Wing v. Richardson, 2 Cliff. 449, 450; Dane v. Chicago Mfg. Co. 6 Fish. Pat. Cas. 130, 133; Howard v. Christy, 2 Ban. & Ard. 457, 458. The application must fully disclose the invention. U. S. 87, 98, 99 (31: 100, 105); Giant Powder | Whenever a party desires to show that his Co. v. California Powder Works, 98 U. S. 126, invention was prior to his application for the 137-139 (25:77, 81, 82); Ball v. Langles, 102 U. patent, he must prove the fact by other sufficient S. 128, 130, 132 (26:104-106); Swaine Turbine evidence. & Mfg. Co v. Ladd, Id. 408, 413, 414 (26:184, 186); Hopkins & D. Mfg. Co. v. Corbin, 103 U. S. 786, 791, 792 (26:610-612); James v. Campbell, 104 U. S. 356, 370, 378 (26:786, 791, 794); Heald v. Rice, Id. 737, 753 (26:910, 916); Johnson v. Flushing & N. S. R. R. Co. 105 U. S. 539, 547 (26:1162, 1165); Gosling v. Roberts, 106 U. S. 39, 47 (27: 61, 64); Wing v. Anthony, Id. 142, 147 (27: 110, 112); Moffitt v. Rogers, Id. 423, 428 (27:76, 77); Hofheins v. Russell, 107 U. S. 132, 141 (27: 332, 335); McMurray v. Mallory, 111 U. S. 97, 103 (28:365, 366); Torrent & Arms Lumber Co. v. Rodgers, 112 U. S. 659, 667-669 (28:842, 845, 846); Coon v. Wilson, 113 U. S. 268, 277, 278 (28:963, 965, 966); Eachus v. Broomall, 115 U. S. 429, 438 (29:419, 423); Ives v. Sargent, 119 U. S. 652, 662, 663 (30:544, 548). The law of the original structure must control; and no afterthought can convert the thing into what it was not normally designed to be. Clough v. Barker, 106 U. S. 166, 175, 176 (27: 134, 137); American Bell Tel. Co. v. Dolbear, 17 Fed. Rep. 604, 605. The testimony of a single witness cannot warrant a court of equity in finding for the complainant against the denial of defendant's answer. Tobey v. Leonard, 2 Cliff. 40, 50, 51; Andrews v. Hyde, 3 Cliff. 516, 522; Carpenter v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co. 45 U. S. 4 How. 185, 218 (11: 931, 946); Grant v. Grant, 34 Beav. 623, .627. He who has rights and sleeps upon them justly loses them. Miller v. Bridgeport Brass Co. 104 U. S. 350, 352, 355 (26:783-785). The procurement of such reissue at so late a date, and after years of adverse practice, by others, was unjust, unlawful and fraudulent. Matthews v. Boston Machine Co. 105 U. S. 54, 58 (26:1022, 1023); Bantz v. Frantz, 105 U. S. 160, 165, 166 (26:1013, 1014); Gage v. Herring, 107 U. S. 640, 645 (27: 601, 603); Clements v. Odorless Excavating Apparatus Co. 109 U. S. 641, 649, 650 (27: 1060, 1063); Turner & S. Mfg. Co. v. Dover Stamping Co. 111 U. S. 319, 326, 327 (28:442, 444); Wollensak v. Reiher, 115 U. S. 96, 100, 101 (29:350, 351); White v. Dunbar, 119 U. S. 47, 52 (30:303, 305); Newton v. Furst & B. Mfg. Co. Id. 373, 384, 385 (30:442, 445); Matthews v. Ironclad Mfg. Co. 124 U. S. 347, 351 (31: 477, 479.) The rule falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus should be applied. The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U. S. 7 Wheat. 283, 339 (5: 454, 468); Union Sugar Refinery V. Matthiesson, 3 Cliff, 639, 654. The conduct of Thomas R. Bailey, Jr., must negative any attempt, at this distance of time, to establish a claim to such invention. Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U. S. 192, 203 (27: 438, 442). There is nothing in regard to which a witness is more likely to be mistaken than in fixing the date at which a transaction long past took place. Willett v. Fister, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 91, 97 (21:804, 805); Wing v. Richardson, 2 Cliff. 449, 453; Hawes v. Antisdel, 2 Ban. & Ard. 10, 22; Sinclair v. Backus, 5 Ban. & Ard. 81, 83, 84. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Sayles, 97 U. S. 554, 563, 564 (24:1053, 1057); Eagleton Mfg. Co. v. West, B. & C. Mfg. Co. 18 Blatchf. 218, 220, 222. Usually the claim contains the words "as described" or "substantially as described," or words of like import, which are understood as referring back to the specification. Words of such import, if not expressed in the claim, must be implied. Mitchell v. Tilghman, 86 U. S. 19 Wall. 287, 391 (22:125, 135). Mr. Justice Blatchford delivered the opinion of the court: This is a suit in equity, brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan, by James Flower, Thomas Flower, and George Flower, against the City of Detroit, the Fire Commission of the City of Detroit, Benjamin Vernon, president thereof, and the Board of Water Commissioners of the City of Detroit, for the infringement of reissued letters patent No. 6990, granted March 14, 1876, on an application filed February 17, 1876, to Thomas R. Bailey, Jr., for an "improvement in hydrants," the original patent, No. 75,344, having been granted to said Bailey, March 10, 1868. Among the defenses set up in