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bcon extended to them, than the other States of the named, at the period of the adoption of the resolution, Union? What was said when the Cumberland Road was and for a long time thereafter. It is as follows: first undertaken? The sole object was to form a con- "Resolved, That the several states, comprising the nection, by a permanent and durable road across the United States of America, are not united on the princiMountains, between the Atlantic Coast and the naviga-ple of unlimited submission to their General Government; bie waters of the West. This was effected by construct- but that, by compact, under the style and title of a "Coning the road from Cumberland to Wheeling. At that stitution for the United States," and of amendments time, did any person dream that so soon, if at all Con thereto, they constitute a General Government for spegress was to be called on to extend it from Wheeling to cial purposes, delegating to that Government certain dethe Mississippi? For that, he understood, was the ob- finite powers, reserving, each state to itself, the residuary ject avowed by the advocates of the bill. If the West- mass of right to their own self-government-and that, ern States, generally, could have no claim to such a ben- whensoever the General Government assumes undeleeficial work, much less had the State of Ohio, consider- gated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void, and of ed singly. The fund out of which it is said the expense no force. That, to this compact, each state acceded as of making the road is to be paid, so far as any portion a state, and is an integral party, its co-states forming, as of it was derivable from that state, had been long since to itself, the other party. That the Government, created expended. The reservation of the per centage on the by this compact, was not made the exclusive or final sales of the public lands for roads, in the State of Ohio, judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself, had been sunk in constructing the Cumberland Road, since that would have made its discretion, and not the to which it was, by law, applied. Nay, the expense of constitution, the measure of its powers. But that, as in all that road had greatly exceeded the reservation, by many other cases of compact among parties, having no common thousand dollars. He was sure the fact would not be judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, denied. as well of infractions, as of the measure of redress."† In this resolution will be found the anatomy of the Federal Government; the principles on which it was created; and, if so, it will not be a difficult matter to determine in what manner the parties to the constitution, those by whom the Federal Government was framed and adopted, intended this instrument of creation should be construed and expounded. If the doctrines contained compact, thus denominated the Federal Constitution, was one entered into between sovereign states, wherein each relinquished a portion of its sovereignty. Common sense would teach us that such a compact should be so strictly expounded, as to take from the grantors no more of their sovereignty than is absolutely necessary to effect the great objects of the compact. At this very point, then, (said Mr. C.) I start in establishing that strict rule, by which I conceive the constitution should be expounded. If I should be so fortunate as to support this strict rule, by other circumstances, equally strong and torcible, it may, with propriety, be contended, that the power to construct roads and canals is no where to be found in the constitution. Should 1, however, fail in showing this to be the true rule, and the liberal one, more recently established, should be adopted in its place, I shall not be able to deny that such power, or any other not expressly prohibited, is conferred.

As the question involved all the principles relating to the powers of the Federal Government on the subject of internal improvements, he would here lay down a proposition, which he thought almost self-evident. It had been contended, that the United States were bound to construct this road, by compact made with several of the Western States at the time of their admission into the Union. Admitting that such a compact could be pro-in that resolution are true, then it is evident that the duced, and that it contained an express stipulation to that effect, it would not, in his opinion, change the proposition. It is, that Congress have no powers, and can have none, but such as are derived from the constitution of the United States. It matters not with whom, whether a state or an individual, the Federal Government may have made such a compact, it could add nothing to the powers of that government, unless contained in the constitution itself This was sufficiently evident from the very first section of the first article of that instrument, which declares that the L gislative powers "therein granted" shall be vested, &c. Other parts of the instrument, especially some of the amendments, shew the truth of the proposition beyond doubt He would not now turn to the clauses, as they were, doubtless, familiar to the memory of every member present.

Almost every person who had expressed an opinion on the subject, so far as had come under his observation, admitted that this Government was one of limited pow ers-limited not alone by the prohibitions of power to be found in the constitution, but by an absence or want of a grant of power therein. It would seem that this was true, as well from the parties by whom, as from the manner in which, the Federal Government was first constructed. It was, perhaps, unfortunate, that we do not more frequently recur to the circumstances under which the constitution was framed, when we are about to establish the principles from which is to be derived the true rule for the construction of an instrument of such vast importance.

