fer the candidate within the State; and the largest States would invariably have the man.

On the question on Mr. ELLSWORTH's motion, as above,-New Hampshire, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, aye-4; Massachusetts, New Jersey, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no-7.

Mr. PINCKNEY moved, "that the election by the Legislature be qualified with a proviso, that no person be eligible for more than six years in any twelve years." He thought this would have all the advantage, and at the same time avoid in some degree the inconvenience, of an absolute ineligibility a second

time.

Col. MASON approved the idea. It had the sanction of experience in the instance of Congress, and some of the Executives of the States. It rendered the Executive as effectually independent, as an ineligibility after his first election; and opened the way, at the same time, for the advantage of his future services. He preferred on the whole the election by the National Legislature; though candor obliged him to admit, that there was great danger of foreign influence, as had been suggested. This was the most serious objection, with him, that had been urged.

Mr. BUTLER. The two great evils to be avoided are, cabal at home, and influence from abroad. It will be difficult to avoid either, if the election be made by the National Legislature. On the other hand the Government should not be made so complex and unwieldy as to disgust the States. This would be the case if the election should be referred

to the people. He liked best an election by Electors chosen by the Legislatures of the States. He was against a re-eligibility at all events. He was also against a ratio of votes in the States. An equality should prevail in this case. The reasons for departing from it do not hold in the case of the Executive, as in that of the Legislature.

Mr. GERRY approved of Mr. PINCKNEY's motion, as lessening the evil.

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS was against a rotation in every case. It formed a political school, in which we were always governed by the scholars, and not by the masters. The evils to be guarded against in this case are,-first, the undue influence of the Legislature; secondly, instability of councils; thirdly, misconduct in office. To guard against the first, we run into the second evil. We adopt a rotation which produces instability of councils. To avoid Scylla we fall into Charybdis. A change of men is ever followed by a change of measures. We see this fully exemplified in the vicissitudes among ourselves, particularly in the State of Pennsylvania. The self-sufficiency of a victorious party scorns to tread in the paths of their predecessors. Rehoboam will not imitate Solomon. Secondly, the rotation in of fice will not prevent intrigue and dependence on the Legislature. The man in office will look forward to the period at which he will become re-eligible. The distance of the period, the improbability of such a protraction of his life, will be no obstacle. Such is the nature of man-formed by his benevolent Author, no doubt, for wise ends-that although he knows his existence to be limited to a span, he takes his mea

sures as if he were to live forever. But taking another supposition, the inefficacy of the expedient will be manifest. If the magistrate does not look forward to his re-election to the Executive, he will be pretty sure to keep in view the opportunity of his going into the Legislature itself. He will have little objection then to an extension of power on a theatre where he expects to act a distinguished part; and will be very unwilling to take any step that may endanger his popularity with the Legislature, on his influence over which the figure he is to make will depend. Finally, to avoid the third evil, impeachments will be essential; and hence an additional reason against an election by the Legislature. He considered an election by the people as the best, by the Legislature as the worst, mode. Putting both these aside, he could not but favor the idea of Mr. WILSON, of introducing a mixture of lot. It will diminish, if not destroy, both cabal and dependence.

Mr. WILLIAMSON was sensible that strong objections lay against an election of the Executive by the Legislature, and that it opened a door for foreign influence. The principal objection against an election by the people seemed to be, the disadvantage under which it would place the smaller States. He suggested as a cure for this difficulty, that each man should vote for three candidates; one of them, he observed, would be probably of his own State, the other two of some other States; and as probably of a small as a large one.

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS liked the idea; suggesting as an amendment, that each man should vote for

two persons, one of whom at least should not be of his own State.

Mr. MADISON also thought something valuable might be made of the suggestion, with the proposed amendment of it. The second best man in this case would probably be the first in fact. The only objection which occurred was, that each citizen, after having given his vote for his favorite fellow citizen, would throw away his second on some obscure citizen of another State, in order to ensure the object of his first choice. But it could hardly be supposed that the citizens of many States would be so sanguine of having their favorite elected, as not to give their second vote with sincerity to the next object of their choice. It might, moreover, be provided, in favor of the smaller States, that the Executive should not be eligible more than times in

the same State.

years from

Mr. GERRY. A popular election in this case is radically vicious. The ignorance of the people would put it in the power of some one set of men dispersed through the Union, and acting in concert, to delude them into any appointment. He observed that such a society of men existed in the Order of the Cincinnati. They are respectable, united and influential. They will, in fact, elect the Chief Magistrate in every instance, if the election be referred to the people. His respect for the characters composing this Society, could not blind him to the danger and impropriety of throwing such a power into their hands.

Mr. DICKINSON. As far as he could judge from the discussions which had taken place during his

attendance, insuperable objections lay against an election of the Executive by the National Legislature; as also by the Legislatures or Executives of the States. He had long leaned towards an election by the people, which he regarded as the best and purest source. Objections he was aware lay against this mode, but not so great, he thought, as against the other modes. The greatest difficulty, in the opinion of the House, seemed to arise from the partiality of the States to their respective citizens. But might not this very partiality be turned to a useful purpose? Let the people of each State choose its best citizen. The people will know the most eminent characters of their own States; and the people of different States will feel an emulation in selecting those of whom they will have the greatest reason to be proud. Out of the thirteen names thus selected, an Executive Magistrate may be chosen either by the National Legislature, or by Electors appointed by it.

On a question which was moved, for postponing Mr. PINCKNEY's motion, in order to make way for some such proposition as had been hinted by Mr. WILLIAMSON and others, it passed in the negative,Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, aye-5; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no6.

On Mr. PINCKNEY's motion, that no person shall serve in the Executive more than six years in twelve years, it passed in the negative,-New Hampshire, Massachusetts, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-5; Connecticut, New Jersey,