The Non-Reality of Free Will
Oxford University Press, 22.11.1990 - 272 Seiten
The traditional disputants in the free will discussion--the libertarian, soft determinist, and hard determinist--agree that free will is a coherent concept, while disagreeing on how the concept might be satisfied and whether it can, in fact, be satisfied. In this innovative analysis, Richard Double offers a bold new argument, rejecting all of the traditional theories and proposing that the concept of free will cannot be satisfied, no matter what the nature of reality. Arguing that there is unavoidable conflict within our understanding of moral responsibility and free choice, Double seeks to prove that when we ascribe responsibility, blame, or freedom, we merely express attitudes, rather than state anything capable of truth or falsity. Free will, he concludes, is essentially an incoherent notion.
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ability to choose abstract entity accept account of free agents and actions alternative answer argue argument autonomy account autonomy variable account behavior belief bilists bribes capital punishment Chapter character choose otherwise claim cognitive common sense compatibilism compatibilist account concept conflicting consequentialist decisions Dennett depend desires determinism is true deterministic dual rationality epistemic exemplars existence explain factors feel free agents free choices freedom and responsibility heteronomy hierarchical accounts identity indeterminacy indeterminate indirect realism instance internalistic JoJo justify Kane Kane's libertarian theories logically meta-compatibilism meta-compatibilist metaethical modus ponens modus tollens moral intuitions moral realism moral responsibility naturalistic neo-Kantian non-realism non-realist nonegocentric actor normative normative ethics notion objective moral properties one-way one's one’s ontological options paradigm persons philosophers prephilosophical problem psychological pure rational ego qualia quantum indeterminacies question reactive attitudes reasonable reject requires Robert Kane satisfy seems sort Strawson subjects suppose tions U-S theories U-S theorist unfree