the answer, it was alleged that new matter, not constituting any substantial part of the alleged invention upon which the original patent was granted, was introduced into the specification of the reissue, and that the reissue is not for the same invention as the original patent, and is void. The specifications and claims of the original and of the reissue are here placed side by side in parallel columns, the parts in each which are not found in the other being in italic. R. Bailey, Jr., of Lockport, in the County of Niagara, and State of New York, have invented a new and improved hydrant fire plug; and I do hereby declare the following to be a full, clear thereof, which will enand exact description Be it known that I, T. able others skilled in the art to which my invention relates to make and use the same, reference be ing had to the accompanying drawing, which forms a part of this specification. This invention relates to improvements in the construction of fire plugs to a new and improved A represents the hydrant tube, from which the water is discharged. B is the horizontal section which is connected with the water main,' and which forms the valve chamber. C is a loose casing around the hydrant tube, for protecting the tube from dirt, etc. D is the cylinder valve, which has its seat at its lower end, on elastic or leather packing, secured in a groove, as seen in the drawing at a. E is a rod, having a screw thread on its upper end, by which the valve is operated. Fis a sleeve nut, which engages with the screw on the rod, raising and lowering it as the nut is turned. This nut is turned by a wrench on the head G. The sleeve nut is secured in the cap of the hydrant by a collar, and packing under the hollow cylinder stuffing box H, as seen in the drawing. J is a yoke, which is attached to the rod E by a set screw, and which is secured in the tube A, and prevented from turning, as it moves up and down, by projecting lugs, as seen in Fig. 2; and it will be seen that the arrangement is such that the rod and valve may be raised and lowered without being rotated. This secures a uniform and perfect bearing of the valve on its seat, the packing a remaining undisturbed. Provision is made for the discharge of the waste water by an orifice beneath the valve D, marked f, which orifice is opened and closed by a valve marked g, as seen in the drawing. h is a wing on the top of this valve. As the cylinder valve D descends the angular flange on its inside strikes the wing h and raises the valve, as seen in the drawing, thus allowing any water which may remain in the hydrant to escape through the orifice ƒ and aperture k. It will be thus seen that no water will be left in the hydrant to freeze in cold weather. The tube A is secured to the horizontal section Fig. 2, a cross section of the same through lines x x of Fig. 1. My invention consists in the following parts and combinations, as hereinafter specified and claimed, wherein A represents the hydrant tube, from which water is discharged. Bis the horizontal section which is connected with the water main, and which may form the valve chamber. C is a loose movable casing around the hydrant tube, D is the cylinder valve, having its seat at its lower end, upon suitable elastic packing, secured in a groove, as shown at a. E is a rod, having a screw thread on its upper end, by which the valve is operated. F is a sleeve nut engaged with the screw nut on the rod E, lifting and lowering said rod as the nut is turned one way or another. This nut is turned by a wrench or crank, or other suitable device on the head G. The sleeve nut is screwed in the cap of the hydrant by a collar, and packing under the hollow cylinder stuffing box H. Jis a yoke, which is attached to the rod E by a set screw, or its equivalent, and it is screwed in the tube A, and prevented from turning, as it moves up and down, by projecting lugs, as shown in detail at Fig. 2. It will be noticed that the arrangement is such that the rod and valve may be raised and lowered without being rotated, thus securing a uniform and perfect bearing of the valve on its seat, the packing a remaining undisturbed. Provision is made for the discharge of the waste water by an orifice f, beneath the valve D, which orifice is opened and closed by a valve g. A wing his provided upon the top of this valve. As the cylinder valve D descends, the angular flange i on its inside, striking the wing h, raises the valve, as shown in the drawing, and allows any water which may remain in the hydrant to escape down through the orifice f and aperture K, thus preventing any retention of water above the freezing level. The tube A' is secured to the horizontal section B by a ring nut m, which B by a