Argument for Plaintiff in Error. entitled to notice of the reappraisement, and then it became the question in the cause whether, under the circumstances, the notice given was reasonable. The importer had been ready and had attended at the times appointed for the hearing, but the United States was not prepared to go on nor to fix a time when they would be ready. They postponed the hearing indefinitely and for their convenience and on a promise of notice. Nine months after this, on a few days' notice, while defendant was absent temporarily from the country, they determined to go on, disregarding the application for time to permit the return of the defendant. It is insisted by the plaintiff in error, as it was in the court below, that the real question was whether the defendant was entitled to notice; for if this be the case the legal consequence was supposed to be that it must be a reasonable one. There is not an instance that can be produced in which notice is requisite and reasonableness of the notice is not involved. It is important to observe that the case was an appeal from an assessment, and that the new assessors were to be governed by evidence. Marriott v. Brune, 9 How. 619, 634. The statute itself is silent on the subject of when and how this new body was to act; but the regulations of the Treasury assume that the importer is entitled to be present, and since these regulations are in favor of the citizen, and tend to produce justice, they are entitled to great weight. In Rankin v. Hoyt, 4 How. 327, 335, this court said: "In case the importer is dissatisfied with the valuation made by appraisers, he is allowed, before paying the duty, an appeal and further hearing before another tribunal, constituted in part by persons of his own selection. These persons have been aptly denominated a species of 'legislative referees,' 2 Mason, 406; and if the importer does not choose to resort to them, he cannot, with much grace, complain afterwards that any overestimate existed." The conduct of these appraisers is inquirable into on the question of the validity of their appraisement. Greely v. Burgess, 18 How. 413, 415. In 10 How. 225, 241, Greely v. Thompson, Mr. Justice Woodbury points out Argument for Plaintiff in Error. that the error lay in not adverting to the judicial character of the merchant appraiser; in fact his removal by the collector is classed with the conduct of the English Stuarts in removing judges if not sufficiently pliable. I assume that nothing further is required to prove that the importer is entitled to notice of the reappraisement, and that the appraisers are performing a judicial function. 2. Notice of a hearing at which evidence is to be given and a fact ascertained by a tribunal, which affects the interests of the person entitled to the notice, means such notice as will enable him to protect his interests. If it does not, this absurdity is involved, that notice after the hearing is sufficient. At the first trial it was so held, but the court on consideration thought they had been mistaken in this, and that the mode and time of notice were intrusted to the caprice of the appraiser. A discretion not inquirable into is a caprice, so far as third persons are concerned. If this ruling be correct, this is the one exceptional case in which it is so intrusted. I, at least, am not aware of another instance in which a person intrusted by law to do such a thing can assert that this discretion cannot be inquired into. The most common instance is that of a trustee, and we all know this does not mean his capricious determination. Hill on Trustees, 494, 495; Coleman v. Strong, 39 Ch. D. 443, 446; and by no one is the point better stated than by Chancellor Desaussure, Haynesworth v. Cox, Harper (Eq.) 118. The case deserves reading. An executor was given the right to elect which of two things should be given a legatee-a slave or a sum of money. Being interested in the estate, he selected a woman past child-bearing and nearly past labor. The court with some emphasis said the discretion was limited to selecting which was the more valuable for the legatee. The authorities collected by Judge Brown, of the Southern District of New York, in a recent case, seem to render further discussion useless. United States v. Doherty, 27 Fed. Rep 730, citing 4 Inst. 41; Rooke's Case, 3 Rep. 100; Rex v. Peters, 1 Burrow, 568, 570; Rose v. Stuyvesant, 8 Johns. 426; President and Trustees of Brooklyn v. Patchen, 8 Wend. 47. These VOL. CXLVI-5 Opinion of the Court. citations are in accord with all the authorities. Passmore v. Petit, 4 Dall. 271; Frey v. Vanlear, 1 S. & R. 435; United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 486, 487; Regina v. Grant, 14 Q. B. 43; Vestry of St. James v. Feary, 24 Q. B. D. 703. If, then, the court had the power or jurisdiction to decide that the defendant was entitled to notice of the hearing or appraisement, they had, of necessity, a power to determine whether what was given was legal notice. As they declined because their jurisdiction was not extended to that, the cause must be reversed, unless this court differs from the judge in thinking the notice was sufficient. Was this so? 3. The notice was insufficient. The cargo had been delivered, and time was quite immaterial. The Government was seeking to correct an error made by one of its officers. The defendant had attended the meeting when the United States, not being prepared, and not being able to say when they would be prepared, put off the meeting with a promise to notify; and at the end of nine months, having fixed on a day, refused to change it, though the defendant had left home to return shortly. It was not pretended that the desired delay was any disadvantage to the United States. And if they could wait, as they had done, from September, 1882, when the importation was made, to March, 1884, when the appraisement was had, there should be some reason for refusing to continue the case till May, to enable the defendant to attend. