us, that they, and especially Hartley himself, are distinguished by several of the characteristics of British intellect. English Metaphysics, indeed, if we trace them in Hobbes, Locke, and Hartley, three of the most celebrated authors on this subject, will give us a very favourable and just idea of some of the most peculiar features of the national intellect. There is, in the metaphysical writings of all these authors (with a few exceptions) a fine vein of good sense, which almost invariably keeps their inquiries in that line that leads to sound and practical conclusions; while, at the same time, there is a degree of penetration and comprehension of mind, a rising above mere words, and a grappling with things that enables them to push their inquiries and investigations beyond the limit, which, to feebler intellects, and intellects that work entirely by means of words, seems the impassable boundary of human investigation on the subject of Metaphysics.

Of the practical tendency and benefit of the metaphysical truths which these writers, and more par ticularly Locke and Hartley, have explained and defended, there will remain no doubt, when we reflect that by the former the doctrine of innate ideas has been exploded, and by the latter, the doctrine of the association of ideas has been most thoroughly investigated and enforced. In fact, whether we regard Metaphysics as a science merely fit to sharpen the powers of the mind, or as one capable of practical application, we shall be equally sensible of the benefit which Locke and Hartley have conferred on it by their writings: for, if ideas are innate, inquiries into their nature, origin, and combinations, are ut

terly unnecessary and useless; and till the doctrine of the association of ideas was established on a firm footing, it was impossible to take advantage of Locke's discovery, and to pursue any satisfactory inquiry into the structure of the human mind. With respect to the practical inferences and applications of these doctrines, there seems hardly any necessity to point them out. Education, taken in its most comprehensive and philosophical mean. ing, cannot be conducted on any regular and systematic plan, or with much hope of forming the character and instructing the mind, so long as ideas are believed to be innate, or so long as (though this doctrine is given up) the doctrine of their association is not understood and practically applied.

As the German Metaphysics of Kant, &c. never gained any extensive or firm footing in this country, it seems not necessary to dwell upon them; indeed, we must confess, that to us they appear either totally unintelligible, or, where intelligible, only wrapping commonplace, or long exploded ideas, in the most mystic jargon imaginable. It is a circumstance well worthy of remark and consideration, that though the national character of the German and the British, as well as their intellectual and literary character, resemble each other very strongly in many respects; yet there are two or three points in which they widely differ. In the first place, among the Germans there are stronger proofs of imperfect civilization than among the English; these break out, in a most peculiar and striking manner, in their outrageous display of the strongest feelings and passions of the human breast, to the utter violation of all

good

good taste, and in a manner shocking and disgusting to all who are desirous of banishing from their feelings and passions all extravagance, and all morbid and selfish passiveness. The truth of this remark is sufficiently established by the German plays and novels; and though these were popular in Britain, yet their popularity was short lived, and was happily and successfully destroyed by our national good sense and good taste. In the second place, the imperfect civilization of the Germans, compared with the British, is further displayed by the favour, countenance, and belief which are shewn in Germany to the doctrines of animal magnetism, &c. In Britain, these doctrines were at one time partially received; but more through a love of novelty and fashion than from real conviction; the reverse seems the case in Germany. Lastly, as we have already remarked, the Metaphysics of Germany are very different from those of Britain, and equally with the other two points of difference just noted, prove, in our opinion, that not only with respect to civilization, but also with respect to the cultivation and progress of intellect, the Germans are much behind the British. Perhaps the principal cause of this state and character of the German intellect may be traced in the comparatively late period at which the Germans devoted themselves to the cultivation of literature and science: they have not proceeded in a regular, cautious, and systematic manner; the consequences are, that, while on some topics they have overleaped the boundary of human knowledge, and thus have plunged into intellectual darkness,-on other topics, they have not advanced so far as to

free themselves from that darkness. Hence Germany, at this time, displays the curious, and by no means uninstructive spectacle of a people with strong and cultivated intellects, and much just and accurate information, so far as some topics are concerned; while on other topics, their depraved rather than their uninformed intellects seek for food which, in most other European countries, is utterly rejected, and was never, at any period, sought for and relished, except while ignorance and credulity overshadowed and benumbed the mind.

But to return from this digression.-The next subject which calls for our notice in this Chapter, is the state and character of the Philosophy of Criticism of the present age.

On this branch of literature, Metaphysics have been brought to bear with considerable effect and success; and, indeed, whatever difference of opinion regarding the practical utility of metaphysical researches in other respects may be entertained, none, we should imagine, will be disposed to deny, that when applied to elucidate the origin and nature of intellectual pleasures, they may be of great utility. In proof of the truth of this remark, we need only notice the doctrine of the association of ideas, which, even by the Scotch writers, has been applied with success and considerable ingenuity to the Philosophy of Criticism.

The most celebrated writers on this topic are Kaimes, Campbell, Alison, Knight, and Dugald Stewart. The writings of the first were formerly very popular, and regarded as having made great discoveries in this branch of literature`; but their real merits are now more fairly and justly appreciated. Indeed, in Lord Kaimes's Essays there

is a singular intermixture of the peculiar Metaphysics of his country, which lead him often to solve a difficulty by a reference to original and innate principles or fee!ings, with a fondness for subtlety and refinement, that, when analyzed, will, in most instances, be discovered to resolve itself into mere words. Thus, after stating the fact he wishes and proposes to explain and account for, and entering on a long and apparently profound investigation into its nature and causes, the reader who is not perplexed or led astray by words, will be satisfied, on comparing the statement of the fact with the explanation of it, that they are both in reality the same; and that the author, though he has been always in motion, yet, by moving in a circle, has not advanced, but only reached the spot from which he set out.

