Opinion of the Court. MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court. This is a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs in error, Benjamin and Phineas Lawrence, brought suit in the court below against Edwin A. Merritt, the former collector of the port of New York, for the recovery of an alleged excess of duties levied by him and paid by them upon an importation of what is called "tissue paper." Schedule M of § 2504 of the Revised Statutes provides for the imposition of the following duties: "Paper, sized or glued, suitable only for printing paper, twenty-five per centum ad valorem; printing, unsized, used for books and newspapers exclusively, twenty per centum ad valorem; manufactured of, or of which paper is a component material, not otherwise provided for, thirty-five per centum ad valorem; sheathing paper, ten per centum ad valorem." The collector classified the paper under the following clause on the same page: "Paper hangings and paper for screens or fire-boards; paper, antiquarian, demy, drawing, elephant, foolscap, imperial letter, and all other paper not otherwise provided for, thirty-five per centum ad valorem." The plaintiffs thereupon protested that the paper which they had imported, instead of being assessed as it was by the collector under this latter clause at thirty-five per cent ad valorem, should have been assessed under the former clause as "paper printing, unsized, used for books and newspapers exclusively," at twenty per cent ad valorem. From the testimony it appears that it was what is generally called "tissue paper," and was mainly if not exclusively used for making letter-press copies of letters or written matter. This is a well-known process, by which, after a letter has been written on ordinary paper, it is placed between the leaves of a book filled with this kind of paper, the pages upon which the copy is desired being usually dampened somewhat for that purpose, after which such book is subject to great pressure by means of a hand or other press. One or more impressions Opinion of the Court. may thus be made of the written matter upon the leaves of this tissue paper. The judge of the Circuit Court, in speaking of the character of this paper, said to the jury: "I do not think that the words used in the statute have any technical meaning. You must take the statute as you find it and a common sense view of the case, and say whether or not this paper which has been produced here is paper which is used, exclusively for books and newspapers; and whether the law-makers intended, when they used this language, that such paper as has been described to you should come in and pay duty under that clause of the statute which provides for paper used exclusively for books and newspapers." He also said that if they found that it was not printing paper used exclusively for books and newspapers, and should not come under this clause, then their verdict should be for the defendant. At the request of the attorney for the defendant he also charged the jury that if they found upon the evidence that the phrase "printing paper," as used in the trade, has a technical signification, and if the plaintiffs' importation in this case does not come within that signification, they should find a verdict for the defendant. The verdict and the judgment were for the defendant. We are of opinion that the charge of the court was correct, and that the verdict and judgment which followed it are without error. It is very obvious from the face of the statute that "printing paper, unsized, used for books and newspapers exclusively," does not include the kind of paper in question in this case, and it therefore falls within the class of manufactures of other paper not otherwise provided for, so that it was properly chargeable with the duty of thirty-five per centum ad valorem. An ingenious argument is made by plaintiffs' counsel to show that the process of transferring the writing made upon sheets of the ordinary writing paper used for that purpose, by causing the ink with which it was written to soak or penetrate through one or more thicknesses of the kind of tissue paper which this is said to be, after the same have been prop Opinion of the Court. erly dampened, is printing within the meaning of the statute, and therefore this paper, being used for that purpose, is "printing paper." We, however, think it is perfectly clear that this process is not printing, and that the use of this kind of paper, which is in controversy here, for that purpose, does not make it "printing paper." The words of the statute, "paper, sized or glued, suitable only for printing paper," and "printing, unsized, used for books and newspapers, exclusively," evidently have reference to the various kinds of paper which are used for printing by means of type or plates, which make an impression only upon the face of the paper presented to them, and not to these kinds of tissue paper, so characterized on account of their thinness, used for the purpose of transferring writing by the penetration or soaking through of the liquid used therefor, so that the copy is read upon the side of the paper opposite to that presented to the original writing. The words of the statute cannot comprehend this species of tissue paper, which is merely used for the multiplication or copying of letters or other writings. Not being included within the true meaning of these phrases above quoted, it must then belong to that other and larger class of "all other paper not otherwise provided for." This is taxable at the rate of thirty-five per centum ad valorem, the amount which was actually levied and collected in this case. We think the charge of the Circuit Judge on this subject, in connection with the testimony, was sound, and that it cannot be made much clearer by amplification. The judgment of the Circuit Court is therefore Affirmed. Statement of the Case. MARYE v. BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA. No. 223. Argued and Submitted April 12, 1888. Decided April 23, 1888. While it is quite competent for the State of Virginia to impose upon the movable personal property of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, (a corporation organized under the laws of Maryland,) which is brought within its territory and there habitually used and employed, the same rate of taxation which is imposed upon similar property used in like way by its own citizens, it has not done so in the taxing laws of the State which were in force when the tax in controversy was imposed. The statutes of Virginia relied upon by the plaintiff in error are not applicable to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, but are confined to corporations which derive their authority from the laws of Virginia. THIS was a bill in equity filed by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company against the taxing officer of the State of Virginia, for the purpose of enjoining him from selling certain engines and cars, the property of the complainant, for the payment of a tax alleged to have been illegally assessed thereon. There was a decree in the Circuit Court granting the relief prayed for, from which this appeal was prosecuted. The material facts in the case were these: The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company is a corporation organized under the laws of Maryland, and a citizen thereof, by virtue of whose charter its rolling stock is exempt from taxation. The line of its road does not at any point lie in the State of Virginia. It, however, connects with certain roads belonging to corporations incorporated by various acts of the legislature of Virginia, to wit: the Winchester and Potomac Railroad, the Winchester and Strasburg Railroad, and the Strasburg and Harrisonburg Railroad, the last named being a part of the old Manassas Gap Railroad; and during a portion of the time embraced in the period for which the taxes in question were levied it worked the Valley Railroad from Harrisonburg to Statement of the Case. Staunton. All of these roads were operated by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company by virtue of leases or contracts, which company for that purpose furnished and used its own. rolling stock, consisting of engines and cars. None of the Virginia corporations owning either of these roads was the owner of any rolling stock. The manner in which this rolling stock was employed for this purpose was thus described: "There is no such rolling stock assigned permanently to the four lines above named, or either of them, in the State of Virginia. The trains in which the rolling stock is used on the four lines above named now start from Lexington, Virginia, and pass through the State of Virginia, over the four lines of railroad above named, into the State of West Virginia, and thence into the State of Maryland to the city of Baltimore, or if any of the cars are destined to western points, thence from Harper's Ferry to the West, but the trains in which the cars are hauled are run solid from Lexington, Virginia, (and formerly before the road was completed to Lexington from Staunton, Virginia,) to Baltimore. None of the rolling stock is assigned permanently to service in the State of Virginia, nor is any of the rolling stock set apart to the four lines in that State, or to the four valley lines above mentioned at all; but such rolling stock is used interchangeably upon the main line and branches of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad in the States of Maryland and Virginia, and indeed, also, upon the divisions of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad in Pennsylvania, and in States west of the Ohio River, just as the necessities of the service of the company require. Sometimes this rolling stock will be found on the main line, sometimes on the Pittsburg division, and sometimes on the trans-Ohio divisions, and there is none of it that is permanently set apart for use upon the four valley lines in Virginia above described.” The several Virginia corporations owning these four railroads, respectively, made their annual reports to the auditor of public accounts as required by law, and were by the board of public works duly assessed on their roadways, tracks, depots, and other real estate owned by them. No tax was assessed or levied as against them on account of any rolling stock, |