ly, the political and philosophic part played by France in the seventeenth century. The two great figures which occupy by far the greater portion of the author's picture are, as the title implies, Richelieu and Colbert. But, although the work is a model of fulness and compactness, and the policy of these statesmen is illustrated with a rare grasp both of detail and general principle, Dr. Bridges has no scruple in casting free glances, not only over contemporary history in other countries, but backwards and forwards also up to the Roman Empire in one direction, and down to the French Revoiution in the other-tossing groups of nations and periods about in a way which will be utterly bewildering to the whole race of Dryasdusts, but which we hold to be perfectly legitimate, and full of sobriety as well as truth. He throughout proceeds upon two assumptions. The first, that European history between the fifth and the eighteenth centuries is essentially one history, which will not bear division, either chronological or geographical, if we would study it with profit. The second is that, between the limits just mentioned, a religion and a polity, both with accidental modifications common to all Western and Southern Europe, arose, culminated, and gradually fell; and the combined result of Christianity, Roman traditions and barbarian invasions, which we know by the names of Feudalism and Catholicism, had a period of growth and noble expansion, say up to the twelfth or thirteenth century, and that since that period they have had a lingering but inevitable decay; that this decay, equally with the previous growth, lay in the nature of things, and, while it might be varied, and here and there postponed, was not finally to be avoided. Thus the history of Europe, contemplated by the light of these two principles, especially of the last, in spite of its multiform complexity and change, is at once shot through with a thread of unity and intelligible sequence. A clear idea is afforded, not only of the starting-point left behind, but of the goal as well to which human affairs are, and have been, constantly tending. We learn to perceive that the changes and revolutions in Church and State have not been solely or chiefly the work of malignant rebels

bent on destroying public order for their own selfish purposes, but the result of immense forces having their seat in the profound est depths of human nature itself. We thus get a criterion by which the actions of men and the working of institutions may be judged with some degree of equity and reason. The sectarians who have hitherto for the most part monopolized history deal out their praise and blame either at random, as the fit takes them, or else on the easy assumption that their own party or clique, whatever it may be, was always in the right, and its adversaries always wrong. And thus the great men of the past are alternately fiends or angels, according to the politics or church of the writer who paints them. History so written becomes a mere vehicle for vituperation and party spleen. But what is it we mean when we assert, for instance, that Philip II., on the one hand, was a reactionary king, and Henry IV. was a progressive one on the other? It is clearly not a mere expression of personal predilection, but manifestly a fact, about which the partisans of neither can have any doubt. It is a fact that Philip did his utmost to stop the course which human affairs had taken in his time, and have continued to take ever since. It is a fact, on the contrary, that Henry did precisely the reverse, and presciently prepared to welcome and assist the advent of the new order of things which he saw the future had surely in store. And so, without a tinge of partisanship, we may estimate the value and characters of the two men. The one was for the modern era, the other against it; the one worked, as Mr. Carlyle would say, in accordance with veracity and fact, as the issue sufficiently proves; the other devoted himself to a phantom of the past, which he vainly, fatuously, and cruelly strove to realize in the present. May we not, after such a probation, call the one great and the other little; the one good and admirable, the other hateful and contemptible? In a word, have not we here got a very fair working criterion by which to estimate the characters of history?

Dr. Bridges has contented himself with indicating, in bare yet bold outline, the progress of the great social forces which, starting from the thirteenth century,

gradually undermined both Feudalism and Catholicism. Up to the date just named, both Fedualism and Catholicism had grown and expanded with unabated vigor and life. The spiritual supremacy of the Popes waxed ever stronger and stronger. Good men and clear-headed men alike felt that the Papal power was salutary, elevating was friendly to their best and deepest interests to be supported, and even fought for, if need were. Then slowly came a great change. In the Universities of England, France, and Italy, men of leisure and meditation were reflecting and comparing. The Church frowned. She was ceasing to be a mother, and preparing for her future character of harsh step-dame. Whereupon men thought and compared only the more. The Church, it now appeared, was willing to be your friend only on conditions-harsh, tyrannical conditions; among others, that you ceased thinking, that you ceased caring for truth, unless it were her truth. She was your friend, not solely or chiefly because you were pure, devout, and aspiring; unless, besides all this, you were prepared to take her word and authority for everything, and suppress and eradicate your love of truth as an evil passion, as a lust of the flesh which would imperil your soul. That love of truth was clearly likely to imperil her supremacy became more and more evident; that it was devilish and damnable, less and less so. Side by side with this spiritual revolution an analogous one was taking place in the secular world of feudalism. Feudalism, of which so much evil is often inconsiderately spoken, was once a very noble and beautiful thing, infinitely,superior to the hard, glittering, social systems of Greece and Rome. The ideal of the knightly character-an ideal more than once approximately reached, as in the exquisitely lovely nature of St. Louis of France, or in the less known instance of Count Theobald of Champagne, the friend of St. Bernard-was an ideal far beyond the conception of the haughty oligarchs and aristocrats of the ancient world, and to this day retains a perfume of grace and comeliness. But feudalism also was degenerating-was not only degenerating, but was being gradually superseded.

