ion, without making any exception, the courts can ing been regular; nor is the purchaser required to
make none.
look behind the patent.
97
2. Where the warrant is recited in the deed, and
the quantity of land it calls for, and the grantor
grants, bargains, and sells the said land; held, that
the deed was a valid conveyance of grantor's inter-
est in the land at the time the deed was executed.
Idem.
97
3. The patent relates back to the location of the
warrant, and constitutes part of the title.
97
4. An intermediate bona fide alienee of the in-
cipient interest may claim that the patent inures
to his benefit by an ex post facto operation, and re-
ceive the same protection at law that a court of
equity could afford him.
Idem.
97
5. A patent for land must be interpreted as a
whole; its various provisions in connection with
each other, and the legal deductions drawn there-
from, must be conformable with the document.
Brown v. Hugar,
125
6. This construction and these deductions are
within the exclusive province of the court.
Idem.
125
7. Proof of the objects or subjects to which it is
applicable is proper.
125
8. In ascertaining the boundaries of surveys or
patents, the rule is, that wherever natural or per-
manent objects are embraced in the calls, these
have absolute control, and both course and dis-
tance must yield to their influence.
Idem.
9. Where a line is described as running to a river,
and thence up and down with the river, the line is
to follow the river according to its meanderings and
turnings, and in water-courses not navigable must
be ad medium filum aquæ.
13. The Act of March 3, 1803 conferred that pow-
er on the Secretary of the Treasury.
Idem.
158
14. The facts, that they were not sold nor offered
for sale and were claimed as school lands; that the
trustees for the township took possession of them;
the indorsement on the plat of the lots, of the
word "school"; that the township had no school
lands assigned to it, unless the lots referred to were
assigned; were proper to be submitted to the jury
from which they might have presumed that the lots
had been duly selected by the Secretary of the
Treasury for school lots.
Idem.
158
15. A holder of a New Madrid certificate had a
right to locate it on any public land authorized to
be sold.
Lea v. Polk Co. Copper Co.,
21. Where the legal title was vested by the grant,
and has thus stood a number of years, and impor-
tant rights have grown up under it, a court of equ-
ity will not interfere, on general principles of
justice.
Idem.
22. If the equity conferred by the entry was in
William Pinkney Lea, the complainant, and the pat-
ent issued in the name of William Park Lea, and
those who have purchased from the latter did so
innocently and ignorantly and paid for the prop-
erty and took legal conveyances for it from him,
with an honest belief that they were acquiring a
legal title from the true owner, then the complain-
ant cannot set up his equity behind the grant to
overthrow the purchase.
26. The question as to whom may be considered
as the "present proprietor" of these surrendered
warrants, must be decided by the Secretary of the
Interior in the first instance, by the rules, customs
and practice of the Land Office.
Idem.
27. Where the defendant, assignee or grantee of
the unsatisfied ten per cent. of a quantity of said
warrants, had paid a large and valuable considera-
tion without any notice of plaintiff's claim, had
made his proofs, and had the decisions of the Land
Office in his favor; held that he had obtained an ad-
vantage of which a court of equity would not de-
prive him.
Idem.
223
28. The Indiana State laws apportioning the
school fund do not violate the Acts of Congress
providing that the proceeds of the 16th section
shall be for the use of schools in the township.
256
Springfield Township v. Quick,
29. Where the plaintiff below derived his title
through a preemption claim, this entry was held to
be valid by the state courts of Arkansas, and a suf-
ficient legal title to sustain ejectment.
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32. The rule laid down by this court in the case of
Garland v. Wynn, "that where several parties set up
tribunal may deal, as between one party and the
conflicting claims to property, with which a special
government, regardless of the rights of others, the
latter may come into the courts, and litigate the
conflicting claims," followed.
33. Where each party has a good title, as against
the United States, in a contention between double
concessions, which balanced each other, proof
could be heard to determine the better rights be-
tween the contending parties.
34. Where one has been judicially declared not to
be entitled to land by the decree of the Supreme
Court, that, of itself,is an eviction under the law of
Louisiana.
405
35. In that State it is not necessary, to constitute
an eviction, that the purchaser of land should be
actually dispossessed.
Idem.
452
45. In cases coming up by appeal from the district
courts of Missouri and Florida, which adjudicated
Spanish claims under the Act of 1824, the petition to
the Governor for land, and his concession must be
taken as one act; the decree usually proceeded on
the petition, which described the land as respected
locality and quantity.
472
46. Where the grant refers to the previous steps
(including the petition, asking for only two
leagues), and carries them along with the grant, the
decree of the District Court, restricting the quan-
tity to two square leagues, must be affirmed.
Idem.
472
47. Under the Act of 1846, to aid in the improve-
ment of the Des Moines River "that portion from
its mouth to the Raccoon Fork" was the "said riv-
er," on which the strip of land granted was to lie.
