make money as plenty, and of as little value; I say, are not such laws akin to those Spanish edicts; follies of the same family?

30. In Great Britain, the silver coin bearing a disproportion to gold more than in neighboring states, of about five in the hundred, must, by that disproportion, become merchandise, as well for exportation, as for the manufactures at home, in which silver is employed, more than if it remained in the mass uncoined. This might be remedied without injuring the public, or touching the present standard, which never should be done, only by enacting that sixty-five shillings should be cut out of one pound weight of standard silver, instead of sixty-two, which are the number now ordained by law. We must, however, remark, that, whenever by any extraordinary demand for silver, a pound weight, bought even for sixty-five shillings, can be sent abroad to advantage; or melted down for manufactures; no prohibitory laws will hinder its exportation, or melting, and still becoming a merchandise.

31. Coiners have pointed out, though at the risk of the gallows, a measure which we think would be advisable in some degree for government to adopt. They coin and circulate shillings of such weight as to gain ten to fourteen in the hundred, and upwards: as out of a pound of standard silver they cut sixty-eight or seventy-one shillings. That these light shillings or counters are useful, though the public be so greatly imposed on, is evident, It must be presumed, that every thing is put in practice by government, to detect and stop this manifest roguery. If so, can it on the one hand be supposed the public purse should bear the burden of this fraud? yet, on the other hand, having no supply of legal shillings or counters, the utility of the illegal ones forces them, as it were, on the public. The power of the legislature to correct the erroneous proportion of five in the hundred, as above mentioned, is indubitable; but whether every private person possessed of these counters, or the public purse, should be obliged to bear the loss on a re-coinage, seems a difficult point to determine; as it may

be alleged, that every private person has it in his power to accept, or refuse any coin, under the weight, as by law enacted, for each denomination. If the former, he does it to his own wrong, and must take the consequences. The individual, on the other hand, has to allege, the almost total want of lawful counters; together with the impossibility or neglect, of hindering those of an inferior weight from being suffered to be current. It may be submitted, that as the use of coin is for public utility, any loss which arises in the coin either by wearing, or even by filing and sweating, ought to be made good by calling in the coin after a certain number of years from the time of coinage, and receiving the money called in at the charge of the public. We are well aware what latitude such a resolution might give to the coiners of shillings, the filers, and the sweaters of gold; but taking proper measures beforehand, this evil might, we think, in a great degree be prevented.

32. In the beginning of his present majesty's reign, quarter guineas were wisely ordered to be coined; whereby the want of silver coin was in some degree supplied: which would still be more so, were thirds and two-thirds of guineas to be coined. We cannot conceive why this is not done; except that these denominations are not specified in his majesty's indenture with the master of the mint; which in our humble opinion ought to be rectified

In Portugal, where almost all their coin is gold, there are divisions of the moeda, or 27 shilling pieces, into tenths, sixths, quarters, thirds, halves, and two-thirds. Of the moeda, and one-third, or 36 shilling piece into eighths, quarters, and halves.

33. We think it not improper here to observe, that it matters not, whether silver, or gold, be called the standard money; but it seems most rational that the most scarce and precious metal should be the unit or standard.

That as to copper, it is fit for money, or a counter, as gold or silver, provided it be coined of a proper weight, and fineness and just so much will be useful as will serve to make up small parts in exchange between man and man, and no more ought to be coined.

As to paper circulating as money, it is highly profitable; as its quick passing from one to another is a gain of time, and thereby may be understood to add hands to the com munity inasmuch as those, who would be employed in telling and weighing, will follow other business. The issuers or coiners of paper, are understood to have an equivalent to answer what it is issued for, or valued at; nor can any metal or coin do more than find its value.

ate.

§ It is impossible for government to circumscribe, or fix the extent of paper credit, which must, of course, fluctuGovernment may as well pretend to lay down rules, for the operations, or the confidence, of every individual, in the course of his trade. Any seeming temporary evil arising, must naturally work its own cure.

34. As some principles relative to exchange, have in our opinion been treated of in a very confused manner, and some maxims have been held out upon that subject, which tend only to mislead; we shall here briefly lay down, what, according to our opinion, are self-evident principles.