ring nut, m, which contains recesses for P represents the dis- Having thus described my invention, I claim as new and desire to secure by letters patent: 1. A hydrant or water plug, constructed substantially as shown and described,-that is to say, with the parts A and B connected together, as shown, contains recesses for packing rings around the valve, as shown at n. Packing about the valve is also secured by another ring nut o, and also under the end of the tube A, as shown in the drawings. represents the discharge pipe, with a screw for the attachment of the hose, and a cap piece for covering the pipe when the hydrant is not in use. It will be observed that the casing C loosely rests upon the main B, or upon a branch projecting upward from the same. This casing extends up ward, enveloping the main portion the water pipe A, at least that portion which is subterranean. Said casing extends upwards and fits loosely about the plug or hydrant at the portion A'. Above the upper terminus of the casing C is provided the bead a upon the hydrant proper. Sufficient space is left between the bead a and the upper terminus of the casing C to permit of sufficient up-anddown play of the said casing C, for the purpose which will hereafter more fully appear. This distance between the bead and casing may be adjusted to any desired distance, thus lengthening or shortening it, by means of its screw attachment at its base. The main function of the casing C is to prevent derangement of parts during cold weather by the ground alternately freezing and thawing around the hydrant or plug. This process of freezing causes the surrounding earth, by its expansion, to lift or upheave, and thus be liable to derange the hydrant or plug. This upheaval or movement is received by the casing C, which, by its capability of sliding loosely up and down, will accommodate the upheaval of the earth above mentioned, without any liability to derange the plug or hydrant. This is the chief function of the casing C, although it likewise serves the purpose of protection to the water pipe A. What I claim is: 1. In combination with a hydrant or fire plug, a detached and sur rounding casing C, said casing adapted to have an independent up-anddown motion sufficient to receive the entire movement imparted by the upheaval of the surrounding earth by freezing, without derangement or disturbance of and with a cylinder valve and a waste water valve connected and operated in combination substantially as herein specified. 2. The arrangement of the parts A, B, valve D, case C, and stuffing box H, as herein described, for the purpose specified." The drawings of the original and of the reissue are also here placed side by side: of the casing. In addition to this, the drawing of the original patent shows a close contact between the top of the casing and the bead or flange above it, so as absolutely to forbid any such independent up-and-down motion of the casing as is covered by the first claim of the reissue, while the drawing, Figure 1, of the reissue, shows a sufficient space between the top of the casing and the bead or flange above it to admit of such independent up-and-down motion. Issue having been joined, proofs were taken on both sides, and the circuit court entered a decree dismissing the bill, from which the plaintiffs have appealed. Its opinion accompanies the record, and is reported in 22 Fed. Rep. 292. It held that the reissued patent was invalid, as matter of law, upon a comparison of the original with the reissue. We concur in this view. FE The material difference between the descriptive parts of the two specifications is that, in the reissue, it is stated that the casing C is movable, and that sufficient space is left between the bead a, upon the hydrant proper, and the upper terminus of the casing C, to permit of sufficient up-and-down play of the casing C to allow it to slide loosely up and down, to accommodate the upward and downward movement of the earth during the process of freezing and thawing, without any liability to derange the plug or hydrant. The casing could not thus slide loosely up and down, unless sufficient space were left between the bead a and the upper terminus of the casing. No suggestion of such arrangement is found in the specification of the original patent, and the drawing of that patent shows no space between the upper terminus of the casing and the bead or flange above it. This is new matter introduced into the specification of the reissue, contrary to the express inhibition of section 4916 of the Revised Statutes. Claim 1 of the reissue is for an invention not indicated or suggested in the original patent; namely, the independent up-and-down motion It is sought to sustain the