independence of America, and that acknowledgment must serve as a foundation for a treaty of peace. Until this is obtained, Mr. Adams can not talk of a treaty of commerce. To propose one while the court of London is flattering itself with the hopes of subduing America, and while with that view it is making the most strenuous efforts, would, in the view of that court, be to propose what was chimerical, and would be taking a step which it would hold in derision.

The case would be the same were one at this time to talk of a minister plenipotentiary from the United States appointed to reside at the court of his Britannic majesty. The only powers, therefore, which circumstances permit Mr. Adams to announce are those which authorize him to take a part in the negotiations for peace. The two other powers can be of no avail until the conclusion of that peace, so that it would be at least useless to produce them at present; and consequently Mr. Adams will not act inconsistent with the design and nature of his appointment by concealing them from the court of London. Although the Count de Vergennes is unacquainted with the instructions of Mr. Adams, yet he is persuaded that they are conformable to the foregoing reflections, and that they do not direct him to make an immediate commmunication of his powers relative to a treaty of commerce any more than they order him to make a separate peace with Great Britain. This opinion is founded on that which the king's ministry entertain of the wisdom, prudence, and fidelity of Congress.

III. It is to be observed that the English ministry would consider that communication as ridiculous; so that it is deceiving one's self to suppose that it will engage them to enter into any conference, or to say anything more than what is contained in the resolutions of Parliament, namely, that they will listen to the Americans and receive them into favor when they return to their former allegiance. It can answer no good purpose to draw from them such an answer, nor can the United States want such an answer to inform them of the present sentiments of the court of London, and much less to prepare with councils and arms to resist them. It is astonishing to talk of preparations of councils and arms when the war is raging in all its fury, when it has now lasted six years, and England has not made an overture to the Americans that can authorize them to believe that she would agree to their independ

ence.

IV. The English ministry would either return no answer, or if they did, it would be an insolent one. In case of the latter, why should a man needlessly expose himself to insult, and thereby make himself the laughing-stock of all the nations who have not yet acknowledged the independence of the United States? But there is reason to believe Mr. Adams would receive no answer, because the British ministry would not think themselves bound to return one to a man who assumes a character which the court of London must consider an insult. It should not be forgotten that that court always considers the Americans as

rebellious subjects. With such an opinion, how could Lord Germain receive a letter from Mr. Adams, taking upon himself the character of minister plenipotentiary from the United States of North America? How could that minister bear the mention of a treaty of commerce, which can only take place between independent nations? These observations will convince Mr. Adams that France has no occasion for the expedient which he proposes to discover the sentiments and dispositions of the court of London, and that we are already perfectly acquainted with what we ought and may expect from it in the present situation of affairs.

V. The silence or the answer of the English ministry, let which will happen, will neither alarm nor arouse the people of England. That people, without doubt, desire peace and an accommodation with America. But we find that only some individuals talk of independence, and these more from a spirit of opposition than from conviction. There never has been a single motion made in Parliament tending to grant that independence. Yet the people have friends and protectors in Parliament. From this Mr. Adams may judge into what embarrassment the announcing his powers would throw the ministry.

VI. England, as well as the rest of Europe, are perfectly acquainted with the nature of the engagements which subsist between France and the United States. The king caused a declaration to be made by this ministry on the 13th of March, 1778, that he had not secured to himself any exclusive privilege by the treaty of commerce of the 6th February of the same year, and his majesty has confirmed that declaration in a writing published by his order. So that the plenipotentiary powers of Mr. Adams can disclose nothing new either to England or to the other powers of Europe, and the false opinion of the court of London in this matter can be no obstacle to a peace. If such an obstacle existed, the English ministry would themselves find means to remove it if they were determined to make peace; depend upon that.

VII. It is certain that the whole English nation, and even the minis ters themselves, wish for peace. But it has been observed that there has not been a single motion made in favor of the independence of America. Certainly the plenipotentiary powers of Mr. Adams will not change the present dispositions of the people in that respect, and consequently the communication that might be made of them will neither facilitate nor accelerate the conclusion of peace.

VIII. This is a sensible reflection. It proves that Mr. Adams is himself convinced that there are circumstances which may induce him to conceal his powers. The king's ministry think that such circumstances will continue till the English nation shall show a disposition to acknowl edge the independence of the United States. That acknowledgment will not be facilitated by proposing a treaty of commerce, for the English are at present well persuaded that they will have such a treaty with America when they shall judge it proper. They have besides, as Mr.

Adams has himself mentioned in his letter of the 19th of February last, a full knowledge of his commission, so that the communication of his full powers will teach them nothing new in this respect.

IX. In answer to this paragraph, it may be observed that there is not an Englishman who is not persuaded that the United States are disposed to grant the advantages of commerce to their ancient metropolis; but it would be a very difficult task to persuade an Englishman, or any thinking being, that by granting independence in exchange for these advantages the court of London would make an honorable and advantageous peace. If this was the real sentiment of the people of England, why have they for these six years past, without murmuring, furnished ruinous supplies for subduing America?

