trustees of all her share and interest in said | amount of $6,000 were recovered against estate; and whereas, by reason of the de- James Couch, in a court of the State of Illistruction of the buildings belonging to said nois, on debts contracted since January 28, estate, and situate upon said lands, by fire, 1877, and executions thereon were forthwith the said trustees under said will have, as taken out and returned unsatisfied. On Febsuch trustees, incurred a large indebtedness ruary 24, 1879, one Sprague, who recovered in rebuilding the same, and for other pur- two of those judgments, amounting to poses beneficial to said estate, and which in- $1,097.85, brought a suit in equity in that debtedness is a lien or incumbrance thereon; court, upon which a receiver was appointed, and whereas it is deemed advantageous to the to whom, by order of that court, on March undersigned devisees as aforesaid, as well as 29, 1879, James Couch executed a deed of to the creditors of said estate, that the same all property, equitable interests, things in should, from the time of the expiration of action, and effects, belonging to him. In the said period of twenty years, be managed 1881 and 1882, James Couch's undivided as a whole, by some person appointed and fourth of the real estate devised was levied agreed upon by the parties interested, to the on and sold by the sheriff on pluries execuend that sales of said estate, or parts thereof, tions issued on Sprague's judgments at law. may be made from time to time to meet the On May 10, 1879, one Brown, as trustee for said indebtedness, that said estate may in the Howard Potter, recovered judgment in the meantime be kept rented, and the income circuit court of the United States against therefrom applied to the payment of the in- James Couch for $15,038.92 on a debt conterest on indebtedness, the taxes, premiums tracted in 1874; and, in 1881, caused an alias on insurance, and the expenses for repairs, execution thereon to be levied on the same and for the management of the estate. This undivided fourth, and purchased the same at 305] power accordingly authorized Wood, on and the marshall's sale on execution. after January 28, 1877, to enter upon and take possession of all the real estate devised: to rent it, and to collect the rents, and also all arrears of rent under leases made by the trustees under the will; to pay taxes and assessments, and the interest and principal of debts against the estate, and all expenses of repairs, preservation and management thereof, and to borrow money when necessary or these purposes; and to sell and convey the whole or any part of the estate whenever and upon such terms as in his judgment should be for the best interest of the constituents; and provided that it should be irreVocable, except that after January 28, 1880, a majority of them, or on giving six months' notice in writing, any one of them might "revoke this power of at rney and annul this agreement. On February 9, 1881, James Couch and Elizabeth G. Couch, his wife, executed a deed of all their interest in that fourth to William E. Hale, expressed to be for a nominal consideration, but the real consideration for which was a contemporaneous agreement between the wife and Hale, by which Hale agreed to buy up the judgments existing against James Couch, and to sell the interests conveyed to him by the deed, and after reimbursing himself for his expenses, to pay one half of the proceeds to her, and hold the other half to his own use. Hale bought up the judgments recovered February 15, 1879, being