the supply of them. If, for instance, while the quantity of silver continued the same, the quantity of gold was increased, the price of gold, as measured in silver, would fall; or, one ounce of gold, instead of exchanging for twenty ounces of silver, would exchange only for nineteen or eigh teen ounces. On the other hand, if the quantity of silver increased, while the quantity of gold remained the same, the value of silver, as measured in gold, would fall; or twenty ounces of silver, instead of purchasing one ounce of gold, would purchase only 18 or 18 of

an ounce.

Let us now suppose, that while the relative value of gold and silver in coin continue the same, or as 1 to 20, that gold in bullion, either from its becoming more scarce, or from silver becoming more plentiful (for these circumstances both operate to the same effect), becomes of greater value than as 1 to 20 to silver in bullion; so that one ounce of gold will exchange for twentytwo ounces of silver-what will be the consequence with respect to the gold and silver coins? Undoubtedly the gold coin will disappear, and the mode by which it will be taken out of circulation is by no means difficult to be pointed out. By the supposition, twenty ounces of silver in coin are equal in value to, or will exchange for, one ounce of gold in coin; but one ounce of gold in bullion is equal in value to, or will exchange for, twenty-two ounces of silver in bullion. A person, therefore, who with twenty ounces of silver in coin, obtains one ounce of gold in coin, obtains that which, when reduced to the state of bullion, will purchase twenty-two ounces of silver in bullion:-a lucrative traffic, therefore, will be carried on, by drawing the gold coin

out of circulation by means of the silver coin.

That this is not mere theory may be proved by a reference to what took place in this country in the beginning of the eighteenth century. At that period the quantity of bullion contained in a guinea was, at the relative prices of gold and silver in the market, worth twenty-one shillings and fourpence, while a guinea could legally be exchanged only for twenty-one shillings; and yet this small profit of fourpence on a guinea was sufficient to withdraw them from circulation; for the bullion in a guinea being obtained in exchange for twenty-one shillings, and afterwards sold for twenty-one shillings and fourpence, the operation being frequently repeated, afforded such a profit as induced many to embark in the trade.

To apply these remarks and illustrations to the topic more immediately before us:-By the present mint regulations with respect to the silver coinage, the relative value of silver in coin, and gold in coin, is different from the relative value of silver in bullion and gold in bullion. Twenty-one shillings are still deemed equivalent to a guinea, and will exchange for one; but twentyone shillings no longer contain as much silver as they did; therefore the same quantity of gold in coin is purchased by a smaller quantity of silver in coin than could be formerly; whereas it requires as much silver in bullion to obtain any given quantity of gold in bullion as it did formerly.

Hence a little reflection will show us that there must be a profit in withdrawing the gold coin from circulation. A pound of silver of the standard fineness is coined at Birmingham, or any other place except the mint (for the mint by

keeping

keeping back the seignorage would prevent any profit from the transaction), into fifty-six shillings of the legal weight; with fifty-two of these shillings as much gold coin can be obtained as will pay for the pound of silver, which was thus coined, leaving a profit of four shillings (with the exception of the expense of coinage) upon the transaction. We say that fifty-two of these shillings will purchase as much gold as will pay for the pound of silver, because the relative value of our gold and siver coin remains the same, that is 31. 17s. 6d. the ounce for gold, and 5s. 2d. the ounce for silver.

This operation will continue either till all the gold coin is withdrawn from circulation, or till the price of gold in the new silver coin advances in proportion to the depreciation of that coin; for to retain the same name to any coin when its intrinsic value is lowered, by its containing a smaller quantity of the precious metal, is in fact a depreciation of such coin. Now, in order that the relative value of our gold

and silver in coin should be the same as their relative value in bullion, it is necessary that the guinea should exchange for 22s. 71d. of our present silver money; and the price of gold in that silver money oug to be 47. 3s. per ounce, in order to render the relative value of our sil ver coin, and gold bullion, the same as the relative value of silver bullion and gold bullion: but as at present silver in bullion can be pur chased for 5s. 4d. per ounce, and when converted into coin, is worth 5s. 6d. the ounce; and as, moreover, gold may be purchased in that silver coin for 47. 1s. per ounce, whereas it is worth in it 4/. 3s. according to the relative value of gold and silver bullion, it is evident, that if the mint were to issue twenty millions of sovereigns instead of four or five millions, they could not be kept in circulation so long as the silver coin is issued of its present reduced weight, while only the same number of shillings are allowed to be given in exchange for that gold coin.