X. The English ministry either have sincere intentions of making peace, or they mean to amuse and penetrate the designs of Spain. In the first case they will express the conditions on which they desire to treat; they will then be obliged to explain their views and their demands with regard to America. They will assuredly forget nothing which they think will forward peace; and upon agreeing to her inde pendence, their first care will be to demand equal privileges with France in regard to commerce. On the contrary, if the English ministry only means to amuse Spain, to penetrate her designs, and to slacken her preparations for war, Mr. Adams should do the ministry of Madrid the justice to believe that they will have sagacity enough to discover their views, and have understanding and prudence sufficient to determine on the conduct they ought to pursue.

XI. If Mr. Adams is as sure as he is of their existence that the English ministers have no intentions of making peace on terms which France and America can agree to, to what purpose communicate to them at present powers which can not be made use of until after the peace? How can Mr. Adams persuade himself that the court of London will be seduced by the bait of a treaty of commerce while it still manifests an invincible repugnance to acknowledge the independence of America? Whenever it shall be disposed to acknowledge that inde pendence it will of itself propose the conditions on which it will think it proper to grant it, and Mr. Adams may rest assured that it will not forget the article of commerce. Then will be the proper time for him to produce his plenipotentiary powers. In the mean time it is necessary to pursue measures for the establishing the foundation of that negotiation, namely, the independence of America, and that can only be effected by carrying on the war with vigor and success.

J. Adams to Vergennes.*

PARIS, July 26, 1780.

SIR: I have received the letter which your excellency did me the honor to write me on the 25th of this month.

The sincere respect I entertain for your excellency's sentiments would have determined me, upon the least intimation, to have communicated my letter and your excellency's answer to Congress, and to suspend, until I should receive orders on their part, all measures towards the British ministry without your excellency's requisition in the name of the king.

I shall transmit these papers to Congress, and I doubt not the reasons your excellency has adduced will be sufficient to induce them to suspend any communication to the British ministry, as it is undoubtedly their wisdom to conduct all such measures in concert with their allies.

There is a great body of people in America as determined as any to support their independence and their alliances, who, notwithstanding, wish that no measure may be left unattempted by Congress or their servants to manifest their readiness for peace upon such terms as they think honorable and advantageous to all parties. Your excellency's arguments, or indeed your authority, will probably be sufficient to satisfy these people and to justify me, whereas without them I might have been liable to the censure of numbers; for it is most certain that all due deference will be shown by the people of the United States and their servants, both in and out of Congress, to the sentiments of the ministry of France.

This deference, however, by no means extends so far as to agree in all cases to those sentiments without examination. I can not, therefore, agree in the sentiment that proposing a treaty of peace and commerce is discovering a great deal of weakness, or that the Americans have forgotten the British system of tyranny, cruelty, or perfidy, or to invite her to believe the Americans have an irresistible predilection for England, or to fortify her in the opinion that the American patriots will submit through weariness or through fear of the preponderant influence of the tories.

And so far from thinking it would give credit to the opinion, if there be such a one in all Europe, that the United States incline towards a defection, and that they will not be faithful to their engagements, it seems to me, on the contrary, it would discredit the opinion which prevails too much in Europe, that there is some secret treaty between France and the United States by which the former is entitled to exclusive privileges in the American trade.

It is very true that the independence of America must be acknowledged before a treaty of peace can be made. But a prospect of a free trade with America, upon principles of perfect equality and reciprocity,

MSS. Dep. of State; 3 Sparks' Dip. Rev. Corr., 212, with verbal changes.

like that between France and the United States, might be a powerful inducement with the people of England to acknowledge American independence. Indeed, I do not see any other considerable motive that England can ever have to make that acknowledgment. The Congress have given no positive instructions respecting the time or manner of making these powers known to one court or another. All this is left at discretion and to a construction of the commissioners themselves. It is very certain that all the belligerent powers are busily occupied every winter in their councils and preparations for the ensuing campaign. And it is also certain that the artifice of the British ministry, in holding up to view every winter some semblance of a design of reconciliation formerly, and of peace latterly, has been a real engine of hostility against America equal to a considerable part of the British army. Neither the people of America nor Mr. Adams have the least dread upon their minds of an insolent answer from one of the British ministers, nor of the ridicule of those nations who have not yet acknowledged the independence of America. No man of any knowledge, justice, or humanity in any of those nations would laugh upon such an occasion; on the contrary, he would feel a just indignation against a minister who should insult a message so obviously calculated for the good of England and of all Europe in the present circumstances of affairs.

I am very much mistaken (for I speak upon memory) if the Duke of Richmond did not make a motion two years ago in the House of Lords, and if Mr. Hartley did not make another about a year ago, which was seconded by Lord North himself, in the House of Commons, tending to grant independence to America. And it is very certain that a great part of the people of England think that peace can be had upon no other terms. It is most clear that the present ministry will not grant independence; the only chance of obtaining it is by change of that ministry. The king is so attached to that ministry that he will not change them until it appears that they have so far lost the confidence of the people that their representatives in Parliament dare no longer to support them; and in the course of the last winter the weight and sen timents of the people were so considerable as to bring many great questions nearly to a balance, and particularly to carry two votes, one against the increase of the influence of the crown, and another against the board of trade and plantations, a vote that seemed almost to decide the American question, and they came within a very few votes of deciding against the American secretary. Now, where parties are approaching so near to a balance, even a small weight thrown into either scale may turn it.

In my letter of the 19th of February I said that my appointment was notorious in America, and that therefore it was probably known to the court of London, although they had not regular evidence of it. The question then was more particularly concerning a commission to assist in the pacification. This was published in the American newspapers