about one third of the judgments against Couch, as well as the title under the sheriff's sale aforesaid; but on November 16, 1882, sold them again to Potter, and never brought up any of Potter's claims, or paid anything to Elizabeth G. Couch. sell at private sale; by Dupee on November By reason of the embarrassment caused by On March 9, 1885, Caroline E. Johnson, the testator's daughter, conveyed to her husband all right, title and interest she might or could have in real estate under the nineteenth clause of the will. On July 5, 1885, she died, leaving her husband and three children surviving her. [206] [307] [308] receiver appointed in Sprague's suit in | 42 Pa. 330, 337; McIlvaine v. Smith, 42 Mo. On August 4, 1884, Potter filed in the circuit court of the United States a bill for partition of the real estate of the testator, making all other parties interested defendants. On October 23, 1884, the bill for the construction of the will, and on May 15, 1885, the bill of Sprague, were removed into that court. On August 3, 1885, these three causes were consolidated by order of the court; and on Nov. 18, 1887, after the various parties had filed answers stating their claims, it was ordered that each answer might be taken and considered as a cross-bill. No question was made as to the share devised to the wife by the second clause, or as to the share devised to the daughter and her children by the third and twentieth clauses of the will. The claims of the various parties to the shares devised to the testator's brother James by the fourth clause, and to the testator's nephew by the fifth clause, were as follows: Potter claimed the share of James under the judgments and the sales on execution against him. Hale claimed the same share under the deed to him from James and wife. James claimed his share under the fourth clause of the will. Ira claimed his share under the fifth clause; and also claimed the share of James, on the ground that, by reason of the alienations thereof to Potter and to Hale, the devise over in the nineteenth clause to his children took effect. The daughter's husband and her children respectively claimed the shares of both James and Ira, contending that, by reason of the alienations thereof, they vested, under the ultimated devise over in the nineteenth clause, in the daughter and her heirs; the husband claiming under his wife's deed to him; and the children claiming under the twentieth clause of the will, by reason of her death. By the decree, it was declared that the devised estate vested at the expiration of twenty years from the testator's death, one fourth in fee in the widow, one fourth in fee in James, one fourth in fee in Ira, and the remaining fourth in the daughter for life, with remainder in fee to her children; and the claims of Potter, of Hale, and of the daughter's husband and children, to the shares of James and of Ira, and of Ira to the share of James, were disallowed. Potter, Hale, the daughter's husband and her children, respectively appealed from the disallowance of their claims; and James Couch appealed from so much of the decree as declared that the legal title under the residuary devises vested at the expiration of twenty years from the testator's death. The five appeals were submitted together on printed briefs and arguments. Mr. Henry B. Mason, for appellant Howard Potter: The trust property is liable for debts. Lester v. Garland, 5 Sim. 205; Ex parte Oxley, 1 Ball & B. 257; Pacific Nat. Bank v. Windram, 133 Mass. 175, 176; Mackason's App. Construction of will. The trust