Abbildungen der Seite
PDF
EPUB

52.-President Buchanan's message to Congress, December 8, 1857.

[Extract.]

The diplomatic difficulties which existed between the Government of the United States and that of Great Britain at the adjournment of the last Congress, have been happily terminated by the appointment of a British minister to this country, who has been cordially received.

Whilst it is greatly to the interest, as I am convinced it is the sincere desire, of the governments and people of the two countries to be on terms of intimate friendship with each other, it has been our misfortune almost always to have had some irritating, if not dangerous, outstanding question with Great Britain.

Since the origin of the government we have been employed in negotiating treaties with that power, and afterwards in discussing their true intent and meaning. In this respect the convention of April 19, 1850, commonly called the Clayton and Bulwer treaty, has been the most un fortunate of all; because the two governments place directly opposite and contradictory constructions upon its first and most important article. Whilst in the United States, we believed that this treaty would place both powers upon an exact equality by the stipulation that neither will ever "occupy, or fortify, or colonize, or assume or exercise any dominion" over any part of Central America, it is contended by the British Government that the true construction of this language has left them in the rightful possession of all that portion of Central America which was in their occupancy at the date of the treaty; in fact, that the treaty is a virtual recognition on the part of the United States of the right to Great Britain, either as, owner or protector, to the whole extensive coast of Central America, sweeping round from the Rio Hondo to the port and harbor of San Juan de Nicaragua, together with the adjacent Bay Islands, except the comparatively small portion of this between the Sarstoon and Cape Honduras. According to their construction, the treaty does no more than simply prohibit them from extending their possessions in Central America beyond the present limits. It is not too much to assert, that if in the United States the treaty had been considered susceptible of such a construction, it never would have been negotiated under the authority of the President, nor would it have received the approbation of the Senate. The universal conviction in the United States was, that when our Government consented to violate its traditional and time-honored policy, and to stipulate with a foreign government never to occupy or acquire territory in the Central American portion of our continent, the consideration for this sacrifice was that Great Britain should, in this respect, at least, be placed in the same position with ourselves.

Whilst we have no right to doubt the sincerity of the British govern ment in their construction of the treaty, it is at the same time my deliberate conviction that this construction is in opposition both to its letter and its spirit.

Under the late administration negotiations were instituted between the two governments for the purpose, if possible, of removing these dif ficulties; and a treaty having this laudable object in view was signed at London on the 17th October, 1856, and was submitted by the President to the Senate on the following 10th of December.

Whether this treaty, either in its original or amended form, would have accomplished the object intended without giving birth to new and embarrassing complications between the two governments, may perhaps

be well questioned. Certain it is, however, it was rendered much less objectionable by the different amendments made to it by the Senate. The treaty, as amended, was ratified by me on the 12th March, 1857, and was transmitted to London for ratification by the British Government. That government expressed its willingness to concur in all the amendments made by the Senate, with the single exception of the clause relating to Ruatan and the other islands in the Bay of Honduras. The article in the original treaty, as submitted to the Senate, after reciting that these islands and their inhabitants

having been by a convention bearing date the 27th day of August, 1856, between Her Britannic Majesty and the Republic of Honduras, constituted and declared a free territory under the sovereignty of the said Republic of Honduras

stipulated that

the two contracting parties do hereby mutually engage to recognize and respect in all future time the independence and rights of the said free territory as a part of the Republic of Honduras.

Upon an examination of this convention between Great Britain and Honduras of the 27th August, 1856, it was found that, whilst declaring the Bay Islands to be "a free territory under the sovereignty of the Republic of Honduras," it deprived that republic of rights without which its sovereignty over them could scarcely be said to exist. It divided them from the remainder of Honduras, and gave to their inhabitants a separate government of their own, with legislative, executive, and judicial officers, elected by themselves. It deprived the government of Honduras of the taxing power in every form, and exempted the people of the islands from the performance of military duty, except for their own exclusive defense. It also prohibited that republic from erecting fortifications upon them for their protection, thus leaving them open to invasion from any quarter; and, finally, it provided "that slavery shall not at any time hereafter be permitted to exist therein."