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Maury for defendant in error. MR. JUSTICE BROWN delivered the opinion of the court. It is conceded in this case that the reappraisement was binding provided it was properly conducted; Rev. Stat. § 2930; Rankin v. Hoyt, 4 How. 327, 335; Bartlett v. Kane, 16 How. 263, 272; Sampson v. Peaslee, 20 How. 571; Hilton v. Merritt, 110 U. S. 97; and the sole defence made upon the trial was that Earnshaw did not receive a reasonable notice of the time when the reappraisement was to be made. Opinion of the Court. The facts being undisputed, the reasonableness of the notice with respect to time was a question of law for the court, and was properly withdrawn from the consideration of the jury. Hill v. Hobart, 16 Maine, 164; Blackwell v. Fosters, 1 Met. (Ky.) 88; Seymour v. McCormick, 19 How. 96, 106; Luckhart v. Ogden, 30 California, 547, 557; Holbrook v. Burt, 22 Pick. 546; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Allen, 11 Michigan, 501. By Revised Statutes, sections 2899 to 2902, provision is made for the appraisement of imported merchandise under regulations prescribed in the succeeding sections, and by section 2930, if the importer is dissatisfied with such appraisement he may give notice to the collector, upon the receipt of which the latter "shall select one discreet and experienced merchant to be associated with one of the general appraisers wherever practicable, or two discreet and experienced merchants, citizens of the United States, familiar with the character and value of the goods in question, to examine and appraise the same, agreeably to the foregoing provisions; .. and the appraisement thus determined shall be final and be deemed to be the true value, and the duties shall be levied thereon accordingly." No provision is expressly made by statute for notice to the importer, but by Article 466 of the Treasury Regulations of 1884, "the importer will be notified of the time and place, but not of the name of the merchant selected to assist in the appraisement." The board of appraisers thus constituted is vested with powers of a quasi-judicial character, and the appraisers are bound (§ 2902)" by all reasonable ways and means in his or their power to ascertain, estimate, and appraise the true and actual market value and wholesale price of the merchandise at the time of exportation," etc. No reason is perceived for excluding this board of appraisers from the benefit of the general rule applicable to such officers, that some presumption is to be indulged in favor of the propriety and legality of their action, and that with respect to their methods of procedure they are vested with a certain discretion which will be respected by the courts, except where such discretion has been manifestly abused, and the board has proceeded in a wanton disregard of justice or of the rights of the importer. Opinion of the Court. The general principle is too well settled to admit of doubt that where the action of an inferior tribunal is discretionary its decision is final. Giles' Case, Strange, 881; King v. Proprietors, 2 Wm. Bl. 701; Henderson v. Moore, 5 Cranch, 11; Marine Ins. Co. of Alexandria v. Young, 5 Cranch, 187; Marine Ins. Co. of Alexandria v. Hodgson, 6 Cranch, 206. error. It was decided at an early day in this court that the refusal of an inferior court to continue a case cannot be assigned as Woods v. Young, 4 Cranch, 237. And yet there are doubtless cases to be found which hold that where, under the recognized practice, a party makes a clear case for a continuance, it is an abuse of discretion to refuse it. Thus in Rose v. Stuyvesant, 8 Johns. 426, the judgment of a justice of the peace was reversed, because he had refused an adjournment of a case on account of a child of the defendant being dangerously sick and in Hooker v. Rogers, 6 Cowen, 577, the verdict was set aside by the appellate court upon the ground that the circuit judge refused to put off the trial of the cause upon proof that a material witness was confined to his bed by sickness, and unable to attend court. See, also, Trustees of Brooklyn v. Patchen, 8 Wend. 47; Ogden v. Payne, 5 Cow. 15. So in Frey v. Vanlear, 1 S. & R. 435, where arbitrators adjourned to a day certain and did not meet on that day, but met on a subsequent day, examined the witnesses in the absence of the opposite party, and without notice of the meeting, and made an award, it was held that their proceedings were irregular, and the judgment was reversed. The question in all these cases is whether in respect either to the notice of the trial, adjournments, allowance of pleas, the reception of testimony, or other incidental proceedings the court has or has not acted in the exercise of a sound and reasonable discretion. The subject is fully discussed in People v. Superior Court of New York, 5 Wend. 114. The tribunal in this case was created as a part of the machinery of the government for the collection of duties upon imports, and while its proceedings partake of a semi-judicial character, it is not reasonable to expect that in notifying the importer it should proceed with the technical accuracy neces |