1. The Courts of the United States
have no jurisdiction, under the
act of April 30, 1790, c. 36. of
the crime of manslaughter, com-
mitted by the master upon one of
the seamen on board a merchant
vessel of the United States, ly-
ing in the river Tigris, in the
empire of China, 35 miles above
its mouth, off Wampoa, about
100 yards from the shore, in
four and a half fathoms water,
and below low water mark.
United States v. Wiltberger, 76.
93
2. In the same act, the description
of place contained in the 8th
sec. within which the offences
therein enumerated must be
committed, in order to give the
Courts of the Union jurisdiction
over them, cannot be transfer-
red to the 12th sec., so as to give
those Courts jurisdiction over a
manslaughter committed in the
river of a foreign country, and
Id. 96
not on the high seas.
3. History and extent of the crimi-
nal jurisdiction of the Admiralty.
106
Id. Note a,
4. Information under the act of the
3d of March, 1807, c. 77, to
prevent the importation of slaves
The
into the United States.
alleged unlawful importation at-
tempted to be excused upon the
Excuse re-
plea of distress.
pelled, and condemnation pro-
nounced. The Josefa Segunda,
338. 351
5. Upon a piratical capture, the
property of the original owners
cannot be forfeited for the mis-
conduct of the captors in viola-
ting the municipal laws of the
country where the vessel seized
by them is carried. Id.
6. But where the capture is made
by a regularly commissioned
captor, he acquires a title to
the captured property, which
can only be devested by recap-
ture, or by the sentence of a
competent tribunal of his own
country; and the property is
subject to forfeiture for a viola-
tion, by the captor, of the reve-
nue or other municipal laws of
the neutral country into which
the prize is carried. Id.
7. Speech of Mr. (now Chief Jus-
tice Marshall,) in Congress, in
the case of Thomas Nash alias
Jonathan Robbins. Appendix,
Note I.
1. Where claims against a party,
both in his own right, and in a
representative character, are
submitted to the award of arbi-
trators, it is a valid objection to
the award, that it does not pre-
cisely distinguish between mo-
neys which are to be paid by
him in his representative cha-
racter, and those for which he
is personally bound. Lyle v.
Rodgers,
394. 407
2. An award may be void in part,
and good for the residue. But
if the part which is void be so
connected with the rest as to
affect the justice of the case be-
tween the parties, the whole is
void. Id.
Note on the history of the disabili-
ties and rights of illegitimate
children in different ages and
countries. Note a,
rights of the assignee in the See LOCAL LAW, 5, 6, 7.
2. So also the deposit of a note, not
negotiable, as security for a
debt, will entitle the creditor,
after notice to the maker, to
enforce in equity his lien against
the depositor and his assignees
284
in bankruptcy. Id.
3. But this doctrine proceeds upon
the supposition that the deposit
is clearly established to have
been made as security for the
debt, and not upon the ground
that the mere fact of a deposit
unexplained affords such proof.
Id.
4. In Equity, a final decree cannot
be pronounced until all the par-
ties in interest are brought be-
fore the Court. Marshall v.
Beverley,
313. 315
5. Where a bill was filed for a per-
petual injunction, on judgments
obtained on certain bills of ex-
change drawn by the plaintiff,
and negotiated to the defendant,
and which had subsequently
passed from the latter into the
hands of third persons, by whom
the judgments were obtained:
held, that the injunction could
not be decreed until their an-
swers had come in, although the
bill stated, and the defendant
admitted, that he had paid the
judgments, and was then the
only person interested in them,
because such statement and ad-
mission might be made by col-
lusion. Id.
313. 315
6. In appeals to this Court, from
the Circuit Courts, in Chancery
cases, the parol testimony which
is heard at the trial in the Court
below ought to appear in the
record. Conn v. Penn, 424
7. A final decree in equity, or an
interlocutory decree, which in a
great measure decides the me-
rits of the cause, cannot be pro-
nounced, until all the parties to
the bill, and all the parties in
interest, are before the Court.
Id.
424
8. Explanation of the former de-
cree of this Court in the case
of Campbell v. Pratt et al.
