Finally, there remains the question of the Bay Islands, as to which there is more of controversy, at least in appearance.

It is due to perfect frankness to say, that the act of her Majesty's government establishing so late as the year 1852, and in apparent contradiction to the express letter of the convention of 1850, a colony at the Bay Islands, has left a disagreeable impression on the minds of the government and the people of the United States.

Possessing, as Great Britain does, numerous colonial establishments in all parts of the world, many of them in the West Indies, it has not been readily seen what inducements of interest she can have had to establish a new colony under the peculiar circumstances of the time in the insignificant territory of the Bay Islands.

Nor, on looking back beyond the fact of her Majesty's warrant establishing the colony of the Bay Islands, and considering the state of things existing in that quarter at the date of the convention of 1850, does this government well see on what ground it can be maintained that Great Britain, at that time, had possession of the Bay Islands, which could be deemed rightful, either as respects her engagements with the United States, or the territorial sovereignty of the republic of Honduras.

I do not understand the Earl of Clarendon positively to assert, that the Bay Islands are dependencies of the British settlement at the Belize. He indicates, to be sure, an inclination on the part of the British government to maintain such a claim, but he concedes, at the same time, that it is a "debateable question."

The President does not permit himself for a moment to entertain the idea that the Earl of Clarendon will insist upon any claim of right in Central America, incompatible with the most sacred respect for all stipulations of treaty, as understood by her Majesty's government. Öf course he looks to see what are the rightful sources of British title to the Bay Islands suggested by the Earl of Clarendon. He finds them in the "statement" from the Foreign Office of May 2, 1854, as communicated to Mr. Buchanan, and by him transmitted to this department.

Her Majesty's government admits, in that paper, that Ruatan was claimed, and militarily occupied by the former republic of Central America, as successor to the rights of Spain; but asserts, at the same time, adverse British claim manifested by acts of authority, military and civil, and by actual possession.

Occasional acts of military authority by the captains of British ships-of-war, or of civil authority by the superintendent of the Belize, are insufficient, it is obvious, to determine a claim of title as against the counter claim of the republic of Central America or the State of Honduras. No relinquishment of title by the latter is alleged, except in certain declarations reported to have been made by the Central American commandant of Truxillo, who, whatever he may have said, could have no power to cede away the territory of Honduras.

The occupation of Ruatan by British subjects, as its origin and character are described in the "statement," presents none of the conditions of rightful possession. Its language on that point is: "Ruatan has been of late years, without any instigation on the part of her Majesty's government, spontaneously occupied by British subjects." It is not presumable that the spontaneous occupation of Ruatan by British subjects, without instigation on the part of her Majesty's government, that is, an act of mere invasion by unauthorized private persons, will be perseveringly insisted upon by the Earl of Clarendon as the foundation of claim by Great Britain to the sovereignty or even the rightful possession of the Bay Islands.

It cannot have escaped the attention of her Majesty's government that the political condition of the Belize, as fixed by treaties, is not itself one of territorial sovereignty, and therefore Great Britain never could have acquired in right of the Belize, and as assumed dependencies thereof, the territorial sovereignty of the Bay Islands.

In a word, this government believes that the Bay Islands belong to the State of Honduras, and that, therefore, the occupation of them, and still more their colonization by Great Britain, are contrary to the tenor of her treaty with the United States as being the occupation and colonization of a part of Central America.

But the British government thinks differently, and upon the question whether the Bay Islands are subject to occupation and colonization by Great Britain, notwithstanding her treaty with the United States, the two governments are at issue.

Upon this retrospect of the several points of difference between the two governments, the President is not able to perceive that any useful result would ensue to either, from calling on a third power to say whether the convention is or is not prospective in its operation, in the sense of that idea as expressed by her Majesty's government; for, if that question should by any possibility happen to be resolved in favor of Great Britain, all the substantial points of difference between the two countries would remain untouched, as being wholly independent of that question of construction. The dispute would still exist as to what rightful possessions, at the date of the convention, Great Britain actually had in Central America.