estate expired at the end of twenty years. Minors v. Battison, L. R. 1 App. Cas. 428, 430: Teale v. Teale, 53 L. T. N. S. 936; Manice v. Manice, 43 N. Y. 303; Wood v. White, 2 Keen, 664, 670; Fairman v. Beal, 14 Ill. 244, 246: Hurt v. McCartney, 18 Ill. 132; Ridgeway v. Underwood, 67 Ill. 419: Illinois Land & L. Co. v. Bonner, 75 Ill. 315; Lynch v. Swayne, 83 Ill. 336; Funk v. Eggleston, 92 Ill. 515; Welsch v. Belleville Sav. Bank, 94 Ill. 191; Nicoll v. Scott, 99 Ill. 529, 539; Blanchard v. Maynard, 103 Ill. 60; Steib v. Whitehead, 111 Ill. 247; Fussey v. White, 113 Ill. 637, 643; McCartney v. Osburn, 6 West. Rep. 793, 118 Ill. 403; Lloyd v. Branton, 3 Meriv. 108; Roosevelt v. Thurman, 1 Johns. Ch. 220, 1 L. ed. 119; Anderson v. Cary, 36 Ohio St. 506; Ware v. Cann, 10 Barn. & C. 433. The instrument of January 8, 1877, was a family settlement. It terminated the power of the trustees to make partition and removed the constraint on alienation. Story, Eq. Jur. § 132; Neale v. Neale, 1 Keen, 672, 683; Hurlbut v. Phelps, 30 Conn. 42, 50; Pullen v. Ready, 2 Atk. 587; Nicoll v. Scott, 99 Ill. 529; Byrne v. Morehouse, 22 Ill. 603, 605. The creditors' bill did not invalidate our title. Miller v. Sherry, 69 U. S. 2 Wall. 237 (17: 827; Hickox v. Holladay, 29 Fed. Rep. 226; Barstow v. McLachlan, 99 Ill. 641; Columbus Buggy Co. v. Graves, 108 Ill. 459; Durand v. Lord, 3 West. Rep. 513, 115 Ill. 610; Watson v. Gardner, 7 West. Rep. 432, 119 Ill. 312; Low v. Pratt, 53 Ill. 438; Higgins v. Curtiss, 82 Ill. 28. Interest on tenant in common may be sold on execution. Murphy v. Orr, 82 Ill. 489; Almond v. Bonnell, 76 Ill. 536. The parties are estopped from disputing the title of Howard Potter. Thompson v. Roberts, 65 U. S. 24 How. 233 (16: 648); Clark v. Wiles, 54 Mich. 323; Gar rick v. Chamberlain, 97 Ill. 620; Ruegger v. Indianapolis & St. L. R. Co. 103 Ill. 449; Bennitt v. Wilmington Star Min. Co. 6 West. Rep. 40, 119 Ill. 9; Fahnestock v. Gilham, 77 IÎl. 637. The family settlement with its recitals estops. the parties from disputing the title of Couch. Byrne v. Morehouse, 22 Ill. 603; Storrs v. Barker, 6 Johns. Ch. 166, 2 L. ed. 88. By selling the sheriff's certificate, Hale is estopped from disputing its validity. Storrs v. Barker, 6 Johns. Ch. 166, 2 L. ed. 88; Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U. S. 578 (25: 619); Kirk v. Hamilton, 102 U. S. 68 (26: 79.) Mr. Monroe L. Willard, for William E. Hale, appellant: Mr. D. K. Tenney, for George B. Johnson, appellant: Mr. Charles H. Aldrich, for Ira Couch Johnson et al., appellants. The testator intended to confer upon the trustees an absolute estate for twenty years, and no longer, and at the expiration of that time a vested conditional estate upon his beneficiaries. Doe v. Considine, 73 U. S. 6 Wall. 458 (18: 869); McArthur v. Scott, 113 U. S. 349 (28: 1015); Illinois Land & L. Co. v. Bonner, 75 Ill. 315; Lunt v. Lunt, 108 Ill. 307; McCartney v. Osburn, 6 West. Rep. 793, 118 Ill. 403; Scofield v. Olcott, 9 West. Rep. 133, 120 Ill. 362. The estate of the trustees did not continue beyond the twenty years. The share devised to James Couch went to Ira Couch, subject to the same terms and conditions as the portion originally devised to him. McArthur v. Scott, 113 U. S. 380 (28: 1027); Davies v. Hopkins, 2 Beav. 276; Re Colshead's Will, 2 De G. & J. 690; Re Palmer, 3 Hurlst. & N. 26; Sweeting v. Prideaux, L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 413; Minton v. Kirwood, L. R. 3 Ch. 614; Dorsett v. Dorsett, 30 Beav. 256;_Wrottesley v. Wrottesley, 2 Atk. 584; Kelly v. Kelly, 5 Lans. 447; Welsch v. Belleville Sav. Bank, 94 Ill. 199; James v. Pruden, 14 Ohio St. 251. Witham v. Brooner, 63 Ill. 344; Lynch v. Swayne, 83 Ill. 336; Meacham v. Steele, 93 Ill. 137; 1 Perry on Trusts, & 320; Doe v. Con. sidine, 73 U. S. 6 Wall. 471 (18: 878); Young v. Bradley, 101 U. S. 782 (25: 1044); Haw v. Brown, 1 McArth. 