Their individuality remaining distinct, it may prove that their original sovereignty will also continue intact in each of them.

One thing is clear, that on the day when each State ratified the new Constitution it was an independent power. The thirteen colonies were acknowledged by Great Britain, and other countries, each of them as separately independent. We need not, however, go further back than the Articles of Confederation, which declare the mutual relation in which they coexisted in the Union. The question is thus narrowed to this,—if they be no longer separately sovereign, to whom did their power pass, and what evidence exists that a change of such supreme importance has ever occurred?

It is clearly the natural conclusion that it remains where it existed before, unless there be evidence to the contrary; the onus of proof lies with those who dispute this. We seek in vain for this proof, for any explanation of the nature of the change, or for any declaration to whom the extinguished power has passed. Mr. Motley expresses, indeed, impatience of the term sovereign, as being feudal and inappropriate on American soil. No term is more frequently used in the State documents, where, indeed, it appears with a frequency unknown in Europe; and as we find it in the immediate parent of the Constitution, it meets us at the first step. From the general scope of Mr. Motley's arguments, they would appear to

convey the theory that the original sovereignty of each State passed into the Federal Government. This is described as "clothed with imperial attributes," as executing laws, which are the supreme law of the land. It would be the natural inference from this, that the Federal Government has become the depository of the sovereign power, originally in the separate States. But Mr. Motley has not gone so far as to assert this. We are led to the brink, but there the guide disappears. No American writer could, indeed, make the assertion, for it would directly contradict all American jurisprudence, and the fundamental principles of their political creed, which are, that all sovereignty is in the people.

If this be so and none will dispute it-it follows, that any government appointed-with whatever functions endowed-of whatever attributes apparently possessed-is still merely an agent, discharging certain allotted duties. That great authority, the "Federalist," observes: "The Federal and State Governments are, in fact, but different agents and trustees of the people, instituted with different powers, and designed for different purposes." Austin, in his work on Jurisprudence, terms the Government the "subjectminister"-minister, as the agent-subject, in relation to the sovereignty of the people. Lincoln, in his last address, terms the people his masters-forgetting, probably, the strange theory he had propounded, that the States derived their

Mr.

powers from the Government they themselves had framed. We are so habituated to associate the idea of sovereignty with the name of government, that it requires an effort to realize the full effect of American political principles. They, however, are those to be applied; and nothing can be more complete, than the accordance of all American authorities on this point. One of the latest, Curtis, in his admirable work on the Constitution, observes: "In America, it has been incontrovertible since the Revolution that the supreme, absolute, and uncontrolled power is in the people, before they make a Constitution, and remains in them after it is made."

As it is thus clear, that the original sovereignty of each State could not pass into the government, its mere agent, wholly or in part, there remains but one theory,-that of the fusion of the thirteen powers into one,-into the Union, so as thus to have formed a corporate power. This seems to be the prevailing belief in other countries, and to be that now held in the Northern States, though we shall find that on other occasions, none have more vehemently denied it. In examining this proposition we encounter a formidable obstacle at the threshold. The Constitution did not form a Union, that was there before,-it subsisted all the time, there was no break of continuity,there occurred a radical reform of government, but no organic change. The States existed in union as a Federal republic,-as such they continued.

Seeing, then, that the Union pre-existed, we trace back to find the mutual relation of the States in it. This is declared in the preceding articles; and when we find by them that they existed in the Union as independent, sovereign powers, mutually acknowledged as such, we must hold that they so exist, unless there be evidence of abdication in the terms to which they assented in the new Federal compact. In those terms no such evidence appears. There is a clause reserving to each State the exercise of every right not expressly delegated. The possession of sovereignty is not named or conferred; and we shall shortly find it to be wholly incapable of transfer when inherent in a people. Hence in regard to the mutual relation of the States in the Union, the only existing evidence is that which declares the distinct sovereignty of each of the separate States.

In what manner is it possible that any change of this nature could have been effected by the Constitution? An agreement is made between the States, as to the amended powers they should allot to their agent, the general government, in order to render it more efficient. In this, there is nothing to affect their relations to each other. Had it been an agreement to form a consolidated State, then of course the powers would have been amalgamated with the people. We have seen, on ample evidence, that this was not intended and did not occur; and it follows that as there was no fusion of the communities, there could be no

fusion of the sovereignty, inherent in each one of them.

Alluding to this subject, Curtis expresses himself thus: "Political sovereignty is capable of partition, according to the character of its subjects, so that powers of one class may be imparted to a Federal, and powers of another class remain in a State Constitution, without destroying the sovereignty of the latter." From this it would appear to be the opinion of this authority that the sovereignty of the State remains. But that which is spoken of as "capable of partition," is not really sovereignty, but simply the exercise of it. Sovereignty is altogether incapable of division, but it may act through several agents. A man may be the owner of a house in fee-simple. He may find it to his advantage that another person shall occupy part of it, and he may engage not to use that portion, but this in no respect voids his ownership, nor does it prove any division of that ownership. So, in this case, the original sovereignty in each State, the ownership of the power -the fee, is vested in the people of that State,it is there inalienable, and indivisible-but in place of exercising it through a single channel, the State divides its action between two agents, the one appointed exclusively by itself, for special objects, and the other appointed in conjunction with the sister States, for objects common to them all.

Indeed, if we consider what sovereignty really