validity of the reissue by attempting to show that the model filed in the Patent Office with the original application exhibited the invention covered by the first claim of the reissue. It is doubtful whether that fact is satisfactorily established. But, irrespective of this, the case falls directly within the recent decision of this court in Parker & Whipple Co. v. Yale Clock Co. 123 U. S. 87 [31: 100]. It was held in that case that what was suggested in the original specification, drawings, or patent office model is not to be considered as a part of the invention intended to have been covered by the original patent, unless it can be seen from a comparison of the two patents that the invention which the original patent was intended to cover embraced the things thus suggested or indicated in the original specification, drawings, or patent officemodel, and unless the original specification indicated that those things were embraced in theinvention intended to have been secured by the original patent. See, also, Hoskin v. Fisher, 125 U. S. 217 [31: 759]. In the present case, it cannot be seen from a comparison of the two patents that the original specification indicated that what is covered by the first claim of the reissue was intended to have been secured by the original. In the present case, also, the reissue was not applied for until nearly eight years after the original patent was granted, and the reissuewas taken with the manifest intention of covering, by an enlarged claim, structures which in the mean time had gone into extensive public use, and which were not covered by any claim of the original patent. Infringement is alleged only of claims 1 and 3 of the reissue. As to the casing C of the third claim, it cannot, any more than the casing C of the first claim, be held to cover a casing which has the independent up-and-down motion referred to. Such casing must be construed to be the casing exhibited in the drawing annexed to the original patent, that is, one in which the up-and-down play is restricted by the overlapping bead or flange. On any other construction, claim 3 is an unlawful expansion, in regard to the casing, of what is found in the original patent. In addition to this, if the casing of claim 3 is only a casing which has no end play, it is anticipated by what is shown in letters patent No. 19,206, granted to Race and Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the court: This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of North Carolina. A bill in chancery was brought in that court Suit by corporation in names of stockholders-by Isaac Taylor, a citizen of the State of Maswhen not sustainable-Statute of Limitations -laches in Courts of Chancery. 1. A suit in behalf of a corporation, to recover its property, cannot be brought in the name of two stockholders, instead of by the corporation itself in its own name, unless sufficient reason for bringing the suit by the stockholders is shown. 2. It is not sufficient reason for bringing such suit by the stockholders, that the corporation is extinct by limitation in its charter, where, by the law of its State, its existence was continued, after such period of limitation, for the purpose of winding up its business and collecting and distributing its as sets. 3. It is not sufficient reason for bringing such suit in the names of stockholders, that many of the directors of the company are dead, where part of them have survived, and no application has been made to the surviving directors to bring the suit, and no effort has been made to call the stockhold ers together to elect directors, or to obtain united action. 4. Where the suit was brought after the lapse of nearly thirty years, during a part of which time the corporation was in existence and operation, and it must have known all the facts stated, during all of which time the defendants held the property adversely, and no sufficient reason is given why relief was not sought earlier,-Held, that the suit was barred by the Statute of Limitations and by the general doctrine of laches applicable in courts of chancery. [No. 209.] Argued April 5, 6, 1888. Decided May 14, 1888. APPEAL from a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of North Carolina, dismissing a bill in Chancery brought by two stockholders of the Gold Hill Mining Company, for themselves and such other stockholders as might desire to unite with them, to correct a mistake in a deed to the corporation, and to recover its property. Af firmed. Reported below, 14 Fed. Rep. 498. Mr. Clarence R. Conger, for appellants: Lapse of time will not of itself bar recovery in equity, but the court will, in each case, consider the particular circumstances. Allore v. Jewell, 94 U. S. 