189; Manice v. Ira Couch did "cease to be entitled" within Manice, 43 N. Y. 303; Elwin v. Elwin, 8 Ves. the meaning of the nineteenth clause of the Jr. 547; Pearson v. Lane, 17 Ves. Jr. 101; will. Hutcheon v. Mannington, 1 Ves. Jr. 366; Sit- Ennor v. Thompson, 46 Ill. 214; Warrick v. well v. Bernard, 6 Ves. Jr. 536; Gaskell v. Har-Hull, 102 Ill. 280; Oldham v. Oldham, L. R. 3 man, 11 Ves. Jr. 489, 497; Clason v. Clason, 6 Eq. 404; Lockyer v. Savage, 2 Strange, 947; Paige, 541, 3 L. ed. 1094, 18 Wend, 369; Tra- Dommett v. Bedford, 3 Ves. Jr. 149, 6 T. R. ver v. Schell, 20 N. Y. 92; Martin v. Martin. 684; Cooper v. Wyatt, 5 Madd. 483; Shee v. L. R. 2 Eq. 401; Phelps v. Phelps, 28 Barb. Hale, 13 Ves. Jr. 404; Yarnold v. Moorhouse, 143; Craig v. Leslie, 16 U. S. 3 Wheat. 577 (4: 1 Russ. & M. 364; Trappes v. Meredith, L. R. 463); Crabtree v. Bramble, 3 Atk. 687; Duffield 7 Ch. App. Cas. 248; Stephens v. James, 4 Sim. v. Duffield, 3 Bligh, N. S. 331; Dubois v. Ray, 499; Craven v. Brady, L. R. 4 Eq. 209; Cowell 35 N. Y. 165, 175; Re Merrick's Trusts, L. R. 1 v. Colorado Springs Co. 100 U. S. 55 (25: 547). Eq. 557; Mendham v. Williams, L. R. 2 Eq. 399; Messrs. Wm. H. Wood and C. Beck. West v. Miller, L. R. 6 Eq. 63; Rathbone v. Dyck-with, for trustees, appellees: man, 3 Paige, 29, 3 L. ed. 44; Waldo v. Cummings, 45 Ill. 430; McCartney v. Osburn, 6 West. Rep. 793, 118 Ill. 421; Teale v. Teale, 53 L. T. N. S. 936. To so prolong the estates at the discretion of the trustees would make the will void, as against the Statute of Perpetuities. Waldo v. Cummings, 45 Ill. 426; 1 Perry, Trusts, SS 380-383; Challis, Real Property, 150; 1 Jarman, Wills (R. & T. ed.) 509. The provisions of the nineteenth clause extend beyond the twenty-year trust estate and attach to the various interests when in the possession and enjoyment of the devisees. Cowell v. Colorado Springs Co. 100 U. S. 55 (25: 547); Blythe v. Granville, 13 Sim. 190; Hoare v. Hornby, 2 Younge & C. Ch. 121; Spring v. Pride, 10 Jur. N. S. 646. The nineteenth clause is valid as an executory devise. Ackless v. Seekright, 1 Ill. 46; Siegwald v. A life estate may be devised to cease upon alienation, voluntary or involuntary, by the life tenant. The property was the absolute estate of Ira Couch in his lifetime, and the devisees named in his will cannot claim the samé, or any part thereof, except under the will, by virtue of the gifts and devises therein contained. McGowan v. McGowan, 14 Gray, 119; Crosp v. Norton, 2 Atk. 74; Sayre v. Townsend, 15 Wend. 647; White v. Carpenter, 2 Paige, 217, 2 L. ed. 882; Perry v. McHenry, 13 Ill. 227; Baker v. Vining, 30 Me. 121. The testator intended that the property should, at the time of his death, vest in interest, subject to the payment of certain legacies, in Caroline E. Couch, his widow, James Couch, his brother, Ira Couch, his nephew, and Caroline E. Couch (since Caroline E. Johnson), his daughter, and that possession of their respective shares should be delivered or conveyed to them after the expiration of twenty years, and after the performance of the trust therein named. 2 Jarman, Wills, 276; 4 Kent, Com. 535; Ill. Rev. Stats. 