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tial to all free governments. And this house do most solemnly protest, that the innovation is an important change of the constitution, and exposes the province to a despotick administration of government.

And whereas the general assembly hath from the beginning made ample provision for the support of his majesty's governor, V. Resolved, That the advice given to his majesty that it was necessary for his majesty's service, and the good and welfare of this province, that certain and adequate provision should be made for the support of the governor thereof, otherwise than has been the invariable practice, by the grants and acts of the general assembly, was, in the opinion of this house, either grounded on false information, or it proceeded from a temper inimical as well to his majesty as to the people of this province.

VI. Resolved,-That a message go up to his excellency the governor, assuring him that this house is ready to make him the usual annual grant, and other ordinary provision for his support; provided his excellency will accept the same in full consideration "of the ordinary services of government done, or to be done, by him" and praying his excellency, that if he is determined in his opinion that he cannot," without his majesty's special permission, accept of any grant from the province, for his support as governor thereof," he would make application to his majesty, that he would be graciously pleased to give further order, that his excellency may without restraint receive his whole support from this government, according to ancient and invariable usage.

W.-Page 360.

Governor Hutchinson's Answer to the above Report.

Gentlemen of the House of Representatives,

IN consequence of my message to you of the 10th instant, you have caused to be laid before me the report of a committee, accepted and ordered to be entered upon your journals. This report contains certain resolves or declarations, which, as I conceive, are not well founded, but, on the contrary, tend to alter the constitutional dependence of this colony upon the crown, and upon the supreme legislative authority of Great Britain.

The sum of these resolves or declarations may be comprised in a few words. You have declared that the support made for the governor by other powers than the legislative authority of this province, is a material infraction upon the charter; that the governor

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is thereby rendered not dependent on the people, as the charter has prescribed, and consequently not, in that respect, such a governor as the people consented to; that the mutual check and dependence of the branches of the legislature is destroyed, and the province exposed to a despotick administration. You have likewise asserted, that the assemblies, ever since the charter, have made adequate provision for the support of the governor; that the advice to his majesty, to make provision for this support, proceeded from false information, or from a temper inimical to his majesty and to the people of the province; and you have desired me to make application to his majesty, that I may, without restraint, receive my whole support from this government, according to ancient and invariable usage.

In support of these declarations, you have first alleged that the charter is a solemn contract between king William and queen Mary and their successors on the one part, and the inhabitants of this province for ever on the other.-If you meant no more by a solemn contract than what is implied between the crown, as the granter of certain powers and privileges, and the inhabitants of the colony, as the grantees, by which they acquire a right to the use of those powers and privileges, until the charter, in whole, or in part, shall be legally vacated, I would take no objection; but when you afterwards allege that, by virtue of this contract, a power devolved on the crown of appointing a governor, there is too great room to apprehend that some may suppose this contract to be something of the nature of the pacta conventa, or agreements settled by treaty between two independent states; which supposition would have such a dangerous tendency, that it is necessary for me to define very particularly the nature of a charter from the crown upon the principles of the English constitution, and to remind you of the particular circumstances which attended the grant of your charter.

It is a part of the prerogative of the crown, as well as of the power and authority of parliament, to constitute corporations, or political bodies, and to grant to such bodies a form of government, and powers of making and carrying into execution such laws as, from their local, or other circumstances, may be necessary, the supreme legislative authority of the British dominions always remaining entire notwithstanding. Now in order to share in the benefit of this authority, our ancestors, by their agents, did not propose a treaty, nor anything of the nature of the pacta conventa which I have before mentioned; but, as subjects of England, first petitioned the parliament, that, by a legislative act, their vacated charter might be restored; and, failing of success, afterwards, to use the words of the present charter, " made their humble application to king William and queen Mary, that they would be graciously pleased to incorporate their subjects in the colony, and to grant and to confirm to them such powers, privileges, and franchises as in their royal wisdom should be thought most conducing

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to their interest and service, and to the welfare and happy state of their subjects in New England." The powers thus granted were not, as you strangely allege, devolved on the crown by our ancestors, but passed from the crown to its subjects. By this charter, a general court or assembly is constituted; and, among other powers granted to this assembly, are those of making laws not repugnant to the laws of England, and imposing rates and taxes, for the service of the crown, and in the necessary defence and support of the government. You have taken pains to prove, what would not have been denied, that the support of the governor must be included in the support of the government, and you say, that, by the grant of full power to raise taxes, you have acquired an exclusive right of supporting the governor, and, therefore, the support of the governor by the crown must be an infraction upon the charter. Consider, gentlemen, where this argument will carry you. The same clause which empowers the assembly to tax the people for the support, empowers it also to tax for the defence of government. The defence and support of government are, in their nature, duties attended with burdens rather than privileges; the powers given to the assembly to tax are in order to compel the performance of these duties. Can it be supposed that this grant of power to compel the people to submit to this burden of taxes, for the defence of the government, should exclude the crown from affording its aid for this defence when it shall be necessary. If you are in danger of being attacked by a foreign power, has the crown deprived itself of the right of ordering a fleet for your defence, and must the colony be lost to this power? And would you, in that case, refuse this aid, because you have an exclusive right of defending the government yourselves? Your charter gives you equal right to this objection in the case of defence, as in the case of support.

