"public ships," which had been taken, were to be returned; property captured, but not yet condemned, was to be mutually restored; individual and national debts were to be paid, but the provision was "not to extend to indemnities claimed on account of captures or confiscations." In waiving these claims for indemnity it was held that the United States assumed the obligation of payment. This view gave rise to the famous "French Spoliation 'Claims," which have been only recently adjusted. Commerce between the two nations was to be free, "and in general, the two parties" were to "enjoy in the ports of each other, in regard to commerce and navigation, the privileges of the most favored nation;" debts were "not to be sequestered nor confiscated in the event of war;" neutral commerce if not "contraband of war" was safeguarded; "contraband of war" was defined to include all military and naval supplies, and it was specified. that the ship and the residue of the cargo were not to be "infected" by the presence of the contraband goods; free ships were to make free goods, contraband of war excepted.

It could not have A treaty between a

The treaty was not a popular one. been such under the circumstances. strong and a weak nation can never be popular in the latter country. The commissioners themselves felt that they did not obtain that which abstract justice would demand. "If . . . less is at present obtained," they said, “than justice requires, or than the policy of France should have granted, the undersigned trust that the sincerity and patience of their efforts to obtain all that their country had a right to demand, will not be drawn in question." The comments of Mr. Trescot in his American Diplomatic History, are of interest in this connection. "Such was the convention; and such as it was," says Mr. Trescot, "it could not, either in its argument or its result, be claimed as a diplomatic triumph. .. Like the English treaty, which in many features it resembled, it was at the time a positive advantage. It is true that it merely temporized, but to

temporize wisely is sometimes the skilful policy. It unquestionably saved the United States from war; for had the negotiators returned without succeeding in any arrangement, it is difficult to see how war could have been avoided, in face of the hostile preparations and energetic language of the government. The United States had openly prepared for war, and declared that this mission was its final effort at conciliation; if that failed, the honor of the country had no alternative. Disastrous as such a necessity would have been at the outset of the mission, it would have been worse at its close. The campaign of 1800, illustrated by the victories of Marengo and Hohenlinden, had scattered the enemies of France.

The treaty of Luneville made her mistress of Europe. Had this state of things found the United States in open hostility with France, who can anticipate the result? This convention avoided these difficult issues, and it is a curious fact, worthy of notice, that the treaty of Luneville, which aggrandized to such vast extent the power of France, enabled her to take Louisiana. from Spain, while our convention, forced on us by the contrast of our weakness with such strength, enabled us, by avoiding the cost and suffering of war, to move on our path slowly but surely, and to purchase that very Louisiana from the power we could not have resisted. For it scarcely needs an argument to show, that a war with France, in 1800, would have forbidden all hope of the acquisition of Louisiana in 1806 [1803]. Another great benefit resulting from this convention was, that it saved the necessity of an extreme policy just at a most critical time in the domestic history of the country. For if the ministers had come home without effecting even an armistice, Mr. Adams would have been going out of office, and in the few remaining months of his administration, could have pursued no vigorous line of conduct; while Mr. Jefferson would not yet have assumed the responsibility of office, and would naturally have regarded the war as an odious inheritance from an administration whose mischievous career he had been elected to

check. Between the two parties, the interests as well as the character of the country would have been in serious danger."

Such were the relations between the United States and France during the presidency of John Adams; the effects of these relations upon the domestic affairs of the country, and particularly upon the Federalist party, remain to be noted in the succeeding chapter.

CHAPTER XV

PARTY CONTENTIONS

PARTY contentions have never been more bitter in the United States than during the presidency of John Adams. The Federalists and Republicans looked upon each other with undisguised distrust and contempt, and the differences were not merely political, but were personal as well. "Men who had been intimate all their lives," said Jefferson, "cross the street to avoid meeting, and turn their heads another way lest they should be obliged to touch their hats." In addition to this the contentions within the Federalist party itself were bitter in the extreme. As Rome was not large enough for the ambitions of Cæsar and Pompey, so also the Federalist party was not large enough for John Adams and Alexander Hamilton. It will be seen that the contentions between these two men did much to wreck the Federalist party-the party of the Constitution.

Jefferson's view of the situation in 1796 is rather gloomily set forth in his famous letter, written on April 24th of that year, to his friend Mazzei, then in Italy. "The aspect of our politics," said Jefferson, "has wonderfully changed since you left us. In place of that noble love of liberty and republican government which carried us triumphantly through the war, an Anglican monarchical aristocratical party has sprung up, whose avowed object is to draw over the substance, as they have already done the forms, of the British government. The main body of our citizens, however, remain true to their republican principles; the whole