Abbildungen der Seite
PDF
EPUB

To all the other advantages which would arise to his Catholic majesty I may add (although that is not so properly within my department) the security which his dominions would derive from our guarantee. This is an advantage which must be the more evident from a consideration of what might have happened had this country continued in union with Great Britain, and had Great Britain pursued those schemes of universal empire which the virtue and fortitude of America first checked, and which it is the object of the present war to frustrate. Our enemies do, I know, allege that our weakness is unable to withstand them, and that our force is dangerous to Spain. The serious refutation of such absurd contradictions would involve an absurdity. It may not, however, be improper to observe that the attention of this country for a century past has been, and for a century to come most probably will be, entirely turned to agriculture and commerce. We must always, therefore, be useful neighbors, and never dangerous except to those who may have views of dominion. Spain can never be in this predicament, though the British may and will. Their solicitude, therefore, to inspire apprehensions of us is, and ought to be, the strongest argument against entertaining them. But, if this evident reasoning did not exist, still the conduct of Congress with regard to his Catholic majesty has been so just, and even generous, not only in being willing to secure his rights, but to gratify him by foregoing their own, that there is not room for the shadow of suspicion. This conduct, I should suppose, would alone have weight sufficient to procure what it is my object to request, if the other very cogent and conclusive reasons for it did not apply. And, after all, if it be considered how much greater is the interest of Spain in the vigorous continuance of the present war than that of any other of the associates, I can not permit myself one moment to doubt of your success. I am the more sanguine from the character of the Catholic king and of his ministers for wisdom, candor, and integrity. These qualities will, I am sure, meet such corresponding dispositions in the United States, that the most thorough harmony and coalition must inevitably take place. This is an object of the greatest importance to both countries. Mutual benefits and the reciprocation of good offices will endear a connexion between them; and their interests require that this connexion should be of the closest kind.

In every point of view, therefore, that we can consider the subject, the advance I have mentioned must appear alike beneficial. If the governor of Cuba, or any other person, were duly authorised, stipula tions might even now be entered into for furnishing all necessary sup plies of provisions to the fleets and armies of his Catholic majesty, which would certainly facilitate their operations. The advance of money also by Spain would enable the fleets and troops of France to subsist cheaper than at present, because it would tend to raise the exchange here, which is now too low.

Your own good sense will suggest to you many other most forcible

539

arguments, as well as the proper time and manner of applying them. It is necessary to mention that the sum of five million dollars may, perhaps, be sufficient for our present emergencies; but if a greater sum can be obtained, we shall thereby become more extensively useful. Whatever the grant may be, it will be proper that it be sent hither in some Spanish ships of war from the Havana, or advanced to us there; in which latter case we will devise the means of bringing it away. Whether to ask for subsidies or loans, as well as the terms on which either are to be obtained, these, sir, are objects which you are fully competent to determine upon. I have only to wish that your applications may meet with that success which I am confident you will not fail to merit. As the means of facilitating your views, I shall apply to the minister of his most Christian majesty here to write on the same subject to the French ambassador at Madrid. The generous conduct of France gives just ground of reliance on her friendly assistance; and you are too well convinced of this not to act in the most perfect harmony with the servants of that court, especially on an occasion so important as the pres ent. I need not stimulate your activity by observing how precious is every moment of time in those affairs on which the fate of empires depends; nor need I suggest the importance of a treaty, and particularly a subsidiary treaty, with Spain in that moment when the judgment of Europe is to be passed on the fate of America. For, however impracticable it may be to subdue us, it is undoubtedly of moment to hasten the approach of that period when the acknowledgment of our independence shall give the blessings of peace to so many contending nations. To spare the present lavish effusion of blood and treasure is a serious object with those who feel, as you do, the emotions of benevolence; and I am confident that the patriotism which has inspired your conduct will prompt you to obtain a peace honorable for your country and advantageous to her friends. The only probable method to effect these things is a thorough union of forces and resources, to reduce the pride and power of that aspiring nation whose ambition embroils the universe. With all possible respect, I have the honor to be, &c.,

ROBERT MORRIS.

MSS. Dep. of State; 3 Sparks' Dip. Rev. Corr., 420.

J. Adams to the President of Congress.*

AMSTERDAM, July 5, 1781.* SIR: The following is an extract from the registry of the resolutions of their high mightinesses the States-General of the United Provinces of the Low Countries:

THURSDAY, June 28, 1781.