S. C.
9 Cranch, 500.
State of Penn-
sylvania, of the 28th of March,
1814, (providing, sec. 21. that
the officers and privates of the
militia of that Státe, neglecting
or refusing to serve, when
called into actual service, in
pursuance of any order or re-
quisition of the President of the
United States, shall be liable to
the penalties defined in the act
of Congress of the 28th of Fe-
bruary, 1795, c. 277. or to any
penalty which may have been
prescribed since the date of
that act, or which may hereaf
ter be prescribed by any law of
the United States, and also pro-
viding for the trial of such de-
linquents by a State Court Mar-
tial, and that a list of the delin-
quents fined by such Court
should be furnished to the Mar-
shal of the United States, &c.
and also to the Comptroller of
the Treasury of the United
States, in order that the fur-
ther proceedings directed to be
had thereon by the laws of the
United States might be comple-
ted,) is not repugnant to the
constitution and laws of the
United States. Houston v.
Moore,
2. The powers granted to Con-
gress are not exclusive of simi-
lar powers existing in the States,
unless where the constitution
has expressly in terms given an
exclusive power to Congress,
or the exercise of a like power
is prohibited to the States, or
there is a direct repugnancy or
incompatibility in the exercise
of it by the States. kl.
3. The example of the first class
is to be found in the exclusive
legislation delegated to Con-
gress over places purchased by
the consent of the Legislature
of the State in which the same
shall be, for forts, arsenals,
dock-yards, &c.; of the second
class, the prohibition of a State
to coin money or emit bills of
credit; of the third class, the
power to establish an uniform
rule of naturalization, and the
delegation of admiralty and ma-
ritime jurisdiction. Id.
49
4. In all other classes of cases, the
States retain concurrent autho-
rity with Congress. Id.
49
5. But in cases of concurrent au-
thority, where the laws of the
States and of the Union are in
direct and manifest collision on
the same subject, those of the
Union being the supreme law
of the land, are of paramount
authority, and the State laws,
so far, and so far only, as such
incompatibility exists, must ne-
cessarily yield. Id.
49
6. The act of the 3d of March,
1819, c. 76. s. 5., referring to
the law of nations for a defini-
tion of the crime of piracy, is a
constitutional exercise of the
power of Congress to define and
punish that crime. United States
v. Smith,
153. 157
7. Congress has authority to im-
pose a direct tax on the District
of Columbia, in proportion to
the census directed to be taken
by the constitution. Loughbo-
rough v. Blake,
8. The power of Congress to lay
and collect taxes, duties, &c.
extends to the district of Colum-
bia, and to the territories of the
United States, as well as to the
States. Id.
318
9. But Congress are not bound to
extend a direct tax to the dis-
trict and territories. Id. 322
The constitutional provision, that
direct taxes shall be appor-
tioned among the several States,
according to their respective
numbers, to be ascertained by a
Census, was not intended to re-
strict the power of imposing di-
rect taxes to States only. Lough-
borough v. Blake,
319
11. The power of Congress to ex-
ercise exclusive jurisdiction in
all cases whatsoever within the
District of Columbia, includes
the power of taxing it. Id. 324
12. The present constitution of the
United Stases did not commence
its operation until the first Wed-
nesday in March, 1789, and the
provision in the constitution,
that "no State shall make any
law impairing the obligation of
contracts," does not extend to
a State law enacted before that
day, and operating upon rights
of property vested before that
ime. Owings v. Speed, 420,
See LOCAL LAW, 1. 4. 15, 16.
1. On an indictment for piracy, the
national character of a merchant
vessel of the United States may
be proved without the produc-
tion of the certificate of regis-
try, or evidence that it was
2. Where a check was drawn by a
person who was the Cashier of
an incorporated Bank, and it
appeared doubtful upon the face
of the instrument, whether it
was an official or private act,
parol evidence was admitted to
show that it was a private act.
Mechanics' Bank v. Bank of Co-
lumbia,
326. 336
3. The acts of agents do not de-
rive their validity from profess-
ing on the face of them to have
been done in the exercise of
their agency; but the liability
of the principal depends upon
the facts, 1st. That the act was
done in the exercise, and, 2dly.
Within the limits of the power
delegated: And in ascertaining
these facts as connected with
the execution of written instru-
ments, except deeds, parol tes-
timony is admissible. Id. 337
4. The books of a corporation, es-
tablished for public purposes,
are evidence of its acts and pro-
ceedings. Owings v. Speed,
See BILLS OF Exchange, 1.
LOCAL LAW, 11, 12. 15, 16, 17,
18, 19, 20.
seen on board. United States v. See LOCAL LAW, 4. 9, 10. 13. 15,
|