which had, a few weeks since, been flushed with success, were now dispirited by disappointment: their sanguine hopes were turned into despondency: and, before the close of a campaign which had begun so gloriously, they had occasion to anticipate their future disasters in the hardships which they endured, and the sickness and loss of lives produced by bad food and an unhealthy climate. During these events and these changes in the southern provinces no memorable occurrence had taken place in the north.-Washington retained his position at Morristown in the Jerseys, and continued to act on the defensive. And the campaign on the part of the royalists was distinguished only by a short and ineffectual incursion in those provinces, under the conduct of Knyphausen and Tryon. || Soon after the return of sir Henry Clinton from Charlestown, † general Washington received a reinforcement of 6000 French troops, under count de Rochambeau, on board a fleet of seven sail of the line and five frigates, commanded by de Ternay. These troops which were landed on Rhode Island, were to have borne a part in the execution of the grand design which had been concerted for the utter destruction of the British power in America and the West Indies, first by the reduction of the West India islands, by means of the combined fleets of France and Spain; then by driving the British armies out of the thirteen provinces; and lastly, by an expedition to be conducted by de la Fayette for the reduction of Canada. The grandeur of the project helped to animate the provincials with sanguine hopes of success, and prevented them from foreseeing the difficulties with which the execution of it must be attended. It served, however, to heighten the patriotic spirit among them; which was now so prevalent that the ladies vied with the men in their liberal contributions for carrying on the war:' and they looked forward with a full expectation of success from the co-operation of the house of Bourbon in their exertions. But they were destined to be disappointed in their immediate views, and to perceive the disadvantage under which all confederacies act.-Agreeably with the plan concerted by the allied powers, don Joseph Solano arrived in the West Indies, in the month of June, with a fleet of twelve sail of the line besides 1780 1780 besides frigates, having 11,460 landmen on board eighty-three transports. These, when they had formed a junction with de Guichen, made a fleet of thirty-six sail; with which it was expected that an attack would be made on Jamaica; it being impossible for Great Britain to send an equal force into these seas without exposing herself to imminent danger in other parts. -But the whole of this complex scheme was frustrated by incidental circumstances. Crowded vessels, laziness, and filthiness, occasioned a disease among the Spanish troops and seamen, which soon disabled a great part of them. A want of concert in the commanders concurred with the vigilance of sir George Rodney in preventing the execution of any enterprise. And at length, when the Spaniards were gone to the Havannah, and it was expected that de Guichen would have joined de Ternay off the American coast, to co-operate in the schemes planned by Washington and de la Fayette, that admiral was constrained by the bad condition of his fleet to return to France. In the mean-time, Arbuthnot's fleet had been reinforced with a squadron under Graves, which gave it a superiority over de Ternay. And Washington, who was now at the head of 20,000 men, and perceived that the whole continent was zealous to forward his designs, had the mortification to see the war protracted to another campaign, at the moment when he expected to have brought it to a conclusion by one decisive stroke.b In the intermission of active hostilities between the grand armies, during a short absence of Washington from his camp, a scheme was concerted, the success of which must have had the most important effects on the war.General Arnold, who had borne so distinguished a part in the commencement of the revolt, and had testified so much zeal in promoting it, had conceived great disgust with the congress on account of some transactions between them, which reflected on his honour. He, however, still enjoyed a commission in the American army, and was apparently on terms of friendship with Washington. How unworthy he was of either was now manifested in his conduct.-Towards the close of the campaign a correspondence was opened by him with sir Henry Clinton, and a plan was formed, by the intervention of major André, for betraying the wing of the American army commanded by Arnold to the English general, and, by that means, exposing the 8 Annual Register. 1781. 22. Idem. 28. the chief body of their forces, then posted on the North River, to a joint attack of the royalists by sea and land. André had held his last conference with Arnold within the American lines, and was returning to New York in disguise, with a passport from that general under the assumed name of Anderson, when he was taken as a spy, and carried to the American camp.‡ The papers found about him in Arnold's handwriting, containing all the information respecting the circumstances of the American army which was requisite for the execution of the design, being laid before a court martial, he was sentenced to death as a spy. Every intercession was made for him: and, above all, his own amiable character as a man and merit as a soldier pleaded warmly in his behalf. But neither pardon, nor even such an alteration of the sentence as might make it more tolerable to a man of high spirit, could be obtained. He suffered the death of a common malefactor with a fortitude correspondent to his general behaviour, || regretted by all, but especially by those of his friends who maturely reflected on the disgrace which an act of treachery brings on a man, however great the object of it may be, or plausible its motives.