His serene highness the Prince of Orange and Nassau having appeared in the assembly, made to their high mightinesses the following proposition :

"HIGH AND MIGHTY LORDS: I have judged necessary to propose to your high mightinesses to examine with the greatest care if, since the present troubles have arisen, proper attention has been paid to the placing the marine of the state in that situation that it had been able to act efficaciously against an enemy, particularly one so strongly armed by sea as the kingdom of Great Britain is, or if any negligence or supineness hath had place in that respect, and in that case to what it ought to be attributed; and to the end to receive the necessary information on that head to write to the respective colleges of admiralty, that they may make report and declare how many vessels they had in 1776 and how many were then equipped and with how many men, what they have done since the English have begun to molest the ships of the inhabitants of this country employed in the West India trade under pretext of the disputes arisen with their Colonies in North America, and by consequence from the end of 1776 and the beginning of 1777, to place themselves as much as was possible and in their power in a state to protect the commerce of this country, and what they have done since the troubles have begun in Europe, and that it was to be feared that the republic would have a share in them, for to put it as much as depended on them in a state of not only protecting her commerce, but also to be able to assist in defending the country and in attacking the enemy; if they have been active to effect that which hath been resolved by your high mightinesses for this object, or if there has been a negligence in this respect; and in that case, for what reason they have not executed these resolutions; if it has been possible for them to furnish the ships put in commission and equip them, to the end that it may appear from whence it arises that the republic finds itself in so deplorable a state of defence by sea, which is certainly the point most interesting in this war, and upon which all the inhabitants of this country have an eye. Although on this occasion I make only mention of the defence by sea, I esteem it necessary to represent to your high mightinesses that I am very far from avowing by that that the land forces of this state are sufficient to assure us that the country is in a respectable state of defence by land.

"I do not think myself under the necessity of justifying my conduct, and that your high mightinesses are ignorant of the efforts I have made since my majority to place everything which regards this republic in a respectable posture of defence; nevertheless I have thought it in my power to represent to your high mightinesses that I have on more than one occasion given it as my opinion that this republic ought to be placed not only by land but also by sea in a proper state of defence, to the end to be able to maintain its liberty and independence, and not to be obliged to take measures contrary to the true interests of the country, but conformable to those of a power from whose menaces it has at length more to fear because it is not in a state to resist it.

* Mr. Adams arrived at Paris on the 6th of July, and consequently could not have written this letter in Amsterdam on the 5th, although it is thus dated in the original. He was absent during the whole month of July, and yet several letters, as will be seen, are dated at Amsterdam in that time. These letters contain chiefly intelligence which was probably collected by his secretary under different dates during Mr. Adams' absence, and forwarded by him on his return without altering the dates. This will account for the circumstance of letters being dated throughout the month of July both at Amsterdam and Paris.-SPARKS.

“It is for that reason that even in the beginning of 1771 I have given to understand that the deputies of the province of Holland and West Friesland had proposed in the assembly of your high mightinesses, by the express orders of the gentlemen the States their constituents, to cause to be formed a petition for the construction of twenty-four vessels of war; that I have not neglected to insist upon all occasions, as well upon the re-establishment of the marine as upon the augmentation of the land forces, and to press particularly more than once the conclusion of the petition for the construction of vessels.

"It is for the same reason that in the beginning of the year 1775, upon occasion of the exertions made by the gentlemen the commissaries of your high mightinesses for the affairs of war, with some members of the council of state, to conciliate the different sentiments of the respective confederates in regard to the plan of augmentation of the land forces, proposed by the council of state the 19th of July, 1773, I have made a conciliatory proposition to this purport, viz: 'that the sum for the department of war should be fixed at six hundred thousand florins for the marine, and to make amends for that that the sum of one million five hundred thousand florins demanded in 1773 for an augmentation to be made of the land forces should be reduced to nine hundred thousand florins,' which proposition was embraced at that time by the gentlemen the states of Guelderland, Friesland, Overyssel, and Groningen, but hath had no further operation.

"I shall not allege here the entreaties that I have annually made with the council of state by the general petition; but shall communicate only to your high mightinesses the proposition that I have made to the assembly of the gentlemen the States of Holland and West Friesland the 10th of March, 1779, which is of the same tenor with the letter I wrote the same day to the gentlemen the States of Guelderland, Zealand, Utrecht, Friesland, Overyssel, and Groningen, a copy of which I have the honor to remit to your high mightinesses. I can not disguise that in my opinion it was to have been wished that what I then proposed had been more attended to, since I dare assure myself that if the republic had found it good at that time to have caused to be armed fifty or sixty vessels well equipped, and provided with every necessary, whereof not less than twenty or thirty should have been of the line, and to have augmented the land forces to fifty or sixty thousand men of foot, it would not have found itself in its present unhappy circumstances, but it would have been respected as an independent state by all the powers; it would have been able to maintain the system of neutrality which it had embraced; and it would have seen itself in a state to promise itself with reason, under the Divine benediction, that in giving great weight to the party to which it should be joined, it would not have been to be feared that any power whatsoever would have attacked it, but that it would have been managed by each, and that her friendship being sought by all, and not giving to any one of them just causes of complaint, it would have obtained the esteem and confidence of all the powers, which would have produced the best effects for the true interests of this state, certainly and in every case if it had been attacked by an unjust war, to which a state is always exposed, it would have seen itself in a state to make an opposition with hopes of success, and of obliging the enemy to seek the friendship of this state upon honorable terms for the republic."