1845, § 13, chap. 30, § 13, Laws of 1872; Funk v. Eggleston, 92 Ill. 531; Spraker v. Van Alstyne, 18 Wend. 200; Heard v. Horton, 1 Denio, 165-167; Jackson v. Martin, 18 Johns. 31. The The testator gives the remainder to his devisees and legatees in fee, excepting a life estate in one fourth devised to his daughter. Gray, Restraints on Alienation, & 78; Nich-devises mentioned are not in contravention of ols v. Eaton, 91 U. S. 716 (23: 254); Hyde v. any law against perpetuities. Woods, 94 U. S. 523 (24: 264); Spindle v. Shreve, 111 U. S. 543 (28: 512); 2 Jarman, Wills, 540; 2 Redf. Wills, 290. If an estate is granted and conditions repugnant to the estate granted are annexed thereto, the latter will be void, and the estate will pass freed from such conditions. Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 3 Swanst. 515; Re Macleay, L. R. 20 Eq. 187; Smith v. Bell, 31 U. 8. 6 Pet. 68 (8: 322); Caruthers v. McNeill, 97 Ill. 256; Murfitt v. Jessop, 94 Ill. 158; Rountree v. Talcot, 89 Ill. 246; Brownfield v. Wilson, 78 II. 470; Markillie v. Ragland, 77 Ill. 98; Lowrie v. Ryland, 65 Iowa, 584. 2 Blackstone, Com. 104; 4 Kent, Com. 5, 203; 1 Jarman, Wills, 799; Phipps v. Ackers, 9 Clark & F. 593; Doe v. Moore, 14 East, 601; Nicoll v. Scott, 99 Ill. 539, 540; Illinois Land & L. Co. v. Bonner, 75 Ill. 324; 2 Redf. Wills, 224; Lunt v. Lunt, 108 Ill. 307; Blanchard v. Maynard, 103 Ill. 60; McCartney v. Osburn, 6 West. Rep. 793, 118 Ill. 421; Scofield v. Olcott, 9 West. Rep. 133, 120 Ill. 362; McArthur v. Scott, 113 U. S. 378-380 (28: 1026, 1027); Doo v. Considine, 73 U. S. 6 Wall. 458 (18: 869); Cropley v. Cooper, 86 U. S. 19 Wall. 167 (22: 109); Dingley v. Dingley, 5 Mass. 535; Waldo v. Cummings, 45 Ill. 426: Jarman, Wills, 292. The trust created by the will was not terminated by agreement. Kirkland v. Cox, 94 Ill. 400; Perry, Trusts, SS 305, 315; Hill, Trustees, 376; Baker v. Copenbarger, 15 nL 103; Ridgeway v. Underwood, 67 Ill. 430. The interest which each of the devisees is entitled to upon the division of the estate. Illinois Land & L. Co. v. Bonner, 75 . 826; 2 Roper, Legacies, 1, 464; Maddison v. Chapman, 5 Jur. N. S. 277; Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 2 Meriv. 843; White v. Chitty, L. R. 1 Eq. Cas. 372; Lloyd v. Lloyd, L. R. 2 Eq. Cas. 722; Trappes v. Meredith, L. R. 9 Eq. Cas. 229; Re Parnham's Trusts, 46 L. J. Ch. 80; Stanley v. Stanley, 16 Ves. Jr. 510; Brewster v. Angell, 1 Jac. & W. 628; Nash v. Smith, 17 Ves. Jr. 32. Mr. Charles H. Wood, for Ira Couch, appellee: Equity will not divest an estate for breach of covenant on a condition subsequent. 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1319; Horsburg v. Baker, 26 U. S. 1 Pet. 233 (7: 125); Livingston v. Tompkins, 4 Johns. Ch. 415, 1 L. ed. 887, 4 Kent, Com. 130. The nineteenth clause of the will of Ira Couch, deceased, is void, for being repugnant to the estate granted. Clinton's Trust, L. R. 13 Eq. 295; Goodwin v. Mix, 38 Ill. 115; Dale v. Olmstead, 41 Ill. 344; O'Hara v. Jones, 46 Ill. 288; Martin v. Clark, 4 West. Rep. 127, 116 Ill. 655; Gibson v. Rees, 50 Ill. 388. A condition must literally happen in order to devest an estate. 