Constitution of Pennsylvania and into the Articles of Confederation. Each State was represented in Congress by not less than two and not more than seven delegates. They served for a term of one year, but might be recalled by their respective States at any time in case they were not considered suitable representatives. The delegates were not eligible to serve for more than three years in any period of six and were paid by their respective States. In the determination of questions in Congress each State, small and large alike, was entitled to one vote.

In financial matters the States were also predominant. The expenses of the general government were "defrayed out of a common treasury," "supplied by the several States in proportion to the value of all land within each State;" and the taxes for paying the amounts thus due were “levied by the authority and direction of the legislatures of the several States." The Congress was given power to legislate on matters pertaining to the United States as a whole, but the assent of nine of the thirteen States was necessary to a decision in all important matters. A majority vote sufficed in ordinary cases.

There was no judiciary such as now exists in the United States. Congress itself was "the last resort on appeal" in cases arising between two or more States, and was given power to constitute courts for the determination of such

cases.

Neither was there any executive authority corresponding to that of the president. There was a "President of Congress," but he was a moderator rather than an executive. He presided over the deliberations of the legislative body, but was not charged with the execution of the laws. There was, however, a "Committee of the States," consisting of one delegate from each State, which was "authorized to execute, in the recess of Congress, such of the powers of Congress, as the United States, in Congress assembled, by the consent of nine States shall, from time to time, think expedient to vest them with." There was,

then, no such separation of legislative, executive, and judicial functions as the framers of the Constitution subsequently strove for so earnestly. The entire governmental authority was vested in the legislative branch.

It was also set forth in the Articles that the Union thus formed should be perpetual, and that no amendment should be made to the plan unless the alteration was assented to by Congress and "afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State." This provision made the amendment of the Articles practically impossible.

It is evident even from this casual survey of the Articles of Confederation that they were defective in some very vital particulars. It is customary to declaim loudly concerning their defects and inadequacies, and to ascribe to them all that political and economic confusion which followed the close of the Revolutionary War. The matter has undoubtedly been overdone; for certainly all the confusion and impotency of the times did not emanate from a defective form of government. Yet it is true that the Articles of Confederation were "a rope of sand" and were not equal to the task imposed upon them.

The most serious defects of the Articles are obvious. The central government was essentially weak. It had no coercive power. Congress was in reality an advisory rather than a mandatory body. It could request and advise indefinitely, but could demand nothing. It could pass laws regarding offences, but could not punish transgressors. It had the power to declare war, but could only ask the various States to furnish the money necessary to equip and maintain the troops. Sometimes the money was forthcoming when asked for, more often it was not. It devolved upon Congress to determine the amount of revenue needed for the support of the government and to apportion the amount among the various States; but if the States did not see fit to respond, there was no method by which they could be coerced. The root of the difficulty lay in the fact that the government acted upon the States instead of upon individual

citizens.

An individual may be coerced, but a State cannot. The payment of a tax may be enforced as against an individual, but requisitions upon a State are essentially feeble. Madison saw clearly the condition of affairs and offered a drastic remedy. Shortly after the Articles were ratified, he moved an amendment "to give to the United States full authority to employ their force, as well by sea as by land, to compel any delinquent State to fulfil its federal obligations." The amendment fortunately failed. It was offered in the right spirit and with a clear comprehension of the difficulty, but the public opinion of the time would not have sustained its execution. Had it been necessary to train the guns of the United States upon a delinquent member in this critical period, the feeble Union would have crumbled in disorder. There was not that spirit of national loyalty which preserved the Union in 1861. The importance of the Union had not as yet laid firm hold on men's minds. Webster and his colleagues had not eulogized it, and in 1783 the individual States occupied a more important place in the minds of their people than the central government. The passage and attempted enforcement of Madison's amendment would in all probability have resulted in a civil war, disastrous and even fatal in its consequences.

Again, Congress could decide disputes among the various States, but could not compel the States to abide by its decisions. It could make treaties with foreign powers, but could not compel the States to observe them; and commercial treaties negotiated by Congress would be of no avail, because the control of commerce was left in the hands of the States. Congress could not guarantee anything to the European nations, because the States might have thirteen different opinions in regard to a single matter. "In everything," as Alexander Johnston put it, "the States were to be sovereign, and their creature, the Federal Government, was to have only strength enough to bind the States into nominal unity, and only life enough to assure it of its own practical impotence."

No satisfactory results could be expected from such a form of government as this. The results obtained accorded nicely with the merit of the instrument. Under it the genius of American statesmanship was powerless. The instrument was obstructive. It was almost impossible for Congress to accomplish anything. In the first place, the consent of nine States was necessary for any important action. Five States could thus block the wheels of legislation effectively. A clique consisting of five Southern or New England States or of five small and jealous States could hold out successfully against the remaining eight. The situation seemed hopeless, since it was practically impossible to amend the Articles, for in a time of jealousies and conflicting interests it was improbable that all the States would agree to the necessary amendments. It was subsequently found necessary to discard the Articles and draw up a form of government upon different lines. This was a revolutionary proceeding, but the Philadelphia Convention was obliged by common sense and the force of circumstances to take the step. The history of more than a century has justified and commended the action of the Convention. The Gordian knot was cut to a good purpose.

The history of the United States under the Articles of Confederation is both humiliating and distressing. The years from 1783 to 1789 of their impotent control, with its attendant disorganization, have well been termed the critical period of American history. A review of the facts in the case will convince one that the term is apt. When the news came to America in 1783 that a treaty of peace had been concluded with Great Britain and that the war was in reality over, Thomas Paine exclaimed in the Crisis: "The times that tried men's souls are over." This was true in one sense but false in another. The times which were to follow were destined to "try men's souls" in a manner quite as exasperating. The need for military genius was now a thing of the past, but the demand for constructive statesmanship and civic patriotism was never more imperative. Ominous.

signs of disintegration were apparent even before the close of the war. For three years before the struggle was terminated, a constant effort was necessary to bolster up the failing credit of the United States and to get money enough to maintain the army. It was only by the heroic efforts of Washington and Robert Morris that the army was kept in the field.

Now that the war was over, the bond which held together the incoherent States was weakening perceptibly and things were approaching a crisis. No one saw this more clearly than did Washington. On June 8, 1783, he addressed a circular letter to the governors of the various States, in which he discussed the "present crisis," as he termed it, exhaustively and earnestly. It is evident from the tone of his letter that he realized fully that the storm and stress under which the American people had been living did not vanish with the echoes of Yorktown. "This," he said, in speaking of the United States, "is the time of their probation; this is the moment when the eyes of the whole world are turned upon them; this is the moment to establish or ruin their national character forever; this is the favorable moment to give such a tone to our federal government, as will enable it to answer the ends of its institution, or this may be the ill-fated moment for relaxing the powers of the Union, annihilating the cement of the confederation, and exposing us to become the sport of European politics, which may play one State against another, to prevent their growing importance, and to serve their own interested purposes. For, according to the system of policy the States shall adopt at this moment, they will stand or fall; and by their confirmation or lapse it is yet to be decided, whether the revolution must ultimately be considered as a blessing or a curse; a blessing or a curse, not to the present age alone, for with our fate will the destiny of unborn millions be involved." In this letter, which he termed his legacy" to the American people, he argued forcibly and with great sincerity for "an indissoluble union of the States under one federal head," "a sacred regard to public justice,"