The following is the letter from his serene highness to the lords the States of Guelderland, Zealand, Utrecht, Friesland, Overyssel, and Groningen, dated March 10, 1779:

NOBLE AND MIGHTY LORDS, INTIMATE AND GOOD FRIENDS: We think ourselves obliged to communicate to your noble mightinesses our sentiments respecting one of the most important objects of your deliberations, viz.: We are very far from judging that it would be expedient that this republic should renounce the lawful rights which appertain to its inhabitants in virtue of solemn treaties; we think, on the contrary, that they ought to be maintained by all the means that Providence

hath placed in the hands of this republic, but that it belongs only to your noble mightinesses, and to the noble mighty lords the States of the other provinces, to decide when it is time that their high mightinesses ought to take the resolution of granting an unlimited protection to their commercial inhabitants, and that their high mightinesses not having engaged themselves by any treaty whatsoever with any foreign power to protect all branches of commerce without distinction, no one hath a right to exact from them that, in granting protection, they ought to grant it to all vessels without distinction, without leaving to their prudence to decide if they are in a condition to protect all the branches of commerce, and if they can do it in the present moment without hazarding important interests and exposing themselves to the greatest danger.

We think, then, that in this case it will be proper to pay no regard to anything else than the true interests of the republic, and it is for this reason that, before a final resolution is taken to convoy vessels loaded with wood, it would be necessary to examine the state of the republic both by land and sea. In our opinion, nothing will be more expedient for this republic than an exact and punctual neutrality, without prejudicing the treaties which it has with foreign powers; but we think that to maintain and support it efficaciously, and not only for so long a time as it may please one of the belligerent powers to require of the republic, in a violent and threatening manner, that it takes a part, that it will be proper that the republic be put in an armed state; that to this end it will be necessary to equip at least fifty or sixty vessels, not less than twenty or thirty of them of the line, and to augment the land forces to fifty or sixty thousand men, and that the frontier places should be put in a proper state of defence, and the magazines provided with the requisite munitions of war. In which case we are of opinion that the republic would be respected by all the powers, and could do, without obstacle, what is permitted it by the treaties, or would not be prevented from doing and acting what it should judge proper to its true interests.

For these reasons we judge that the fidelity we owe to our country requires us to offer this consideration to the enlightened minds of your noble mightinesses, and to give your noble mightinesses the deliberation of it, to take a resolution, to the end that by the construction of a considerable number of vessels, and particularly of the line, the marine may be reinforced, and that by the augmentation of the monthly pay or premiums, or by such other arrangements as your noble mightinesses and the lords the States of the other provinces shall judge proper, it may be effected that the sailors necessary to equip them be procured, and that at the same time your noble mightinesses grant the sums for the necessary augmentation, to the end to carry the land forces to the number of fifty or sixty thousand men and for the petitions respecting the fortifications and magazines.

When your noble mightinesses and the lords the states of the other provinces shall have done that, and this reinforcement both by sea and land shall have been carried into execution, we think that this is the epoch when the republic may with advantage, and as an independent state, take the resolution of maintaining the rights which appertain to their inhabitants according to the treaties, and particularly that of marine in 1674. But before the republic is put in a respectable state of defence, we should fear that a resolution to take under convoy all vessels indiscriminately, according to the letter of the said treaty, and particularly vessels loaded with ship timber, might have very bad consequences for the true interests of this state, and expose the honor of its flag to an affront. And it is for this reason we are of opinion that it would be proper that it should be resolved by an ulterior resolution that the vessels loaded with masts, knees, beams, and other kinds of wood necessary to the construction of ships of war should not be taken under convoy before an equipment of fifty or sixty vessels (not less than twenty or thirty of them of the line) is ready, and before having augmented the land forces to fifty or sixty thousand men of foot; but that in the mean time, to the end to protect as much as possible the general com

« ZurückWeiter »