And if it is now contended by the British government that, in the name of the Mosquito Indians, Great Britain may take, with military force, and hold, San Juan de Nicaragua, or any other point in Central America, such a pretension would be so totally irreconcilable with all idea of the independence or neutrality of the isthmus, as to render the convention worse than nugatory to the United States. Instead of submitting to arbitration a pretension involving such consequences, or in any other way consenting to restore effect to the treaty with such possible construction, it would, in the judgment of the President, be his duty to propose its annulment, so as to release the United States from obligations not attended by any benefits, and which obligations, thus unattended, the United States did not intentionally incur, they having entered into the treaty only upon the supposition that absolute reciprocity of restriction was incurred by Great Britain.

I repeat, if the treaty could, by any possibility whatever, have the construction of leaving Great Britain in the possession or military control of the Atlantic coast of Central America, in the name of the Mosquito Indians, and with power to colonize insular positions commanding it, on the ground of their having been "spontaneously occupied by British subjects," while the United States are restrained from all such rights of control or acquisition, that, in the estimation of the President, would be to deprive the treaty of moral force, both because it would thus cease to have reciprocal effect, and because the United States did not intentionally enter into any such engagement; and if such were a possible construction of the letter of the treaty, it would be incumbent on the President to consider whether it would not then become the duty of the United States to seek for the most honorable means of being discharged from such obligations, and render themselves perfectly free to re-establish their proper relation as an American power to the transit routes of the American isthmus and the general independence of America.

In fine, the President cannot consent to any act which implies the existence of possible doubt on this point. The convention of 1850, construed in the sense above supposed, would not be the treaty into which the United States entered. Nor can he do anything which could be taken to admit, either directly or impliedly, that there is question in his mind relative to the true construction of that convention. And he feels bound to take care that, in entertaining the present proposition of arbitration, he shall not be understood as actuated by the slightest feeling of distrust regarding the treaty rights of the United States.

But the President is not prepared to say that some of the questions of facts concerning which the two governments differ, may not be conveniently determined by arbitration or by some analogous method.

Of this class of objects of inquiry is the question, what are the rightful limits of the establishment at the Belize on the side of the State of Honduras; the question whether the Bay Islands do or not belong to that republic; and the question what extent of country is embraced in the term Mosquito coast, or is in the actual occupancy of the Mosquito Indians, considered as Indians, and with such territorial rights only as that description of persons are entitled to claim, according to the established public law of Great Britain, of the United States, and of Spain, or of the independent states which have succeeded Spain in America; remembering that no power exists, on the part of Great Britain and the United States, to dispose of the sovereigu rights of Nicaragua, or any other State of Central America.

All these questions of political geography regard, in the first instance, the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the independent States of Central America. Great Britain and the United States have no pretension thus to intervene, except for the purpose of defining their own mutual obligations, arising out of the engagements they have contracted in order to assure, so far as they are concerned, the neutrality and the independence of the American isthmus. Regarded only as collateral considerations, affecting the construction of the treaty between the United States and Great Britain, they are questions which, if not determinable by agreement of the two governments themselves, the President would not decline to refer to arbitration.

He is aware of many practicable obstacles to the adjustment of any international difference of this nature by arbitration, of which difficulties both Great Britain and the United States had experience, in their attempt to settle, by such means, a previous controversy on the subject of the boundary between the United States and the British provinces in North America.

The President does not doubt that any one of the powers of Europe, which should consent to undertake the task of such an arbitration as is now proposed, would perform the duty with perfect impartiality; but to apply to any power to do this, would be to ask of it an act which, if granted by it, would add to its own domestic duties and labors the burden of settling complicated differences of other governments. He would greatly prefer that, in a controversy like the present, turning on points of political geography, the matter should be referred to some one or more of those eminent men of science who do honor to the intellect of Europe and America, and who, with previous consent of their respective governments, might well undertake the task of determining such a question, to the acceptance as well of her Majesty's government as of the United States.

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You are instructed, therefore, to enter into communication with her Majesty's principal secretary for foreign affairs, in relation to Central America, in order to ascertain, in the first place, whether existing differences cannot be promptly terminated by direct negotiation; and if they cannot, then to discuss the conditions of arbitration of those points of difference, as to which alone this method of settlement seems requisite or applicable; it being assumed that the other points. of difference would after that yield, as of course, to conference between the Earl of Clarendon and yourself, conducted in the spirit of cordiality and frankness, which belongs to your personal relations, and which is dictated by the true interests both of the United States and of Great Britain.