-Arnold, mean-while, had escaped to the British army, and was honoured with the commission of a brigadier general. His immediate object was to raise a strong body of men, to act under his own separate command, from among the Americans who were dissatisfied with the system of policy adopted by the congress. With that view he published an address to the provincials, censuring that assembly for the inconsistency of their conduct, in having refused the fair terms of a reconciliation offered them by Great Britain; which was followed by a proclamation, inviting the officers and soldiers of the continental army to join him, who have the real interests of their country at heart, and who are "determined to be no longer the tools and dupes of congress or of "France."-The effect of these addresses was the reverse of what was expected. The unavailing efforts of this able general to disunite the provincials, and bring them back to their allegiance, proves that, whatever might be the disposition of some individuals who had no weight among them, the troops and the great body of the people were firmly attached to the present government. 66 1780 We September 21. October 2. i Stedman. 2. 252. k Ann. Regist. 1781. 47. 1780 We have seen, in the occurrences of this campaign, that, with the greatest exertion of national strength and resources that ever were made by any people, and the most meritorious conduct on the part of the commanders both by sea and land, no advances were made towards the accomplishment of the primary object of the war. Moreover, ill success was rendered more bitter to those at the helm by a reflection that the chief circumstances of adverse fortune which had marked the progress of it had been foretold and deprecated by men whose counsels were recommended by their judgment and information; which proved that they were not beyond the bounds of human foresight.-Nor were we yet arrived at the greatest height of our embarrassment. Disastrous as was the present aspect of her affairs, Great Britain had still greater dangers to encounter, and, as the only compensation for her losses and her sufferings, she was to have the glory of sustaining a severer conflict, and the merit of giving yet stronger proofs of her unshaken constancy and patriotism. The insidious policy of the Dutch states began at this time more fully to unfold itself. And there appeared also, in the powers of Europe, a systematic determination to oppose the interests of Great Britain, originating in a jealousy of her naval superiority. It was agreeable to general practice, and was considered as a law of nations, that the ships of neutral states should be liable to search, and should not protect an enemy's property.'This rule had been practised towards the Dutch; who had notoriously violated the obligations of friendship and of a treaty by which they were bound to promote the interests of Great Britain. They had submitted to be searched by the British ships, though not without complaint; and the cargoes which they were clandestinely carrying to France had been seized. But they now derived confidence from the embarrassed situation of this crown; and discovered more evidently an intention to act in concert with its enemies.-The British government, when it perceived this determination, preferring an open to a concealed enemy, resolved to bring the matter to an issue with the states. With that view captain Fielding was sent with a squadron to cruise for a fleet of merchantmen laden with stores for France. The two fleets met in the channel.† And when the Dutch admiral Byland refused 1 Stedman. 2. 259. + June 3. refused to suffer the merchantmen to be searched, a slight conflict ensued, which ended in the convoy's being carried into Portsmouth, whither the admiral attended it.—A spirited memorial was then presented to the states general, calling on them for an explicit declaration of their intentions towards Great Britain, which received an evasive reply.TM This was immediately followed by a transaction which threw a blaze of light on the conduct of the states general; shewing evidently what was the source of that confidence which enabled the French party to effect their purpose of bringing on a war with England.-The naval pre-eminence of Great Britain had, for ages, been an occasion of jealousy to the other maritime states of Europe. In the late war they were chagrined at seeing her proudly triumphing over the combined fleets of the house of Bourbon. And the same feelings were excited by her late successes. Other combinations were, therefore, deemed necessary to restrain her power.—With that view the empress of Russia came forward as the projector and patroness of a confederacy, the real intention of which, however concealed by professions of public spirit, was to distress Great Britain; that crown, which had rendered her the most essential services in her late war with the Turks; that crown which had sacrificed its own dignity and a regard for its true interests and those of all Europe to the preservation of her friendship in the affair of the partition of Poland.—It was seen that his Britannic majesty was assisted in maintaining the contest with the powerful confederacy formed against him by the right which he asserted, by virtue of the ancient practice of nations, of searching neutral vessels, to prevent supplies from being carried to his enemies.-In opposition to this, the empress now proposed a new regulation, to be observed as a general law of nations, which should supersede the former; " that neutral ships shall enjoy a free navigation, " even from port to port, and on the coasts of the belligerent powers. "And that all effects belonging to the subjects of the said belligerent powers shall be looked upon as free on board such neutral ships, except only such goods as are stipulated to be contraband.""-This regulation was warmly promoted by the kings of Sweden and Denmark: it was readily acceded to by France, Spain, and the Dutch states; and lastly by his Prussian 1780 Anderson. 4. 267. 70. n Idem. 4. 273. |