35. Exchange, by bills, between one country or city and another, we conceive to be this. One person wants to get a sum from any country or city; consequently has his bill or draft to sell: another wants to send a sum thither; and therefore agrees to buy such bill, or draft. He has it at an agreed-for price, which is the course of the exchange. It is with this price for bills, as with merchandise; when there is a scarcity of bills in the market, they are dear; when plenty, they are cheap.

36. We judge it needless to enter into the several courses, and denominations of exchanges, which custom hath established: they are taught at school. But we think we must offer a few words to destroy an erroneous principle that has misled some, and confused others: which is, that by authority, a certain par, or fixed price of exchange, should be settled between each respective country: thereby rendering the currency of exchange as fixed, as the standard of

coin.

37. We have above hinted, that plenty, and scarcity, must govern the course of exchange. Which principle,

duly considered, would suffice on the subject; but we will add, that no human foresight, can absolutely judge of the almost numberless fluctuations in trade; which vary, sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly, between countries: consequently no state, or potentate, can, by authority, any more pretend to settle the currency of the prices of the several sorts of merchandise, sent to and from their respective dominions, than they can a par of exchange. In point of merchandise, indeed, where there is a monopoly of particular commodities, an exception must be allowed, as to such articles; but this is not at all applicable to trade in general; for the encouragement of which we cannot too often repeat, that freedom and security are most essentially necessary.

38. Another specious doctrine, much labored by theorists, in consequence of that relating to the par, is, that the exchange between any particular country, being above, or below par, always shews whether their reciprocal trade be advantageous or disadvantageous. It is, and must be allowed, that in trade, nothing is given without adequate returns, or compensations; but these are so various, and so fluctuating, between countries, as often indirectly as directly, that there is no possibility of fixing a point from whence to argue; so that should there happen a greater variation than of two or three or more in the hundred, at any certain period in the exchange, above or below what is called the par or equality of the money of one country, to that of another, influenced by the fluctuations, and circulations in trade; it does not follow, that a trade is advantageous, or disadvantageous, excepting momentarily, if one may so say; which can be of no consequence to the public, in general; as the trade from advantageous, may become disadvanta geous, and vice versa; and, consequently, the deducing of reasons, from what, in its nature must, be fluctuating, can only help to embarrass, if not mislead.

39. To return to trade in general. Our principles, we apprehend, may hold good for all nations, and ought to be attended to by the legislative power of every nation. We will not discuss every particular point: nor is it to our pur

pose to examine the pretended principles or utility, whereon monopolies are generally established. That the wisdom of government should weigh and nicely consider any proposed regulation, on those principles, we humbly judge to be self-evident; whereby may be seen, whether it coincides with the general good. Solomon adviseth not to counsel with a merchant for gain. This, we presume, relates to the merchant's own particular profit; which, we repeat, must ever be the spring of his actions. Government ought, notwithstanding, to endeavor to procure particular informations from every one; not only from those actually employed, or those who have been concerned in particular branches of trade; but even from persons, who may have considered of it theoretically, and speculatively.

Perhaps, in general, it would be better if government meddled no farther with trade, than to protect it, and let it take its course. Most of the statutes, or acts, edicts, arrets, and placarts of parliaments, princes, and states, for regulating, directing, or restraining of trade, have we think been either political blunders, or jobs obtained by artful men for private advantage, under pretence of public good. When Colbert assembled some wise old merchants of France and desired their advice and opinion, how he could best serve and promote commerce; their answer, after consultation, was, in three words only, Laissez nous faire. Let us alone. It is said, by a very solid writer of the same nation, that he is well advanced in the science of politics, who knows the full force of that maxim-Pas trop gouverner: Not to govern too much. Which, perhaps, would be of more use when applied to trade, than in any other public concern. It were therefore to be wished, that commerce was as free between all the nations of the world, as it is between the several counties of England: so would all, by mutual communication, obtain more enjoyments. Those counties do not ruin one another by trade; neither would the nations. No nation was ever ruined by trade; even, seemingly, the most disadvantageous.