Dubuque & P. R. R. Co. v. Litchfield, 500
48. Grants of this description are strictly con-
strued a ainst the grantees; nothing passes but
what is conveyed in explicit language.
49. The donation stands on the same footing of
a grant by the public to a private company, the
terms of which, if not expressed, cannot be im-
plied.
Idem.
500
50. The Act of Congress was a grant to Iowa of an
undivided moiety of the tract lying on each side of
the river from the Raccoon Fork to the Missouri
line. Idem.
500
51. No authority was conferred on the executive
officers administering the public lands to do more
than make partition between Iowa and the United
States, as prescribed by the Act.
500
52. It was impossible to make partition under the
grant, of lands lying outside of the boundaries.
Idem.
500
53. Where the case involved the title of M. as
contradictory to the title of O.; held, that the U. S.
officers are not bound to settle this dispute between
these parties, nor should either party be permitted
to carry on the litigation, by assuming to act for
the government.
560
54. Nor can this court be thus compelled, on an
appeal by the Attorney-General, to become the ar-
biters of a dispute in which the government has no
64. When that had been done, the claimant be-
came a confirmee under the Act, and his right to
the lot, as between himself and the U. S., was com-
plete.
Idem.
65. The law was intended to grant the lot settled
upon and improved, and no other land described as
an equivalent.
641
66. No location of the lots could be made after
the patent for them had been issued by the U. S.
Idem.
641
67. The inchoate right of the claimant under the
Act was subject to a survey and designation, before
it could be matured into a title.
641
68. Under the Act, a claimant was to have one
confirmation of “a lot so settled and improved."
which had been claimed and entered in the report
of the Register.
Idem.
641
69. No claimant, though he made several claims,
could, after having had one of them confirmed,
transfer any right of property in the others to any
persons whatever.
Idem.
641
70. No one could be confirmed in more than ten
acres of Peoria claims.
641
71. The decision of the Register and Receiver of
the Land Office, in favor of one of two claimants
of government land, is not conclusive of the con-
troversy.
75. The reserved sections of public lands along
the lines of all the railroads, wherever public lands
560 have been granted by Acts of Congress, after the
99. The failure to direct the precise manner of
the location of the land, is not a fatal error.
Idem.
332
100. Where the general description, and the call
for "two square leagues," found in the condition
of a grant, are inconsistent, the court must rely on
other title papers and proofs.
U. S. v. Pacheco,
336
101. A map, in connection with evidence of wit-
nesses explaining its contents, may be conclusive.
Idem.
336
102. Where claimant obtained an order of Gov-
ernor Micheltorena to search after and to take pos-
session of land, and selected a tract and occupied
and improved it and solicited a grant, and the
Governor referred the petition to the alcalde for
the usual informe; and this constitutes all the evi-
dence of title, and no grant was obtained; held,
that the claim should be rejected.
103. The Governor of California had no power,
in 1844, to grant gratuitously, for the purposes of
tillage, inhabitancy and pasturage, more than
eleven leagues of land to any one person, under
the law of 1824, although in different tracts.
457
462
114. It will not be presumed that the Governor of
California had dispensed with the customary re-
quirements for granting land, because there is, in
a paper said to be a grant, a declaration that they
had been observed, where the archives do not show
any record of such a grant.
376
115. The Act of 1824 and the Regulations of 1828
are limitations upon the power of the Governor to
make grants of land.
Idem.
376
116. Where the petition and the other require-
ments following it have not been registered with
the grant, a presumption arises against its genu-
ineness.
Idem.
376
117. Slight testimony should not be allowed to re-
move the presumption.
Idem.
376
118. When it appears that none of the prelimi-
nary steps for granting land in California have been
taken, this court will not confirm such a claim.
Idem.
376
119. Where there was no proof of a survey or
measurement of the land, or of any performance of
its conditions, it may be inferred that the grantee
had abandoned his claim.
128. Islands situated on the coast, were never
granted by the Governors of California, under the
Colonization Law of 1824, or the Regulations of 1828.
U. S. v. Castillero,
129. The power to grant the lands of the Islands
was neither c'aimed nor exercised by the author-
ities of the Department prior to the 20th day of
July, 1838.
498
130. Grants made by the Governor, under the
power conferred, without the concurrence of the
Departmental Assembly, were simply void.
ldem
498
131. A dispatch from the Supreme power of the
Nation, operated of itself to adjudicate the title to
the claimant, leaving no discretion to be exercised
by the authorities of the Department.
Idem.
498
132. Mexican title to Rosa, after a careful ex-
amination of the testimony, is pronounced false
and forged.
Luco v. U. S,
133. The testimony of the late officers of Cali-
fornia, cannot be received to supply or contradict
the public records, or establish a title of which
there is no trace to be found inthe public archives.
Idem.
