REMARKS, &c. IT is not unknown to many of the citizens of the United States, that the inadmissable demands and unprovoked aggressions of the Bashaw of Tripoli have forced us into a war. From the menaces of the Emperor of Morocco, a few months ago, notwithstanding any temporary accommodation which has since taken place, it is probable that he will, at no very distant day, be added to the num ber of our enemies. Nor would it be surprising that the other two powers of Barbary should ultimately make a common cause against us. Should we be provoked by their piracies, what will remain for us but to prosecute, on a larger scale, the plan of defence which has at length been adopted? The policy of protecting our commerce by a national marine has ever been considered by me as a necessary part of the system on which our public prosperity essentially depends. If any of my writings, in an official or private capacity, in poetry or prose, have tended to promote its adoption, I shall receive a complete compensation for all the tedious correspondences, dangerous voyages, and troublesome negociations, in which I was for many years engaged, in consequence of the real and apprehended hostilities and depredations of some of the states of Barbary. While I was charged with full powers to negociate with all of them, I never ceased to give it as my opinion to my government, that the employment of a sufficient marine force would be the cheapest and most effectual mode of procuring and maintaining peace. For a long time the want of resources, and afterwards the destination of our few armed vessels to cover our navigation from other spoliations, prevented our executive from affording the much needed protection to our Mediterranean trade. To avoid introducing any thing irrelevant, I shall omit to mention many particulars concerning my ministry, during the protracted and distressing period in which a considerable number of our countrymen were detained in slavery at Algiers. Such of them as are still living will, I am confident, bear testimony to the zeal with which I attempted to promote the public cause, and, at the same time, to put a period to their individual suffering. Iassume no claim to merit for thus doing what was not immediately within the limits of my duty as a minister at a particular court; but I may, perhaps, be permitted to indulge the gratification which is derived from a consciousness of having cheerfully, faithfully, and disinterestedly executed that trust. If the inconveniences of many voyages, and especially the perils of a winter passage across the western ocean, and of being driven repeatedly from the American coast, after having been long at sea, in a leaky ship, with a debilitated crew, contributed to hasten the release of our brave countrymen, not from ideal and figurative, but real and galling chains, it was enough. At last the day of their re demption arrived. Treaties of amity were finally concluded with all the Barbary states, by agents under my direction. New out rages were, however, again meditated by one of them, as thus announced in my communications* to the Secretary of State. "This letter is particularly intended to transmit to government the circular letter received this day from our Consul at Tripoli, announcing the imminent danger of an immediate rupture with that regency. While I refer this communication to your attention, I cannot but anticipate, from the various representations heretofore made by our Consuls in Barbary, that adequate measures will already have been taken to avert the blow." On another occasiont these words were used: "I think I cannot display too much eagerness in communicating to you, by different conveyances, t the news this moment received by me from Algiers. Ihasten then to transmit copies of Consul O'Brien's letters to the 6th instant, which came to me through the department of the first minister of State of his Catholic Majesty. From the last of these letters you will learn that the Bey of Tripoli, having refused the mediation of Algiers, the presents sent from thence, and the bills of Consul Cathcart, was determined upon war against the United States, and was sending his cruizers to sea accordingly. It is devoutly to be wished that he may soon have reason to repent this wicked and rash proceeding at his leisure. As it is a considerable time since Consul Cathcart (whom I consider a very faithful and vigilant public officer) took the wise precaution of giving extensive advice of the great probability of this event, I cannot but hope that our unarmed merchant vessels will not be exposed to the hazard of falling into the possession of these pirates, but that they will rather be retained in port (however inconvenient or expensive it may be) until they can be protected by armed vessels of the United States adequate to the purpose. See the letter dated Madrid, February 6, 1801. + Letter to the Secretary of State, dated Madrid, April 14, 1891. |