Essays on the Intellectual Powers of ManJ. Bartlett, 1850 - 462 Seiten |
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abstract absurd analogy apparent magnitude appears apprehend argument Aristotle attention attributes axioms beauty belief Bishop Berkeley body brain called cause ceive centaur Chap cognition color common sense conceive conception consciousness consider degree demonstration Descartes distinctly distinguish doctrine eral Essay evidence existence experience expressed external objects faculties feel figure give human mind Hume hypothesis ideas identity imagination impression individual ject judge judgment kind knowledge language Lect Leibnitz Leibnitzian Locke Malebranche mankind matter meaning memory monads nature necessary nerves never Nominalists objects of sense observed operations opinion organ pain perceive perception Peripatetics person personal identity phenomena philosophers Plato primary qualities principle produced proper proposition reason reflection Reid relation remember Samuel Clarke secondary qualities Sect seems sensation sensible signify similitude space species suppose testimony theory things thought tion train of thought true truth understanding vulgar words
Beliebte Passagen
Seite 445 - honor clad In naked majesty, seemed lords of all. And worthy seemed, for in their looks divine, The image of their glorious Maker, shone Truth, wisdom, sanctitude severe and pure ; Severe, but in true filial freedom placed, Whence true authority in man ; though both Not equal, as their
Seite 82 - mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is real, only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things. But what shall be here the criterion? How shall the mind, when it
Seite 226 - in consciousness alone, and, as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person. So that whatever has the consciousness of present and past actions is the same person to whom they belong.
Seite 420 - cannot be founded on reasoning. If the last be what the author calls his hypothesis, I subscribe to it, and think it not an hypothesis, but a manifest truth ; though I conceive it to be very improperly expressed by saying that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive than of the cogitative part of our nature. Our
Seite 121 - this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception." The phrase of being present to the mind has some obscurity; but I conceive he means being an immediate object of thought, — an immediate object, for
Seite 212 - It was a very laudable attempt of Mr. Locke " to inquire into the original of those ideas, notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his mind, and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them.
Seite 120 - universal and primary opinion of all men that we perceive external objects immediately, subjoins what follows : — " But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an
Seite 122 - The table which we see seems to diminish as we remove farther from it ; but the real table, which exists independent of us, suffers no alteration. It was, therefore, nothing but its image which was presented to the mind. These are the obvious dictates of reason." To judge of the strength of this argument, it is necessary
Seite 177 - being told what things were, whose form he before knew from feeling, he would carefully observe, that he might know them again " ; for observation supposes the power of discrimination, and, in particular, the anecdote of the dog and cat would be inconceivable on that hypothesis.
Seite 299 - that universals cannot be the objects of imagination, when we take that word in its strict and proper sense. " I find," says Berkeley, " I have a faculty of imagining or representing to myself the ideas of those particular things I have perceived, and