(189 [190] tion to those of my brethren, upon the propo sitions of law advanced by the court below. Those propositions, if maintained, would, in my judgment, unsettle titles he d under pat ents issued upon such confirmed grants, and lead to great litigation in the State to the serious detriment of its interests and these of its people. The action is ejectment for the possession of certain premises within the limits of the city and county of San Francisco, and also within the boundaries of the tract of land confirmed to the city, as successor of a Mexican pueblo, as they are described in the official survey of the tract made under the direction and authority of the Land Department, and carried into the patent of the United States. serted is valid and entitled to recognition, | venture to make some observations, in addi- Judgment reversed and cause remanded with directions for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Bradley and Mr. Justice Gray did not hear the argument or participate in the decision of this case. Mr. Justice Field concurring: I concur in the judgment of this court and in the views expressed in its opinion. As a correct solution of the questions involved is of vital importance to the security of titles claimed under confirmed Mexican grants in California, followed by a survey made and a patent issued under the Land Department of the government, and as I have had personal knowledge of all legal proceedings touching the claim of the pueblo of San Francisco from their commencement, I will of May, 1865, as "a tract situated within the A survey and plat purporting to be of the To the approval of the survey and plat the city and county of San Francisco filed their protest and objections. The military officer of the United States in command of the Department of California also filed objections to so much of the survey as related to the military reservation within the limits of the tract. Surveyor-general Day succeeded the officer | test were above high-water mark in 1846, The confirmation was, as already stated, Mr. Schurz was then at the head of the Interior Department, and he examined at great length the action of the commissioner and of the surveyor-general upon the survey; received a large amount of testimony upon the objections presented, and heard arguments of counsel thereon. And he held that the treatment of the survey by the commissioner proceded on the assumption that the United States had no interest in the matter, and that if the State and city were satisfied, the duty of the department was to approve the survey. This the Secretary held to be a grave error, observing that if the excluded tracts which the city claimed under the pro lands designated as Beach and Water lots; Such maps were made and deposited as [193] [194] [195] They represented, as he held, the line of of his predecessor, and overruled the appli cation for its review. After much difficulty with the surveying officers a survey was made pursuant to the directions given and was approved by the then commissioner of the general land office, and upon that survey a patent was issued to the city of San Francisco, bearing date the 20th day of June, 1884. This patent was forwarded to the mayor of San Francisco, and was accepted on behalf of the city and county. When Mr. Lamar succeeded Mr. Teller as the head of the Interior Department, application was made to him to recall the patent and issue a new one in accordance with the Stratton survey. In support of the applica tion it was strenuously contended, by the same parties who had resisted the action of Subsequently, after Mr. Schurz had ceased his predecessors, that there was a want of to be the head of the Interior Department jurisdiction on their part to review the decis and Mr. Teller had become Secretary, ap-ion of the commissioner of the land office. plication was made to the latter officer to Such contention was urged upon the supreview the decision of the former, and upon posed meaning of the statute, and on the such application argument of counsel was ground that the supervisors of the city and heard and a most extended consideration of county of San Francisco had by resolution [196] the whole matter was had. Secretary Teller directed that no appeal should be taken from observed that all the material questions re- his decision, and, when it was taken by lating to the boundaries of the tract confirmed counsel retained for the protection of the inwere settled, except the single inquiry terests of the lot-holders as well as of the whether or not, in running the line of ordi- city, had declared that his action was unaunary high-water mark of the ocean, and thorized. especially of the bay, the main shore or The Secretary, in considering the objectcourse line of such body of water identified ions, referred to the fact that the supervisors, by its larger description should be followed, subsequently to those resolutions, had recutting across the mouths of streams, estua-quested him, before whom they admitted the ries and creeks which, intersecting the body case was then pending relating to the boundof the peninsula, find their entrance into the aries of the military reservation, to take up ocean or bay, or whether such