all other abuses and excesses noyefull to the comen weale ought to be reformed,) for thies causes folowing.

First, The said Statute is prejudicial unto the comen weale, because it is occasion of prolix sute and superfluous delayes in the said Court, else more necessary to be restrained than augmented. For the said nombre of Ten Proctors appoynted by the said Statute is unsufficient for the speedy and diligent attending of mens causes in the said Court, though all Ten were procuring there at once: as it is not like but that three or four of the same shal bee alwayes impotent or absent. For such they account also within the said nombre of Ten. And besides that the same Ten or fewer, that shalbe onely procuring, shal serve not onely for the said Court of thArches, but also for my said Lord of Canterburies Audience (wherein be as many causes as in thArches) and for the Consistorie of the Busshop of London. For by the Statutes of both the same Courts of Audience and Consistorie, there is no man admitted to pro-32 cure in the same, unlesse he be a Proctor admitted first in thArches. So that so few Proctors, appoynted for so many causes as shal be in traverse in all the said Courts, can never be able to spede their busines without great delayes taking.

For heretofor whan there were in the said Courtes twenty Proctors continually occupying, and moo, it hath ben seen, that divers of theym hath been than so overladde with causes, that they were driven to take oft and many delayes and Prorogations ad idem, for to bring in their matiers, libelles and plees. Than moche more must they do the same now being but Ten of theym. And moost of al, when of the same Ten there shalbe, (as like it is allwayes to be,) three or four absent or impotent, Undoubted they must needs use infinite delayes. Which had else rather more need to be restrayned, then that any occasion shuld be yet given of more using the same. For by reason of the same the King's Subjects, called to the said Court, are putto greate expenses, tedious Labour, and losse of tyme. And therfor divers, that have good right to many things pleadable in the said Courts, had lever renunce and forgoo their

interest in the same, than entre so desperate a Sute in the said Courts therfor.

Alse mens causes cannot be diligently attended by so fewe Proctors. And men shalbe destitute of counsaill (whereof shuld be allweys plenty in every Courte.) And through the negligence of the Proctors, that they must be than of, whan they shall have so moche busynes, divers good causes muste neds perish, for lack of good looking unto; as lightely maye be: for the forgeting of one houre, or mistaking of a worde, doth in the said Courts otherwhiles marre the best matier.

And it is impossible, that the said Ten Proctors only shalbe able to applye accordingly al the causes, that shalbe depending in al the said Courts, as Proctors of duetie shuld. For a Proctor's office is Laborious, and requireth moche busynes. First, a Proctor must take sufficient instructions of his Clients, and kepe every Court-daye, remember every houre, that is appoynted him to doo any thing at; solicite and instruct his Advocates; write and penne every Instrument that shalbe requisite to be made in his matiers. And whosoever of the Proctors, that shalbe negligent or forgetfull in doing any of these his matiers, must needs decaye. But so few Proctors as be appoynted by the said Statute are not able not only to do so in each matier, but also scant able to remember their Clients names, for so many that they shall than have. Each matier, if it were exactly applied, and men able so to do, wold require a Proctor alone. But because every man is not able to find a Proctor for every one matier, it were best, next the same, that there were so many Proctors appoynted, as might most easily apply their causes, as they shuld. And though that were less profit to the said Proctors, whose wele is best, when they are moost charged with busines: yet it shuld be more profit for the Common wele, whose interest were to have causes speedily and diligently applyed in the said Courts.

Also, the fewer that there be of the said Proctors, the sooner they maye agree among theymselves to give delayes each to other because that one may have the same leave, that he gave the other: as they do in termes to Prove. 33 Where, to each of the three termes, which they cal Termi

nos ad proband. a moneth would suffice, though they dwelled never so fer from the Court within this Royalm; they take now by cross suffraunce of each an other of theym a quarter of a year commonly for ech of the same three termes. Which were enough and too moche, though the parties dwelled in Paris. Which delayes though they be nothing profitable, ne commodious for the poore Sutors, be both profitable to the said Proctors; by reason that the causes are kept thereby the longer in their handes. And also commodious by reason, that they, being greatly occupied, shuld have the longer time to do their busynes in.

And for like consideracion the said Proctors do omitte commonly in every matier a certayn othe ungeven, called Juramentum Calumpnic, which is the best provision ordeyned in al the said Lawe of Civile and Canon, for the restrainct of unlawful Sutes and prolixe processes. Theffect wherof is this. Both the parties being in sute, or their Proctors, shal by the same oath swear, first the Plaintiff, That he believeth himself to have a just cause to sue; and the Defendant, a just cause to defend. Secondariely, That neyther of theym shall use any unlawful delayes, whereby justice may be deferred or letted. Thirdely, That eyther of theym, whan they shalbe asked by the Juge, shall answer truly to every thing, that is asked of theym according to their belief. Fourthly, That there is nor shalbe nothing geven, ne promised, to the Judge, or any other Officer, but only the Fees and duty permitted by the Law. And fifthly, That neyther of them shal use, ne procure, any false witnes wittingly in the matier.

