Joan Dodaro, on my left, is Deputy Assistant Comptroller General for Human Resources. Larry Thompson is head of our Human Resources Division. Tom Hagenstad is head of our congressional liaison. Dick Brown, of course, is our new Deputy Assistant Comptroller General for Operations, and JoAnn Classen has been working on the GAO budget here for many years and doing a great job. That is the GAO team. We are pleased to be here. I want to thank this subcommittee for the support you have given us over the years. It has allowed GAO to modernize and to do important work. Last year was another record year. We issued 1,381 reports, which is a 5 percent increase over 1989, a comparable year, and a 24 percent increase over 1987. If you look at our 5-year statistics, which I will present to the oversight committees later in the year, the increase in our productivity, the numbers of reports, testimony, and measurable financial benefits, is up substantially, and that is the progress we have made in the last 5 years. Last year, we issued nearly 4,000 legal decisions. We testified 275 times; the previous year it was 370 times. We came close to testifying 650 times in two years, second only to the Defense Department. Our measurable financial benefits last year, based on decisions by the Congress and the Executive Branch, were $33.8 billion, which is, of course, a record for us. Mr. FAZIO. Your savings seem to go up with the deficit. Mr. FAZIO. There is more out there to be had, I guess. FUNDING OF OPERATION DESERT STORM Mr. BOWSHER. One area we played a big role in last year which brought a lot of money into the Treasury and on which we testified was what the cost of the desert war might be. The Defense Department was not willing to do that. Once we laid the numbers out, that allowed the Congress, I think, to pressure the administration to go out and raise the money from our allies. And eventually we raised $45 billion, but the numbers used consistently Mr. LEHMAN. Thirty-five billion cash or promises? Mr. BOWSHER. No, they got the $45 billion basically in cash, a little at a time, but mostly in cash. We had a struggle there with a couple of the countries midway through. Mr. FAZIO. What was the cost of the war? Mr. BOWSHER. The cost of the war comes close to that figure. If you look at a cash flow, it didn't come up to that number. Mr. FAZIO. We were talking about the same subject with CBO the other day. They are quite proud of the work they have done on estimating the potential cost of the war, and they were somewhat reluctant to get into this. In some measure we may have made money on this war, which would be a shocking revelation, not the reason you want to go out there and deploy your troops. But it reminds you of the Hessians and those who helped the British in the 1770s. The questions that needs to be looked at are: what were the direct outlays involved with the war, and what were the costs of replenishing stocks and putting us, in effect, back in the position from Mr. BowSHER. We have issued a report on that so we can supply it for the record, if you like. It comes very close to what the allies put out, but on a straight cash-flow basis, in the period, it looks as if we made some money on the war, but in the long run, I don't think we did, since we have to replace things. Mr. FAZIO. Did you factor in the cost of oil? Mr. BowSHER. No, that is not in the cost. Another of our major efforts last year, in addition to the war, on which we are still working, as far as the lessons learned on that, is of course, defense programs always a big area. I don't know whether you saw the "60 Minutes" program a week or so ago. It showed the problem of excess inventories, which we have been working on for some time. I know the Appropriations Committee on the Senate side is looking at that, and it is one thing the Appropriation Committees should look at very carefully. [CLERK'S NOTE.-The following report was provided:] GAO Results in Brief United States General Accounting Office National Security and International Affairs Division B-245304 September 24, 1991 The Honorable Les Aspin Chairman, Committee on Armed Services Dear Mr. Chairman: In response to your request, we have evaluated the incremental cost of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.' Specifically, our objectives were to (1) evaluate the executive branch's cost estimates and funding requirements for the operation, (2) determine the extent to which the United States needs to provide any additional funding, and (3) determine how the Department of Defense (DOD) and the individual services tracked the operation's costs. Specific information on the valuation and reporting of allied contributions, both cash and assistance-in-kind, will be reported separately. We testified in May 19912 that the executive branch's incremental costs estimate appeared high and that funding requirements were much lower than reported costs. This report expands on that testimony. The Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) estimated $47.5 billion for Operation Desert Shield/Storm funding requirements appears to be overstated. The estimate reflects (1) higher-than-actual costs incurred by the revolving fund accounts, (2) overestimated maintenance needs, (3) replacement of recoverable munitions, and (4) procurements that were canceled due to the operation's short duration. Foreign contributions to the Defense Cooperation Account should fully cover the operation's funding requirement; therefore, the $15 billion appropriated to the Persian Gulf Regional Defense Fund will not be needed. Foreign commitments for cash contributions to help defray the U.S. costs for the operation total $48.3 billion, or almost $800 million more than OMB's funding requirement estimate, assuming that each nation fulfills its pledge. Countries making these pledges have already contributed $42.4 billion, or about 88 percent of the total amount pledged. 'This report refers to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm as the operation. Cost of Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm and Allied Contributions (GAO/T-NSIAD-91-34, ; |