FRO

ROM the elucidation and discussion of topics, which are rather dry and abstruse, and are not generally deemed to fall within the peculiar and legitimate province of the historian or annalist, we turn to topics of a very different nature; we mean the state of political parties in Britain during the year 1817.

It is needless, and would be a waste of time, to prove that in such a country as Britain a view of the political parties which exist in it, at any particular period, and especially of such parties as take a regular and important share in the proceedings of parliament,is absolutely essential to the right understanding of its history, as well as to

a due

a due and just appreciation of the strength and extent of the different political principles and feelings, which must always exist and operate in such a country as Britain.

But though such a discussion is totally uncalled for, and therefore need not be entered into, yet it may be proper and instructive to preface our history of the state of parties in Britain during the year 1817, by some remarks on the alleged benefits derived from political parties, and on the inconveniences, if not the absolute evils, to which they are exposed.

It is contended, that unless there were political parties, public business could not be conducted. By political parties is understood an association of public men who, agreeing generally in their political principles, and in the view they take of the interests of the country, and of their own duties towards it, resolve to act together on all public points. Ministers contend that unless their friends formed such a party; that is, unless they could on all great and vital questions depend on the support of the members of their party, they could not carry on the business of the nation. While opposition contend, that party must be opposed by party; and that if ministers have a firm phalanx of friends, who on all great and vital questions vote with them, it is absolutely necessary that their phalanx, however inferior in numbers, should be as firm and unanimous on all such questions.

This is plausible, and would be satisfactory reasoning, provided the members of a political party were always associated and acted together, from strict uniformity of principle; and provided also, that the principles on which they did associate and act together

were all of them just and well founded. But, in the first place, with respect to the opposition (we do not now allude to the opposition of the present day, or to any parti cular opposition, but to the opposition as we suppose it has always existed and acted in this country),

with respect to the opposition, is it not proved by their public conduct, that one of their operating, if not avowed principles is, uniformly to oppose ministers? Can it justly be said that they give credit and support to ministers, even in those cases in which the measures of mini sters are most clearly and decidedly for the public good? If proof were wanting of this position, it might be found in the circumstance, that often when an opposition have come into power, they have adopted and defended those very measures which, while out of power, they reprobated and voted against. The same remark may be made with respect to that party of which the ministers for the day are the head: they almost uniformly object to measures introduced and recom mended by the opposition; so that in fact the axiom of each party seems to be-that whatever the other party does or recommends must be wrong and injurious to the country. Can political party therefore be really beneficial to the country? can it fail to warp the minds and soil the consciences of those who embrace it, if this axiom is necessary to its existence?

Let us now consider the separate members of which any particular party is composed. If they are staunch and really party men, they are expected to support their party, not only on questions which they do not understand (for this conduct may be defended on the plea that they can confide in the intelligence of the heads of the party), but also

on questions which they believe to be injurious to the country. That this is no unfounded or exaggerated statement, the history of all periods of Britain will sufficiently prove; and yet can political party require such conduct in its members? If it does, are the benefits it bestows on the public an adequate and full atonement for such dereliction of principle? for it can be called nothing else. What then, it may be said, ought to be the leading and fundamental rule on which a public man should act? ought he not to unite himself with any set of public men? To this it may be replied, that the only bond of union should be sameness of principle and uniformity of views on all grand public questions. We are much mistaken if public conduct pursued simply, and in all cases, according to this rule, would not more benefit the nation, than public conduct as it is now pursued; and we are confident, that if public men acted on this rule, they would gain and preserve a much larger share of the approbation and confidence of the people-which in fact would at once add to their strength, and ensure those public benefits which their measures were calculated and intended to produce: for a measure, in itself really beneficial to a nation, will often prove neutral, or actually injurious in its effects, if it is not agreeable to the wishes of the people; while it will take a deeper root, spread more widely, and produce more lasting benefit, if it not only meets the wishes of the people, but also is the act of those men who have secured their approbation and confidence.