2 Jarman, Wills, 32, 34; 1 Redf. Wills, 441; Illinois Land & L. Co. v. Bonner, 75 Ill. 327; 1 Roper, Legacies, 414; Graham v. Lee, 23 Beav. 388; Hamilton v. Elliott, 5 Serg. & R. 375; Hayden v. Stoughton, 5 Pick. 528; Ross v. Tremain, 2 Met. 495. Where forfeiture is to arise on bankruptcy or insolvency, the annulment of the bankruptcy or insolvency saves the forfeiture. Lewin, Tr. Am. Law Series, 103, 104; Trappes v. Meredith, L. R. 9, Eq. 229; Samuel v. Samuel, L. R 12 Ch. Div. 152; White v. Chitty, L. R. 1 Eq. Cas. 372; Lloyd v. Lloyd L. R. 2 Eq. Cas. 722; Ancona v. Waddell, L. R. 10 Ch. Div. 157; Re Parnham's Trusts, 46 L. J. Ch. 80; Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U. S. 716 (23:254); Lockwood v. Sikes, 51 L. T. N. S. 562. If any forfeiture prima facie accrued it was waived by the parties in interest. Chalker v. Chalker, 1 Conn. 79; Devlin, Deeds, § 959; Kenner v. American Contract Co. 9 Bush, 202; Willard v. Henry, 2 N. H. 120; Ludlow v. New York & H. R. Co. 12 Barb. 440; Hooper v. Cummings, 45 Me. 359. In no aspect of the case can there be a double forfeiture. Rudge v. Barker, Cas. t. Talb. 124; Ex parte West, 1 Bro. Ch. 499; Crowder v. Stone, 3 Russ. 217; Henley v. Robb, 86 Tenn. 474; Barker v. Lea, 1 Turn. & R. 415; Pain v. Benson, 2 Atk. 80; Vandergucht v. Blake, 2 Ves. Jr. 534. The facts disclosed by the record do not estop either James Couch or Ira Couch from claiming the shares devised to them. 2 Co. Litt. 1st Am. ed. 29, *26; Shaw v. Ford, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 669, 674; Johnson v. Valentine, 4 Sandf. 36; Leslie v. Marshall, 31 Barb. 560; Stehman v. Stehman, 1 Watts, 466; Waddell v. Ratter, 5 Rawle, 231; Taylor v. Taylor, 63 Pa. 481; Parker v. Parker, 5 Met. 134; Fisk v. Keene, 35 Me. 349; Arnold v. Brown, 7 R. I. 197; Wolfe v. Van Nostrand, 2 N. Y. 436; Illinois Land & L. Co. v. Bonner, 75 Ill. 316; Manderson v. Lukens, 23 Pa. 31; Burleigh v. Clough, 52 N. H. 267; Weatherhead v. Stoddard, 58 Vt. 623; Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U. S. 2 Pet. 658 (7: 553); Belote v. White, 2 Head, 703; Provost v. Provost, 70 N. Y. 141; Steven- Brewster v. Striker, 2 N. Y. 19; Deininger son v. Lesley, 70 N. Y. 512; Jordan v. Haskell, v. McConnel, 41 Ill. 223; Jayne v. Gregg, 42 63 Me. 192; Doe v. Considine,73 U. S. 6 Wall. Ill. 413; Blake ▾ Fash, 44 Ill. 302; Darst_v. 458 (18: 869); Hempstead v. Dickson, 20 Ill. Bates, 51 Ill. 439; Hardin v. Osborne, 60 Ill. 193; Nicoll v. Scott, 99 Ill. 529; Gray, Re-93; Hardin v. Crate, 78 Ill. 533; Jackson v. straints on Alienation, § 105; Ware v. Cann, Schoonmaker, 2 Johns. 234; Devlin, Deeds, 10 Barn. & C. 433; Bradley v. Peixoto, 3 Ves. 177. Jr. 324; Re Machu, L. R. 21 Ch. Div. 838; Lewin, Trusts, 102; Re Rosher, L. R. 26 Ch. Div. 801; Corbett v. Corbett, L. R. 13 Prob. Div. 136; Roosevelt v. Thurman, 1 Johns. Ch. 220, 1 L. ed. 119; Anderson v. Cary, 36 Ohio 3 Washburn, Real Prop. (5th ed.) 370, 371; St. 506; Steib v. Whitehead, 111 Ill. 251; Jack-Fulwood's Case, 4 Coke, 66 b.; Marks v. Marks, son v. Chew, 25 U. S. 12 Wheat. 153 (6: 583); 10 Mod. 423; Jackson v. Catlin, 2 Johns. 261; United States v. Crosby, 11 U. S. 7 Cranch, 115 Lamb v. Kamm, 1 Sawy. 238. (3: 287); Brine v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. 96 U. S. 627 (24: 858); Holmes v. Godson, 8 De G. M. & G. 152; Re Yalden, 1 De G. M. & G. 53; Byng v. Strafford, 5 Beav. 558; Hughes v. Ellis, 20 Beav. 193; Greated v. Greated, 26 Beav. 621; Newkerk v. Newkerk, 2 Cal. 345; Reifsnyder v. Hunter, 19 Pa. 41; Walker v. Vincent, 19 Pa. 369; Brothers v. McCurdy, 36 Pa. 407; Hawley v. Northampton, 8 Mass. 3, 38; Blackstone Bank v. Davis, 21 Pick. 42; Gleason v. Fayerweather, 4 Gray, 348. The nineteenth clause of the will can only be held valid by construing it to be a condition precedent, to the vesting of the estate, at the end of the twenty year period. Umbers v. Jaggard. L. R. 9 Eq. 200; Re George B. Johnson acquired no rights by the conveyance of the rights of his wife under