545
134. In a Mexican claim, where the claim was not
presented to the Departmental Assembly, and no
evidence exists in the archives of any petition,
order, or the record of a grant; held, that claimant
was bound to prove that records did exist when the
copy he produces was given, before he could prove
their loss and their contents.
569
136. The primary object of the Act, "to ascertain
and settle the private land claims in the State of
California," approved 3d March, 1851, was to dis-
tinguish the vacant and public lands from those
that were private property.
137. For this purpose, an inquiry in to pre-ex-
isting titles became necessary. To accomplish this,
every person claiming lands in Californía from the
Spanish or Mexican Government, was required to
present the same to a Board of Commissioners.
138. The government has no interest in the con-
tests between persons claiming ex post facto the
grant; nor is it charged to decide between such
claimants.
139. The refusals of the Commissioners of the
Land Office to issue a patent upon this survey, was
an appropriate exercise of the functions of his
office.
Idem.
140. In a Mexican land case, where the only docu-
ment found among public records shows that the
petitioner asked for land; that the Governor did
not accede to the request, the claim was rejected.
Palmer v. U. S.,
609
141. Where the testimony to sustain a Mexican
claim is similar to that in the cases of U. S. v. Nye,
62 U. S., 408, and U. S. v. Rose, 64 U. S., 262, the
claim rejected.
146. But as the loss or destruction of public docu- | Statute of Limitations of Maryland prevents a re-
ments may, in some instances, have occurred upon covery.
proof of that fact, secondary evidence to a certain
extent will be received.
1. A bastard in esse, whether born or unborn, is
3. Where the common ancestor, and the defend-
ant's claiming under them, have been in the exclu-
sive possession of premises sixty two years before
the suit, and no right has been set up by the plaint-
iffs or by those under whom they claim, until the
filing of this bill; held, that the case is one in which
courts of equity follow the courts of law, in apply-
ing the Statute of Limitations.
4. There are two Acts of Limitation in the State
of Michigan, either of which bars the claim of the
plaintiffs: 1. The Act of May 15, 1820, which limits
the right of action to twenty years; and 2. The Act
of November 15, 1829, which limits it to ten years.
Idem.
5. When the plaintiffs seek to avoid the limita-
tion, by the concealment and fraud of the defend-
ants, and those under whom they claim, the par-
ticular acts of fraud or concealment should be set
forth, as well as the time when discovered.
Idem.
competent to be a devisee or legatee of real or per-stated, and the time when intention to defraud was
sonal estate.
Gaines v. Hennen,
770
2. In Louisiana though a child may be adulterine
in fact, it may be legitimate for all the purposes of
in eriting from its parents, if one or either of them
intermarried in good faith.
3. On such a question good faith is first to be pre-
sumed, and as to what constitutes good faith, it is
adjudged in that State that to marry a second time,
supposing the previous marriage invalid, is one of
the cases of good faith.
4. The testamentary recognition of a child as le-
gitimate is of the highest legal authority. All pre-
sumptions are to be taken in favor of such a decla-
ration.
484
6. When no acts of fraud or concealment are
discovered was fifty years after the exclusive pos-
session of the defendants and those under whom
they claim had commenced; held, that the Statute
of Limitations applies.
619
9. Defense held complete under that statute of
three years' limitation.
Idem.
619
10. Where there was not five years from the date
of the deed to defendant to the commencement of
the suit: held, that the pleas of the Texas Statute
of Limitations were not proved.
11. The Act of Limitations of Wisconsin provides
that "bills for relief in case of the existence of a
and in all other cases not herein provided for, shall
trust not cognizable by the courts of common law,
shall accrue, and not after that time."
be filed within ten years after the cause thereof
Cleveland Ins. Co. v. Reed,
12. Where a bill prays that the equity of redemp-
tion be foreclosed, or that an undivided interest in
the quarter section alleged to be covered by a mort-
gage, be sold, and the proceeds appropriated to-
wards paying the debts sccured, as neither of these
modes of release are cognizable at law, and the only
3. So far as a corporate body authorized the pub-remedy is in equity, it is barred by the limitation
lication of the libel, it is responsible in damages. named in the Act.
Idem.
15. The Tennessee Act of Limitation was intended
to protect and confirm void deeds purporting to
convey an estate in fee simple, where seven years'
adverse possession had been held under them.
Lea v. Polk Co. Copper Co.,
203
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
1. To support an action for malicious criminal
prosecution the plaintiff must prove, in the first
place, the fact of prosecution, and that the defend-
ant was himself the prosecutor, or that he insti-
gated the prosecution, and that it finally terminat-
ed in his acquittal.
765
2. He must also prove that the charge preferred
against him was unfounded, and that it was made
without reasonable or probable cause, and that the
defendant in making or instigating it was actuated
by malice.
3. Malice alone is not sufficient to sustain the
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