Aristotle from genuine sources, of studying him in his own language, and availing themselves of the elucidations of his best disciples, indolently took the dogmas of the schoolmen for those of Aristotle, and lawlessly promulgated a philosophy of their own. The men I allude to, are no other than Lord Bacon, Des Cartes, and his disciples, Malbranche, Newton, Boyle, and Locke. These men

having the sagacity to perceive that nothing could less deserve the appellation of philosophy than the jargon of the schoolmen, and hastily and falsely concluding that it was legitimately derived from Aristotle, in reprobating his doctrines, either founded their defamation on the authority of the schoolmen, or on a cursory inspection of his works in the original. Nothing surely can be more unpardonable than such conduct, nothing can more plainly indicate a lawless and unbounded ambition in those who were guilty of it, and nothing can be so foreign from a genuine love of truth. For after what we have observed respecting the schoolmen, I trust it must be obvious to every one, that their authority in what pertains to philosophy is so far from carrying any weight, that it ought never to be adduced; and to be satisfied with cursorily inspecting the writings of Aristotle in the original, and to expect to become adepts in his philosophy as it were by intuition, discovers the greatest perversion of intellect, united with the most consummate arrogance. It also indicates the most profound ignorance of the genius of ancient philosophy. For the great philosophers of antiquity, besides the extraordinary abilities they possessed, spent a considerable portion of their lives in imbibing the doctrines of others, with a docility without example. Pythagoras was a scholar fifty years under the greatest masters of his time. Plato was the disciple of Socrates, Archytas, and Cratylus, above forty years; and Aristotle studied under Plato more than twenty years. Now is it reasonable to suppose that men of a genius so confessedly great, and who have in all ages been more or less celebrated for their wisdom, would have bestowed so much application, and spent so much time, in acquiring a knowledge of the doctrines of their masters, unless that knowledge had been of the most exalted kind, and was no less arduous in its attainment, than important in its consequences? Surely a little reflection must have convinced every mind of this that was not purblind through arrogance, and giddy through ambition.

That this knowledge is thus arduous, sublime, and important, is evident from what we have already observed in the beginning of this dissertation; viz. that the end of Aristotle's moral philosophy, is perfection through the virtues, and of his contemplative philosophy, an union with the one principle of all things. All the works of Aristotle lead us to the attainment of this end. For some of them

unfold to us the art of demonstration; others, that we may become virtuous, instruct us in morals; and lastly, others lead us to the knowledge of natural things, and afterwards to those luminous beings which have a supernatural subsistence. The philosophy of Aristotle, however, is so scientifically connected in all its parts, that his sublimest theoretic doctrines cannot be understood by any one who has not been previously disciplined in those that are less sublime; nor are even the latter to be apprehended without long and laborious study, accompanied with an ardent love of truth, an extreme docility, and as the consequence of it, an indefatigable perusal of the writings of his Greek disciples. Surely the moderns I have above mentioned, in thus superficially inspecting the works of Aristotle, must also have been ignorant that all the great philosophers of antiquity wrote in such a way as to conceal the sublimest of their doctrines from the vulgar, as well knowing that they would only be profaned by them without being understood; the eye of the multitude, as Plato says, not being strong enough to bear the light of truth. Hence, as Proclus well observes, "it is needless to mention that it is unbecoming to speak of the most divine of dogmas before the multitude, Plato himself asserting that all these are ridiculous to the many, but in an admirable manner are esteemed by the wise. Thus also the Pythagoreans said, that of discourses, some are mystical, but others adapted to be delivered openly. With the Peripatetics likewise, some are esoteric, and others exoteric; and Parmenides himself wrote some things conformable to truth, but others to opinion; and Zeno calls some assertions true, but others adapted to the necessary purposes of life."

The following extracts from the writings of the above mentioned moderns, will convince the reader of the truth of what I have asserted, viz. that they founded their defamation of Aristotle either on the authority of the schoolmen, or on a cursory inspection of his works. And to begin with their leader Lord Bacon: in the first place, he reprobates the confidence of Aristotle as follows (in Vol. 4. of his works, p. 87.) Qua in re Aristotelis confidentiam proinde subit mirari; qui impetu quodam percitus contradictionis, et bellum universæ antiquitati indicens, non solum nova artium vobacula pro libitu cudendi licentiam usurpavit; sed etiam priscam omnem sapientiam extinguere et delere annisus est. Adeo ut neque nominat uspiam auctores antiquos, neque dogmatum corum mentionem

1 Ότι δε απρεπη τα θειοτατα των δογμάτων εστιν, εις ακοας φερομένα των πολλων, ουδεν δει λέγειν, αι του πλατωνος είποντος, ως παντα ταῦτα καταγελαστα μεν εστι τοις πολλοις, θαυμαστ τω; δε αξία τοις σοφοις ουτώ δε και οι πυθαγόρειοι, των λόγων τους μεν έφασκον ειναι μυστικούς, τους δε υπαίθριους, και οι εκ του περιπατού, τους μεν εσωτερικους, τους δε εξωτερικούς, και αυτος παρμενίδης, τα μεν προς αλήθειαν έγραψε, τα δε προς δόξαν, και ο ζηνων δε τους μεν αληθείς εκάλει των λόγων, τους δε χρειωδεις. Procl. MS. Comment. in Parmenidem.