the 19th clause of the will, which will give him any standing in a court of equity. Messrs. Jno. S. Cooper and John G. Reid, for James Couch, appellee, on the appeal of Howard Potter, appellant: The interest of appellee in the property devised was not subject to levy and sale under an execution at law, because no estate, either legal or equitable, was vested in him. The trustees became vested with the legal and equitable title to the estate by the terms of the will. West v. Fitz, 109 Ill. 425; Kirkland v. Cox, 94 Ill. 400; Wicker v. Ray, 6 West. Rep. 495, 118 Ill. 472; Young v. Bradley, 101 U. S. 782 (25: 1044); Wood v. Wood, 5 Paige, 596, 3 L. ed. 844; Hawkins, Wills, 155; Hill, Trustees, 242; Isham v. Gilbert, 3 Conn. 169 The title to the estate, vested in the trustees | Reid, for James Couch, appellee, on the apat testator's death, continued in them after the peals of Ira Couch Johnson and Martha H. expiration of the twenty years from his decease, Johnson, minors, and George B. Johnson, apand will there remain until the trusts are fully pellants: performed. Shalters App. 43 Pa. 84; Miller v. Meetch, 8 Pa. 418; Dunch v. Kent, 1 Vern. 260; Chasmar v. Bucken, 37 N. J. Eq. 415; Smith v. Kinney, 33 Tex. 283; Clark v. Wilson, 77 Ind. 176; Clark v. Merriam, 83 Ind. 58; Edmondson v. Dyson, 2 Kelly (Ga.) 307; Lincoln v. French, 105 U. S. 614 (26: 1189); Seymour v. Freer, 75 U. S. 8 Wall. 202 (19: 306); Golder v. Bressler, 105 l. 421; Kellogg v. Hale, 108 II. 164. Even if under the will an equitable estate vested in the devisees at testator's death, or at the end of twenty years after his decease, yet appellee's interest was not subject to levy and sale upon an execution at law. Carpenter v. Browning, 98 Ill. 282; Almond v. Bonnell, 76 Ill. 537; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1845, § 1, chap. 57; Baker v. Copenbarger, 15 Ill. 103; Weaver v. Fisher, 110 Ill. 153; Hatch v. Wagner, 15 Ill. 127; Thomas v. Eckard, 88 Ill. 593; Bowman v. People, 82 Ill. 248: Nicoll v. Ogden, 29 Ill. 323; Stow v. Steel, 45 Ill. 328; Atkin v. Merrell, 39 Ill. 62: Owen v. Robbins, 19 Ill. 545; Strawn v. Strawn, 50 Ill. 34; Clybourn v. Pittsburg, Ft. W. & C. R. Co. 4 Ill. App. 463; Taylor v. Kearn, 68 Ill. 339; Brandies v. Cochrane, 112 U. S. 344 (28: 760); Morrow v. Brenizer, 2 Rawle, 185; Harris v. Pugh, 4 Bing. 335; Doe v. Greenhill, 4 Barn. & Ald. 684; Lewin, Tr. (8th ed.) 811; Lynch v. Utica Ins. Co. 18 Wend. 236; Bogert v. Perry, 17 Johns. 352; Brewster v. Power, 10 Paige, 563, 4 L. ed. 1092; Harrison v. Battle, 1 Dev. Eq. 537; Clarke v. Harker, 48 Ga. 596; Gerard v. Bates, 14 West. Rep. 144, 124 Ill. 150; Pearce v. Savage, 45 Me. 98; Illinois Land & L. Co. v. Bonner, 75 Ill. 316; Jackson v. Chapin, 5 Cow. 485; Jackson v. Parker, 9 Cow. 81; Jackson v. Scott, 18 Johns. 94; Drake, Attachments, §§ 235, 498. The provisions of the nineteenth clause of the will were valid, and the interest devised to appellee was thereby secured from appellant's levies and sales. Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U. S. 716 (23: 254); Steib v. Whitehead, 111 Ill. 252; 2 Jarman, Wills, (5th Am. ed.) 709; Curtiss v. Brown, 29 Ill. 230; Lunt v. Lunt, 108 Ill. 307; Hale v. Hale, 125 Ill. 399; Robert v. Corning, 89 N. Y. 226; Henderson v. Henderson, 113 N. Y. 1. There was no equitable estoppel against appellee, either by virtue of the power of attorney, or any of the acts done or proceedings bad. Isham v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. 