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On motion, by Mr. Holmes, of Maine,

The Senate proceeded to consider, as in committee of the whole, the consideration of the bill to provide for the collection of duties on imports and tonnage in Florida, and for other purposes; and,

On motion, by Mr. Williams, of Mississippi,

Ordered, That the further consideration thereof be postponed until to-morrow.

Agreeably to the order of the day, the Senate resumed, as in committee of the whole, the consideration of the bill to abolish the United States' trading establishment with the Indian tribes, and to provide for opening the trade to individuals; Mr. Holmes, of Maine, in the chair; and, after debate,

On motion, by Mr. Williams, of Tennessee,

Ordered, That the further consideration thereof be postponed to, and made the order of the day for, to-morrow.

After the consideration of Executive business,
The Senate adjourned.

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 27, 1822.

On motion, by Mr. Lanman,

Ordered, That the Committee on the District of Columbia, to which was recommitted the report of said committee, relating to the appropriation of a room for the third painting of Col. Trumbull, be discharged from the further consideration thereof.

The bill supplementary to an act, entitled "An act to set apart and dispose of certain lands for the encouragement of the cultivation of the vine and olive," was read the second time.

On motion, by Mr. Lanman,

Resolved, That a committee of three members be appointed, to join such committee as may be appointed by the Honse of Representatives, to confer upon the subject of such disposal as may be suitable, of the national paintings executed by Col. Trumbull, and report thereon; and,

Ordered, That Mr. Lanman, Mr. Dickerson, and Mr. D'Wolf, be the committee on the part of the Senate.

Ordered, That the Secretary notify the House of Representatives accordingly.

The Senate proceeded to consider the report of the Committee on Finance, to which was recommitted the petition of Paul Lanusse and F. Baily Blanchard, together with the additional evidence; and,

On motion, by Mr. Johnson, of Louisiana, Ordered, That it lie on the table.

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On motion, by Mr. Holmes, of Maine,

The Senate resumed, as in committee of the whole, the consideration of the bill to provide for the collection of duties on imports and tonnage in Florida, and for other purposes; and the same having been amended, it was reported to the Senate; and,

On motion, by Mr. Parrott,

Ordered, That the further consideration thereof be postponed until to-morrow, and that the bill, as amended, be printed, for the use of the Senate.

The following written message was received from the President of the United States, by Mr. Gouverneur, his Secretary:

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:

Congress having suspended the appropriation at the last session, for the fortification at Dauphine Island, in consequence of a doubt which was entertained of the propriety of that position, the further prosecution of the work was suspended, and an order given, as intimated in the message of the 3d of December, to the Board of Engineers and Naval Commissioners, to examine that part of the coast, and particularly that position, as also the position at Mobile Point, with which it is connected, and to report their opinion thereon, which has been done, and which report is herewith communicated.

By this report, it appears to be still the opinion of the Board, that the construction of works at both these positions is of great importance to the defence of New Orleans, and of all that portion of our Union which is connected with, and dependant on, the Mississippi, and on the other waters which empty into the Gulf of Mexico, between that river and Cape Florida. That the subject may be fully before Congress, I transmit, also, a copy of the former report of the Board, being that on which the work was undertaken, and has been, in part, executed. Approving, as I do, the opinion of the Board, I consider it my duty to state the reasons on which I adopted the first report, especially, as they were in part suggested by the occurrences of the late war.

The policy which induced Congress to decide on and provide for the defence of the coast immediately after the war, was founded on the marked events of that interesting epoch. The vast body of men which it was found necessary to ca into the field, through the whole extent of our maritime frontier, and the number who perished by ex

posure, with the immense expenditure of money and waste of property which followed, were to be traced in an eminent degree to the defenceless condition of the coast. It was to mitigate these evils, in future wars, and even for the higher purpose of preventing war itself, that the decision was formed to make the coast, so far as it might be practicable, impregnable, and that the measures necessary to that great object have been pursued with so much zeal since.

It is known that no part of our Union is more exposed to invasion by the numerous avenues leading to it; or more defenceless by the thinness of the neighboring population; or offers a greater temptation to invasion, either as a permanent acquisition, or as a prize to the cupidity of grasping invaders, from the immense amount of produce deposited there, than the city of New Orleans. It is known, also, that the seizure of no part of our Union could affect so deeply and vitally the immediate interests of so many states, and of so many of our fellow-citizens, comprising all that extensive territory, and numerous population, which are connected with, and dependant on, the Mississippi, as the seizure of that city. Strong works well posted were therefore deemed absolutely necessary for its protection.