By what parties, and for what object the instrument was formed, would better appear from a document which he was about to read, than from any thing he could say It was one of the celebrated resolutions of the Kentucky Legislature, containing, as was at one time said, the foundation of Republican principles. He used the word Republican as a party designation, inasmuch as he now had allusion to the principles professed by the party so

The rule for which I contend derives strong support from many other circumstances, as before stated. It is supported from the first section of the first article of the constitution, which I have already noticed. It is supported by the adoption of the amendments of the constitution, all inserted for "greater caution." It is supported by the manner in which amendments are directed to be made. When adopted by Congress, they are to be ratified by that body, in each state, which represents its sovereignty; or the same representatives of sovereignty may request a call of a convention for proposing amendments. It is supported, also, by the declarations and commentaries of the early expositors of the instruments. I venture to throw the guantlet, and defy any one to point to any contemporaneous expositor, of approved reputation, who has decided in favor of those broad and liberal principles of construction contended for by the advocates of the bill.

Finally, I refer to the ratifications of the constitution by the several state conventions, as furnishing unanswer.

*These resolutions are said to be, and no doubt are, the production of Mr. Jefferson, and contain his opinion on the subjects embraced in them.

+Resolutions of a similar character were about the same period (1798) adopted by the Legislature of Virginia, in support of which "Madison's report" was founded, at the session thereafter. At a later period, the Legislatures of Pennsylvania and Ohio adopted resolutions containing like principles.

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able evidence in favor of a strict construction. Inasmuch as these instruments have been so recently published, that the public mind may not be very familiar with them, (although the members of the two Houses of Congress may be,) I hope I shall be pardoned for turning to small parts of several of them. In the ratification of the constitution of the Common-cise of such a power-but it is equally plain that there wealth of Massachusetts, I find the following declaration: "That it be explicitly declared, that all powers not expressly delegated by the aforesaid constitution, (of the United States,) are reserved to the several States, to be by them exercised."

Having said thus much concerning the nature of the Federal Government, the limitations of its powers, the rule by which the Constitution should be expounded, I proceed to the inquiry, From what clause in that instrument can the power to construct roads and canals be derived? I admit there is no clause prohibiting the exeris no clause containing an express grant of the right, as a distinct and independent power. May we not go some. what farther, and say, that, in addition to the fact of no such express grant of power being found in the Constitution, there is a strong presumption that such a grant was intended to be denied to the General Government? This presumption is established from the Journal of the Convention, as I will read: On the 14th Sept. (Journal of Convention, p. 376,) it was proposed to add to the enumeration of powers contained in the 8th sec, 1st. art. the following: "To grant letters of incorporation for canals,"* &c. It was rejected, three states only voting for it, viz Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Georgia. There is a slight difference in words, between the amendment The State of South Carolina, in like manner, declared, thus rejected, and the bill under consideration. The in her ratification, "that no section or paragraph of amendment proposed to invest Congress with power to said constitution, warrants a conclusion that the States "grant letters of incorporation for canals," &c. The do not retain every power not expressly relinquished by bill presupposes that Congress possesses the power to them and vested in the General Government of the construct roads and canals. But every one will at once Union." The language of this declaration is more ex-see, that there is no difference in principle. For if the plicit than that of Massachusetts, and leaves no doubt as to the rule by which that State intended the constitution should be interpreted.

What inference is to be drawn from this declaration, thus made by the Representatives of the people of Massachusetts, selected for the express purpose of considering on the propriety of adopting the constitution, but that, by ratifying the instrument, they intended to yield only such powers as were expressly granted? In other words, that none of their reserved powers should be taken from them by construction of doubtful terms and phrases?

The ratification, by the State of New Hampshire, contains a similar declaration, “ that all powers not expressly and particularly delegated by the aforesaid constitution, are reserved, &c."

The terms used in the ratification, by the New York Convention, are quite as explicit-"That every power, Jurisdiction, and right, which is not, by said constitution, clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States, &c. remains to the people of the several States, or to their respective State Governments, &c."

