[67] ANNA M. CARPENTER, Piff. in Err., v. Executrix of A. P. MERRI (See 8. C. Reporter's ed. 87-106.) Jurisdiction over judgments of state court-fea eral question-effect of state judgment in another State-judgment against executrix, when conclusive in another State-election under a will-jurisdiction of court of chancery-decree, when does not affect lands in another State-transcript, how authenticated. 1. 2. Whether a judgment or decree of one State has received full faith and credit in a court of another State, presents a federal question which gives this court Jurisdiction to review the judgment of such court. A judgment in a state court which has jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties is binding upon the parties thereto, in a suit in another State between the same parties, where the subject matter and the issues are the same as in the former suit. is enough in the case before us to decide it 8. A judgment of a state court in favor of a creditor against an executrix for the recovery of moneys against the estate, the parties being citizens of the State which was the domicil of the testator, and the court having jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, is conclusive against the executrix in another State in which she afterwards takes out letters testamentary, in a suit between the same parties for the same purpose. Where a trustee dies indebted to the cestui que trust for trust moneys, and devises to the latter a NOTE.-A8 to conclusiveness of judgment, see note to Bank of United States v. Beverly, 11: 75. As to estoppel by judgment, see note to Aspden v. Nixon, 11: 1059. As to effect of judgment beyond territorial limits of jurisdiction, see note to Darby v. Mayer, 6: 367. As to judgments of state court, when conclusive, and when not, in another State, see note to Mills v. Dur yee, 3: 411. of nil debet,-see note to Mills v. Duryee, 3: 411. As to record evidence of jurisdictional facts; plea As to conclusiveness of record as to jurisdiction in suit on judgment of another State; fraud as plea to de-judgment of another State,-see note to Christmas v. Russell, 18: 475. The case of Brimmer v. Rebman was cided in accordance with these views, the law in question being held to be unconstitutional and void. The decision in that case is so directly apposite to the present that it is unnecessary to prolong the discussion, or to cite further authorities. That lands bought with trust money and deeded to trustee belong to cestui que trust; any statement by trustee, or credit in account, amounts to declaration of trust; profit gained by trustee by sale of property belongs to the cestui que trust,-see note to Wormley As to parol trust on conveyance of land, good; The judgment of the Corporation Court of the. Wormley, 5: 651. where one takes title for another at judicial sale, he trustee, see note to Hughes v. Edwards, 6: 142. is One who acquires a trust estate, with knowledge of the trust, is subject to the same duties, as to the trust, as the original trustee; cestui que trust may follow property. See notes to Hughes v. Edwards, 6: 142; Wormley v. Wormley, 5: 651. 141 U. S. freed from the condition and to subject other real piece of land on condition that she renounce all A. P. Merrill had resided in Memphis, claim upon his estate for the trust moneys, a suit Tennessee, and subsequently became a citizen brought by the cestui que trust against the execu- of the State of New York, where he died in trix of the trustee, to recover the trust moneys November, 1873, leaving there some personand to have the land decreed to belong to her alty and holding title at the time to a conestate conveyed by the testator to the payment siderable amount of real estate in Memphis. of the trust moneys, is not an election to claim In December, 1867, Merrill executed a deed title under the will and to renounce her claim to another daughter, Mrs. Strange, dated against the estate, and she is not estopped from December 3, and acknowledged December 27, of lot 59, Madison Street, Memphis, without valuable consideration, and which was not recorded until December 27, 1873, after Merrill's decease. recovering the trust moneys in said suit. 6. The jurisdiction of a court of chancery may be sustained over the person, notwithstanding lands not within the jurisdiction may be affected by the decree, and such decree is not in itself necessarily binding as to the lands upon the courts of the State where the lands are situated. 6. A judgment in a state court against an executrix, declaring a deed from the testator to her In 1871, Merrill (made his last will and testament. By the first item, he bequeathed to Mrs. Carpenter a life estate in lot No. 98, Madison Street, Memphis, "upon condition that she of land in another State void as to a debt due from renounce all claim upon my estate for moneys the testator to the plaintiff, but not directing a conveyance of the land, does not annul the title accruing from the sale of a tract of land in to the land and is not binding upon the courts of Illinois conveyed to me in trust for her benethe other State so far as to compel them to sur-fit by Dr. W. N. Mercer;" and upon her derender jurisdiction over the land, which is exclusively subject to the laws and jurisdiction of, the courts of the latter State. 