventory of certain real estate, and a list of persons indebted to the assignor, and was verified by his oath to the effect that it contained a true list of the assignor's creditors and the amount of their respective demands. But it contained no clause or provision which, by any construction, embraced a stock of goods worth about $10,000, and constituting, at the time, the bulk of the assignor's estate. Held, That the title to these goods did not pass to the assignee, and remained subject to attachment as the property of the assignor. The general description in the assignment of the property conveyed is limited by the particular description immediately following in the same clause referring to Schedule A.

The statutes of Iowa relating to assignments for the benefit of creditors refer to general assignments, by which the assignor makes a disposition of all his property for the benefit of all his creditors. They do not relate to partial assignments which are permissible under the laws of that State.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. D. E. Lyon for plaintiff in error. Mr. H. B. Fouke was with him on the brief.

Mr. Francis B. Daniels and Mr. Louis G. Hurd for defendants in error. Mr. David B. Henderson was with them on the brief.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court.

This action involves the title to a certain stock of goods seized under attachments sued out against the property of II. P. Lane from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Iowa, and directed to the marshal of that district for execution. The goods, when seized, were in the possession of the plaintiff in error, who claimed the right to hold them under an assignment made to him by Lane before the attachments were issued. Bock seeks to recover from Perkins, the marshal, and from Thrift and Hopkins, his deputies, damages in the sum of ten thousand dollars for their seizure. The defence was, that the goods were the property of Lane at

Opinion of the Court.
•

the time of the seizure, and, therefore, were liable to be taken under the attachments. Upon the petition of the defendants, accompanied by a proper bond, and an affidavit setting forth. the nature of the defence, the case was removed into the court below for trial as one arising under the laws of the United States. The plaintiff moved to remand it to the state court. The motion was denied, and by direction of the court the jury returned a verdict for the defendants. A judgment in their favor was accordingly entered. Bock v. Perkins, 28 Fed. Rep. 123.

The court below properly retained the case for trial. Every marshal of the United States, as well as his deputy, must take an oath or affirmation that he will faithfully execute all lawful precepts directed to him, and in all things well and truly perform the duties of his office. The marshal must also give bond, with sureties, for the faithful performance of the duties of his office by himself and deputies. And marshals and their deputies have, in the respective States, the same powers in executing the laws of the United States as sheriffs and their deputies have in executing the laws of such States. Rev. Stat. $$ 782, 783, 788. A case, therefore, depending upon the inquiry whether a marshal or his deputy has rightfully executed a lawful precept directed to the former from a court of the United States, is one arising under the laws of the United States; for, as this court has said, "cases arising under the laws of the United States are such as grow out of the legis lation of Congress, whether they constitute the right or privilege, or claim or protection, or defence of the party, in whole or in part, by whom they are asserted." Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257, 264; Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U. S. 135, 141. If the goods in question, when seized, were the property of Lane, the marshal and his deputies were in the discharge of duties imposed upon them by the laws of the United States; and for any failure in that regard he would be liable to suit by any one thereby injured. Rev. Stat. § 784. This case was, therefore, one arising under the laws of the United States, and removable from the state court. Feibelman v. Packard, 109 U. S. 421, 423; Bachrack v. Norton, 132 U. S.