estuaries as and decide the case without further delay. fall below high tide should be segregated And after a careful review of the question by following up the tide line on one side of jurisdiction, and the proceedings prelimi and down on the other so as to make them nary to the issue of the patent, he refused to as it were a part of the sea. He said that recall the patent, holding that an order by his predecessor had decided that the former him to that effect would be illegal and void, was intended by the decree and expressed its and that the matter presented for his considtrue construction, and, after mature delibera-eration in the past proceedings of the case tion, he adhered to the same view. sea. "When we look," said the Secretary, "at the calls for boundary there is no ambiguity, no doubtful phraseology. Said tract being bounded on the north and east by the bay of San Francisco; on the west by the Pacific Ocean. The tract bounds upon the bay and ocean, not upon estuaries, creeks, and streams intersecting such tract, even though they be navigable and technically termed arms of the The boundary, he added, was not the stream, but the bay; consequently the ordinary high-water mark must be the highwater mark of the shore as pertaining to the sea, and not the high-water mark of the bank as pertaining to a river or stream; so although Mission Creek was alleged to have been as well a tidal inflow as an outlet for the inland waters, it nevertheless fell within banks instead of resting upon shores, and must be considered an inland water for all purposes. He added that it was plain that the highwater mark extended to the shore of the bay, leaving out any reference whatever to the inland channels of the streams intersecting the granted peninsula. He accordingly directed a substantial adhesion to the decision did not justify any recommendation to the legal department of the government to institute proceedings to recall, or modify, or in any manner interfere with the patent. I have stated with as much brevity as possible the steps taken for the confirmation of the title of the city as successor of the Mexican pueblo, which are set forth more în detail in the opinions of the different Secreta. ries of the Interior laid before us on the hearing, for the statement is important to a clear perception of the character and import of the rulings of the referee and of the court below. An extended narrative of the proceedings would occupy a much greater space and would show that parties claiming an interest in the lands left out of the Stratton survey, and resisting the approval of the official survey subsequently made, had also applied to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia and to Congress for aid to carry out their pretensions, and were met by the declaration that to obtain a remedy for any errors alleged, resort should have been had to the Secretary of the Interior as the only revisory authority over the action of the inferior officers of the Land Department. It would also show that in obtaining a recogni- | location and had made surveys in their neightion of its claim, the city had met from them borhood in that year, and that they were at every step the most strenuous opposition, then below the line of ordinary high-water and that every possible objection taken to mark. He did not add "of the bay;" but 197) the claim and survey since, was then pre- as the premises were where the water of the sented and fully considered by the different creek formerly ran, and where, for aught Secretaries of the Interior; so that with truth that appears in evidence, it may now run, was it said in the recent decision of this it was to the high-water mark of that creek court in San Francisco v. Le Roy, 138 U. S. to which he had reference. 656, 672 [34: 1096, 1101] that the boundaries of the pueblo were established by the United States after the most thorough and exhaustive examination ever given to the consideration of the boundaries of a claim of a pueblo under the Mexican government. The parties who carried on the long and protracted contest in the land department. against the confirmation of the claim and its survey as finally approved, asserted the acquisition of an interest in those premises under certain deeds of the tide-land commissioners, created by the Legislature of California. [198] On March 30, 1868, that Legislature passed an Act to survey and dispose of certain salt marsh and tide lands belonging to the State. It empowered the governor to appoint three persons, who were to constitute a board of tide-land commissioners, and authorized them to take possession of all the marsh and tide lands, and lands lying under water, situate along the bay of San Francisco and in the city and county of San Francisco, belonging to the State; to have the same surveyed and maps of the property prepared; to sell the interest of the State therein, and to execute conveyances to the purchasers. (Laws of Cal. 1867-68, chap. 543.) At that time one George W. Ellis had settled upon lands excluded from the Stratton survey, and after its passage he applied to the board of tide-land commissioners and obtained from it two deeds, dated in November, 1875, covering the premises. His grantees