NEW SERIES-Vol. VI., No. 1.

The growth and wealth of the communes or free towns in France, but more especially in rich and thriving Flanders, was showing men that there was something better for them in the world to do than slaving and fighting for a feudal suzerain. At the battle of Courtrai, the sturdy burghers of Bruges and Ghent made it clear to the prancing nobles of France that townsmen and artisans could not only work better, but also fight better, than their aristocratic oppressors. And this silent but ceaseless revolution in things secular and spiritual has been going on without interruption. The fragments of Catholicism, the fragments of feudalism which still exist here and there, are seen, by all who have eyes, to be gradually melting away with the progress of science and of industry. Whatever may be in store for us in the illimitable future, the abolition of aristocratic privilege and dogmatic orthodoxy is clearly the immediate goal to which we are tending.

or

But assuming now as sufficiently proved that the advent of the modern era― the principles of '89, as Dr. Bridges, following French writers, is pleased to call it was certain and inevitable, it is still manifest that the outward form and circumstance of that advent was to some extent a matter of choice and forethought, a matter in which large and noble statesmanship might take a single part. The principles of '89 were sooner later certain to triumph, they were in the past as the oak is in the acorn; if the world went on, they were inevitable. But the mode of their triumph was evitable, was controllable. At the opening of the seventeenth century this point was undecided, lay in the remote future. Would the incipient decay of Catholicism and feudalism then in progress be wisely assisted, wisely directed, by statesmanship competent to the task, or would it be vainly yet disastrously delayed and impeded? Would the successive steps leading to the destined end be taken slowly and deliberately one by one, or would they all be deferred to be taken at one terrific leap? Would the change be gradual, peaceable? would the excision of the old be slow yet constant, each month and year bringing its small instalment of substituted new, or would it all

6

be reserved for one universal crash amid the shaking of nations? In a word, was the Revolution to come as we know it, or in a more mild and benignant form? These questions summon Richelieu, Mazarin, Colbert, and Louis XIV., the four chief characters in Dr. Bridges's book, on the historic scene. And if we apply the principles above enunciated to the public policy of these prominent actors in European history, we arrive at this result-namely, that Richelieu was a true precursor of the Revolution, of the peaceful Revolution, of the Revolution as we do not know it, in that he aimed at and did much to advance (1) religious toleration; (2) abolition of aristocratic power and privilege; (3) peaceful industry; (4) the unity and consolidation of France as a nation. That Mazarin continued his foreign, and Colbert his domestic, policy, while Louis XIV., in the larger portion of his reign, succeeded in undoing the work of all three, and thus stands before history as the remote but indubitable author of the Revolution as we do know it-the Revolution of September massacres, noyades, and guillotine.

Into the very able and luminous dissertations in which Dr. Bridges propounds and illustrates his views, we have no intention to enter. It is too terse for compression, too round and harmonious to be exhibited by extract. We will content ourselves with remarking that he appears, in our humble opinion, to be very largely endowed with the best and rarest qualities of a great historian. The exceptional elevation of his point of view; the sweep and comprehensiveness of his historical survey; the breadth and calmness, not only of his style and language, but of his entire conception and treatment; and, with one or two exceptions to be presently noticed, the magnanimous candor and impartiality of his judgments, cannot fail to win for him a high place in the opinion of those who love and reverence genuine history. He unites two very uncommon and opposite gifts-namely, great command of cold philosophical deduction and unimpassioned application of principles, with a keen interest in human character and emotion, and a most sensitive spontaneous sympathy with the good and the heroic wherever displayed. The reminis

cence of a great name or of a noble action at once flushes his style with a deep glow of fervor and admiration; grandeur and devotion of mind kindle instantly in him a responsive and appreciative enthusiasm. He has a genius for history.

