Abbildungen der Seite
PDF
EPUB

Spirit, we deny that they are limits of his understanding; all this we may truly be said to understand and believe: but if we proceed farther, and enquire what it is to have such an understanding, or will? this is not a proposition, and consequently not the object of faith, as well as exceeds the reach of our understanding. So as to the doctrine of the Trinity, when we affirm that there is one God, and that the Father, Son, and Spirit, have all the perfections of the Godhead; and that these perfections, and the personality of each of them, are infinitely greater than what can be found in the creature, this we yield our assent tc; but if it be enquired how far does God herein exceed all the ideas which we have of finite perfections, or personality, here our understandings are at a loss; but so far as this does not contain the form of a proposition, it cannot, according to our common acceptation of the word, be said to be the object of faith.

3. As to what concerns practical religion, the ideas we have of things subservient to it are of two sorts; either such as engage our obedience, or excite our adoration and admiration: as to the former of these, we know what we are commanded to do; what it is to act, as becomes those who are subject to a divine person, though we cannot comprehend those infinite perfections, which lay us under the highest obligation to obey him: as to the latter, the incomprehensibleness of the divine personality, or perfections, has a direct tendency to excite our admiration, and the infiniteness thereof our adoration. And, since all religion may be reduced to these two heads, the subject matter of divine revelation is so far from being inconsistent with it, that it tends to promote it. Things commanded are not, as such, incomprehensible, as was but now observed, and therefore not inconsistent with that obedience, or subjection, which is contained in one branch thereof; and things incomprehensible do not contain the form of a command, but rather excite our admiration, and therefore they are not only consistent with, but adapted to promote the other branch thereof. Is it not an instance of religion to adore and magnify God, when we behold the display of his perfections in his works? And is he less to be adored, or admired, because we cannot comprehend them? Or should we not rather look upon them with a greater degree of astonishment, than if they did not exceed the reach of a finite mind? Must a person be able to measure the water of the ocean, or number all the particles of matter that are contained in the world; or can our ideas be no ways directed to shew forth the Creator's praise? Or must we be able to account for every thing that is a mystery in nature; or can we not improve it to promote some of the ends of practical religion, that we are

[ocr errors]

engaged to thereby? May we not say, with wonder, O Lord, how manifold are thy works! in wisdom hast thou made them all; the earth is full of thy riches? Psal. civ. 24. So when we behold the personal glory of the Father, Son, and Spirit, as displayed in the work of redemption, or as contained in scripture, which is therein said to be an instance of his manifold wisdom, Eph. iii. 10. should we not admire it the more, inasmuch as it is, as the apostle calls it, unsearchable? Therefore practical religion, as founded on divine revelation, is not, in all the branches thereof, inconsistent with the incomprehensibleness of those things, which are, some in one respect, and others in another, the objects thereof.

And as to what is farther contained in this objection, concerning the will's following the dictates of the understanding, and practical religion's being seated therein, I own, that we must first know what we are to do in matters of religion, before we can act; thus we must first know what it is to worship, love, and obey, the Father, Son, and Spirit, as also that these three divine persons are the object of worship, love, and obedience, and then the will follows the dictates of the understanding; but it is one thing to know these things, and another thing to be able to comprehend the divine, essential, or personal glory, which belongs to them, and is the foundation of these acts of religious worship.

4. As to what is farther objected, concerning the design of divine revelation's being to improve our understanding; or, as it is sometimes expressed, that it is an improvement upon the light of nature; this seems to have a double aspect, or tendency, viz. to advance, or depreciate, divine revelation.

