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that a rear may exist, before this will come into force.

Let us assume that an army has been provided to garrison the towns of Virginia, and hold down the State, and that another is ready to advance to the attack of Charleston. That city is defended on one side by a noble harbour, and on two others by large rivers, the Ashley and the Cooper. To complete the circuit requires only a line from river to river, across the intervening ground by which alone the assailants can approach. Here would be assembled the spirited population of the city and State, and the forces of the adjoining States of Georgia and Alabama-the militia of the three being in number, by the last army register, 191,362 men. To the strength obtainable out of this number would be added that of the retreating army, and the aid from distant quarters. In all probability the defenders would be much more numerous than the assailants - reduced as the latter would be by no ordinary march, for the distance from Washington to Charleston is 650 miles. To attempt an attack if such were the circumstances would most probably be to invite a disastrous repulse, and expose the assailing force to the fate of Burgoyne. And after all, if Charleston were taken, it need of necessity have no more result upon this war than when taken by us in that of the Revolution. New Orleans is as independent of it, in any military sense, as Lisbon of Constantinople. When taken by us,

after a gallant defence, it cost more in the garrison it absorbed than we ever gained in any advantage from its occupation.

An operation has been proposed-the descent of the Mississippi from Cairo, which, to any one acquainted with that river, has almost a ludicrous aspect. Such a measure may be classed with that of calling out volunteers for three months, for the purpose of subduing a country, merely to cross which would be at least a four months' march. From Cairo to New Orleans by the river is about a thousand miles-the whole length in the hands of the enemy, and all commanding positions mounted with guns. Troops could not be conveyed in the river steamers, all of which have the boilers above the deck, and are of the flimsiest and most inflammable construction. It would be the work of years to construct such a flotilla as might face the fire of artillery, and would be sufficient for the transport of forty thousand men and the stores required. It has, indeed, been proposed that the troops should march along the banks of the river, using it only as a mode of conveying the heavier stores. The banks of the Mississippi for hundreds of miles of its course are one dreary, monotonous scene of interminable swamp and jungle-impenetrable to other progress than that of snakes and lizards, and dismal as a campingground even for the musquitoes, that are the only inhabitants. If, at a very wide distance indeed from the river, such a march were accomplished,

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few would be likely to arrive at New Orleans in fit condition to attack the fortifications that would await them, and to defeat many times their own number, whom there would have been ample opportunity to assemble during the four months that march must occupy.

There is a resource which has been frequently alluded to abstinence from which has been described as proof of almost sublime magnanimity -that of declaring at once emancipation of the slaves, and so prostrating the South at one fell blow. This at first, as the resolve of some principle shrinking from no sacrifice, all would have respected, whatever the opinion of its wisdom. Now, as an act of revenge and spite, because the people of the South could not otherwise be subdued, it would stamp on the page of American history a stigma dark and indelible-that never, we trust, may appear there. Beyond this it would be an impotent act of vengeance. If the negroes resolve to rise, they will wait for no act of Congress-without such resolve on their part, a proclamation would be addressed to the idle wind. And how would it help the slaves to rise who are a thousand miles off-who is to take it down there, to read to them-to go provided also, as he need be, with railway tickets and other arrangements for the removal of four millions of human beings? To leave them where they are, would simply be to light the flames of servile war, and this, as we have seen, would speedily be quenched in blood

leaving only behind the waste of so much human life, and a never-dying memory to avenge.

The proclamation of Fremont is another striking illustration how with politicians this great question is simply one of the convenience of the hour. The Unionist-the Northerner in sentiment, may retain and rejoice in his slaves; in the Southerner it remains a crime. Slavery has existed in all ages, in many countries; here alone conscience has been graduated-reduced to calculationtaught to discover in the slave three-fifths of a man-to discern in him a thing, "contraband of war"-and now to declare the ownership of him a party-coloured crime-sinful in the opponent, blameless in the ally. What conceivable outrage on principle could be more worthy of a proclamation that copies the ferocity of the Mexican creole, and ordains that fellow-countrymen are to be shot, and this in the name of Union-for the simple crime that, as citizens of the State of Missouri, they obey the orders of the lawful authorities of their State?

It results from the previous considerations that there is but one contingency that might permit this conquest to be achieved. It is possible that a series of victories won by the North might, although barren of military result, induce feelings of despondency, of panic, and thus induce the people of the South to lay down their arms. This seems indeed the only theory, or rather hope, consistent with reason. On what ground can it be

based? We have seen the extreme improbability of such victories, but assuming that they should occur, New Orleans is 1,400 miles from Washington; no panic can span that distance. No reason appears why greater effect should be produced by the capture of any city than by that of the capital when taken in the last war. On this point, on the 28th January last, Mr. Iverson spoke thus in the Senate: "You boast of your superior numbers and strength, but remember that the race is not always to the swift, nor the battle to the strong. You have 100,000 fighting men; so have we. And fighting upon our own soil, and to preserve our rights, and vindicate our honour, and defend our homes, our firesides, our wives and children, from the invader, we shall not be easily conquered. You may overrun us, desolate our fields, burn our dwellings, lay our cities in ruin, murder our people, and reduce us to beggary, but you cannot subdue and subjugate us to your will. You may whip us, but we will not stay whipped. We will rise again and again to vindicate our liberty, and to throw off your oppressive and accursed yoke, and we will never cease the strife until our race is extinguished, and our fair land given over to desolation.'

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This does not seem the language of those who will lose heart on a defeat, or on a series of defeats, or who, possessed still of ample means of material resistance, will be subdued by moral dismay. Where hatred exists, defeat adds to its bitterness—it does not change it to alarm. We

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