7. A judgment of another State is duly authenticated by the attestation of the clerk and the seal of the court annexed, with a certificate of the presiding justice that the attestation is in due form. [No. 267.] Argued March 26, 1891. Decided May 25, 1891. IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee to review a judgment of that court vacating a decree in the Chancery Court of Shelby County, Tennessee, and decreeing that a decree in a New York court was beyond the power of the court, and that the plaintiff had elected to claim as devisee under a will and must renounce her claim against the testator's estate, and that plaintiff is entitled to recover a life estate, but is not entitled to recover upon her alleged money demand against the testator's estate, etc. Reversed. Statement by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller: In 1857, William Newton Mercer conveyed certain lands in Illinois to Ayres P. Merrill, in trust for the latter's daughter, Anna M., to the sole and separate use of said Anna M., and the heirs of her body, free from the control, debts, liabilities or contracts of any husband she might have, with power in the trustee to sell and dispose of the same, in whole or in part, and reinvest the proceeds in either real or personal property, to be held for the same uses and purposes and upon the same trusts, and providing that in the event of the death of Anna M., leaving no surviv ing issue, the property so conveyed in trust, or the proceeds thereof, should descend to her brother, William Newton Mercer Merrill, and be held by the trustee or his successor for the use and benefit of the said William upon the same conditions and trusts, with power of appointment. A. P. Merrill sold and conveyed the lands described in the deed in 1861 and 1864, for an aggregate of $6,200, but never accounted to said Anna M., or anyone for her, for the amounts received and interest. Anna M. subsequently intermarried with one Carpenter, now deceased. cease or declining the condition, it was provided that the property be sold "for the benefit of the daughters then surviving of my several daughters." By the second item he devised to Mrs. Strange lot No. 59, Madison Street, being the same lot described in the deed of December, 1867, and also all his personal property. By the third item he bequeathed to Mrs. Strange certain moneys in trust for his grandchildren. The fourth item was: "All other property may be sold for the benefit of my own children, equally, who may survive me. By the fifth item he appointed Mrs. Strange sole executrix, without bond, and requested her to give to his son and three grandchildren certain specified articles. Mrs. Strange was a citizen of New York, and there proved the will and qualified as executrix in February, 1874. Shortly after the letters testamentary issued, Mrs. Carpenter, also a citizen of New York, brought suit in the supreme court of that State against Mrs. Strange, as executrix, for the recovery of the trust moneys. The amended complaint alleged the decease of A. P. Merrill in December, 1873, testate; that Mrs. Strange was sole executrix; that the will was admitted to probate in February, 1874, a. copy being annexed; set up the trust created in 1857 by Mercer; the sale by Merrill of the lands and the receipt of the money; charged that Merrill converted the money to his own use, and that it became absorbed in his business and materially enhanced the value of his estate; that he lad rendered no account to her of the trust estate; and that he left real estate of large value in Memphis, and large sums of money and personal property in New York. She then set forth the clause of the will in relation to No. 98 Madison Street, and stated "that she has not renounced said claim, so as aforesaid required to do, not has she refused to renounce said claim, for the reason that plaintiff claims that by virtue of the deed of trust it is impossible for plaintiff to release said trust funds, and for the further reason that such a condition as aforesaid required is against conscience and justice." She further [89] [90] [91] alleged that Mrs. Strange was unfit for the position of trustee, and that her interests were opposed to plaintiff's interests; that at the time of Merrill's death plaintiff was informed and believed he was free from debt, except plaintiff's claim for the trust moneys and other money she had put into his hands in trust, and a balance due her brother William for money held upon a similar trust created by Mercer simultaneously with that in plaintiff's favor, and that if any debts had existed they had been paid except as aforesaid. She charged that the executrix refused to account for these sums of money, and denied the liability of the estate for the same, and in proving the will claimed and declared that she owned as devisee the real estate specifically devised to her, but suppressed mention of the fact that a deed of the same property had been made to her. Complainant further alleged that if the deed of December, 1867, was obtained at all from the testator, it was so obtained by collusion with him and for the "fraudulent purpose of defeating the collection of the plaintiff's just and legal claim against the estate of the said testator, and to take so much of his estate as said property represents from liability to said claim;" and plaintiff alleged and charged that said "conveyance