1. If we take it in the former view, we freely own,

(1.) That it is a very great improvement upon the light of nature, and that, either as we are led hereby, not only into the knowledge of many things which could not be discovered by it, namely, the doctrine of the Trinity, the incarnation of the Son of God, and that infinite satisfaction which was given by him to the justice of God, in order to our discharge from condemnation, as also that communion which believers have with the Father, Son, and Spirit; and therefore, since the light of nature gives us no discovery of these doctrines, divine revelation, and particularly the gospel, makes a very great addition to those ideas which we are led into by the light of nature. It is true, they both take their rise from God, yet one excels the other, as much as the light of the sun does that of a star: and is, as the Psalmist says, when comparing them together, perfect, converting the soul; and sure, making wise the simple. Psal. xix. 7.

(2.) That when the same truths are discovered by the light of nature, and by divine revelation, the latter tends very much to improve our ideas: thus when the light of nature leads us into the knowledge of the being and perfections of God, his wisdom, power, and goodness, as illustrated in the works of nature and providence, we have not so clear ideas thereof, as we receive from the additional discoveries of them in divine revelation; and in this respect one does not cloud or darken those ideas which the other gives. But neither of these are designed by those who bring this objection against the doctrine, of the Trinity: therefore we must suppose,

2. That they intend hereby to depreciate divine revelation, and then the sense thereof is this; that though the light of nature leads mankind into such a degree of the knowledge of divine truths, as is sufficient, in its kind to salvation; so that they, who are destitute of divine revelation, may thereby understand the terms of acceptance with God, and the way which, if duly improved, would lead to heaven; yet God was pleased to give some farther discovery of the same things by his word, and, in this sense, the one is only an improvement upon the other, as it makes the same truths, which were known, in some degree, without it more clear, and frees them from those corruptions, or false glosses, which the perverse reasonings of men have set upon them; whereas we, by insisting on inex-, plicable mysteries, which we pretend to be founded on divine revelation, though, in reality, they are not contained in it, cloud and darken that light, and so make the way of salvation more difficult, than it would otherwise be; and this certainly tends to depreciate divine revelation, how plausible soever the words, at first view, may appear to be; for it supposes those doctrines but now mentioned, and many others of the like nature, not necessary to salvation; so that this objection takes its first rise from the Deists, however it may be applied, by the Antitrinitarians, in militating against the doctrine of the Trinity. Therefore, since it is principally designed to overthrow this doctrine, by supposing it to be unintelligible, and consequently, according to their method of reasoning, in no sense the object of faith, the only reply which need be made to it is, that the discoveries of the glory of God, by the light of nature, are, in some respects, as incomprehensible as the doctrine of the Trinity; which we are not, for that reason, obliged to disbelieve, or reject; and therefore there is no advantage gained against our argument, by supposing that the light of nature contains a discovery of truths, plain, easy, and intelligible by all, in the full extent thereof, and that the doctrine of the

[blocks in formation]

Trinity is otherwise, and consequently must not be contained in divine revelation, and, as such, cannot be defended by us.

4. Another thing that may be premised, before we enter on the proof of the doctrine of the Trinity, is, that it is not contrary to reason, though it be above it; neither are our reasoning powers, when directed by scripture-revelation, altogether useless, in order to our attaining such a degree of the knowledge thereof, as is necessary, and ought to be endeavoured after. When a doctrine may be said to be above reason, has been already considered, as well as that the doctrine of the Trinity is so; and now we are obliged to obviate an objection, which is the most popular one of any that is brought against it, namely, that it is an absurd and irrational doctrine; and that they who maintain it must first lay aside their reason, before they can be induced to believe it, for it is as much as to say that three are equal to one; which is contrary to the common sense of all mankind, or else, that we maintain a plurality of gods, which is contrary to the very first principles of the light of na

And here we are reflected on, as though we demanded that our antagonists should lay aside their reason, before we argue with them, and then it is easy to determine on which side the argument will turn; therefore, to make way for what might be said in defence of the doctrine of the Trinity, we shall, under this head, consider,

(1.) When a doctrine may be said to be contrary to reason. (2.) Shew that the doctrine of the Trinity is not so. (3.) What is the use of reason, in establishing it, or or any other doctrines, which are the subject of pure revelation.