ullam faciat, nisi quo aut homines perstringeret, aut placita redargueret. Cæterum de viro tam eximio certe, et ob acumen ingenii mirabili, Aristotele, crediderim facile banc ambitionem eum a discipulo suo accepisse, quem fortasse æmulatus est; ut si ille omnes nationes, hic omnes opiniones subigeret, et monarchiam quandam in contemplationibus sibi conderet." Here he says that Aristotle, impelled by contradiction, and proclaiming war against all antiquity, not only introduced new terms of art at his pleasure, but also endeavoured to extinguish and obliterate all ancient wisdom. That in consequence of this, he never names any ancient authors, nor mentions their dogmas, except that he may either censure the men, or confute their opinions. And he concludes with observing, that he should believe Aristotle, who was certainly an excellent man, and wonderful for the acuteness of his genius, derived this ambition from his disciple Alexander; that as he subdued all nations, so Aristotle might subjugate all opinions, and procure for himself a certain monarchy in contemplations.

Nothing surely can be more false than the whole of this, and nothing can more satisfactorily prove Lord Bacon's ignorance of the true character of Aristotle, and of the aim and end of all his writings. For I trust the intelligent reader is sufficiently convinced from the perusal of the former part of this Dissertation, that Aristotle was neither impelled by contradiction, nor hostile to all antiquity; but that when he confutes the apparent meaning of the ancients, it is in order to prevent men of superficial understandings being misled by mistaking the apparent for the real meaning of what is written. Hence Aristotle, so far from endeavouring to extinguish and obliterate all ancient wisdom, by this mode of writing, aims on the contrary to diffuse it as much as possible, and to preserve it inviolate and pure. He does not therefore proclaim war against, but is the friend and benevolent guardian of all antiquity. Whenever also he introduces new terms, he does this from necessity, and not, as Lord Bacon has done, as we shall hereafter see, from that very spirit of contradiction which he ascribes to the Stagirite. I refer the reader who wishes to be convinced of this, to the notes in my translation of Aristotle's works on the parts where these terms occur. As to the last charge against Aristotle, that of boundless ambition, like his pupil Alexander, and a desire of subjugating all opinions to his own, and as Bacon, elsewhere expresses it, believing like the Othoman emperors, that he could not reign with safety unless he slaughtered all his brothers, it is perhaps one of the most remarkable instances upon record, of one man fancying that defect to be in another for which he is himself notorious. That this was actually the case with Lord Bacon we shall shortly see, when we come to examine his philoso

phy; but that Aristotle had by no means this ambition we shall now demonstrate.

That Aristotle then everywhere recommends investigation and doubting, and displays no less modesty' in proposing doubts, than sagacity in dissolving them, must be obvious to every unprejudiced mind from barely inspecting his works. For having exercised hinself in that part of Plato's dialectic, which proceeds through opposite arguments, when in philosophising a question is proposed, before he solves it he usually introduces another question, and from the solution of the latter solves the former. He often likewise brings many doubts together, which he dissolves by one and the same, or by continual, answers. But, that the reader may be fully convinced that the philosophy of Aristotle is of all others most foreign to dogmatic assertion, and most friendly to doubting, I shall, in the first place, present him with an account of the words and the modes of expression by which he signifies doubting. Aporein (arope) then, is properly to doubt, and this is the word which Aristotle most frequently uses; but the formulæ by which he expresses that word in the investigation of truth, as well in the theoretical as in the practical parts of his philosophy, are various. And these are sometimes subservient to the doubts proposed from the beginning of the chapter, and to what has been adduced in former chapters, and sometimes they promote a more diligent investigation in the middle or end of a chapter. Sometimes the word

The modesty in particular with which his Problems are invariably solved, is no less admirable in so transcendent a genius, than the sagacity displayed in their solution.

2 Thus, among others, lib. iii. Metaphys. c. 1, et lib. xi. c. 1, añoɛY OV Tis, some one may doubt. Likewise, lib. vii. c. 1 et c. 9. lib. iii. c. 4 et 6. lib. ii. de Anima c. 11, et lib. i. c. 8. lib. i. Mag. Mor. c. 35, lib. ii. Mag. Mor. c. 3, 6, et 11. lib. vii. de Moribus, c. 2. lib. i. Meteor. c. 3 et 14. lib. i. de Anima, c. 1 et 7. lib. v. de Moribus, c. 11, et lib. ii. c. 3. lib. v. Eudem. c. 12. lib. ix, c. 2. lib. v. Nat. Ausc. c. 9. lib. vii. c. 5. lib. i de Gen. et Corr. c. 3. lib. de Sensu et Sensili, c. 5 et 6. et de Incessu Animalium, c. 11. lib. ii. de Gen. Animal. c. 2. lib. ii. de Cœlo, c. 14. In lib. ii. de Generat. Animalium c. iii. we have other formulæ, τούτων δ' εχομενον εστι και απορήσαι, &C., τα τοιαυτα απορείται, TOTEрov, &c., aπope avayasov. lib. iii. Met. c. 6. lib. iv. Nat. Ausc. c. 4. lib. ii. de Sophist. Elenchis c. 33. Samopnora, lib. iii. Met. c. 1. Likewise to ano is joined with T Bouλauny, lib. vi. de Moribus c. 11. The philosopher, also, by the word anogia differently expresses doubt: for he either expresses it through this, σ de anopia, lib. de Animalium Motione, c. 4. et anopia SE εστι

