Opinion of the Court. below, in striking out of his answer, on motion, the allegations pertaining to the supposed gambling transactions, and in sustaining the demurrer to his cross-bill. This action of the court was probably based on the view urged on behalf of the complainants, that Lloyd, as assignee, could not be heard, in this suit, to impeach the validity of the judgments obtained against the railway company, by going into an investigation of the nature of the original transaction out of which had arisen the indebtedness of Harper to Preston & McHenry, and in a settlement of which the bonds had been received by the latter. But it does not appear to be necessary to inquire into the reasons of the action of the court below in this respect, nor to consider whether the legal position implied in that action was sound, because, as we have seen, and as the court below held, there was no evidence admitted or offered which sufficed to sustain the allegation that the transactions between Harper and Preston & McHenry were of a gambling character. Hence, if those allegations had been permitted to stand in Lloyd's answer, there was no evidence to support them, and he was not injured by the order of the court in striking them out. But it is plain that the court treated those allegations as before it, applied the evidence to them, and held that they were not sustained; so that, even if the course of the court was somewhat irregular, in striking out the allegations, and in afterwards passing upon them and the evidence offered to support them, the defendants were not thereby injured. This view of the case renders it unnecessary to consider the question whether Harper, as the owner of the capital stock of the railway company, was concluded by the judgments obtained by the complainants against the railway company, and whether he or his assignee can go behind them, to disclose the nature of the business transactions between Harper and Preston & McHenry. There is an assignment of error to the decree wherein it subjects the estate of Harper, in the hands of his assignee, to liability on account of stock standing in the name of W. D. Lee. But the court below found, from the evidence, that Lee Opinion of the Court. took and held this stock for the use and benefit of Harper, and, though served, he permitted the bill, with its allegations to that effect, to go unanswered. The Ohio statute, applicable to railway companies, provides that "the term 'stockholders' shall apply not only to such persons as appear by the books of the corporation to be such, but to any equitable owner of stock, although the stock appears on the books in the name of another." It does not appear, therefore, that the court erred in holding the same measure of liability to apply to Harper's stock standing in the name of Lee as to that standing in his own name. Nor does the objection that the decree was for an unnecessarily large amount, thus forming a basis for an inequitable division of the proceeds of the assets of Harper's estate, appear to be well founded. The amount of the decree is not, as suggested by the assignee, the joint and aggregate amount of the Harper and Lee stock, but is restricted to the aggregate amount of the judgments owned by the complainants. Error is likewise assigned to the allowance of interest on the judgments after the date of Harper's assignment. It is claimed that, as against the estate in the hands of the assignee, interest ceased from the date of the assignment. There is nothing before us to show that there are not funds in the hands of the assignee sufficient to pay Harper's debts in full, with interest to the date of payment, and as it does not appear that this matter was brought to the attention of the court below, when framing the decree, or at any time, we do not feel disposed to disturb the decree. Finding no error in the record, the decree of the court below is Affirmed. The CHIEF JUSTICE, not having heard the argument, did not take part in the decision of this case. Statement of the Case. YESLER v. WASHINGTON HARBOR LINE COMMIS SIONERS. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON. No. 912. Argued October 24, 25, 1892. Decided December 19, 1892. An allegation—in a petition to a state court for a writ of prohibition to restrain State Harbor Commissioners from extending or locating harbor lines over wharves erected by and belonging to the petitioner — that the petitioner is and for thirty years past has been the owner of the wharf and of the uplands abutting on the shore upon which the wharf was constructed, does not set up or claim a title, right, privilege or immunity under the Constitution, or a statute of, or authority exercised under the United States, so as to give jurisdiction to this court to review the judgment of the highest court of the State denying the writ. Such a judgment does not deprive the owner of the wharf of his property without due process of law; nor is it in conflict with the provisions of 'the act of September 19, 1890, (26 Stat. 426, 454, c. 907,) concerning the construction of wharves, etc., in navigable waters of the United States where no harbor lines are established. The opinion of the state court in rendering the judgment refusing the writ of prohibition stated that the relator was not entitled to the writ because he had other remedies of which he might have availed himself. Held, that this was broad enough to sustain