the king of Prussia, the king of Sardinia, and the king of Saxony were to be called in, not to act as umpires, but they were each to be requested to name a scientific man, and that these three members of a scientific commission should proceed to arbitrate. Was there ever a proposition like this suggested for the arrangement of a question on which two countries had differed for fifty-eight years? And this, too, was proposed after the failure of the arbitration on the part of the king of Holland, and when they had had their commission of exploration in vain. And yet, with all this, there were to be three scientific men, foreign professors, one from Prussia, one from Sardinia, and one from Saxony! To do what? And where were they to meet; or how were they to come to a satisfactory adjustment?"

It was asked in the House of Commons, not inaptly, What would the people of Maine think, when they should read that they were to be visited by three learned foreigners, one from Prussia, one from Saxony, and one from Sardinia? To be sure, what would they think, when they should see three learned foreign professors, each speaking a different language, and none of them the English or American tongue, among the swamps and morasses of Maine in summer, or wading through its snows in winter, on the Allegash, the Maguadavic, or among the moose deer, on the precipitous and lofty shores of Lake Pohenagamook, and for what? To find where the division was, between Maine and New Brunswick! Instructing themselves by these labors, that they might repair to Frankfort on the Maine, and there hold solemn and scientific arbitration on the question of a boundary line, in one of the deepest wildernesses of North America!

-

Sir, I do not know what might have happened, if this project had gone on. Possibly, Sir, but that your country has called you to higher duties, you might now haye been at Frankfort on the Maine, the advocate of our cause before the scientific arbitration. If not yourself, some one of the honorable members here very probably would have been employed in attempting to utter in the heart of Germany the almost unspeakable names bestowed by the Northeastern Indians on American lakes and streams. Mr. Fox, it is said, on reading his despatch, replied, with characteristic promptitude and good sense, "For Heaven's sake, save us from the philosophers! Have sovereigns, if you please, but no professional men."

But Mr. Fox was instructed, as it now appears, to renew his exertions to carry forward the arbitration. "Let us," said Lord Palmerston, in writing to him, "let us consider the American contre projet as unreasonable, undeserving of answer, as withdrawn from consideration, and now submit my original projet to Mr. Webster, the new Secretary of State, and persuade him it is reasonable."

But with all respect, Sir, to Lord Palmerston, Mr. Webster was not to be so persuaded; that is to say, he was not to be persuaded that it was reasonable, or wise, or prudent, to pursue the negotiation in this form further. He hoped to live long enough to see the northeastern boundary settled; but that hope was faint, unless he could rescue the question from the labyrinth of projects and counter-projects, explorations and arbitrations, in which it was involved. He could not reasonably expect that he had another half-century of life before him.

Mr. President, it is true that I viewed the case as hopeless, without an entire change in the manner of proceeding. I found the parties already "in wandering mazes lost." I found it quite as tedious and difficult to trace the thread of this intricate negotiation, as it would be to run out the line of the Highlands itself. One was quite as full as the other of deviations, abruptnesses, and perplexities. And having received the President's authority, I did say to Mr. Fox, as has been stated in the British Parliament, that I was willing to attempt to settle the dispute by agreeing on a conventional line, or line by compromise.

Mr. President, I was fully aware of the difficulty of the undertaking. I saw it was a serious affair to call on Maine to come into an agreement, by which she might subject herself to the loss of territory which she regarded as clearly her own. The question touched her proprietary interests, and, what was more delicate, it touched the extent of her jurisdiction. I knew well her extreme jealousy and high feeling on this point. But I be

* Mr. Tyler.

It is now well known, that in 1832 an agreement was entered into between some of the heads of department at Washington, namely, Messrs. Livingston, McLane, and Woodbury, under the direction of President Jackson, on the part of the United States, and Messrs. Preble, Williams, and Emery, on the part of the government of Maine, by which it was stipulated that Maine should surrender to the United States the territory which she claimed beyond the line designated by the King of the Netherlands, and receive, as an indemnity, ONE MILLION of acres of the public lands, to be selected by herself, in Michigan 9

VOL. V.

The

lieved in her patriotism, and in her willingness to make sacrifices for the good of the country. I trusted, too, that her own good sense would lead her, while she doubtless preferred the strict execution of the treaty, as she understood it, to any line by compromise, to see, nevertheless, that the government of the United States was already pledged to arbitration, by its own proposition and the agreement of Great Britain; that this arbitration might not be concluded and finished for many years, and that, after all, the result might be doubtful. With this reliance on the patriotism and good sense of Maine, and with the sanction of the President, I was willing to make an effort to establish a boundary by direct compromise and agreement, by acts of the parties themselves, which they could understand and judge of for themselves, by a proceeding which left nothing to the future judgment of others, and by which the controversy could be settled in six months. And, Sir, I leave it to the Senate to-day, and the country always, to say how far this offer and this effort were wise or unwise, statesmanlike or unstatesmanlike, beneficial or injurious.