The ratification by the State of Rhode Island declares, that "every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not, by the said constitution, clearly delegated to the Con gress of the United States, &c. remain to the people of the several States," &c.

In the ratifications of Virginia and North Carolina, an amendment was proposed, embracing the same princi ple, with a slight modification. It is, that "each State in this Union, respectively, retsin every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not, by this constitution, delegated" (the adverb "clearly" being left out) to the Congress," &c.

There were seven States, being a majority of those who adopted the constitution,) who inserted the declarations I have quoted. I have read them to show, under what impressions the people of the several States, represented in their several state conventions for the express object, received and ratified that instrument as the su preme law of the land, and to show, that the delegation of power was to be "clear, express, or particular," or at least beyond doubt, before it could be exercised; con sequently, that the grant was to be strictly construed. From all these circumstances, it appears to me that this rule of construction is so clearly deducible, as that an exercise of power upon any other, would be little else than a fraud upon the people, and a usurpation of their rights! The use of such language is justifiable only upon the principle that I have proved that such, and such only, is the true rule of construction.

power to grant letters of incorporation for canals, &c. had been conferred on Congress, it would have carried with it a grant of power to Congress itself, to construct them, inasmuch as the letters of incorporation could confer only such powers as vested in the person or body politic by whom they were to be granted. What, then, is the presumption to be drawn from the refusal by the Convention to confer this power? It can be only one of two: 1st, That the Convention intended to deny the power to Congress, and if so, the question as to our power to pass the bill under consideration is settled: we can have no such power. 2d, The other presumption is, that the Convention refused to adopt the amendment, because they believed the power was conferred in some other clause or grant. If this last presumption were correct, we should have had some evidence, somewhere, of its truth. We should have had some hint, either from the early expositors of the Constitution, or from the declarations of some member of the Convention, that such was the opinion entertained by that body. Consult the Letters of Publius, published under the title of the Federalist-that work was principally written by two distinguished members of the convention, one of whomt was at his post when the vote was taken on the amendment. Does that work any where insinuate that such power was ves ed expressly or impliedly, in Congress, by the Constitution? Nay, has not the distinguished individual alluded to, when subsequently President of the United States, in a solemn message to Congress, denied that any such power was conferred by the Constitution? Surely it would not have been unknown to him, if the Convention had ever intended to delegate the power. Consult, also, the work recently published by Mr. Yates, another member of the Convention, and nothing will be found favorable to the presumption. At the present moment, we have in this very body a distinguished member of that Convention. He was present, and voted on the amendment I have read from the Journal. Doubtless he will be able to inform us whether the rejection of the amendment proceeded from a belief in the Convention that the power was conferred in some other clause of the Constitution. § This second pre

* Other motions of similar import were elsewhere proposed, but none of them adopted. +Mr. Madison.

Hon. Rufus King, of New York.

In this part of his remarks, Mr. C. addressed himself to Mr. K. who, shaking his head, is understood to have said, "Such a thing was not thought of." Mr, K. voted against the bill.

