Argument for Plaintiffs in Error. 6 Wall. 594; State Freight Tax Cases, 15 Wall. 232; State Tax on Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284. In this connection wer also invite attention to the twenty-eighth finding, it being in substance set up in the answer. It is attempted by this to show a discrimination against the defendant by attempting to show that there are other corporations similarly situated where deductions are allowed. But an examination of the facts as alleged in the answer, and as found in this finding, shows that it falls very far short of accomplishing this. The next Question is, Is the Assessment an Attempt to take the Property of the Defendant without "Due Process of Law"? This contention of the defendant rests upon the assertion that there is no notice given of the assessment; and that while in case of individuals in respect to assessment of their property notice and a hearing are provided for before the local or county Board of Equalization, no notice of assessment by or hearing is provided for, before the State Board of Equalization, which makes the assessment against corporations such as the defendant. There is no complaint that all corporations of the same class as the defendant are not treated alike in this regard. The complaint is, that while notice is given to one class no notice is given to the other. One class is not dealt with precisely as property of corporations and individuals belonging to another class. What constitutes notice, due process of law, has been fully considered by this court in State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575; McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 37; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97; Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 321. Without entering into details here, it is sufficient to say that the statutes on which these decisions were made are, in all essential features, the same as the constitution and laws of California, in respect of making assessments. Undoubtedly, if the State has the right to make classes of property, it has the right to fix the methods of assessing property in these Argument for Plaintiffs in Error. respective classes, and it cannot be required to make these methods the same for all classes. Did the Defendant have Notice, etc.? 1. The Constitution, § 1, article 13, provides that "all property' in the State shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law." 2. Section 9 creates a State Board of Equalization. 3. Section 10 provides that the franchise, etc., of railroads operated in more than one county shall be assessed by the State Board. So here was notice in the constitution that this property of this company would be assessed by this board as the legislature might provide. Under the provisions of the law there was not only notice to the company, but an actual appearance by the company before the Board, in the fact that it made answer as required. by law, and not only an appearance as a party but in effect an appearance as a witness at a hearing, because it not only returned the amount of property it held, but also testified under oath as to the value of the railway as to which the return was made. We most respectfully submit that to assert in the face of all this that the company had no notice and no opportunity to be heard, has no substantial foundation upon which to rest, either in fact or law. The cases cited place it beyond controversy that this is notice-"due process of law." Does the Fourteenth Amendment affect this Case? That the classification that was made by the State is one that it could lawfully make if the Fourteenth Amendment had not been adopted must, we think, in the light of the authorities, be conceded, and therefore the next question is, Has that amendment destroyed that right to thus classify? We insist that that amendment has no relation to this power of the State to impose taxes; that it does not enlarge the restrictions upon the State, which we have above stated; that, Argument for Plaintiffs in Error. so far as the power to tax is concerned, the amendment leaves the power of the State just where it found it. What led to the adoption of this amendment and what it was intended to accomplish, its "pervading spirit," never can be more forcibly stated than in the language of this court in the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36. The substance of that "pervading spirit," as there declared by the court, is to confer citizenship on the negro race, just released from bondage, and to prohibit hostile discrimination against the race; and that this amendment might be safely trusted to prohibit such slavery as Mexican peonage or Chinese cooley labor, and that "in any fair and just construction" of any phrase or section of the amendments this "pervading spirit" must be looked to. See also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339; Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94. Assuming after the declaration of the Chief Justice in the Santa Clara Case, 118 U. S. 396, that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to these corporations, the question still remains whether they are to be considered as standing precisely on the same footing as natural persons. They are endowed with some qualities that a natural person cannot have, and they cannot be endowed with some qualities possessed by natural persons. They cannot hold office, nor vote, nor sit on juries, and the like, and the withholding of these privileges could not be depriving them of the equal protection of the laws, although these are conferred upon all other "persons." And therefore, even if they are persons, they are only persons of their own class, and as such they are entitled only to have all, of that class, treated alike when the conditions are the same, or to be treated the same as natural persons when the conditions are the same. And, if corporations are embraced as persons, there still remains the further question, is it a denial of the equal protection of the laws, if, having provided for notice as to assessments against individuals by county boards, the same notice is not provided in case of assessment of corporations by the State Board? and is it a denial of the equal protection of the laws to Argument for Plaintiffs in Error. allow a division between mortgagor and mortgagee in case of the individuals and deny it in case of corporations, for the purposes of taxation? We insist that they are not embraced in this Amendment for any such purposes or considerations. Nothing could have been farther from the minds of the makers of that Amendment than the thought that it was in any way to interfere with the power of a State to regulate after its own methods, and according to its own discretion, the assessment and collection of taxes. But it is contended now by this defendant that this language is so elastic that it can be stretched over all the affairs of corporations, and control the State in the exercise of its right of taxation as to such corporations. We have already seen by the adjudications of this court how supreme and absolute is the power of a State as to taxation. That it was a known and thoroughly recognized right, a right indispensable to its existence, a right which cannot be hampered or trammelled, except by the clearest prohibition by its only superior, the Constitution of the United States has been already established. And we most respectfully submit that the language well known to have been intended to subserve one purpose, "the pervading spirit" of which is to accomplish the purpose stated by the court, cannot, without violence, be used to strike down a sovereign right of a State. Certainly such right of the State would not be held to be trespassed upon by the Constitution of the United States without the clearest provision. No doubtful or uncertain language could have that effect, and this is especially so in the matter now under consideration, because it is a right of such supreme importance, and because of the express reservation in favor of the States of all power not expressly delegated. An analysis of the defence shows that it includes in it the following elements: First. That owing to the prohibition in the Fourteenth Amendment against denying equal protection, no State can extend or deny to any owner or class of owners of property, held for private purposes, any exemption on account of the ability, Argument for Plaintiffs in Error. or lack of ability, of the owner to pay, or on account of the wants or condition of his family, or on any account which relates to the condition of the owner, which is not extended to all owners of private property. Second. That in exercising its sovereign right of discretion and choice, regarding the subject, method, and rules of taxation, no State of the Union, since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, holds any power to regard or treat any railroad property, not actually used in operating the road, as being, for the purposes of taxation, "affected" by the supremely valuable franchises and powers bestowed, by the State, upon such railroads. Third. That although the States may, notwithstanding the Fourteenth Amendment, exempt from taxation all property held by private owners for the purposes of education, religion, or charity, this because the benefits which these do to the State may be received as equivalent to the taxes remitted, yet the State may not deny to railroads any exemption from taxations on account of the enormously valuable franchises, rights, privileges, and immunities which these derive, by gift, from the State; nor yet on account of the exceptional burdens, damages, etc., which these roads inflict upon the State and its citizens. That each of these three propositions is in conflict with reason, the practices of all the States, and with authority, seems to be exceedingly plain. Take, for example, the matter of the right and the propriety of the legislature, looking to the condition of the taxpayer, in determining upon his taxation and his exemptions. All States have found it wise to encourage the immigration of skilled artisans, artificers, manufacturers, and the like by securing to them exemption from certain classes of taxation which the State has found necessary to impose upon the majority of the people. Now it is alleged that the Fourteenth Amendment has rendered this also unlawful. All States have found it wise to encourage the professions of teachers in literature and the useful arts and in religion; and have accordingly exempted these from certain taxes which are |