It is not, however, by the Mississippi only, or the waters which communicate directly with, or approach nearest to, New Orleans, that the town is assailable. It will be recollected, that, in the late war, the public solicitude was excited, not so much by the danger which menaced it in those directions, as by the apprehension that, while a feint might be made there, the main force, landing either in the Bay of Mobile, or other waters between that bay and the Rigolets, would be thrown above the town, in the rear of the army which had been collected there for its defence. Full confidence was entertained, that that gallant army, led by the gallant and able chief who commanded it, would repel any attack to which it might be exposed in front. But, had such a force been thrown above the town, and a position taken on the banks of the river, the disadvantage to which our troops would have been subjected, attacked in front and rear, as they might have been, may easily be conceived As their supplies would have been cut off, they could not long have remained in the city, and withdrawing from it, it must have fallen immediately into the hands of the force below. In ascending the river to attack the force above, the attack must have been made to great disadvantage, since it must have been on such ground, and at such time, as the enemy preferred. These considerations shew, that

defences, other than such as are immediately connected with the city, are of great importance to its safety.

An attempt to seize New Orleans, and the lower part of the Mississippi, will be made only by a great power, or a combination of several powers, with a strong naval and land force, the latter of which must be brought in transports which may sail in shallow water. If the defences around New Orleans are well posted, and of sufficient strength to repel any attack which may be made on them, the city can be assailed only by a land force, which must pass in the direction above suggested, between the Rigolets and the Bay of Mobile. It becomes, therefore, an object of high importance to present such an obstacle to such an attempt as would defeat it should it be made. Fortifications are useful for the defence of posts; to prevent the approach to cities, and the passage of rivers; but as works, their effect cannot be felt beyond the reach of their cannon. They are formidable in other respects, by the body of men within them, which may be removed and applied to other purposes.

Between the Rigolets and the Bay of Mobile, there is a chain of islands, at the extremity of which is Dauphine Island, which forms, with Mobile Point, from which it is distant about 34 miles, the entrance into the Bay of Mobile, which leads through that part of the state of Alabama to the towns of Mobile and Blakeley. The distance between Dauphine Island and the Rigolets, is 90 miles. The principal islands between them are Massacre, Horn, Ship, and Cat Island, near to which, there is anchorage for large ships of war. The first object is, to prevent the landing of any force, for the purposes above stated, between the Rigolets and the Bay of Mobile; the second, to defeat that force in case it should be landed. When the distance from one point to the other is considered, it is believed, that it would be impossible to establish works so near to each other, as to prevent the landing of such a force. Its defeat, therefore, should be effectually provided for. If the arrangement should be such, as to make that result evident, it ought to be fairly concluded, that the attempt would not be made, and thus we should accomplish, in the best mode possible, and with the least expense, the complete security of this important part of our Union, the great object of our system of defence for the whole.

There are some other views of this subject, which, it is thought, will merit particular attention, in deciding the point in question. Not being able to establish a chain of posts, at least for the present,

along the whole coast, from the Rigolets to Dauphine Island, or on all the Islands between them, at which point shall we begin? Should an attack on the city be anticipated, it cannot be doubted, that an adequate force would immediately be ordered there for its defence. If the enemy should despair of making an impression on the works near the town, it may be presumed that they would promptly decide to make the attempt in the manner, and in the line above suggested, between the Rigolets and the Bay of Mobile. It will be obvious that the nearer the fortification is erected to the Rigolets, with a view to this object, should it be on Cat or Ship Island for example, the wider would the passage be left open between that work and the Bay of Mobile, for such an enterprise. The main army being drawn to New-Orleans, would be ready to meet such an attempt near the Rigolets, or at any other point not distant from the city. It is probable, therefore, that the enemy, profiting of a fair wind, would make his attempt at the greatest distance compatible with his object, from that point and at the Bay of Mobile, should there not be works there of sufficient strength to prevent it. Should, however, strong works be erected there, such as were sufficient not only for their own defence against any attack which might be made on them, but to hold a force connected with that, which might be drawn from the neighbouring country, capable of co-operating with the force at the city, and which would doubtless be ordered to those works in the event of war; it would be dangerous for the invading force to land any where between the Rigolets and the Bay of Mobile, and to pass towards the Mississippi above the city, lest such a body might be thrown in its rear as to cut off its retreat. These considerations show the great advantage of establishing, at the mouth of the Bay of Mobile, very strong works, such as would be adequate to all the purposes suggested.

If fortifications were necessary only to protect our country and cities against the entry of large ships of war into our bays and rivers, they would be of little use for the defence of New Orleans, since that city cannot be approached so near, either by the Mississippi or in any other direction, by such vessels, for them to make an attack on it. In the Gulf, within our limits west of Florida, which had been acquired since these works were decided on and commenced, there is no bay or river, into which large ships of war can enter. As a defence, therefore, against an attack from such vessels, extensive works would be altogether annecessary, either at Mobile Point

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