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sumption, then, is fallacious, and, consequently, Con-rule," and commerce means "trade or traffic in equivagress have no power, either express or implied, over lent values." He would proceed, and take into view the subject of roads and canals. the situation of the United States before the adoption Notwithstanding these proofs and arguments, there of the Constitution. Commerce was then carried on are many who yet pertinaciously insist that the power is" among the states." The instruments employed were conferred; not expressly, to be sure, but cloaked under ships on the ocean, boats on the navigable streams, some express grant of powers as an incident thereto. wagons, &c. on the roads made by the states. But each When asked to what clause they refer it as an incident, state had her own, and consequently different regalathey are placed in some difficulty to point their fingers tions as regards this commerce. Hence, the regulations to one. At one time, there were those who said it was were attended with discrepancies, a want of uniformity, conferred in that grant which gives Congress power "to irregularities, and trequently great injustice, which provide for the common defence and general welfare could not well be amended or prevented. It was, of the United States," (2d clause, 8th sec. 1st art.) and therefore, proper to transfer the power of regulating, under this claim the advocates of this system of internal that is, adjusting by uniform rules, the commerce among improvements, and some other measures depending the states to the Federal Government, as a common upon the same rules of construction, have gone so far as and impartial arbiter upon the subject, who alone to say, "That, whatever the public good required to be could avoid the pre-existing evils. Doubtless the coast“done, was necessary and proper, and that Congressing trade was principally in the view of the Convention "was, in this respect, like the state legislatures."-- and the states, when the Constitution was framed and Others again have said, "That Congress may adopt any ratified. Such a man would scarcely dream that the "measures which they may deem necessary and proper words included the authority to construct roads and "to accomplish the object in any manner, whether the canals, and to me it appears a monstrous stretch of "means be direct or remote." It will at once be seen, power to give them that meaning, especially as we that, were such principles generally adopted, the pow-have already seen that, in the Convention, such authoers of Congress would be unlimited even by the prohi-rity was viewed as constituting, of itself, a separate and bitory clauses of the constitution; it is proper to admit, distinct power. that the friends of the system under consideration, unwilling, as yet, to come to such a conclusion, (which, however, is inevitable, sooner or later,) have relinquish ed this derivation of power. Some have said, that the power is incident to that of "declaring war," or of "raising and supporting armies." This ground they have found to be equally untenable; because, with the same propriety they might have dispensed with the power to "levy, and collect taxes," as a distinct power; for the powers of declaring and prosecuting war, and of raising and supporting armies, would be inefficient without means, and money alone can afford those means; therefore, as incident of these powers, and as "necessary and proper" for their execution, Congress could have levied and collected taxes with equal propriety as they could construct roads and canals; yet the Convention gave the taxing power in a separate and distinct form.

It will be in vain to enter into a further explanation of these two clauses. I have endeavored to put upon them what I think to be their obvious, common sense construction-such a construction as it is propable the people of the several states gave to them. The moment we go beyond such a construction; the moment we commence the work of attenuation, and making nice distinctions, we shall commence the destruction of the constitution, by constructing it in a manner to invest Congress with all the powers they may please to exercise.

That the constitution emanated from the " 'people," and not from the "states:" (This position is directly at war with every principle contained in the resolution of the Kentucky Legislature, which I have already read.)

That although the Government of the United States is one of "enumerated and limited powers," it is supreme within its sphere of action:

I am aware that a very different rule of construction than that for which I have been contending has been established by an important and highly imposing department of the Government. I allude to the rule established in the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of M'Culloch and the state of Maryland. That opinion goes the full length of deIn latter times, two other clauses have been selected,nying almost every point for which I have contended. as containing the power to construct roads and canals, to The points determined in that case may be stated as which I shall now advert, viz: the powers "to estab- follows: lish post roads," and to “regulate commerce." It will be well to examine these clauses in the simplest form that we can. If, upon showing to a plain man, of good common sense, (and for such the Constitution was formed,) the clause conferring on Congress the power "to establish post roa ls," he were asked its meaning, would it enter into his imagination, that it meant to construct roads? How would he reason? His answer would be formed from his opinion of the circumstances That having the power to do an act, and having imof the country; that the Post Office establishment could posed on it the duty of performing that act, it must have not be managed with benefit by the states, therefore, it the power of selecting the means; and has, moreover, was proper to confer it on the General Government; given to it power to pass all laws " 'necessary and prothat the mail was wanting only where there were peo-per" to carry into effect its defined powers: ple, and wherever these were, there would be roads of some sort, made by the local authorities; that the Constitution meant to give Congress the power of declaring upon which of such roads the mail should be carried, That, in the selection of "means" to execute its for the benefit of the greatest number, and that such powers, the National Legislature can exercise its disdeclaration would be “establishing" such roads as cretion in the choice and take all such as are 66 ap"post roads," giving to them a legal existence as such.propriate, plainly adapted to the end, not prohibited, Under this plain, common sense construction, so obvious &c. and is not tied down to such, without which some to every one, the Government has acted, from the of the powers conferred could not be executed; and adoption of the Constitution to the present time. finally, Congress is to judge of the degree of "necessity."