Should not so heavy a charge against the crown, as that of making an infraction upon your charter, and wresting out of your hands powers vested in you, have had something more than this shadow of an argument for its support? A support so feeble, that I have no need to call to my aid the act of parliament which enables the crown to do what has been done; and which, if your claim from the charter had been better founded than it is, would have been sufficient to have rendered it of no effect.

If you fail of this exclusive right of supporting the governor, your assertions that the charter prescribes a governor dependent upon the people, and that you have not, in that respect, such a governor as the people consented to, is altogether without foundation.

You are equally unfortunate in your notions of the mutual check and dependence which each branch of the legislature ought to have upon the other, as also in the nature of a free government, and of the English constitution,

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The mutual check which each branch of the legislature ought to have upon the other, consists in the necessity of the concurrence of all the branches, in order to a valid act; and when any one branch withholds this concurrence, it is properly a check upon the other two. So far as this may be said to be a dependence I agree with you. But this is not sufficient for your purpose; for the same check will remain in each branch when the salary of the governor is paid by the crown, as when it is paid by the province. Now this check does not affect the freedom and independence in each branch, which is the glory of the English constitution, and which will not admit that any one should be compelled by the other to any act against its judgment. If I should violate this freedom and independence of the council, or house of representatives, I should justly incur his majesty's displeasure. Is it not reasonable that the governor should be entitled to the like share of freedom and independence, in the exercise of his judgment, with the other branches? That independence, which cannot consist with a free government, and which the English constitution abhors, and which may properly be termed despotism, is a freedom in those who are vested with executive and judicial powers, from the restraint of known established laws, and a liberty of acting according to their own will and pleasure. This restraint, in your constitution, will remain the same, whether the governor receives his salary from the crown or from the province. Thus, by confounding the sense and meaning of the words check and dependence, you have given a plausible appearance to your argument. This is an artifice which has often been made use of by writers in newspapers, with design to give false notions of government, and to stir up discontent and disorder; but I am far from attributing any such design to the members of the house of representatives in general.

Let me add that the English constitution is founded upon these principles of freedom: the king, lords, and commons have this mutual check upon each other. They are, notwithstanding, altogether free and independent; and that this freedom may be preserved entire in the crown, we find, that, ever since the hereditary revenues have ceased, a revenue, known by the name of the civil list, has been established among the first acts of every reign; not temporary, or from year to year, but during the life or administration of the prince upon the throne. I have reason to think, that, if the governors of this colony may be made equally secure of an adequate provision for their support, the crown will never interpose.

You find that the same spirit of freedom runs through the several offices of the English government. The salaries of such persons as are entrusted with the executive and judiciary powers, do not depend upon grants made by the house of commons, in proportion to their abilities, station, and merit, as you say it is essential to a free government that they should do, but certain fixed salaries and emoluments

emoluments are annexed to their offices. Indeed, nothing can be more dissonant than your system from the spirit of the English constitution.

You have made a forced construction of a clause in your charter, and have then made a very essential change in your constitution, that it may agree with this construction.

By your charter, the legislative power consists of three branches, and the consent of the governor is expressly declared to be essential to every valid act of government. You say, notwithstanding, that he is constitutionally dependent upon the people for his support, and that this dependence is intended as a check. This check must be, by withholding his support when, in some case or other, he shall act, or refuse to act, contrary, in your judgment, to the duty of his station. If he gives up his own judgment, and conforms to yours, does not the act in such case cease to be the act of the governor, and become the act of the house of representatives? And will not this so far destroy one branch of the constitution?

Let me add farther, if a governor departs from his own judgment and conscience, is he not highly criminal? And will not the house of representatives, which compels him to it, be at least equally guilty with him?

I am sensible, that, when all other exceptions to this representation of your constitution are taken away, you will ask, what security have we then against the oppression of a governor? The answer is obvious. The law and the constitution are your secu rity; if he departs from them, there is a power superior to him, to which he is accountable for his mal-administration. This is all the redress that can consist with the nature of a subordinate government.

No state of government is perfect: if we have all that perfection which the state we are in will admit of, we have no reason to complain. Indeed we have no reason to fear redress from any opposition. So tender has been our most gracious sovereign of the rights of his subjects, that although I should humbly hope for royal forgiveness, in case of inattention to some point of no great importance, which might affect the prerogative, yet I may not expect the forgiveness of any wilful invasion of your liberties.

If, when you declare, that the assemblies, ever since the charter, have made an adequate provision for the support of the governor, you intend a provision suitable to the dignity of his station, and not merely such as, in the judgment of the house, the particular merits of the governor might require, you will not be able to maintain your assertion; on the contrary, it evidently appears, that, in some instances, the support of the governor has been delayed until he has complied with the measures of the assembly, and, in others, defalcations have been made from it in order to effect the same purpose.

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