Polycentric Games and Institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy AnalysisUniversity of Michigan Press, 2000 - 541 Seiten Polycentric Games and Institutions summarizes contributions to the analysis of institutions made by scholars associated with the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University. The readings in this volume illustrate several varieties of institutional analysis. Each reading builds upon the foundation of game theory to address similar sets of questions concerning institutions and self-governance. The chapters in the first section lay out interrelated frameworks for analysis. Section two illustrates the normative component of institutions and their effects on human behavior. Readings in the following two sections detail how these frameworks have been applied to models of specific situations. Section five presents a modeling exercise exploring the functions of monitoring and enforcement, and the sixth section discusses approaches to the problems of complexity that confront individuals playing polycentric games. The final readings provide overviews of experimental research on the behavior of rational individuals. Contributors include Arun Agrawal, Sue E. S. Crawford, Clark C. Gibson, Roberta Herzberg, Larry L. Kiser, Michael McGinnis, Stuart A. Marks, Elinor Ostrom, Vincent Ostrom, James Walker, Franz J. Weissing, John T. Williams, and Rick Wilson. Michael McGinnis is Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and Co-Associate Director, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University. |
Inhalt
Introduction by Michael D McGinnis | 1 |
1 | 20 |
A Different Approach to the Study | 34 |
Urheberrecht | |
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Polycentric Games and Institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political ... Michael Dean McGinnis Eingeschränkte Leseprobe - 2000 |
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Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen
action situation ADMADE affect agenda aggregation alternative American Political Science assumptions attributes behavior blocking power camp Chicken game coalition collective action collective choice collective decisions committee common-pool resources cooperation correlated equilibrium costs decision makers decision situation delta parameters DEONTIC Development distribution domestic Economic efficiency electoral Elinor Ostrom enforcement example expected experimental experiments external farmers game models game theory grim trigger groundwater groups incentives individuals institutional arrangements institutional statements interactions Intercollegiate Tennis Association irrigation systems leader levels of analysis McGinnis ment Michigan Press mixed strategy nambardar Nash equilibrium norms organizations participants payoffs players Plott policy outcomes Political Science predicted preferences Prisoner's Dilemma probability problems Public Choice pure strategies rational shepherds Shepsle social choice social choice theory specific status quo structure subgame perfect equilibrium theoretical theorists tion tional turnwaiters variables veto voters voting wildlife York