Let us examine the power "to regulate commerce," in the same manner. Were the same supposed individual asked the construction of this clause, he would commence by giving the plain and obvious meaning of the words. To "regulate" means to "adjust" by

That the word "necessary" imports no more than that one thing is "convenient", "useful," "appropriate," "needful," or "conducive to❞ another:

Under such principles, I know not what powers Congress cannot exercise-I know of no limit to its powers.

For myself, Mr. President, I declare I have no reve

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rence for the decision of this tribunal. Much has been "tution a supposed usefulness or propriety for the nesaid during the present session of the Senate concerning "cessity expressed and contemplated by the instruthe claims of power set up by that court. In most of" ment; and which, in fact, destroys every limitation of these sentiments I heartily concur. In the work of ag- "the power of Congress. It will follow, that, instead of gression, it has ever been foremost in the march. What" being bound by any positive rule laid down by their claim of power by the Federal Government has it not charters, the discretion of Congress, a discretion to be sustained? What claim of power by the states has it" governed by suspicion, alarm, popular clamor, prinot denied? Its members, deriving their authority and "vate ambition, and by the views of fluctuating facemoluments from the Federal Government amenable❝tions, will justify any measure they may pleas to adopt; only to that for their acts; answerable there only for acts that, instead of being bound by a Constitution, they of corruption; (for, however flagrantly erroneously their "may claim the omnipotence of the British Parliament; opinions may be, if unattended with corrupt motives," that all the reserved powers of the people, or of the they are beyond the reach of punishment,) and holding "states, will be swallowed up at their pleasure, by that their offices during life, fully understand the importance "undefined discretion. In a word, thas the Constituof their station. Supported by the other departments "tion itse, so far as repects a limitation of powers, is, of the Government, this court has commenced the work" by that doctrine, completely annihilated.

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Even the

of consolidation. In its outstretched hand it brandishes" positive checks which, in a few instances, prohibit the a sword which commands to the execution of its decrees," exercise of certain powers, will not prove a sufficient the purse, and the physical force of the nation. Before"guard against an inordinate appetite to legislate on the terrors of that sword the friends, as well as foes of "some favorite subject." its authority are made to prostrate themselves; and the Such are the views of this distinguished and veneraperiod, I fear, is not distant, when they must all perish ble character. In perfect accordance with the princiby being crushed by the mighty engine of Government, ples of construction laid down by him, is the celebrated of whose destructive approach it is only the forerunner. report adopted by the Legislature of Virginia about the I may be told of the venerable age, the talents, the same period, on the same subject. I have it at hand, sagacity, and high integrity of the individuals of whom but presuming every member of the Senate familiar this court is composed. These high sounding charac- with it, I will not detain them by reading it. A slight teristics have but little weight with me. They are men; comparison of the portion of the spee h which I have and when they have the opportunity of exercising pow-read, and of the report I have referred to, with the opi er, like other men, they will do it, be the consequences nion of the Supreme Court, of which I have attempted what they may. I am no believer in the infallibility of to give an analysis, will show their utter hostility to each judges. other upon all the principles of construction. Why should the decisions of that court be better entitled to our respect than the opinions of others equally eminent for talents, for patriotism, and stern integrity? Have they considered the subject more profoundly? Have the authors of the opinions to which I have referred, less character, less judgment, less impartiality? Sir, they had not the same interest in the establishment of the powers of this Government. They were the advo cates of the rights and powers of the "people and the states."

Sir, if my opinions are to be regulated by those of others, there are other fathers in the political church whom I prefer consulting, I hold in my hand an extract from a speech, made by one of the most distinguished politicians who has ever had an influence in the councils of the Federal Government. It was made in Congress, at the session subsequent to the passage of the Sedition Law, and upon the expediency of repealing that law. I will read it:

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"The expressions used in the clause (of the Constitution) are, necessary and proper.' The idea conveyed by the word proper,' is implied in that of the "word 'necessary;' for whatever is necessary is proper. "The addition of the word 'proper' was, therefore, useless, unless designed more precisely to ascertain the meaning of the word 'necessary,' the better to pre❝vent a construction that, by necessity, nothing more was meant than propriety,' and to establish, beyond "contradiction, that whatever might, by Congress, be "thought proper, was not, on that account, to be judg"ed necessary. Hence, the meaning of the word 'ne"cessary' is confined in that clause to its strictest sense, to wit, to the power of passing laws, without which, "some of the powers delegated to Congress, could not "be carried into effect.