And now we feel it incumbent on us to confess that there are certain portions of Dr. Bridge's work which are pretty certain to excite opposition, not only from the uncandid adversaries of his master's philosophy, but also from many who are anxious to do that philosophy, and Dr. Bridges also, all the justice they can. We take exception, in the first place, to his inordinate estimate of the greatness and originality of Richelieu's genius. In his third lecture he says:-"Richelieu's grasp of the situation was indeed far larger, if not more noble, than that of the Swedish hero. Gustavus was inspired, as Cromwell after him, by something of the enthusiasm of the Protestant crusader. Richelieu, Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church, was devoted to the interest of neither sect. His policy was simply' occidental. I use the word in its double sense of contrast. His policy was occidental, as opposed on the one hand to a policy purely national, and as opposed also to a policy exclusively Catholic or Protestant." In this remark a cosmopolitan turn of mind is ascribed to Richelieu, which he was very far from possessing. No French statesman ever lived who cared more for French glory, French interests, French prestige and importance. He said that the reverses of France "killed" him, while her successes gave him life. Provided an officer or subordinate of his were a "bon Français," a phrase the Cardinal often used, he cared but little what else he was. That his national pride and ambition were very far-sighted, and had nothing vulgar or Napoleonic about them, we readily acknowledge. But this, we take it, is not what Dr. Bridges means by occidental statesmanship. Again, his Protestant alliances, and the European equilibrium which he labored to bring about, are adduced as proofs of a wonderful sagacity and political foresight. That Richelieu was sagacious no one will question, but where is the marvel that a great secular statesman should be chiefly actuated by secular motives in the choice

of his alliances? Richelieu had powerful adversaries in Spain and Austria, and felt that without Protestant aid . he had but an indifferent prospect of getting the better of them. He accordingly co-operated with Gustavus and other Protestants. Dr. Bridges thinks this conduct shows a singular emancipation from the prevalent religious narrowness of the age. But even such a poor creature as Francis I., a century previously, had been equal to a similar reach of liberal statesmanship. He promised to assist the Protestant princes who formed the league of Smalkalde, that he would do his best to "les secourir à son pouvoir sans rien épargner." And further, as regards the balance of power, which Richelieu beyond all question did much to promote, it is clear that the treaties and alliances which were so often made and broken between Charles V., Francis I., and Henry VIII., proceeded upon a crude and rudimentary conception of such an equilibrium which could not fail to be expanded and completed as time wore on. The whole pith of the matter amounts to nothing more profound than this, that it is salutary and politic for the smaller and weaker members of the European system to unite against any one over-grown Power which might be ready to play the tyrant over the rest. It proceeds on a supposition, in fact, which is not altogether ignored or neglected in the relations and the play-grounds of ingenuous youth.

But this point of difference with Dr. Bridges is quite of trivial importance compared with those which follow. We refer to his treatment and estimate of Constitutional government, and the view he takes of the historical position justly occupied by Protestantism in the development of modern Europe. Against the former Dr. Bridges brings no regular charge, he does not state at any length the objections to which he considers it open; but he emits a succession of sneers surprising to no one who is acquainted with his master's writings, but which we venture to think out of harmony with the tone of candor and dignity which distinguishes the rest of his book: "The practical government of France [he says] has been a strong centralized monarchy

administered by middle-class officials. The practical Government of England has been an equally strong local aristocracy, administered by aristocratic officials. Popular consent to taxation during the last three centuries has been the rule in neither, as in England assuredly it is not the rule now. And whether the Government be a united monarchy or a commercio-feudal aristocracy, whether the millions be governed by the thousands or be governed by one, would seem to be to the millions, however it may seem to the thousands, a matter of but secondary importance."