was made without any valuable consideration in law;" that said deed, if made at all, was made while the trust existed and was a just claim and lien against testator's estate; and that Mrs. Strange had notice and knowledge thereof. Plaintiff prayed that the court might adjudge and decree that the bequest of the life estate "be taken and held free from all and every condition thereunto attached in said will; that the said condition be decreed as void, and that the title to the life estate be absolutely vested in this plaintiff, and she be relieved from renouncing any claim for said trust money, and that the trust estate be declared unaffected by said condition in said will and a charge upon the estate of the said testator;" that Mrs. Strange, executrix, be compelled to account; that the deed from Merrill to Mrs. Strange be set aside and be declared inoperative and void and of no effect, as against the claims of plaintiff against testator's estate; and that the sums of money found due plaintiff be made a lien on the property described in the deed to Mrs. Strange and in the will, and the decree be enforced against the same; that the cause be referred, and Mrs. Strange compelled to account as the representative of A. P. Merrill as trustee, and a suitable trustee be appointed to carry out the trust; that on the rendition of the account, the sums reported due be paid over to the trustee or to the cestui que trust, as the court should direct; and for general relief. faction of all her claims against Merrill's estate, and that there was no obstacle to plaintiff's renunciation of such claims; and further alleged that decedent was solvent and had sufficient property to pay his debts, aside from the real estate conveyed to her; and also set up the Statute of Limitation She praved that the complaint be dismissed as to her individually, as well as executrix, and for judgment on her counterclaim as executrix; 'and that it may be adjudged and declared by this court herein that the devise to, and the provisions made for the plaintiff by said last will and testament was and is, as it was intended by said testator to be, in full satisfaction of any and all claims and demands which the plaintiff had against him at the time of the death of the testator or now has against his estate, or against this defendant in her capacity of executrix of his last will and testament; that in the event that the plaintiff shall elect to take, or in the event that it shall be adjudged that plaintiff take and accept, the devise contained in said last will and testament so intended to be in satisfaction of all her claims and demands against the estate of said testator, the plaintiff in that case be required and directed by the judg ment of this court to execute and deliver to this defendant, in her representative capacity, as the executrix of said last will and testa. ment, and also to this defendant in her individual capacity, a release in due form of law of this defendant and the estate of said testator from all her claims and demands, as in said last will and testament provided, as to the testator's estate; and that in the event that plaintiff shall not elect to take or accept, nor be required to take or accept, the devise to and provisions for her contained in said last will and testament, and it be found that the plaintiff is entitled to an accounting as to said alleged trust estate as found, and to recover any amount for or on account thereof, this defendant prays that in such case" her counterclaim be set off against such recovery. To this answer a special replication was filed. The cause was referred on January 29, 1880, to a referee, who made his report July 1, 1880, whereupon it was ordered and adjudged: "1st. That Anna M. Carpenter, the plaintif in this action, do recover of or against the estate of the said Ayres P. Merrill, deceased, and of the executrix as such, or of any person or persons having the possession, custody or control of said estate or part thereof, the sum of sixteen thousand four hundred and thirty-six dollars and seventy cents, hereby adjudged to be due to plaintiff, or so much thereof as said estate or any part thereof will pay. Mrs. Strange was personally served and answered fully. She denied the trust; al- 2d. That all of the above-mentioned sum leged that the trust moneys had been paid of $16,436.70 be paid to the said plaintif over to plaintiff; averred that testator's per- or her said attorney, except sixty-two hunsonalty was insignificant; set up a counter-dred dollars thereof, which last-mentioned claim; alleged the validity of the deed of Merrill to herself; and as to the devise to plaintiff, insisted that it ought to be taken and accepted by plaintiff as a complete satis sum shall be paid to a suitable person to be appointed by said court as trustee for the purposes above referred to, and that such appointment be made on notice by plaintif (94] to defendant, William N. M. Merrill, or his | for the sum of $16,436.70. A certified copy "3d. That the above-mentioned deed of conveyance by Ayres P. Merrill to Maria E. Strange is hereby adjudged to be absolutely null and void from the beginning, so far as the same in any wise affects the above-mentioned indebtedness of said estate to said plaintiff. "4th. That any bequest or devise in said last will and testament of said Ayres P. Merrill