Which Othe yf it were geven in every matier, as it shuld be, there shulde not be so many wrongful causes attempted and kept in the said Courts, nor so many delayes, used in the same. But because that neither of bothe that standes with the proufitt of the said Proctors, by common assent and crosse sufferaunce of eche another of theym, they omitte the same moost commonly not only ungeven, but also not spoken of. And yf they saye, that they doo so, because that ofte accustuming of othes maketh men to sett lesse by an othe; Trueth it is that it doth so. And therefore the said othe ought to be chiefly commended. For the

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geving of the same but ones in any matier shuld excuse theym from geving of many other oaths that they geve in euery matier. For it alone conteyneth th'effect of div's other othes requisite. And where one shuld serve for all, better it were for advoyding of too ofte swering, that the same alone shuld be given, and al other omitted, than that it alone shuld be lefft, that al the other doth supplye.

Also, The said Statute of Ten Proctors may be occasion, that the same shuld wax haulte, arrogant, negligent, and lothe to take payne, and excessive in taking, by reason that they shuld be so fewe. As we see experiently in al other faculties or mysteries, where fewest Occupiers be of the same there be they moost dangerous, and hardest to be goten to do their facultie, and moost excessive in taking for the same as scarsitie or raritie of any thing else maketh the same deir. For whan there be few of a faculty, they know than that be they never so excessive in taking, or negligent in their doing, they shalbe occupied wel ynough: whan men can have no other choice but of a fewe, that be al alike agreyd upon the price of every thing; as they maye soone doo, whan they be but a fewe. Where yf they were many, all shuld be contrary.

Moreover, the said Statute of Tenne Procters may be occasion, that justice shuld not indifferently procede in the said Courts for lack of lauful defense. As if the Juges of the said Courts, or any of theym, be affectionate in any matier depending before theym (as it may be that the Juges there shal not be allweys of such integritie as they be of, that be there nowe,) the said Proctors dare not be retained of his part, that the Juge doth not favor: or if they be retayned, they dare not purpose their Client's best Interest and remedye, yf the same do any thing offend the said Juges affection. By reason that the said Proctors be removeable from their Proctors offices at the said Juges plesure, and the same made so beneficiall unto theym by reason of the said Statute.

Than, whan the said Proctors shalbe in suche fear of the said Juges, to speak in matiers of Instance, where the Juge doth bear but a light affection to another man: moch more will they be so in cases of office, where the Juge is partie

hymself, and hath his owne matier in hand. And no mervail, if they dare not speak in such. For it hathe not ben seldom seen, and harde there, that it hath ben spoken unto such Proctors, as hath spoken any thing constantly, or frely, in their Clients causes, by the Juges aforesaid, Non es amicus Curia: and that they were threttened of expulsion from their Offices, and put to silence. Yet no lawe forbedeth the contrary, but that every man shuld have his lawful defense, yea, agenst the Juge himself.

But if there were many Proctors in the said Courts, the Juges could not so lightly keep them al in such subjection and feare of theym. Nor than the said Proctors shuld not have so great cause to fere theym so moche, seeing their offices shuld not be so beneficiall unto theym than. And lesse shuld they yet fear to purpose their Clients right duely, if it were ordeined, that the same Proctors shuld not be removeable from their Offices, at the said Juges plesure, (as heretofor they were; and now are) but only for certain greate offences proved afore indifferent Juges, to be committed by theym after their admission. And by reason, that the said Proctors be so abondoned unto the said Juges, where men had most nede of trusty Counsaillors, there they be most destitute of the same, as when the Juge is not indifferent. For the partialitie of a Juge is more to be feared, than the manifest malice of an Adversarie. For the tone hurteth prively, and is able to execute his malice: and the tother doth apertly all that he goeth about. And a man may provide for thadvoyding of the intent. And he is not so able to execute his purpose as the tother is. And though partialitie of any Juge is to be greatly feared, yet most of all in the Courts spirituall: where al depends upon the Juges hands, and that one man's commonly. For which partialitie the remedie of appeal was first invented. Which remedy, like as it was at the first most holsomely provided for the avoyding of thiniquity of partiall Juges; so it is nowe moost wickedly abused for the maintenance of yll doers in their wrongful causes and avoyding of due execution of justice, by reason that they be infinite: specially, after the Canon lawe. For by Civile, there is but appellacion permitted; and that not