the decree, irrespective of the decision of a Federal question, if any such arose. ON October 28, 1890, the affidavit of J. D. Lowman, the attorney in fact of H. L. Yesler, was filed in the Superior Court of King County, State of Washington, stating: "That said H. L. Yesler has lived in the city of Seattle upwards of thirty years; that he is now and has been for thirty years last past the owner of the following described property, to wit, the property commonly known as Yesler's wharf and dock and the upland abutting on the shore upon which said wharf and dock were constructed; that said property abuts upon the shores of Elliott Bay; that more than thirty years ago said Yesler, in aid of commerce and navigation, caused to be constructed in front of and to the westward of said premises, and extending into Elliott Bay, a wharf and dock at large expense, to wit, at the expense of one hundred Statement of the Case. thousand dollars; that said Yesler, at large expense, for many years prior to June 6, 1889, maintained and kept up said wharf and docks in aid of commerce and navigation; that the fire which occurred on the 6th day of June, 1889, and which destroyed the city of Seattle, destroyed said wharves and docks; that immediately thereafter said Yesler caused said wharves and docks to be rebuilt at a large expense, to wit, at the expense of fifty-six thousand dollars, and has ever since. maintained said wharves and docks and now maintains the same; that said wharves and docks are necessary aids to commerce and navigation and are largely used and have been largely used in building up and promoting the commerce of the city of Seattle and of the State of Washington. "That under and by virtue of the act of the legislature of the State of Washington approved March 26, 1890, and entitled, 'An act for the appraising and disposing of the tide and shore lands belonging to the State of Washington,' affiant is entitled, as affiant believes, to the privilege of purchasing the space upon which the improvements were made by him as aforesaid upon the shore in front of the upland. Affiant further says that under and by virtue of the act of the legis lature of the State of Washington approved March 28, 1890, · entitled 'An act to create a board of harbor line commissioners,' prescribing their duties and compensation, the governor of the State appointed as such commissioners W. F. Prosser, Eugene Semple, H. F. Garretson, Frank Richards, and D. C. Guernsey; that the members of said Harbor Line Commission have duly qualified as such and entered upon the discharge of their duties as such commission and are about to take final action in the location and establishing of the harbor lines within the limits of the city of Seattle; that, as affiant is informed and believes, said commission propose and are about to locate and establish such harbor lines in such a way as to include within such harbor lines a large part of the improvements of affiant hereinbefore mentioned; that the extension of the harbor lines over said improvements is an attempt on the part of the said Harbor Line Commission to exercise unauthorized power and to do an act which is not within the jurisdic Statement of the Case. tion of the said Harbor Line Commission; that said Harbor Line Commission has not authority or jurisdiction under the laws of the State of Washington, as affiant is advised and believes, to embrace or include within the harbor lines to be located and established in front of the city of Seattle the wharves, docks or other improvements made therein; that after the fire of June 6, 1889, the said Yesler rebuilt, at large expense as aforesaid, the wharves and docks above mentioned, and did so upon the faith of protection afforded to said Yesler by the act of legislature approved March 26, 1890, above mentioned; that if the Harbor Line Commission aforesaid is not prevented by a writ of prohibition from this honorable court from extending the so-called harbor lines over the wharves and docks of said Yesler the said commission will so extend said lines and thus deprive said Yesler of the use and benefit of his said wharves and docks without compensation or due process of law, and cloud his title to the same in such a manner as greatly to embarrass and hinder the plaintiff in the legitimate use of his said property." Deponent therefore prayed for a writ of prohibition, directed to the said Harbor Line Commissioners, to prohibit and restrain them and each of them "from extending, locating or establishing the harbor lines in front of the city of Seattle or in the harbor of the city of Seattle over the wharves and docks of the said H. L. Yesler, or any part thereof, and from filing the plat thereof in the office of the Secretary of State, or the duplicate thereof in the office of the clerk of the city of Seattle." An alternative writ having been issued, defendants appeared and moved to quash. The cause was heard upon the motion, the motion denied, and judgment rendered that the writ be made absolute, "and that this court does hereby command said respondents and each of them absolutely and finally that they and each of them desist and refrain from any future proceedings in locating, establishing and extending the harbor lines mentioned and referred to in the affidavit of J. D. Lowman, made and filed herein on October 28, 1890, and in said alternative writ issued thereon, over, across and in front of |