11 N. J. Eq. 227; 1 Perry, Tr. (2d ed.) § 386; Barnes v. Dow, 59 Vt. 530; Welsch v. Belleville Sav. Bank, 94 Ill. 192; Jennings v. Smith, 29 Il. 122; Ridgeway v. Underwood, 67 Ill. 430; Baker v. Copenbarger, 15 Ill. 103; McArthur v. Scott, 113 U. S. 340 (28: 1015); Deery v. Cray, 72 U. S. 5 Wall. 795 (18: 653); Brant v. Virginia C. & 1. Co. 93 U. S. 326 (23: 927); Orthwein v. Thomas, 4 L. R. A. 434, 127 Ill. 554; Russell v. Place, 94 U. S. 606 (24: 214); Phelps v. Harris, 101 Ú. S. 370 (25: 855); United States v. Lane, 75 U. S. 8 Wall. 185 (19: 445); Hughes v. United States, 71 U. S. 4 Wall. 232 (18: 303). Messrs. Jno. S. Cooper and John G. The intention of the testator was to protect the shares given to his widow, brother and nephew from creditors, assignees and purchas ers, at least, until the final division should be made. Carpenter v. Browning, 98 Ill. 282. In giving effect to testator's intention, as expressed in the nineteenth clause of the will, the court acts in accordance with the principles of courts of equity, in effectuating the intentions of a testator respecting an executory trust. Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U. S. 716 (23: 254); Steib v. Whitehead, 111 Ill. 247; Longwith v. Riggs, 12 West. Rep. 215, 123 Ill. 258; Stamford v. Hobart, 3 Bro. P. C. 31; Humberston v. Hum berston, 2 Vern. 738; Hopkins v. Hopkins, 1 Atk. 581; Baskerville v. Baskerville, 2 Atk. 279; Harrison v. Naylor, 2 Cox, Ch. 247; Bundy v. Bundy, 38 N. Y. 410; Young v. Bradley, 101 U. S.782 (25: 1044); Lewin, Trusts, 121; Fearne, Remainders, 118, 119, 139, 337, 338. The decree of the circuit court denying to these appellants the share devised to appellee, should be affirmed. Spindle v. Shreve, 111 U. S. 542 (28: 512); Pool v. Blakie, 53 Ill. 495; Monroe v. Van Meter, 100 Ill. 347; 1 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 381, 459; Smith v. Cremer, 71 Ill. 186; Deery v. Cray, 72 U. S. 5 Wall. 795 (18: 653): Brant v. Virginia C. & 1. Co. 93 U. S. 326 (23: 927); Brewster v. Striker, 2 N. Y. 19; Finley v. Lynn, 10 U. S. 6 Cranch, 238 (3: 211). Mr. Justice Gray, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court: The matters in controversy concern those shares only of Ira Couch's real estate, which he devised to his brother James and to his nephew Ira, the son of James. 1. In order to ascertain the nature and the time of vesting of their interests, it is important in the first place to determine the extent and duration of the trust estate of the executors and trustees named in the will, bearing in mind the settled rule that whether trustees take an estate in fee depends upon the requirements of the trust, and not upor the insertion of words of inheritance. v. Considine, 73 U. S. 6 Wall. 458 [18: 869] Young v. Bradley, 101 U. S. 782 [25: 1044]; Kirkland v. Cox, 94 Ill. 400. Doe In the first clause of the will, the testator appoints his wife, his brother James and his brother-in-law Wood "executors and trustees" of his will, and devises and bequeaths to them all his estate, real and personal, "for the term of twenty years in trust, and for the uses and objects and purposes hereinafter mentioned and expressed, and for the purpose of enabling them more fully to carry into effect the provisions of this will, and for no other use, purpose or object;" authorizes them to lease his real estate at their discretion, and, out of any surplus funds, to improve his real estate, to purchase other real estate to be held upon the same trusts, and to lend money on bond and mortgage; but, in order that their doings may not create any obstacle to the division of his real [309] |