Having premised these observations on the mode in which parties are formed in this country, the principles on which they act, and 1817.

the consequences which flow from parties thus formed and acting,we shall now proceed to a view of the different political parties, in the year 1817.

The circumstances by which the present ministry of Britain attained their power, and been enabled to reduce the influence and the numbers of opposition almost to absolute insignificancy, have been already detailed in some of our preceding volumes. They may, however, be here briefly recapitulated; indeed, they may be summed up in two particulars:-the unexpected success of ministers, arising much more from good fortune, than wise conduct on their part; and the total want of prudence, we had almost said of common sense, in the opposition, at the time when political power was either in view or actually in their grasp. Not even the most zealous and devoted adherent of ministers will contend that they are men of superior talents: in fact, without one exception, they are men of very inferior talents, when compared with the great statesmen of former times; and yet the unparalleled difficulties of the period at which they obtained power-whether we look. to political events, or to the state of the country with respect to its commerce and finances-seemed to require the most profound abilities, acting upon, and sharpened by, the utmost degree of experience as statesmen. They exhibited, however, during those difficulties great steadiness, and no common share of prudence, moderation, and good sense: their steady adherence to a line of conduct which required rather perseverance than activity, and which certainly did neither require nor admit of much deviation, benefited them in the same manR

ner,

ner, as a man's life is often saved in the midst of a storm, in a dark night, by standing still, till the storm passes away. Mr. Pitt had been active in his opposition to Bonaparte: he had infused his activity into the potentates of Eu rope, but not into the minds of their subjects: the consequence was, that all his measures increased and strengthened that power which he wished and expected to destroy. The present ministry, on the other hand, allowed Bonaparte to destroy himself by his own measures; they only stood by, prepared to take advantage of his blunders. Thus with little real risque, and with very inferior talents, they witnessed the accomplishment of that, which Mr. Pitt had in vain so long endeavoured to achieve. Hence they became popular and till their conduct in 1817, (which we shall presently describe,) they continued popular, from the hold which their success had given them on the minds of the people, as well as by the moderation and good sense of their most important measures.

The opposition have been once in power, and twice has power been within their grasp: but at none of these times did they conduct themselves either with prudence and good sense, or in such a manner as to secure the confidence and approbation of the people. Mr. Fox had lost a considerable share of his popularity before he came into power, in the year 1806,-not so much perhaps by his opposition to the war with France, as by his backwardness to rejoice in victories gained by British valour: he was still, however, very popular when he came into power at the period alluded to: but his union with lord Grenville, and the persuasion that his easy temper and un-business

like habits, would in too many points yield to lord Grenville's politics, destroyed a large portion of his popularity. On his death, lord Grenville's influence being now much increased, the whig ministry became still less popular; nor did the cause of their going out of office regain them that hold on the feelings, good wishes, and confidence of the nation, which they had lost by not pursuing measures of economical and political reform while they were in power. the time of the regency in 1811, and afterwards on the death of Mr. Perceval, they might have come into power; but they conduct ›d themselves with so little prudence, and raised up so many frivolous obstacles, that it almost seemed as if they wished to have some excuse for declining power.

Since the latter of these periods, the successful termination of the war against Benaparte, and the death of their most eminent leaders, have greatly weakened their influence both in and out of parliament.

Such is a general view of the state of the ministerial and the opposition party at the beginning of 1817. During that year, their actual as well as their relative state changed.-Let us first consider the ministerial party. There are at least three men in it, to whom the nation has always been disposed to give credit for moderate and liberal views and conduct, and for feelings and principles by no means in unison with tory notions of government; -we allude to the earl of Liverpool, lord Sidmouth, and Mr. Vansittart; the two latter had indeed formed part of the whig administration, and therefore, from them might be expected some whig notions on government. But a very different idea was formed of

lord