It is painful to find a writer of such rare elevation and moderation as Dr. Bridges condescending to so captious and prejudiced a style as this. That many points in French life and national organization contrasts favorably with their analogues in England, no well-informed person will hesitate for a moment to admit. But that, of all things, French bureaucracy and fiscal arrangements should be selected as topics on which to establish a comparison very slightly, if at all, to our advantage, is what could hardly have been expected. Does Dr. Bridges really think that the chief difference between English and French officials is, that in the one country they are taken from the middle-class

in the other, from the upper class? Does he really think an army of functionaries-reckoned by some to number upwards of 800,000 paid agents of the government-does not constitute a heavy incubus on the country which supports. it? That country is France. Does Dr. Bridges really think that, whatever may have been our financial improvidence and shortcoming, we have had no more effective control over our Budgets than the French have had over theirs? Does he think that we should endure a growing deficit in time of peace with the equanimity which they at this moment display? Again, our author tells us that Richelieu did not summon the States-General, and hints pretty broadly that, like a sensible man, he did not trouble himself to adopt any "form whatever of elective representation." It is easier to say that Richelieu did not do so than to show that it would not have been fortunate for him and for France had he been able or willing to adopt some form or other of elective representation." On this point not only the facts, but the whole morla,

of Dr. Bridge's book may be adduced against him. What is his main thesis? Why this, that a peaceful revolution, a peaceful introduction into the modern era was possible for France had the wise policy of Richelieu, Mazarin, and Colbert been persisted in. But it appears that Louis XIV. was "fatally inferior" to Richelieu, and that everything went wrong in consequence. Fatal inferiority in your despot, when you most of all need superiority, is just one of those fatal weaknesses to which absolute monarchy is peculiarly liable. But it is odd to see a thinker like Dr. Bridges sighing over "might have beens." However, it is competent to us to point to what has been and is, and to remark that, with all her aristocracy and landlordism, England just precisely succeeded in doing what France failed to do-to introduce the modern era peacefully, without the universal holocaust of her traditions and political continuity to which the country of Richelieu was ultimately driven.

With regard to Protestantism and its historical position, we venture to think that Dr. Bridges is still more unjust. Both he and Comte seem to be deserted of their usual candor and impartiality when they speak of the Reformation and its results. Comte was fond of congratulating himself and France on her having escaped the delusive and treacherous stage of Protestantism." Into the general question we cannot enter on this occasion. The pith of Dr. Bridge's reasoning is that Protestantism stood in the way, not only of Richelieu and his schemes of centralization, but also interfered with the political and spiritual emancipation of the French nation. The refractory and unpatriotic nobles were its great patrons, and it could only have prevailed in France at the cost of "a new impulse which would be given to feudalism." Now even Mr. Buckle, whom Dr. Bridges rather tamely follows, in much that he says of the Reform movement, might have taught him better than this. It lies on the face of the history of those times that the nobles were deserting the Protestant cause with undisguised alacrity throughout the first period of Louis XIII.'s reign. The numerous conversions to the dominant religion

sufficiently prove this. The great Assembly which gathered at Rochelle, and which eventually gave Richelieu a useful pretext for demolishing that stronghold of Calvanism, was openly denounced and neglected by the aristocratic members of the party. And when later, in 1632, Henry of Montmorency raised his revolt in Languedoc, he found favor and support among Roman Catholic bishops, none among the Protestant clergy and laymen. Mazarin, who was in a good position to know, declared that he had no fault to find with the petit troupeau, the little flock of Protestants. It is clear that, to whatever dangers of a feudal reaction France might have been exposed in the beginning of the seventeenth century, Protestantism contributed but little to them. Again, if it be true, as asserted by Dr. Bridges, that by the triumph of Protestantism in France "the progress of French thought would have been hampered, and the great philosophic movement of the last century, culminating in the French Revolution, would have been seriously retarded "-if the reformed faith was really such an impediment in the pathway of all progress, political and intellectual-how comes it to have been so wise in Richelieu to lend it the helping hand he so often did? Dr. Bridges holds it as one of its titles to admiration that politically he held the balance so evenly between the two faiths. But this was in effect to "hamper the progress of French thought," to "retard the great philosophic movement of the last century." One thing is clear, that if the reactionary powers of Spain and Austria wanted opposing-and no one is more convinced than Dr. Bridges that they did-then the historical value of Protestantism is amply vindicated, for without it most certainly they could not have been opposed.

Chambers's Journal.

GREENWICH TIME.

If we examine the time-books of our trunk railways, we shall find in some of them a distinct statement that Greenwich time is kept 66 on this railway and all its branches;" in others, in which no simi