Tn, lib. ii. de Sophist. Elench. c. 33. lib. iii. Met. c. 1. or by amogia ex? lib. i. de Anima, c. 1. et lib. ii. c. 5. et c. 11. lib. iii. Nat. Ausc. c. 5. lib. vii. Metaphys. c. 5. lib. i. Nat. Ausc. c. 3. lib. iv. Metaphys. c. 3. lib. i. de Gen. et Corr. c. 3. or by anopiɑv napaσx, as lib. iii. Met. c. 1. et lib. ii. Mag. Mor. c. 6. or by оy aяopiar, as lib. iii. Nat. Ausc, c. 5. or by anоgian amour, as lib. viii. Met. c. 3.

arogia, doubt, alone in the singular or plural number comprehends the matter of the whole, or the better part of the chapter, by which the proposition of things dubious is exhibited: and sometimes other words joined with this denote the same doubt;2 to all which the words Europe and evropia signifying abundance, correspond as the end.3

In the next place, it will be proper to observe that metaphysical doubting, according to Aristotle, begins from an ignorance of the causes of being, from whence admiration of the greatest effects arises, and then receives its consummation when the causes and principles of the universe are known. But the philosopher in the third book of his Metaphysics, which, as we have observed, is wholly employed in the enumeration of doubts, assigns four reasons why in the investigation of truth we should begin from doubting, The first is," because the power of acquiring posterior knowledge is derived from the solution of prior doubts." Hence, in his Nicomachean Ethics, he says that the solution of doubt is invention. The second reason is, "because those that investigate without having previously doubted, resemble those who are ignorant whither they ought to go." For he shows that doubting is a road through which we must necessarily pass in the investigation of truth. Not that we are to be continually employed in doubting, but only till we arrive at truth, the object of our search. The

This may be seen in lib. iii. Metaphys. c. 1. lib. iii. de Rep. c. 3. lib. viii Met. c. 6. lib. xii. Met. c. 6. lib. xiii. Met. c. 1 et 2. lib. iv. Nat. Ausc. c. 3 lib. ii. de Cœlo, c. 12. lib. i. de Gen. et Corr. c. 11. lib. i. de Moribus c. 10° lib. ii. de Moribus, c. 3. lib. v. de Moribus, c. 2. et lib. ix. c. 2 et 3. et 8, et 9, et 11. lib. i. Mag. Moral. c. 35. lib. vi. Eudemior c. 2. et lib. vii. c. 8. lib. iii. de Anima, c. 10. lib. de Animalium Incessu, c. 10.

2 Viz. Either eRXENTE, as in lib. de Animalium Motione, c. iv. and oxes, as lib. ii. Mag. Mor. c. 4. lib. i. Meteor. c. 13. et lib. viii, Nat. Ausc. c. 3. lib. 1. de Moribus, c. 10. He also uses the word anоpua as well elsewhere as lib. iv. Nat. Ausc. c. 6. lib. xi. Met. c. 2. and diamogav, lib. iii. Met. c. 1. lib. iv. c. 5. et lib. i. de Moribus, c. 11. et 2. lib. vii. c. 7. Categ. de Relatis, c. 7. lib. xi. Met. c. 11. lib. i. de Gen. et Corr. c. 5. et 10. lib. i. Meteor. c. 3. lib. iv. Nat. Ausc. c. 5. et lib. i Eudem. c. 4.

3 As may be seen lib. iii. Met. c. 1. et lib. i. de Anima, c. 2. And the words αμφισβητειν and αμφισβητησις denote the same doubting. See lib. i. Eudem. c. 3. et 4. lib. vi.c.2. lib. i. de Cœlo, c. 11. lib. 3. Met. c. 1.

4 Η γαρ λυσις της απορίας ευρεσις εστι. Lib. vii. c. 1

5 The words απορήσαι, διαπορήσαι, and ευπορήσαι, which the philosopher uses in this place, accord with each other; for they refer to those that are travelling; Topes signifying a way. But by the verb anopna in the beginning of this passage and elsewhere, he signifies a previous doubting of particulars; but by diaropna a more profound investigation, and a solicitude of penetrating through all doubts, and increasing the doubt itself by various reflections and arguments.