Had Honduras ratified this convention, she would have ratified the establishment of a state substantially independent within her own limits, and a state at all times subject to British influence and control. Moreover, had the United States ratified the treaty with Great Britian in its original form, we should have been bound "to recognize and respect in all future time" these stipulations to the prejudice of Honduras. Being in direct opposition to the spirit and meaning of the Clayton and Bulwer treaty, as understood in the United States, the Senate rejected the entire clause, and substituted in its stead a simple recognition of the sovereign right of Honduras to these islands, in the following language:

The two contracting parties do hereby mutually engage to recognize and respect the islands of Ruatan. Bonaco, Utila, Barbaretta, Helena, and Morat, situate in the Bay of Honduras, and off the coast of the Republic of Honduras, as under the sovereignty and as part of the said Republic of Honduras.

Great Britain rejected this amendment, assigning as the only reason. that the ratifications of the convention of the 27th August, 1856, between her and Honduras, had not been "exchanged, owing to the hesi tation of that government." Had this been done, it is stated that "Her Majesty's Government would have had little difficulty in agreeing to the modification proposed by the Senate, which then would have had, in effect, the same signification as the original wording." Whether this would have been the effect; whether the mere circumstance of the exchange of the ratifications of the British convention with Honduras prior, in point of time, to the ratification of our treaty with Great Britain S. Doc. 161-13

would "in effect" have had "the same signification as the original wording," and thus have nullified the amendment of the Senate, may well be doubted. It is, perhaps, fortunate that the question has never arisen.

The British Government, immediately after rejecting the treaty as amended, proposed to enter into a new treaty with the United States, similar in all respects to the treaty which they had just refused to ratify, if the United States would consent to add to the Senate's clear and unqualified recognition of the sovereignty of Honduras over the Bay Islands, the following conditional stipulation:

Whenever and so soon as the Republic of Honduras shall have concluded and ratified a treaty with Great Britain, by which Great Britain shall have ceded, and the Republic of Honduras shall have accepted the said islands, subject to the provisions and conditions contained in such treaty.

This proposition was, of course, rejected. After the Senate had refused to recognize the British convention with Honduras on the 27th August, 1856, with full knowledge of its contents, it was impossible for me, necessarily ignorant of "the provisions and conditions" which might be contained in a future convention between the same parties, to sanction them in advance.

The fact is, that when two nations like Great Britain and the United States, mutually desirous, as they are, and I trust ever may be, of maintaining the most friendly relations with each other, have unfortunately concluded a treaty which they understand in senses directly opposite, the wisest course is to abrogate such a treaty by mutual consent, and to commence anew. Had this been done promptly, all difficulties in Central America would most probably ere this have been adjusted to the satisfaction of both parties. The time spent in discussing the meaning of the Clayton and Bulwer treaty would have been devoted to this praiseworthy purpose, and the task would have been more easily accomplished because the interest of the two countries in Central America is identical, being confined to securing safe transits over all the routes across the Isthmus.

Whilst entertaining these sentiments, I shall nevertheless not refuse to contribute to any reasonable adjustment of the Central American questions which is not practically inconsistent with the American interpretation of the treaty. Overtures for this purpose have been recently made by the British Government in a friendly spirit, which I cordially reciprocate; but whether this renewed effort will result in success I am not yet prepared to express an opinion. A brief period will determine.

53.-Lord Napier to General Cass.

WASHINGTON, February 15, 1858. SIR: On the 30th of November last I had the honor to convey to you, under the instructions of Her Majesty's Government, a proposal to submit the controverted points in the treaty of 1850, respecting Central American affairs, to the free arbitration of any European power which the Government of the United States should prefer to select for that office. In a separate note, under the same date, I imparted to the Government of the United States an outline of the instructions under which Sir William Gore Ouseley has been charged to proceed on a special mission to the Central American republics, with a view to the settle

ment, by direct negotiation with those states, of the questions which the correspondence of last year in London had failed to adjust. Something in the nature of an alternative was thus offered to the American cabinet. Should the expedient of arbitration be adopted, a great portion of Sir William Ouseley's duty would be transferred to other agencies. Should arbitration be declined it was hoped that the efforts of Her Majesty's envoy would result in a settlement agreeable to the United States, inasmuch as in essential points it would carry the treaty of 1850 into operation in a manner practically conformable to the American interpretation of that instruction.