506 (24:260); Young The Key City, 81 U. S. 14 Wall. 653 (20:896); Connecticut Gen. L. Ins. Co. v. Eldredge, 102 U. S. 545 (26:245); Gunton v. Carroll, 101 U. S. 426 (25:985). The Statute of Limitations cannot properly be pleaded on demurrer. Burnley v. Jeffersonville, 3 McLean, 336. But the objection that the action was not commenced within the time limited can only be taken by answer. Code, Civ. Proc. North Carolina, § 138. Where, as in this case, it is shown that the officers of a corporation are inactive, equity sachusetts, and Sallie A. Howes, a citizen of the State of New Jersey, as they declare, "for themselves individually, each as a holder and owner of shares of the capital stock of the Gold Hill Mining Company, as well as for and in behalf of all other stockholders of the said company who may desire hereafter to unite with them," against Moses L. Holmes, Reuben J. Holmes, Ephraim Manney and Valentine Manney, all citizens of the State of North Carolina. To this there was a demurrer, which was sustained, and a decree rendered dismissing the bill. The Gold Hill Mining Company, according to the bill, was duly incorporated under the laws of the State of New York, August 30, 1853; its capital stock fixed at $1,000,000 and its shares at the par value of $5 each. Its term of existence was to be twenty-five years. It also appears from the bill that shortly after its organization, to wit, September 1, 1853, this corporation bought of Moses L. Holmes, one of the defendants, the Gold Hill mines and mining property, consisting of twelve lots and tracts of land lying in the Counties of Rowan and Cabarrus, in the State of North Carolina; that the company expended large sums of money in the pursuit of mining and in making improvements upon the lands of which it had possession, and that $20,000 or thereabouts was raised by assessments upon its stock. It would appear that this was the condition of affairs before the outbreak of the war in 1860, when the enterprise seemed to be a failure and practical mining was abandoned. The bill also set up a foreclosure sale under a mortgage at which the property was purchased in by Moses L. Holmes and Reuben J. Holmes, who have had undisturbed possession thereof ever since. It is also alleged in the bill that about July, 1861, the officers of the corporation, which had been in possession of the property, were driven off by the defendants, and that thereafter, by the death and resignation of its officers and directors or the greater part thereof, it became utterly disorganized and never held any meetings of its directors or stockholders since the year 1862, so that at the time of the filing of the bill there was but one director of the corporation living and surviving, within the knowledge of complainants; and it is alleged that he, by his acts and doings and connections with the defendants, in and touching pretended claim or claims adversely to the interest of said corporation and its stockholders and creditors, has rendered himself incompetent to assert and protect the rights of said corporation and of complainants, and has refused and neglected and still refuses and neglects so to assert and pro- | of North Carolina, or upon the general princitect the same. ples of courts of equity with regard to laches, the complainants are barred of relief in the present case. One of the objects of the bill is to correct an alleged mistake in the original conveyance made by Moses L. Holmes, of the lands on which the mining operations were conducted, to this corporation; the allegation being that it was intended to convey to it a perfect title in fee simple, whereas, wanting the words of limitation to heirs or assigns, and other defects, it did not convey such a title. These matters are set forth with much particularity and at great extent in the bill of the complainant, but as the decision of the court does not turn upon them, nor upon another question which has been raised, connected therewith, as to whether or not one of the deeds was delivered as an escrow or absolutely, we need not here consider them further. The court below sustained the demurrer to the bill upon two principal grounds: First, that the suit was barred by the Statute of Limitations and by the general doctrine of laches as applicable in courts of chancery. Second, that no sufficient reason is shown why the suit should be brought by two stockholders instead of by the corporation itself, in its own name. We think both of these grounds or either of them sufficient to sustain the position taken by the court below. It is, however, alleged that the corporation itself is extinct by reason of the limitation placed upon its existence, under the articles of incorporation, by