SIR: I proceed now to communicate to you the principles by which the President desires you to be guided, and the manner in which those principles are to be applied to the definite subjects of controversy in your negotiations with her Britannic Majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs, for the purpose, if possible, of disposing of the questions in regard to Central America.

We assume the convention of April 19, 1850, as the point of depar ture of all discussion and action. That convention having been duly concluded and ratified by the United States, is binding on their good faith, and, as a part of the supreme law of this country, will be respected and sacredly fulfilled by the President until it shall be annulled or modified by another treaty, or the United States shall be discharged from its mutual engagements by the non-performance of them on the part of Great Britain.

It is not necessary for the President to say that he would not enter into such a treaty, if that was a question open for his decision.

It suffices for him that the treaty exists. By the stipulations of that treaty, the United States relinquished great advantages which they had or might have, obtained by seperate negotiation with the republic of Central America. At that very time this government was in possession of a treaty, needing only to be ratified by it, the effect of which would have been to place the United States in the complete and separate control of the proposed canal and its route. Such advantages were important to us by reason of our peculiar relation, political and geographical, to the American continent. We relinquished them on the supposition and expectation that we received some imperfect equivalents in the treaty with Great Britain. These equivaTents are the present subjects of controversy with her, and it depends, in the judgment of the President, on what shall be determined concerning them, whether the convention is to continue to have moral authority. They are the considerations which give solidity to the stipulations and oblige the good faith of the United States.

The contracting parties declare, in a body of that convention, that they not only desired to accomplish a particular object, but to estab

lish a general principle. What was that object, and what that principle? On these points all possible doubt is precluded by the explicit language of various parts of the instrument.

"The particular object" of the two governments, as declared in the preamble, was to set forth and fix "their views and intentions with reference to any means of communication by ship canal, which may be constructed between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, by the way of the river San Jaun de Nicaragua, and either or both of the lakes of Nicaragua and Managua, to any port or place on the Pacific ocean." Those "views and intentions" as to the proposed "ship canal," thus definitely described as to place and direction, are expressed in the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th articles of the convention.

By the 1st article, the two governments declare that "neither will ever obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over the said ship canal;" and that they both renounce all "purpose of acquiring or holding, directly or indirectly, for the citizens or subjects of the one, any rights or advantages in regard to commerce or navigation through the said canal, which shall not be offered on the same terms to the citizens or subjects of the other."

These "views and intentions" in regard to the particular object of the ship canal are further defined in the 5th article, as being the assurance of "the neutrality thereof, so that the canal may be forever open and free. "

Finally, in the 6th article, they announce what is "the great design" of the convention, "namely, that of constructing and maintaining the said canal as a ship communication between the two oceans for the benefit of mankind, on equal terms to all, and of protecting the same.

Here, then, is "the particular object" of the convention announced distinctly three times; and it is the construction and protection of the proposed ship canal, for the common benefit of mankind, completely neutralized, and with full abnegation for themselves, at least, on both sides, of any separate advantage in or exclusive control over it.

For the accomplishment of this great object, special stipulations were necessary, so as to indicate more clearly the "views and intentions" of the contracting parties in that respect.

The fundamental stipulation is that of the 1st article, "agreeing that neither will ever erect or maintain any fortifications commanding the same or in the vicinity thereof, or occupy, or fortify, or colonize, or assume, or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast, or any part of Central America; nor will either make use of any protection which either affords or may afford, or any alliance which either has or may have, to or with any State or people, for the purpose of erecting or maintaining any such fortifications, or of occupying, fortifying, or colonizing Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast, or any part of Central America, or of assuming or exercising dominion over the same."

This engagement, it is obvious, constituted the essence of the whole arrangement. It would have been yielding to a delusive expectation, and laying the foundation of future difficulties to rely upon a stipu lation for the "neutrality" of a ship canal, as between the United States and Great Britain, if either of them was to be in the military occupation or to have political control, under whatever name or form, of the coast of Nicaragua, on either ocean, or of insular positions, capable in a military sense of commanding the waters adjacent to Nicaragua. The supposition of the neutrality of the canal in such circumstances would be just as absurd as to imagine that any mere