The note which I had the honor of addressing to you, in reference to the mission of Sir W. Ouseley, has received the official sanction of the Earl of Clarendon, and may therefore be regarded as an authoritative exposition of the intentions of Her Majesty's Government. In that communication, however, I indicated that two obstacles had arisen which might possibly modify the resolutions of Her Majesty's Government: first, the cotemporary negotiation of a convention for the protection of the transit route between the Government of the United States and that of Nicaragua; and secondly, the invasion of the Nicaraguan territory by a band of adventurers, who were engaged in an attempt to subvert the lawful government recognized by Great Britain. The impediments to which I alluded do not now exist.

In the treaty contemplated between the United States and Nicaragua, Her Majesty's Government do not see any obstacle in the realization of their designs committed to the management of Sir William Ouseley, while the projects of Walker and his confederates have been arrested by the interposition of the United States Navy, and we may hope definitively extinguished by the reprobation expressed, and the measures adopted by the President of the United States.

Satisfied in respect to the relations between the Government of the United States and Nicaragua, and relieved of the apprehensions raised by the renewed disturbances of the peace of Central America, Her Majesty's Government are prepared, if necessary, to sanction the departure of Sir William Ouseley on his mission and the execution of his instructions in the most conciliatory spirit.

Her Majesty's Government have, however, received no reply to their proposal for arbitration, a measure which they still regard as embodying the most unexceptionable method for the settlement of existing difficulties.

In requesting to be informed of the definitive resolution of the United States Government on this point, I am enabled to add that, if their determination should be an adverse one, Her Majesty's Government would give a friendly consideration to any observations which you may be disposed to offer on the objects of the mission intrusted to Sir William Ouseley.

I have, &c.,

54.-Lord Napier to Lord Malmesbury.

NAPIER.

No. 56.]

WASHINGTON, March 22, 1858. (Received April 5.) MY LORD: The overtures made by Her Majesty's late cabinet to the Government of the United States for the adjustment of pending controversies in Central America are known to your lordship from the cor

respondence between the foreign office and Her Majesty's legation on this subject.

Those proposals comprise an alternative submitted to the selection of the American Government. Her Majesty's Government have offered to refer all the controverted points in the treaty of 1850 to the free arbitration of any European power, or, if more agreeable to the United States, they design to adjust the matters under discussion by negotiation with the Isthmus republics, to which, through the medium of Sir William Ouseley's mission, they are prepared to make such concessions as would carry the treaty of 1850 into operation in the most important particulars, according to the construction placed upon that instrument by the cabinet of Washington.

These modes of settlement both involve the maintenance of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty in its essential principle, viz, the neutrality of the Central American region, the exclusion of the contracting parties from territorial acquisition in a country which, from its configuration and position, possesses a common and momentous interest to the maritime powers.

The conciliatory inclinations of Her Majesty's Government have, however, not stopped here. Prompted by an impression, derived from many sources, that the obligations of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty were repugnant to the people of the United States, and influenced, no doubt, by the declaration of the President in his late message to Congress, in which he intimates a desire for the amicable dissolution of that convention, the Earl of Clarendon authorized me to imform General Cass that Her Majesty's Government would not decline the consideration of a proposal for the abrogation of the treaty by mutual concert. An official character was not given to this communication, because the recent overtures of Her Majesty's Government are still under the consideration of the President, and because it seems most natural that the proposal for the repeal of the treaty should emanate from the party to which we are told it has been onerous and unacceptable.

I have, accordingly, on two occasions informed General Cass that if the Government of the United States be still of the same mind, and continue to desire the abrogation of the treaty of 1850, it would be agreeable to Her Majesty's Government that they should insert a proposal to that effect in their reply to my note respecting arbitration, and to that in which I explained the character and motives of the mission intrusted to Her Majesty's commissioner in Central America.

Some conversation ensued regarding the manner in which the dissolution of the treaty should be effected, and the condition by which it might be accompanied, and on these topics I have held the following language, premising that the views expressed were altogether spontaneous and personal, for I had no information of the intentions of Her Majesty's Government beyond the bare fact that they would entertain a proposal to cancel the engagements of 1850, emanating from the United States.

I stated that, in my opinion, the treaty in question could only be repealed by a new treaty in the usual forms, and that it might be desirable that such a treaty should not be restricted to a single article annulling its predecessor. Both for considerations of decency and policy, I advocated the insertion of stipulations involving an expression of a common policy in Central America, and the disavowal of any exclusive or monopolizing projects on either side. I said that I thought a treaty might be framed of three articles.

The first should declare the desire of the contracting parties to en

« ZurückWeiter »