which it expired on the 30th day of August, 1878. But, under the laws of New York, the existence of such a corporation was continued after the period for which it was limited for the purpose of winding up its business, and for the purpose of collecting and distributing its assets and paying its debts. Although the allegation of the bill is that many of the directors of the company are dead, still it is shown that one of them survives, and no assertion is made that there was any application to this surviving director on the part of the defendants for the purpose of instituting any proceedings looking to the rectification of this deed or for the recovery of the real estate in North Caronlia; nor does it appear that there was any request made to him to bring any suit either at law or in chancery for that purpose. No effort was made to call together the stockholders to take any action on the part of the company, or to elect other directors, or to obtain any united action in the assertion of the claims now set up. The mistake sought to be corrected, which is made the foundation of the present suit, occurred in 1853. This suit was brought in 1882, after the lapse of nearly thirty years, during all of which time the action might have been brought, so far as relates to the correction of the alleged mistake in the deed. During seven or eight years of this time the corporation was in full existence and operation; it had the means to prosecute this suit and had an opportunity of knowing, or at least its principal members must have known, all the facts which are now brought to the consideration of the court, and even up to the time when this suit was commenced there was a director surviving who had never been discharged or resigned. There was no reason, if stockholders were proper persons to bring this action, why proceedings should not have been begun by them upon the practical dissolution of the company in 1862, after which time, as the complainants allege, no corporate organization was kept up, no work or business done, and no attempt made by any of the directors to act upon any of the rights of the corporation or to exercise their authority in the conduct of its affairs. If we allow some deduction for the period of the war, which closed in 1865, there still remains the long delay between that time and the bringing of this suit in 1882, a period of about seventeen years. This lapse of time requires some better account in regard to the reasons why this suit was not earlier instituted than is given in the present bill. It is obvious that during all this time, and, indeed, from the year 1861, when, as the bill declares, the defendants took possession of the property, it has been held by them adversely to the claim of the Gold Hill Mining Company, and to the claim of the complainants. No sufficient reason is given why relief was not sought earlier. During all this period the shares of the corporation seem to have been of no value, so that the defendants may have bought them in the market for a very inconsiderable sum and may now be prosecuting a suit for relief which, if sustainable at all, ought to inure to the benefit of other parties. Clarke v. Boorman, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 493 [21:904]. These questions have been too frequently discussed in this court to need further comment. We concur with the Circuit Court that the bill is without merit, and believe that it was rightfully dismissed. The decree is therefore af CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE AND ST. PAUL RAILWAY COMPANY. Appt., V. UNITED STATES. Although there is in the bill a declaration that the two complainants are owners of a ma-firmed. jority of the stock of the Gold Hill Mining Company, there is no statement as to when or how they became such, or whether they were such stockholders during the times that injuries were inflicted, of which they now complain, in regard to the taking possession of the property by the defendants, or whether they became stockholders afterwards. In short, there is no such averment of their relation to the corporation or of their interest in the matter, about which they now seek relief, as brings subject-repugnancy—implied repeal. this action within the principle of the decisions of this court upon the subject. Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U. S. 450 [26:827]. Under the Statute of Limitations of the State (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 406-409.) Section 3962, Rev. Stat.-two Acts on same 1. Section 3962, Revised Statutes, authorizing the Postmaster-General to make deductions from the pay of contractors, for failures to perform service according to contract, applies to all contractors, |