"In order to support the constitutionality of the law, "[the Sedition Law] the Select Committee must suppose, in the first place, that Congress may pass laws "without a certainty of their being necessary for carry"ing into execution some of the specific powers granted "to them; that is to say, that Congress have powers to "pass laws which may be unnecessary for that purpose. "In the next place, that, if a certain law is necessary for "executing a constitutional measure, of a temporary na“ture, that law may constitutionally be executed, al"though the temporary measure, itself, should not be "executed at all; that is to say, that the incidental pow"er may be exercised for a purpose different than that "of executing the power on which it rests. [Such is the fact, as regards constructing roads.]

"The application of that constructive doctrine to the "sedition and alien laws, justifies a conclusion, that, if "adopted, it will substitute in that clause of the consti

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From the arguments which I have urged, and the authorities and documents read and referred to in support of them, my conclusion is easily drawn. If the delega tion of powers, (especially of incidental or implied powers,) is to be ascertained by a strict rule of construction; if the power proposed to be exercised, is not a defined power, clearly granted in the constitution;-if Congress cannot adopt urlimited means for the execution of li mited powers;-nor such as merely have a tendency to promote an end;"-nor such as are merely "requisite," "highly convenient," "appropriate,” or “conducive to" that end; but only such means as that, without them, some powers clearly granted, could not be executed;" such were the implied power, proposed to be exercised as " means," plainly flows from, and "necessarily and properly" grows out of, the defined or express power, having an immediate, appropriate, and undoubted relation thereto; then there is no power in Congress to pass this bill: For, none will contend that it is "indispensable," "necessary," or very highly "needful," for the transportation of the mail, or adjusting by rule, the commerce among the several states." Both these powers are now executed without the aid of the bill, most beneficially and profitably for all. Even upon a fair interpretation of the rule established by the Supreme Court, it may be doubted whether Congress have power over the internal improvements of the country.

It will, however, not be without its use to examine into the consequences likely to result from the establish ment of the liberal principles of construction laid down by the Supreme Court, and the advocates of this system of internal improvement. I cannot be mistaken in sup

posing that it will cause many of them to pause and shudder at the extent of the powers which such principles will confer on the General Government.

Will it be denied, at the present day, that the "Sedition law" was unconstitutional?--not barely as being contrary to that article providing for "freedom of the press," but because Congress had no power, express or implied, to enact it? I should be contending against shadows, to attempt now to prove that it was. It has been decided to be so by a tribunal higher than the Supreme Court. It has been decided to be so by the people themselves, in opposition to the opinions of every department of the Government. Yet, what was the reasoning employed by the friends of that measure in favor of its constitutionality? It will be found embodied in a report of a committee of the House of Representatives, in 1799, and upon which the speech, a part of which I have read, was delivered. I will read an extract from it.

The objection is-" That Congress have no power by the Constitution to pass any act for punishing libels, no such power being expressly given, and all powers not given to Congress, being reserved to the states respectively, or to the people thereof.

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they should be their very existence depends upon their being so.

In what manner did the advocates of this restriction claim the power to impose it? I will show by an extract from one of the most celebrated speeches delivered on that memorable question.* "In what part of the Constitution is this power conferred? It is conferred in that part of the Constitution which authorizes Congress to admit new states into the Union;' and, to me, it is per fectly plain, that we need look no further for it." "The power to admit new states is given to Congress in general terms, without restriction or qualification, and upon every just principle of construction must be understood to confer whatever authority is necessary' for carrying the power into effect; and every authority which, in practice, had become incident to the principal power, or was deemed to make a part of it.