(1.) When we may conclude, that a doctrine is contrary to reason. This it may be said to be, when it is contrary to the methods of reasoning made use of by particular persons, which are not always just, and therefore it does not follow, from hence, that it is false or absurd, because our reasoning about it is so, but rather the contrary; so that when they, on the other side of the question, tell us, with an air of boasting, that if the doctrine we are maintaining could have been accounted for, how comes it to pass that so many men of sense and learning, as are to be found among the Anti-trinitarians, have not been able to do it? But this is nothing to our present argument; therefore we suppose that a doctrine is contrary to reason, when it contradicts some of the first principles, which the mind of man cannot but yield its assent to, as soon as ever it takes in the sense of the words which contain them, without demanding any proof thereof; as that the whole is greater than the part; and that a thing can be, and not be, at the same time; or that two is more than one, &c. or when we can prove a thing to be true to a demonstration, and yet suppose that 2

contradictory proposition, in which the words are taken in the same sense, may be equally true. (a)

(2.) That the doctrine of the Trinity is not contrary to reason. This appears, inasmuch as we do not say th: the three Persons in the Godhead are one Person, or that tl. ne divine

Being is three divine Beings.

[ocr errors]

Object. But it is objected, that it is contrary to reason, which establishes and proves the unity of the Godhead, to say that the divine nature may be predicated of more than one, inasmuch as that infers a plurality of Gods, and every distinct Person must be concluded to be a distinct God; therefore the Trinitarian doctrine is down-right Tritheism, and consequently contrary to reason; and here those words of the Athanasian Creed are produced, as an instance hereof, namely, that the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God,

(a) He who has marked the differences between truth and error, good and evil, made them discoverable, and formed human minds susceptible of their impressions, thereby discovers his will that we should attend to them, and has made it our duty to do so. With this sentiment sacred revelation is expressly accordant; "prove all things, hold fast that which is good." The Gospel requires not faith without evidence, it demands no more assent than is proportioned to the weight of probability, and charges as a crime only our refusing to attend to the evidence, or our coming to it with hearts prejudiced against, and therefore insensible to, its evidence. The exercise of reason is essential to faith, for how sudden soever our convictions, still it is the judgment which is convinced.

Yet reason has her due province; she may and ought to ascertain the genuineness, authenticity, and divine authority of the scriptures. When this is done, she cannot correctly delay her assent, because she may not fully comprehend the promises or works of God, for this would require wisdom no less than Divine. But suppose she should presume to try them, by what balances shall she weigh them? To what shall she compare them? To the reasons and fitness of things? what are these but circumstances and relations springing from the works of God? His creation originated from his wisdom and power, and is ever dependent on them. This is therefore to circumscribe infinite wisdom by what has been already discovered of it; it is to limit infinite power from effecting any thing which it has not hitherto accomplished. Such judgment is not the work of reason, it is irrational. Reason can only make an induction, where there exists premises from which a conclusion can be drawn; but here her limits are exceeded, she has no standard by which she can measure infinity. By reasoning we justly infer from the works of God, many of his glorious moral, as well as natural, per fections; we gather that he is holy, just, true, and good, and we may fairly say that he will never depart from such rectitude, but that all his works will be conformed to such principles. We can go no farther than unto generals, we have no right to question any word or act of his, and say it is not conformed to such perfections, because this would suppose that we possess infinite wisdom. He may have ways of solving our difficulties and objections, with which we are not acquainted. Such judgment is not only irrational, but arrogant, as it is an extension of the claims of reason beyond her just limits. Our duty in such case is exemplified in the father of the faithful." At God's command we must, like him, sacrifice our Isaacs, and leave to him both to accomplish his promises and to justify the action It is evident that the doctrine of the Trinity is but partially revealed to man, but sufficiently to let him into a competent knowledge of the plan of redemption.

« ZurückWeiter »