The writings of Campbell, Alison, Knight, and Stewart, as well as the occasional but valuable glimpses of philosophical criticism which are interspersed in Johnson's Lives of the Poets, and in other works, are much more valuable and instructive than Lord Kaimes's Elements of Criticism; and, in fact, from them may be gleaned a greater number of the real Elements of Criticism than are to be found in that work.

The treatise of Blair on the Belles Lettres seems hardly to fall within the scope of our present Chapter; for though there are in it some good illustrations of the Philosophy of Criticism, yet for the most part it is occupied with a practical and detached application of that Philosophy to the different branches of literature, and some of the most celebrated writers in those branches. Besides, Blair in this work has been too much indebted

to French Authors, where he does treat of the Philosophy of Criticism, to be entitled to a particular notice here.

On the whole, the Philosophy of Criticism is still in a rude and imperfect state (compared with many other branches of science and literature) in Britain ;-it is a rich mine, but it requires to be worked carefully and deeply before its riches can be fully procured: much rubbish must be removed from the surface. A most intimate and profound knowledge of mankind, of all that forms their character, and of the inmost recesses of the human mind and heart, are indispensable in him who is ambitious of enlarging the boundaries of the Philosophy of Criticism.

Closely connected with this subject is the consideration of the state and character of the periodical Criticism of Britain in the present age.

Since the publication of the Edinburgh and Quarterly Reviews, these have been very striking; before they appeared, there were occasionally in the Monthly Reviews articles which displayed not only strong powers of mind, and an intimate acquaintance with the subject of the work reviewed, but which also were written with great command of language: but these were rare. The Edinburgh Review first. led the way to a new style of Criticism: on its appearance, it attracted notice by the elaborate and regular dissertations which it contained,especially on topics of general Politics, and Political Economy, into which former Reviews had scarcely ever entered ;-by the polish and elegance of its style, and by the contemptuous, sarcastic, and severe manner, in which it treated many authors, who had met with re

spect

spect and adiniration from the other Reviews, and through their means, from the world in general. The Edinburgh Review preserved its high and unparalleled popularity till its political predictions were proved to be false, and till it was opposed and rivalled by the Quarterly Review. The plan on which the latter is conducted, is exactly similar to that of the Edinburgh Review;-in politics, and with respect to the merits of many authors, where no political bias can be supposed to operate, they differ widely. At first, the Quarterly Review was rather heavily written;-at present, it approaches very near its rival with respect to talent and information,

and the manner in which they are conveyed: its antipathies, however, are expressed in a much heavier and coarser manner than those of the Edinburgh Review; and, occasionally, with a very indefensible and unmanly malignity. Yet in the very same Numbers which are thus disgraced, there will appear articles rich and warm with the admiration of all that is good and lovely in nature and in man, and written with stronger impressions of the importance of truth, and more genuine and ardent aspirations after the happiness and well-being of man, than any articles which the Edinburgh Review contains.

CHAPTER

H

Wordsworth,

OWEVER delicate and subtle the essence of Poetry may be, and however difficult to detect and define it, there are few, we apprehend, who will be disposed to deny, that in the writings of those authors whose names are placed at the head of this Chapter, it exists in a greater or less degree, though they may differ with respect to that degree, as well as with respect to the strength and purity of the essence. We may likewise add, without much fear of contradiction, that some at least of the characteristic features of British intellect and British Poetry may be distinctly traced in the works of these authors, and that their mental and moral powers, so far as they may be deduced from their poetry, are of that description which we have emphatically denominated British.

In briefly pointing out what we regard as the most distinguishing, as well as the most discriminating beauties of these poets, we shall not attempt to class them or to assign to each the place which he ought to hold in the scale of poetical merit that is not our object; but rather so to hold them up to the critical eye, as will most easily and effectually exhibit their prevalent and peculiar beauties and blemishes.

We are disposed to rate the merits of Burns as a poet very high. In his poetry we think we can trace,

very distinctly, nearly all that strength and vividness of colouring which gives such interest and effect to our elder poets, and to our national ballads of the highest character, united to much more warmth of feeling, and overflowing sympathy for his fellow-creatures, than they display. Indeed, the peculiar merits of Burns, as a poet, spring from his ardent feelings, either of contempt, anger, friendship, or love; and from the sympathy which his mind and heart hold with the joys and sufferings of those with whom he was connected. He was a man (if we may use rather a homely expression, but an expression pregnant with meaning) full of flesh and blood; a man to whom society, and especially the society of his friends, or of those who were bound to his heart by still closer ties,-was essentially necessary; who was keenly alive to all that was amiable, and all that was contemptible and mean in his fellow-creatures; and whose powers of thought enabled him to embody all that he saw and felt with regard to them. He knew the worth of the peasantry of Scotland; he knew the sources of their domestic comfort and happiness; their warm, sincere, and at the same time, reflecting and rational sense of religion; their kind but considerate attachment to one another; and their quick and ardent love of their Country's glory and honour,

and