Well, Sir, in the autumn of 1841 it was known in England to be the opinion of the American government, that it was not advisable to prosecute further the scheme of arbitration; that that government was ready to open a negotiation for a conventional line of boundary; and a letter from Mr. Everett, dated on the 31st of December, announced the determination of the British government to send a special minister to the United States, authorized to settle all matters in difference, and the selection of Lord Ashburton for that trust. This letter was answered, on the 29th of January, by an assurance that Lord Ashburton would be received with the respect due to his government and to himself.† Lord Ashburton arrived in Washington on the 4th of April, 1842, and was presented to the President on the 6th.

On the 11th, a letter was written from the Department of State to the Governor of Maine, announcing his arrival, and his declaration that he had authority to treat for a conventional

existence of this treaty was not known for some time, and it was never ratified by the high contracting parties.

*The letter of Mr. Everett referred to will be found among the Diplomatic Papers, in the sixth volume.

See the letter, in the sixth volume.

line of boundary, or line by agreement, on mutual conditions, considerations, and equivalents."

The Governor of Maine was informed, that,

"Under these circumstances, the President has felt it to be his duty to call the serious attention of the governments of Maine and Massachusetts to the subject, and to submit to those governments the propriety of their coöperation, to a certain extent and in a certain form, in an endeavor to terminate a controversy already of so long duration, and which seems very likely to be still considerably further protracted before the desired end of a final adjustment shall be attained, unless a shorter course of arriving at that end be adopted than such as has heretofore been pursued, and as the two governments are still pursuing.

.....

"The opinion of this government upon the justice and validity of the American claim has been expressed at so many times, and in so many forms, that a repetition of that opinion is not necessary. But the subject is a subject in dispute. The government has agreed to make it matter of reference and arbitration; and it must fulfil that agreement, unless another mode of settling the controversy should be resorted to with the hope of producing a speedier decision. The President proposes, then, that the governments of Maine and Massachusetts should severally appoint a commissioner or commissioners, empowered to confer with the authorities of this government upon a conventional line, or line by agreement, with its terms, conditions, considerations, and equivalents, with an understanding that no such line will be agreed upon without the assent of such commissioners.

"This mode of proceeding, or some other which shall express assent beforehand, seems indispensable, if any negotiation for a conventional line is to be attempted; since, if happily a treaty should be the result of the negotiation, it can only be submitted to the Senate of the United States for ratification."

A similar letter was addressed to the Governor of Massachusetts. The Governor of Maine, now an honorable member of this house,† immediately convoked the legislature of Maine, by proclamation. In Massachusetts the probable exigency had been anticipated, and the legislature had authorized the Governor, now my honorable colleague here, to appoint commissioners on behalf of the Commonwealth. The legislature of Maine adopted resolutions to the same effect, and duly elected four commissioners from among the most eminent persons in the

See the letter, in the sixth volume.

Mr. Fairfield.

Mr. John Davis.

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State, of all parties; and their unanimous consent to any proposed line of boundary was made indispensable. Three distinguished public men, known to all parties, and having the confidence of all parties in any question of this kind, were appointed commissioners by the Governor of Massachusetts.

Now, Sir, I ask, Could any thing have been devised fairer, safer, and better for all parties than this? The States were here by their commissioners; Great Britain was here by her special minister, and the Canadian and New Brunswick authorities within reach of the means of consultation; and the government of the United States was ready to proceed with the important duties it had assumed. I put the question to any man of sense, whether, supposing the real object to be a fair, just, convenient, prompt settlement of the boundary dispute, this state of things was not more promising than all the schemes of exploration and arbitration, and all the tissue of projects and counter-projects, with which the two governments had been making themselves strenuously idle for so many years. Nor was the promise not fulfilled.

It has been said, absurdly enough, that Maine was coerced into a consent to this line of boundary. What was the coercion? Where was the coercion? On the one hand, she saw an immediate and reasonable settlement; on the other hand, a proceeding sure to be long, and its result seen to be doubtful. Sir, the coercion was none other than the coercion of duty, good sense, and manifest interest. The right and the expedient united, to compel her to give up the wrong, the useless, the inexpedient.

Maine was asked to judge for herself, to decide on her own interests, not unmindful, nevertheless, of those patriotic considerations which should lead her to regard the peace and prosperity of the whole country. Maine, it has been said, was persuaded to part with a portion of territory by this agreement. Persuaded! Why, Sir, she was invited here to make a compromise, to give and to take, to surrender territory of very little value for equivalent advantages, of which advantages she was herself to be the uncontrolled judge. Her commissioners needed no guardians. They knew her interest. They knew what they were called on to part with, and the value of what they could obtain in exchange. They knew, especially, that on the one hand was