contained in favor of any person or persons whatever is subject to the payment of the whole amount above mentioned as due from said estate to plaintiff, and to interest thereon at the rate of six per cent per annum until paid. "5th. That plaintiff have execution against the property which was of said Ayres P. Merrill at the time of his death for the amount last above mentioned, and interest thereon until paid, besides sheriff's fees and expenses as provided by law." It was then stated that Mrs. Strange became possessed of Merrill's property soon after his death; that complainant, being informed that Mrs. Strange had qualified as executrix in Tennessee, filed her bill, No. 1805, against her as such executrix, to recover the amount due from Merrill, and among other things sought to attach the real estate of the testator, and that it was attached and a receiver appointed; that by the said proceedings she sought to impound the real estate and hold it subject to the judgment sought to be recovered in New York against the estate and Mrs. Strange, who was a nonresident of Tennessee, and said suit No. 1805 was ancillary and auxiliary to the suit in New York; that judgment was recovered in the latter; and that there was no need of proceedings to recover judgment in No 1805. Complainant further alleged that Mrs. The writ of attachment was issued as prayed In January, 1881, Mrs. Strange caused the will of her father to be probated in Tennessee, where she had then taken up her residence, and letters were issued to her there. On February 2, 1881, Mrs. Carpenter filed her bill in the Chancery Court of Shelby County, Tennessee, No. 3912, against Mrs. Strange as executrix and individually, and the heirs, distributees and legatees under Merrill's will. This bill set forth the death of Merrill in New York in November, 1873, testate; the probate of the will in February, 1874, by Mrs. Strange, and its probate in Tennessee in January, 1881; and that complainant had "never renounced her claim upon the testator's estate and has never claimed anything under said will or received anything. She averred that she was a creditor of said estate on account of trust funds received by Merrill in his lifetime, and that the claim had been reduced to judgment in a suit brought against Mrs. Strange, as executrix, in the Supreme Court of the County and State of New York, which judgment was Complainant charged that the insolvency of the estate had been duly suggested in the County Court of Shelby County; that the personalty had been exhausted in the payment of debts, and that there remained nothing but the real estate to pay such debts; and herself and all other creditors and persons interested in the estate who may wish to come in and be parties herein." Complainant further represented that lot No. 59 had become, by virtue of the judgment of the New York court, assets of Merrill's estate, and liable for the payment of debts, together with the other real estate, and prayed that the administration and settlement of the estate be transferred from the county court to the Shelby Chancery Court; that an account of the assets and liabilities be begun, and a settlement had with Mrs. Strange as executrix, and that she pass her accounts and settlement in the latter court; that Mrs. Strange be made to account for the money left her in trust; that the legatees under the will account for legacies turned over to them and be postponed until the debts were paid; that the creditors and others interested be permitted to become parties to the proceedings; that the clerk and master make publication for all creditors to file their claims on or before the 15th of May, 1881; that the judg ment recovered by the complainant in New [95] [96] [97] York be allowed and a decree rendered there- | and the heirs of his body, or for his sister By consent of the parties the two cases, Mrs. Strange answered as executrix and, in her own right, admitted that she had made no settlement as executrix in New York, and that the personalty was disposed of, and among other things pleaded and relied upon, as executrix and individually, the Statutes of Limitation of the State of Tennessee, and as executrix that no personal assets whatever had come to her hands to be administered in Tennessee; and she further averred that the bequest in item No. 3 of the will had not been paid, either in whole or in part; claimed lot No. 59 as her own under the deed made to her in 1867, and stated that the will left no realty belonging to Merrill except Nos. 98 and 100 Madison Street. Answers were filed for the other defendants, adopting Mrs. Strange's answer, and pleading all of the Statutes of Limitation of the State of New York and of the State of Tennessee applicable in any way to the case. The answer of the minors submitted their case to the court, and also relied on the Statutes of Limitation. W. N. M. Merrill tiled a claim in the suit, setting forth a trust created by Mercer in 1857, by conveyance to A. P. Merrill for the benefit of claimant, and that the lands described in the conveyance were sold in 1860 for $6,000 or thereabouts. And he insisted that any surplus remaining after the payment of the judgment in favor of his sister Anna M. should be paid into court in trust for him credit were due to his official acts, and that When the record of the New York court [98] |