"Of late, it has been the fashion to insist upon a liberal construction of the constitution, and its most extensive efficacy has been found in the implied powers it is supposed to confer. All powers are implied, that are necessary' for the execution of the enumerated powers, and the necessity need not be absolute; a modified necessity, or high degree of expediency, is sufficient. "To this objection it is answered, that a law to punish Whence the power to incorporate a bank? Whence the false, scandalous, and malicious writings, against the Go-authority to apply the public treasure to the improvevernment, with an intent to stir up sedition, is a law ne- ment of the country by roads and canals? Whence the cessary for carrying into effect the power vested by the authority to encourage domestic industry, by bounties Constitution, in the Government of the United States, or prohibitions? Is it to be found in the letter of the and in the departments and officers thereof; and con- constitution? They all rest upon this single position: sequently, such a law as Congress may pass; because, That an original power having been granted, every other the direct tendency of such writings is to obstruct the power is implied, which is necessary,' or useful, for acts of the Government by exciting opposition to them, carrying that power into execution; and this is an into endanger its existence by rendering it odious and con-herent essential principle of the constitution, altogether temptible in the eyes of the people, and to produce se- independent of its words." ditious combinations against the laws, the power to punish which has never been questioned; because it would be manifestly absurd to suppose that a Government might punish sedition, and yet be void of power to prevent it, by punishing acts which plainly and necessarily lead to it; and because, under the general power to make all laws, " proper and necessary," for carrying in to effect the powers vested by the Constitution, in the Government of the United States, Congress has passed many laws for which no express provision can be found in the Constitution, and the constitutionality of which has never been questioned," &c.

Precisely the same reasoning is employed by the Massachusetts report in answer to the Virginia resolutions, and which drew forth the able report of the Virginia Legislature, before al uded to. I have it at hand, but will not consume time by reading it. A very slight comparison will show that the principles of the report just read, and those contained in the opinion of the Supreme Court, so often alluded to, are the same, differing only in words and phrases. According, then, to these principles, another sedition law would be constitutional.

Such is the derivation of the power to impose the restriction on Missouri. It is in strict conformity with that of the Supreme Court, in the case of the Bank. The latter is made a precedent to the former. The tariff, and the bill under consideration, rest upon the same principles. Can a sound distinction be drawn between them? This question is more particularly addressed to the representatives of those states where slavery is tolerated, who may be friendly to this bill. The more the question is examined, the more plainly will it appear, that, if any one of these measures is constitutional, the others are equally so; and yet what man in the South will admit the constitutionality of the restriction on Mis. souri?

By a similar course of reasoning, it is proveable that Congress has power to " emit bills of credit." This, as a distinct and independent power, is expressly prohibited to the states. As a distinct and independent power, it is no where conferred on the United States. Nay, the presumption is, that it was intended to be refused, because it was at one period, during the deliberations of the convention, inserted after the power "to borrow I am about to advert to another subject, which I know money," and then stricken out. We know that Conis a hateful one. I allude to the attempt made to impose gress has exercised this power, because every Treasury a restriction upon the state of Missouri in relation to note issued during the late war, was a "bill of credit." slavery. But I make the allusion without any improper Under what grant of power was it done? Under no exfeeling, or any desire to open wounds long since healed. pressed one, I am sure, and of course it must have been But the question was, and is, and must always be, one of done as "means" (not absolutely necessary, nor indisgreat interest to the Southern states. There are daily pensable) to the exercise of a power, without which it occurrences in relation to the slavery of a portion of the could not be executed, but as being highly convenipopulation of the South, calculated to excite alarm; and ent," " useful," needful," "" conducive to" the powit is only within a few days past, that a measure intro-ers of borrowing money,' declaring war," sup. duced on this subject, was, by consent of the mover, porting armies," " maintaining navies," &c. to none of laid on the table of the Senate, for the residue of the which did the measure bear a more appropriate relationsession. The people of the Southern states are watch-ship, than the sedition law did to the power to supful concerning all measures of the General Government press insurrection." touching the subject of slavery; and it is proper that In all the cases I have named, Congress have acted;

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This extract is taken from the speech of Mr. Sergeant, of Pennsylvania. The speeches of Messrs. King, Taylor, and Plumer, and others, occupied nearly the same grounds.

VOL. I.-42