carried on the contest, but not in their own names, against the location and survey of the tract confirmed before the Interior De partment, and in every possible way sought to defeat its action and secure such a survey as would leave the lands claimed by them without the limits of the pueblo. The interest which the plaintiffs below, the United Land Association, and Clinton C. Tripp, had or claimed in the premises covered by the patent to the city of San Francisco, was founded upon these conveyances of the tideland commissioners. Relying upon a title from that source the present action was brought. As stated above, it is an action of ejectment for the possession of premises within the limits of the pueblo survey and covered by the patent to the city .of San Francisco. After issue was joined it was by consent of parties referred to a referee. The plaintiffs claimed title to the premises in controversy under the deeds mentioned. The defendant relied upon the fact that the premises were within the boundaries of the tract patented. They were situated in what constituted in 1854 the channel of Mission Creek, above its mouth. A witness produced by the plaintiffs testified that he knew their The plaintiffs also gave in evidence the final decree of confirmation of the claim of the city of San Francisco rendered by the circuit court of the United States, and the Stratton survey, mentioned above, with the certificate of approval of the surveyor-general and the confirmation thereof by the commissioner of the general land office. Objection was made to the introduction of this survey on the ground that it was not competent evidence, not being matter of record; and that it had been canceled and superseded by another survey made in accordance with instructions of the Secretary of the Interior. The referee overruled the objections under the exception of the defendant, admitted the rejected survey, and, among other things, held that in approving that survey the commissioner was acting in a judicial capacity, and that his judgment thereon was not reversible and was not legally reversed. The defendant, to show that no title ever vested in the plaintiffs under their alleged deeds from the tide-land commissioners, gave in evidence the patent of the United States issued to the city of San Francisco, dated the 20th of June, 1884; also the plat of the pueblo lands finally confirmed to the city under instructions of the United States surveyor-general, ordered by the Secretary of the Interior and approved by the commissioner of the general land office, upon which the patent issued. It was conceded that the patent included within its boundaries the premises in question. The referee admitted the evidence thus offered of the patent and survey, with the concession that they included the demanded premises, but refused to find for the defendant thereon, and the defendant excepted. The decree of confirmation, as seen above, bounds the tract confirmed on the north and east side by ordinary high-water mark of the bay of San Francisco. The Stratton survey and the proofs before the referee did not show that the premises in controversy were below that water mark of the bay, but only that they were below that water mark at a point in the channel of Mission Creek, and yet the referee held that the Stratton survey and the parol proofs in the case showed that the premises were outside of the specific boundary of the decree, and therefore remained the property of the State. He accordingly gave judgment for the plaintiffs. His rulings on the trial exhibited several errors. He gave no effect to the general rule that in actions of ejectment a patent of the United States, issued upon a confirmation of a land claim to which protection had been guaranteed by treaty, cannot be collaterally assailed for mere error alleged in the action of the officers of the government. He admitted in evidence, against the objections of [199] [200] [201] the defendant, the rejected survey of Stratton, are included, legal or equitable, perfect or By the Treaty of Guadaloupe Hidalgo, the United States also stipulated for such protection, and that implied that rights of property, perfect or imperfect, held by the inhabitants previous to the acquisition of the country should be secured to them, so far as such property was recognized by the laws and constitution of the new government; and for that purpose that the holders should receive from the new authorities such official and documentary evidence of their rights as would assure their full possession and enjoyment. Pueblos in that respect stood in the same position as private individuals. All their rights of property, legal or equitable, were alike entitled to protection. Whatever property was ceded to the United States from Mexico, whether marsh lands or tide lands, passed subject to the obligation to protect existing claims to them of all parties. The State could take no greater interest than the United States acquired; all lands she received went under her control charged with the equitable claims of others, which the United States were bound by the There were several hundred claims to lands marsh lands granted to her by the Act of When the patent to the city was brought [202] |